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ABSTRACT 
 
Large free high technology (FHT) companies such as search engines can bring immense 
benefit to consumers. Only the largest FHT company is likely to be able to maximize 
innovation. Beyond this, any further innovation can only be brought by completely new and 
disruptive technologies that replace the product of the incumbent.  
 
However, whilst consumer welfare is purportedly the main objective of EU competition law, 
it presumes that more competition creates increased consumer benefit. This thesis explores 
this conflict by analysing how it manifests in a limited and uncertain approach on the part of 
the EU Commission. It then proposes a test that resolves the problems of the approach.  
 
First, the thesis explores the tension between FHT economics and the presumptions of 
competition law.  
 
Next, it evaluates the EU Commission’s approach to analysing FHT markets against literature 
and its conflicting approach in other technology cases. We conclude that the EU 
Commission’s proclamation that FHT markets are competitive is based on a limited approach 
that does not give due consideration to factors such as network effects. 
 
Subsequently, based on the above evaluation, the thesis hypothesizes that the EU 
Commission’s true belief is that dominant FHT companies are good for consumers even with 
reduced competition. However, the EU Commission can justify dominant company 
4 
 
expansion only by showing that there is enough competition in the market; this is required by 
the analytical framework of competition law investigations. The EU Commission therefore 
ends up stating rationale based on limited reasoning.  
 
Finally, a test based on Magill and innovation markets, which focuses analysis on competing 
innovation projects in the market instead of the current relevant market, is proposed. This 
way the EU Commission bypasses arguments regarding network effects and simply focuses 
on making sure that there is a sufficient level of competition in the innovation market which 
ensures future innovation.   
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CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION 
The EU Commission has now investigated a number of free high technology cases involving 
search engines and social networks. However, the developing body of Commission decisions 
seemingly reflects an inconsistency in methods of justification and principles. A stand out 
example is where two high technology companies both with massive market shares and likely 
massive market power are approached in very different ways. We see this stark difference 
especially in the way the EU Commission dealt with the Microsoft1 tying decisions where it 
declared that there was a significant reduction in competition which needed to be remedied; 
whilst in some of the latest technology cases such as Facebook/Whatsapp,2 the EU 
Commission was not concerned with the level of competition in the market post-merger. All 
these companies are the largest players3 in their respective markets and hence, the difference 
in treatment is not clearly explicable at first. These cases will be expanded on and will 
heavily feature in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
In summary, this thesis evaluates the analysis of the EU Commission in investigations 
concerning free high technologies, explores the inconsistencies in analyses, hypothesizes 
about the reason behind the inconsistencies and particular type of analyses, and proposes a 
new appropriate competition law test suited to such investigations. The evaluation of analysis 
                                                          
1 Microsoft (Case COMP/C-3/37.792)[2004] at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/37792/37792_4177_1.pdf accessed on 4th February 
2015 
2 Facebook/Whatsapp (Case No COMP/M.7217) [2014] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf accessed 
on 23rd July 2017 
3 Also note other free high technology companies like Google which will especially be discussed in Chapter 4. 
Google has at least 90% market share in Europe. In some of the biggest European economies such as Spain and 
France, it appears to be 95%. See Matt Rosoff ‘Here's exactly how dominant Google is in Europe in search, 
smartphones, and browsers’ (Business Insider UK, 20 April 2016) <http://uk.businessinsider.com/google-
europe-market-share-search-smartphones-browsers-2016-4> accessed on 26th May 2017   
12 
 
and discovery of inconsistencies displays the problem of both limited and inconsistent 
reasoning by the EU Commission.  
 
1.1 Clarifying what we mean by free high technology 
 
These are technology services/products delivered via the internet that have no monetary cost 
to the user of the technology. They are ‘zero-price services’4 and most are funded by 
advertising revenue. Prime examples are general search engines, social networks and many 
communication applications on phones and other devices. These are very advanced electronic 
technology services that are subject to regular innovations and are therefore ‘high’ 
technologies. Whilst it is common knowledge that search engines and social networks rely 
heavily on advertising revenue, zero-price communication applications do not always have 
the same source of funding. 5 
 
Of course, it is acknowledged that there is growing literature6 to state that such technologies 
are labelled free (due to the lack of monetary cost), but in reality they are not as consumers 
pay for the services in the form of data. Such technologies gather a large amount of 
information, a lot of which is personal to the user; only in exchange for this information are 
                                                          
4 G Colangelo & M Maggiolino ‘Data Protection in Attention Markets: Protecting Privacy through 
Competition?’ (2017) 8(6) JECL&Pract 363 
5 See for example Zaw Thiha Tun ‘How viber makes money’(Investopedia, 12 June 2015) available at 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/061215/how-viber-makes-money.asp accessed on 27th July 
2017- Viber does not make any money off advertising. Although it may have some revenue from selling 
‘emoticons’ for example, it does not make money from advertising to its users.  
6 See for example, Stucke M & A Grunes Big Data and Competition Policy (OUP Oxford 2016). Further 
literature will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
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the users able to use the services.7 The issue of data as a potential currency and cost will be 
discussed within the context of this thesis especially in Chapter 2.8 However, purely for 
definitional purposes we will still refer to these technologies as ‘free high technologies’.  
 
Going back to ascertaining the definition of free high technologies, there is no monetary cost 
for the ultimate benefit the user seeks to derive from the technology. This is to distinguish, 
for instance, services such as online shopping sites from search engines being used simply to 
find information. On online shopping sites the user is ultimately there to look for a good on 
the site to purchase for a monetary price. This can be compared to, for example, a shopper 
walking into a supermarket for free and then comparing prices and quality for free, but 
ultimately with the intention of purchasing something. Hence, a site like Amazon would not 
be considered a free high technology for the purposes of this thesis.  
 
It must be acknowledged however, that there could be a considerable portion of consumers 
who use sites like price comparison websites to carry out research but then directly purchase 
from the producer rather than via the comparison website. 9 It could be argued that it is also a 
free high technology given that there is a significant portion of consumers using it as a free 
research tool. However, the problem with that logic is that it can be stretched to cover typical 
brick and mortar businesses that retail offline. For example, a shopper may walk into one 
store, look at a price and then go into the next store to do a comparison. Do we then consider 
that the open display of prices in each store is a free service with its own relevant market? It 
                                                          
7 See for example, Peter Hustinx ‘Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor; Privacy and 
competitiveness in the age of big data: the interplay between data protection, competition law and consumer 
protection in the Digital Economy’(March 2014) page 6 available at 
https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/14-03-26_competitition_law_big_data_en.pdf accessed on 27th 
July 2017 
 
8 See section 2.2.5 
9 UK Regulators Network ‘Price Comparison Websites’(Final Report , 27th September 2016) page 16 
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may be, but that is not the main purpose of displaying the price. It is to hopefully attract the 
shopper and make a sale. Sites such as search engines and social networks operate differently. 
Therefore price comparison websites are not considered as free high technologies. 
 
A user may visit a social networking site and seek to view social photos and videos of his/her 
connections for free. The user does not expect to pay for that benefit. Both the service and the 
ultimate benefit derived/expected are free of charge. Hence, a social network is a free high 
technology.  
 
Finally, all free high technology services discussed in this thesis are known as two-sided 
markets.10 This means that they deal with at least two groups of different customers and aid 
transactions between the two groups. A simple example would be a search engine that links 
searchers more effectively with online content publishers. The literature on two-sided 
markets will be thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2. 11 
 
1.2 Justifying and addressing our hypothesis 
The formulation of our hypothesis entails two fundamental elements.  
First, is an understanding of the foundations of competition law within the specific context of 
free high technologies. This in turn can be broken down into three further sub-elements all of 
which are explored in Chapter 2 in the following order; 
a) The economics of free high technology (see section 2.2 especially)- we conclude here 
that increasingly large dominant companies are likely to be good for consumer 
                                                          
10 See for example L Filistrucchi, D Geradin, E van Damme & P Affeld ‘Market Definition in two-sided 
markets: theory and practice’ (2014) 10(2) JCL & E 293 
11 See section 2.2 
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welfare for several reasons including a greater ability to match users with what they 
need and the motivation to attract a large number of users who are not financially tied 
to any dominant company’s service as they do not pay. 
b) The objective(s) and assumption(s) of EU Competition law- we found from relevant 
doctrine that, whilst competition was a very important objective, consumer welfare is 
to take priority. We also found that   there was a well-established assumption that 
more competition means higher consumer welfare.  
c) The objective to be pursued in free high technology cases-- we concluded that 
consumer welfare is to be pursued as the main objective .  
 
Second, is an analysis of the inconsistencies and limitations in the EU Commission’s 
approach to the relevant market and market power in free high technology investigations. 
This takes place in Chapters 3 and 4. We observe that there are clear limitations and 
inconsistencies in one of the main two free high technology cases (Facebook/Whatsapp) in 
terms of the ways the market is defined in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 we not only observe 
limitations in the approach to two main aspects of market power in free high technologies 
(network effects and market share) but also clear inconsistencies in the approach to those 
factors in comparison to other cases, especially with reference to the Microsoft 
interoperability case. For example, in free high technology cases network effects are not 
considered strong and market share is considered temporary when there is evidence to the 
contrary.12  
                                                          
12 See paraphrased Comment by Andreas Mundt, President of German Bundeskartellamt, at Conference entitled 
‘Online Markets and Offline Welfare Effects- The Internet, Competition, Society and Democracy’ (22 May 
2017, Pembroke College, Oxford)- the last time a large online dominant platform was taken over by a smaller 
one was in 2004 when Facebook took over from MySpace. It appears since then, high market shares for most 
large platforms have remained stable.   
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These inconsistencies mean that there is a problem of legal uncertainty13 that can lead to 
negative consequences such as companies not knowing whether a particular business practice 
is illegal and an under-deterrence of socially detrimental actions. 14 For example,  we will 
observe that the EU Commission has allowed large free high technology companies with 
massive market share to increase their market share even further and increase the likelihood 
of reducing competition in the market.15 However, this is anomalistic as European Union 
(EU) competition law is there to protect society from the effects of abuses of market power 
and significant reductions in effective competition.16 Conventionally, it is known to be highly 
attuned to and suspicious of any potential increases in a company’s market power. It is 
therefore quite a surprise that recently the EU Commission has been arguably lenient towards 
a number of high technology mergers between dominant companies and dominant high 
technology companies’ unilateral actions that increase their market shares significantly.17 In 
terms of the problem of under-deterrence, it could mean that companies across all industries 
wrongly construe this as a sign that they can engage in otherwise anti-competitive conduct 
and can get away with it.18  
                                                          
13 A definition of legal uncertainty is as follows: ‘the situation that obtains when the rule that is relevant to a 
given act or transaction is said by informed attorneys to have an expected official outcome at or near the 0.5 
level of predictability.’(Anthony D’Amato ‘Legal Uncertainty’(1983) 71 Cal. L. Rev. 1) 
14 Matthias Lang ‘Legal Uncertainty – an Effective Deterrent in Competition Law’ (February 2012) available at 
file:///C:/Users/Adnan/Downloads/paper-lang-2012.pdf accessed on 18 November 2017 
15 We will see this in cases such as Facebook/Whatsapp and Microsoft Skype. See Facebook/Whatsapp (Case 
No COMP/M.7217) [2014] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf accessed 
on 23rd July 2017 
&  Microsoft/ Skype (Case No COMP/M.6281) [2011] at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6281_924_2.pdf accessed on 5th February 2015 
16 European Commission ‘Competition: making markets work better’ available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/general/overview_en.html accessed on 10th September 2017 
17 See for example M Bergman, M. Jakobsson & C. Razo ‘An Econometric Analysis of the European 
Commission’s Merger Decisions’ (2003) 23(9-10) INT J IND ORGAN 717-738; the authors conclude from an 
evaluation of 96 cases that the likelihood a merger is blocked grows as market share grows.  
18 For more about deterrence see P Buccirossi, L Ciari, T Duso, G Spagnolo & C Vital ‘Deterrence in 
competition law’(Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Discussion paper No. 258, October 
2009)available at http://www.sfbtr15.de/uploads/media/285.pdf accessed on 10th September 2017  
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Once we highlight the inconsistencies and limited approach, we consider them in conjunction 
with the information in Chapter 2; the economics of free high technologies and the 
assumption and objective of EU Competition law. We come up with the following 
hypothesis: 
The EU Commission is, in actuality, of the opinion that a free high technology 
company having increased market power can be good for consumer welfare. Given 
that consumer welfare is the main objective of competition policy, the EU 
Commission is inclined to allow such consumer-welfare enhancing free high 
technology companies to continue with unilateral actions and mergers that would 
otherwise be anti-competitive. However, given the current analytical framework of 
competition law investigations, in order to allow these companies to engage in these 
practices, the EU Commission needs to show that there is no and will not be reduced 
competition in the market. The EU Commission shows this, but in doing so, it puts 
forward limited and inconsistent substantive arguments causing legal uncertainty. It 
presents the market to be very competitive when in reality it is unlikely to be. 
 
In Chapter 5, we finally propose a test that remedies the legal uncertainty caused by the EU 
Commission’s approach, which is highly likely to be simultaneously congruent with its actual 
opinion on free high technologies and consumer welfare. The test is formulated by combining 
the concept of ‘innovation market’ with the Magill test. It is a test specifically assigned for 
free high technology investigations and probes the level of competition in the innovation 
market as opposed to the current product market. This, as will be seen in Chapter 5, will 
allow the EU Commission to avoid addressing network effects and market share, which are 
mainly relevant to the current product market; thereby the EU Commission would no longer 
18 
 
have to present limited and inconsistent arguments on these issues. At the same time, the test 
allows a higher chance for large dominant free high technology companies to pass the test; 
this is because such innovation markets tend to be highly competitive due to low capital 
requirements and barriers to entry.  
 
However, the current product market is also considered, but the test is satisfied so long as 
there is, in effect, at least one other competitor in the market. However, to satisfy the 
innovation market aspect of the test, there must be less than a significant reduction in 
competition. Therefore, the test remains in essence, a traditional competition law test in that 
the level of competition in the market plays a central role.  
 
1.3 Background and gaps in the literature  
We are now in an era of the new economy where digital platforms play a very important role 
in our lives. We search for necessary information on various internet platforms, share photos 
and videos with friends and at times with public audiences on social networks, purchase 
goods from massive online retailers and can use phone applications to order services. The list 
can go on. Prices for a lot of these valuable services are low and in some cases non-existent. 
Instead, consumers are more concerned with and desire better technological progress and 
more innovative products/services, which is something that these new economy companies 
have delivered. High technology companies such as Alphabet (owner of Google), Facebook, 
Amazon, Microsoft and Apple are amongst the top ten most valuable companies in the 
Fortune 500. 19 At the least, this is some indication that these companies hold significant 
                                                          
19 Stephen Gandel ‘These are the 10 most valuable companies in the Fortune 500’ (Fortune Finance 4 February 
2016) available at < http://fortune.com/2016/02/04/most-valuable-companies-fortune-500-apple/> accessed on 
6th August 2017 
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market power in their respective main relevant markets whilst delivering high quality 
products and services for very low prices. 
 
Although high concentration is not on its own illegal, it is definitely a concern for 
competition authorities like the EU Commission that prompts further investigation.20 The EU 
Commission has paradoxically allowed some mergers (without imposing further conditions) 
and unilateral actions that have the strong potential to give free high technology companies 
even more market power. We will expand on this in Chapters 3 and 4 especially in the 
context of Facebook/Whatsapp21 and Microsoft/Skype. 22 Of course, some of the literature23 
has disagreed with this approach of the EU Commission and one of the ways it has done this 
is by expressing its views on network effects24 (which as we will observe are one of the main 
characteristics of free high technology platforms)  as a factor that consolidates market power.  
 
The literature that criticizes any increase in the size of high technologies emphasizes that 
network effects can prevent competitors from entering the market successfully.25  Take a 
social network with a great number of users as an example. If an individual were to decide to 
                                                          
20 G Williams, A Lindsay & E Lecchi ‘Power and Reach in European Antitrust Cases’ (2003) 12 ECLR 673- 
market share is an important determinant of EU Competition Commission cases 
21 Facebook/Whatsapp (Case No COMP/M.7217) [2014] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf accessed 
on 23rd July 2017 
22 Microsoft/ Skype (Case No COMP/M.6281) [2011] at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6281_924_2.pdf accessed on 5th February 2015 
23 See for example Melamed A & A. Douglas ‘Network Industries and Antitrust’ (1999) 23(1) Harv JL & Pub 
Pol’y 147. More literature will be discussed in Chapter 3.  
24 These are effects that are a result of a service becoming more valuable to a user the more users utilize it.  
25 See Maurice E Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi ‘When Competition fails to optimize quality: A look at search engines’ 
 (2016) 18 Yale JL Tech 70, Pamela Jones Harbour & Tara Isa Koslov ‘Section 2 in a Web 2.0 World: 
An Expanded Vision of Relevant Product Markets’ (2010) 76 Antitrust L.J. 769, 784, C Argenton, & J Prufer 
‘Search Engine Competition with Network Externalities’ (2012) 8(1) JECL & Pract 73, S Wismer, C Bongard 
& A Rasek  ‘Multi-Sided Market Economics in Competition Law Enforcement’ (2017) 8(4) JECL & Pract 257 
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consider leaving a network, the fact that most of his/her friends and acquaintances are on the 
network would prevent him/her from leaving.26  A search engine may benefit from network 
effects in a different manner. If a large search engine has many people using it, it becomes 
more valuable; it has more data from consumers to detect the range of information that both 
specific individuals and most people in general are looking for .27 It is therefore able to 
provide better search results than competing search engines which do not have the same 
amount of data. 28 These factors enable free high technology digital platforms to raise barriers 
and prevent entry from competitors and therefore any merger or unilateral action is likely to 
reduce competition. In this sense the literature can be seen as critical of the EU Commission’s 
decisions in allowing free high technology mergers and unilateral actions without sufficient 
consideration of network effects in its analyses.  
 
Recently the literature however has turned to an even more specific characteristic of free high 
technology companies; that is the debate surrounding big data.29 It is looked at from two 
different angles. One view is that it is considered as a precious resource that allows large free 
high technology companies to have a competitive advantage over smaller competitors. That 
data can provide the ability to provide a better quality and customised service.30 In that sense 
again, the big data literature  would likely disagree with the EU Commission’s relaxed 
attitude towards free high technology companies in terms of its analysis of network effects.31 
                                                          
26 Ibid See Stucke & Ezrachi 
27 Ibid 
28 Ibid 
29For examples see N Schepp & A Wambach ‘On Big Data and Its Relevance for Market Power Assessment’ 
(2016) 7(2) JECL & Pract 120, D Sokol & R Comerford ‘Antitrust and Regulating Big Data’ (2016) 23 Geo 
Mason L Rev 1129, Tim Cowen ‘Big Data as a competition issue: Should the EU Commission’s approach be 
more careful?’(2016) ENLR 14 
30 See for example sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3  
31 The more people use a service, the more data collected which in turn allows the incumbent to provide a better 
service. In this sense big data leads to network effects.   
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The other view is that the collection of large amounts of data also poses privacy risks for 
consumers. When free high technology companies take unilateral actions or merge, they end 
up collecting more personal information on users and adversely affecting our sense of 
security regarding our private information.32 We will see that whilst the privacy issue is an 
important one, it is quite unclear as to how it is a competition law issue within the specific 
context of free high technologies. Equally important is the fact that the actual negative effect 
on consumers from collecting large amounts of data on them is not well defined and 
explained. 33  
 
Hence, we see that the literature34 has focused on network effects and big data issues in a way 
that could be seen as critical of the analysis of the EU Commission. This thesis does 
something similar. It does engage in a critical evaluation of the EU Commission’s substantive 
analysis as well, but takes a few steps further. It considers a wide range of high technology 
cases including free high technology ones, compares them, discovers inconsistencies and puts 
forward a justified hypothesis on the EU Commission’s actual agenda and intentions behind 
its limited approach. There is a gap in the literature about what can be read between the lines 
in the EU Commission’s analyses. As will be explained, inferring from the limitations and 
inconsistencies in analysis, the EU Commission in actuality believes that free high 
technologies are good for consumers but carries out a limited analysis to justify mergers and 
unilateral actions that would reduce competition in the market.  
                                                          
32 See section 2.2.5 
33 Nir Kshetri ‘Big data's impact on privacy, security and consumer welfare’ (2014) 38 Telecommunications 
Policy 1134 
34 See for example, Zhang S ‘How have network effects affected the European Commission's enforcement of 
competition law in technology enabled markets?’ (2015) 36(2) ECLR 82 
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This is an important inference and can have broader implications. One of the main 
implications is our understanding of the objectives of competition law. There has been an 
ongoing debate about whether consumer welfare is in fact the main objective of competition 
law. This thesis’ hypothesis reveals that the EU Commission is, in essence, willing to allow a 
reduction in competition as long as consumers are provided with high quality and low prices 
by the incumbent. Hence, the free high technology investigations appear to confirm that 
consumer welfare is in fact the main objective of competition policy in the EU. 
 
Another implication is for future research. For those in the field who are anxious about free 
high technology companies becoming larger due to the EU Commission’s limited focus on 
network effects and big data, the findings of this thesis will help redirect future research 
aimed at limiting the power of big data monopolies in the correct way. This thesis shows that 
the EU Commission is not in reality concerned with factors such as big data and network 
effects that are likely to reduce competition in the market. Hence, the current literature on 
network effects and big data as a factor providing a competitive advantage is unlikely to 
persuade the EU Commission to change its analysis. The EU Commission is instead a 
proponent of the notion that free high technologies are good for consumers because they are 
innovative,35 but mainly because they are free. Hence, research must fundamentally be 
redirected towards questioning whether these technologies from large companies are in fact 
free. As discussed in terms of privacy issues and as we will see in Chapter 2, there is 
definitely literature that states that these services are not in reality free and do have a cost.  
                                                          
35 Of course there are various other industries which are very innovative as well. But the zero-price of free high 
technologies is indubitably an additional contributor towards consumer welfare.  
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However, whilst the theory of invasion of privacy as a cost is clearly explained, there is very 
little solid evidence to support these claims in a competition law context. When a user of a 
search engine or social network gives up personal information in exchange for information, 
exactly how does he or she lose out? Yes, there is a fear of personal information getting into 
the wrong hands, but there are data protection laws that ensure companies keep the 
information confidential. How is it a competition law issue? If privacy is such a cost, why do 
users continue to give up their personal information? 36 Future research therefore needs to 
focus on answering these questions and explaining exactly how consumers are harmed when 
more information on them is collected by a single large entity. That would be one of the few 
effective ways in which to convince the EU Commission to change its analysis.  
 
The final part of the thesis formulates a test suited to free high technologies. The literature37 
has attempted to suggest a more direct test or framework for competition cases where there is 
doubt whether competition can occasion consumer welfare. There have been suggestions to 
assess harm to consumers directly with more solid evidence and without making assumptions 
on market structure. Some have suggested scrapping market definition exercises all together 
and simply focus on elasticity of demand.38 These suggestions have especially come through 
given the new economic approach of the EU Commission. However, there has been no 
significant change in the way the EU Commission analyses cases.  
                                                          
36 For example, DuckDuckGo is popularly known to be a search engine that does not collect any data. However, 
Google search retains the lead in search queries by miles. 
37 See for example, Keith Waehrer ‘Online Services and the Analysis of Competitive Merger effects in Privacy 
Protections and Other Quality Dimensions’ Draft, 12 January 2016 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.726.2142&rep=rep1&type=pdf accessed on 27 March 
2017 
38 See Louis Kaplow ‘Market Definition: Impossible and Counterproductive’ (2013) 79 Antitrust LJ 361 
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The framework for analysis remains the same in the sense that the market must be defined 
and the level of competition in the market must be considered. Whilst in the specific case of 
free high technologies there have been suggestions on adjusted methods of analysis (Inge 
Graef and former Commissioner Harbour of the FTC who suggested to see data as the new 
market), 39 there is no suggestion as to how to formulate a test that incorporates the notion 
that dominant free high technology companies with increasing market share are likely to be 
good for consumers while at the same time remaining in essence a competition law test. What 
is meant by this is that the test still largely possesses an element of analysing competition and 
therefore remains a competition law test in character. The test put forward in this thesis does 
exactly this.  
 
As we will see in Chapter 5, based on the idea of innovation markets and the Magill 
consumer harm test, we can formulate a test that, simply by shifting the main market for 
analysis from the current product market to the innovation market, genuinely shows that free 
high technology markets are under competitive pressure when it comes to innovation. This, 
however, does not change the fact that they are dominant in current service/product markets. 
By considering the innovation market only in the special case of free high technologies, the 
EU Commission can convincingly show a competitive market without having to re-adjust its 
arguments to show a competitive one in the current market. At the same time the test also 
                                                          
39 Graef I EU Competition Law, Data Protection and Online Platforms: Data as Essential Facility (Wolters 
Kluwer 2016), Harbour P & T Isa Koslov ‘Section 2 in a Web 2.0 World : An expanded vision of relevant 
product markets’ [2010] 76 Antitrust LJ 769 
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makes it conditional on ensuring that competition is not completely eliminated in the current 
product market.  
 
The existence of such a test is good for legal certainty as it clarifies to those in the industry 
that it is only when it comes to free services and products that the competition authorities will 
be more lenient and consider the more likely wider market for innovation.  
     
1.4 Methodology 
The core research methodology applied in this thesis is doctrinal in that our core approach 
involves understanding various guiding legal objectives and principles, case law and EU 
Commission investigations; all this doctrine is then analysed holistically and evaluated in 
terms of consistency and possible limitations in application of principles and legal tests on the 
part of the EU Commission.  Within this doctrinal research framework, positivist, descriptive, 
normative and critical methodologies are required and used depending on which aspect of the 
thesis is being considered. For example, in evaluating the EU Commission’s approach in 
Chapter 4, the authority’s rationale is benchmarked against both legal and economic 
literature. In this sense there is a critical methodological element. 
 
It should be noted at this point however, that although the doctrinal approach is our core 
overarching methodology in that it is prevalent throughout, there is one instance where a 
guiding principle is criticised under an interdisciplinary approach. In Chapter 2 we use 
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economic literature40 specifically on two-sided markets to critically evaluate a guiding 
principle in competition law that presumes competition is the instrument through which to 
achieve consumer welfare. We will discuss this further below when summarising our 
methodologies chapter by chapter.  
 
The core legal doctrinal approach has been chosen as most appropriate. This is because the 
overarching fundamental law is not criticised from, for example a socio-economic 
perspective. In Chapter 2, through a descriptive and positivist discussion of the doctrine on 
the objectives of competition law, one of our findings is that consumer welfare is more than 
likely the main objective of competition law. This is accepted for the purposes of the rest of 
the thesis; our hypothesis in Chapter 4 is predicated on consumer welfare being the main 
objective from the perspective of the EU Commission and our proposed test is designed to 
ensure consumer welfare is maximised. Whether consumer welfare should be the objective, 
from for instance a macroeconomic perspective, is an issue outside the remit of the thesis.  
 
Furthermore, in evaluating the Commission’s approach in Chapter 4, use is made of 
economic and statistical literature on network effects for the purposes of critique. However, 
this does not require interdisciplinary research. The analysis of this literature still must be 
considered using a doctrinal approach as the law requires the EU Commission to carry out an 
evaluation of economic and statistical arguments on network effects. It therefore forms part 
of the legal assessment.   
 
                                                          
40 See section 2.2 
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Finally, the network effects arguments that we argue should have been given due attention by 
the Commission in particular cases, are arguments that have been used by the Commission on 
other occasions; therefore what we fundamentally end up looking at is the consistency with 
which the Commission is applying its arguments across similar cases. That strongly indicates 
the requirement of a doctrinal approach to research.   
 
With the exception of the use of some critical interdisciplinary research mentioned above 
with regards to Chapter 2,  other methodologies such as a core socio-legal approach is 
considered incongruent with the aims of the thesis. Such approaches may, one can argue, be 
more suited to other areas of controversy in this area of law. For example, as will be seen in 
Chapter 2, there is a body of literature41 highly concerned with the privacy implications of 
mergers between free high technology companies. This thesis argues that this is an issue 
unlikely to be resolved by competition law; rather, other areas of law such as data protection 
may help. If a researcher were to attempt to find a way to get competition law to resolve 
privacy issues, he/she would have to look into changing the fundamental principles. For 
instance, it may be necessary for competition law to espouse a principle that reduction of 
competition should be achieved without regard to the effect on consumer welfare. In that 
way, any merger can be prevented where there is a significant reduction in competition and 
no one company can possess a huge amount of data. However, such research behind a 
revolutionising principle would mean that the researcher would have to use critical research 
to challenge the fundamental principle and overarching legal framework itself. As indicated, 
this is not the aim of the thesis.  
                                                          
41 See section 2.2.5 
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Below, we look at how the core methodology is applicable to different chapters of the thesis.  
 
Chapter 2  looks at the relationship between competition and consumer welfare in the very 
specific context of free high technology in a critical manner using economic literature. This is 
the interdisciplinary research part of the thesis where we question the particular presumption 
in competition law that competition leads to consumer welfare. We then move on to a 
positivist  and descriptive discussion of the current doctrine surrounding the objectives of 
competition law to conclude on how the objectives of competition law are currently 
considered in comparison to each other. Finally, having understood the status of the 
objectives of competition law, we engage in a normative discussion on what objective of 
competition law should be  followed in the particular case of free high technology.  
 
In Chapter 3 we begin with a descriptive discussion of the analytical framework used in 
competition investigations of free high technology cases by the Commission to then critically 
bring into light how it is incompatible with the economics of free high technology we 
considered in Chapter 2. We also critically analyse the way the Commission carries out its 
market definition to find certain limitations in its approach which contribute to our 
understanding of our hypothesis in Chapter 4.  
 
In Chapter 4 we utilise a critical approach. We analyse discrepancies between different high 
technology cases and within the same cases in terms of approach that we conclude are 
unjustified. We then consider these discrepancies in a greater context widening it to our 
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knowledge about the economics of free high technologies from Chapter 2 to formulate our 
hypothesis on why the Commission applies an inconsistent approach. In doing so we 
reorganise the EU Commission investigations into distinct categories that are treated 
differently and expose potentially unstated beliefs of the Commission through a process of 
inductive deduction; deducing from the fact that the Commission clearly treats the free high 
technology category differently and in a particular way because of the fact that it is a free 
product.   
 
In  Chapter 5 finally, we apply a normative method of research in that we propose a new test 
that we conclude is more appropriate for free high technology investigations. The method 
remains embedded in a doctrinal methodology as we use currently available tools in the 
doctrine to deduce the new test. The current tests are adapted to suit free high technologies in 
the appropriate manner. .  
 
1.5 Original Contribution 
This thesis comprises of two original contributions; 
1. It applies a unique analysis by comparing two different groups of EU Competition 
Commission technology investigations and their associated substantive arguments to 
find an inconsistent approach. It can be inferred from the inconsistent approach that 
the EU Commission believes free high technology companies are good for consumers 
because they are free and highly innovative, which is a unique conclusion in itself. 
This will be clearly explained in detail in Chapter 4.  
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2. It proposes a new specific test only for the category of free high technology that 
combines the Magill42 test and concept of innovation markets in order to prevent the 
EU Commission from putting forward limited substantive arguments and to prevent 
legal uncertainty. 
 
1.6 Limitations 
1.6.1 Not an evaluation/statement of the actual economic effects of free high technologies 
This thesis does not intend to conclude as to whether free high technologies are good for 
consumers. It is important to point this out at the outset as Chapter 2 especially puts forward 
literature43 that strongly supports the notion that large free online platforms are good for 
consumers. But there is a specific reason for this. We recall that part of our hypothesis is that 
the EU Commission believes that dominant free high technology companies with increasing 
market power are good for consumers and therefore it puts forward justifications that are 
limited according to the literature. The thesis observes the EU Commission acting a particular 
way and through analysis and inference, can only conclude that the EU Commission must be 
espousing the idea that large platforms are good for consumers in order to explain these 
limited justifications. Hence the seemingly, so to speak, pro-monopoly literature in the thesis 
is there as a highly plausible reason for the EU Commission’s approach. The thesis itself does 
not intend to make a statement on whether it supports large free high technology companies; 
it instead puts forward an explanation behind the EU Commission’s lax approach which is 
only reasonable if it does support free high technology companies. 
                                                          
42 Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television 
Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission of the European Communities [1995] ECR  I-00743 
43 See section 2.2 
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1.6.2 Perspective of users as consumers  
The competition analysis considered in the thesis is looked at from the perspective of users of 
free online technology services and how consumer welfare is affected for those users. For 
example for search, it would be those who use search engines for searching all kinds of 
information. For social networking it would be those using the social networks. It does not 
look at the perspective of other potential relevant consumers44 such as advertisers. There are 
several reasons for this which overall make researching the perspective of advertisers as 
consumers unremarkable within the context of this thesis.  
 
Firstly, if we look at two of the main merger investigations involving free high technologies, 
one will note that either the substantive arguments surrounding advertising is uncontroversial 
                                                          
44 The meaning of consumer in the context of competition law has been the centre of some literature; there is no 
definite meaning. However, despite the fact that it can be concluded that the term consumer can include various 
groups including, for example, intermediate wholesalers and final individual buyers (that purchase for final 
consumption), this does not pose much of a problem in the context of this particular thesis. Free high technology 
companies provide their services direct to the end-user. There is of course the necessary presence of the Internet 
Service Provider (ISP) intermediary; but we assume (and this is usually the case anyway) that ISPs do not 
charge internet content producers for communicating to the end users. There have been for example, alleged 
controversial practices in the US where particular ISPs would charge particular internet content providers a 
higher sum for higher bandwidth (faster speeds). The internet content provider then becomes a customer of the 
ISP; it purchases higher bandwidth to then pass on in a beneficial way to the end-user. However, this does not 
appear to be conventional practice and therefore the thesis excludes it from its scope.   Hence, there is no direct 
business dealing with the ISP. It is imperative that the meaning of consumer is clarified in the EU competition 
law sense as there does not appear to be an official definition for the term (Some national courts have referred to 
the CJEU for clarification on the type of consumer they need to consider in their analysis of harm. See Case C-
53/03 Synetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias & Akarnanias (Syfait) and Others v GlaxoSmithKline plc and 
GlaxoSmithKline AEVE [2005] ECR I-04609 [20]- The national court of Greece asked the CJEU whether the 
disadvantage to the final consumer of the medicinal products in terms of price should be taken into 
consideration in balancing interests of the different groups effected by the practice of parallel trade. Very similar 
questions were asked in Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06 Sot Lelos Kai and others v GlaxoSmithKline AEVE 
Farmakeftikon Proïonton [2008] ECR I-07139, [22]  ). Technically, a consumer could refer to any party or 
entity within the chain of distribution. For instance, if there is an investigation into a vertical merger between a 
computer hardware producer and a security software developer, there will be an analysis of the potential harm 
caused to consumers. However, consumers could refer both to the other security software developers who 
purchase licenses from the hardware producer (consumer of a raw material) and those who actually use 
computers with installed security software (final consumer of the product). 
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or is non-existent. In Facebook/Whatsapp45 the market share of Facebook in online 
advertising seemed to be construed as quite low. For example, it was stated that Facebook 
only collected 6.39% of all data available on the internet compared to Google’s collection of 
30%.46 Hence, from the perspective of the market of online advertising, the authorisation of 
the Facebook and Whatsapp merger is likely to attract little controversy; its market share was 
considered too low to be considered as a competitive threat anytime in the future. However, 
from the perspective of social network users, given that Facebook is the largest online social 
network, the authorisation of the merger appears more suspect.   Then, in Microsoft/Skype47 
online advertising as a relevant market was not discussed; it appears at the time there were no 
pertinent issues to be discussed that could affect advertisers.  
 
Apart from these two cases, virtually all other cases that involve free high technologies and 
other technologies considered only mainly involve the final consumer as the concerned 
consumer. All the Microsoft cases and  mergers such as Intel/McAfee48  and 
Symantec/Veritas49 which  are key cases for this thesis do not concern the advertising side. 
Since we are looking at the approach of the EU Commission and the EU Commission has 
focused on the final user, this will be our focus. A notable exception is the 
Google/Doubleclick50 case which we will consider for its contribution to the EU 
                                                          
45 Facebook/Whatsapp (Case No COMP/M.7217) [2014] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf accessed 
on 23rd July 2017 
46 Ibid- see diagram on pg 34 
47 Microsoft/ Skype (Case No COMP/M.6281) [2011] at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6281_924_2.pdf accessed on 5th February 2015 
48 Intel/McAfee (Case No COMP/M.5984) [2011] at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5984_1922_2.pdf accessed on 10th March 2015 
49 Symantec / Veritas (Case No COMP/M.3697)[2005] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m3697_20050315_20310_en.pdf accessed on 24th July 
2017 
50Google/Doubleclick (Case No COMP/M.4731) [2008] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4731_20080311_20682_en.pdf accessed on 24th July 
2017  
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Commission’s current narrative that competitive conditions on the internet are good. But 
because it is only one decided case on advertising (and where the advertising platform has 
major market share) and an analysis with other decided cases through comparison cannot take 
place, the advertising side as the consumer is not considered.  
 
1.6.3 A note on the presumption that ‘more competition is good for consumers’ 
Throughout the thesis we will be referring to the idea that competition law analysis is based 
on the concept or presumption that competition is good for consumers, or that more 
competition equals more consumer welfare. It is important to specify that competition, when 
mentioned in this context, refers to competition within the relevant markets that the EU 
Commission is discussing within that particular decision/investigation. For example, when 
we critically analyse a free high technology case and mention that the EU Commission 
assumes competition is good for consumers and that this may be a limited approach, we are 
only speaking of competition being possibly not good for consumers within the relevant 
market that the EU Commission considers. It is not a general statement to indicate that no 
competition whatsoever is required for consumer welfare; it is only within the particular 
context of the relevant market in question. For example, when discussing the 
Facebook/Whatsapp51 case we will consider that the EU Commission analyses the case on 
the basis of the presumption that competition is good for consumers. But this will only be 
referring to competition within one of the relevant markets that the EU Commission has 
chosen to analyse; for instance, the consumer communications applications market.   
 
                                                          
51Facebook/Whatsapp (Case No COMP/M.7217) [2014] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf accessed 
on 23rd July 2017 
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It is important to note this as it is not the intention of this thesis to show that competition is 
unnecessary for consumer welfare period. Yes, the thesis does put forward literature to show 
that competition is not necessary for consumer welfare, but this is only within the current 
product market. It puts forward that within a current free high technology market, 
concentration is likely to lead to higher consumer welfare; only a large free high technology 
company can provide the best service. However, beyond that, the only way consumer welfare 
can increase is the arrival of a disruptive technology that will replace that market all together. 
We will explain in Chapter 252 how this is not the same as competition within the same 
market. So putting aside the meaning of competition within a relevant market, competition in 
its general terms is required for better consumer welfare. But this is competition for the 
market as opposed to in the market.53 The issue is that the majority of competition law 
analyses and all the competition law analyses in free high technology markets do not clearly 
and systematically analyse54 competition for the market.  
 
1.7 Structure of Thesis 
This thesis comprises of three main core chapters excluding the Introduction and Conclusion 
Chapters.  
 
This Introduction Chapter so far has given a comprehensive summary of what problem the 
thesis intends to tackle, the reason behind the problem and how it will as a result tackle it. 
                                                          
52 See especially section 2.2.6 
53 Ibid 
54 As we will see in Chapter 4, the EU Commission does recognize that free high technology industries are 
characterized by cycles of innovation, but it does not specifically take into account the specific features of 
disruptive innovation and how it fits into competition analysis.   
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The Introduction has also clarified the limitations of the thesis and definitions of terms used 
throughout the work.  
 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 together help build the thesis’ hypothesis. Chapter 2 sets out the 
background and the foundations to the legal problem of inconsistency and limitations in the 
EU Commission’s reasoning. This constitutes looking at the unique features of free high 
technologies and how they relate to the objectives and presumptions of current EU 
competition law. This chapter helps us understand the rationale behind the EU Commission’s 
approaches in Chapters 3 and 4 and helps us formulate our hypothesis.  
 
Chapter 3 introduces the analytical framework that is used by the EU Commission in free 
high technology cases. It builds on Chapter 2 in that it shows how the presumption of 
competition law that competition leads to consumer welfare trickles down and forms the 
basis of the structure of analysis that the EU Commission has to apply. Simultaneously and 
with equal importance, it provides context for the analysis carried out in Chapter 4. The 
analytical framework shapes up the arguments of the EU Commission we evaluate in Chapter 
4. 
 
Chapter 4  describes and analyses the EU Commission’s approach in free high technology 
cases and compares it with other categories of investigations and cases to see why the free 
high technology investigations are associated with a different approach. In discussing the EU 
Commission’s approach, we see that it applies particular competition law tests to come to its 
decisions. The tests would in turn be linked to an EU competition law framework which in 
turn would be based on presumptions and objectives of the law itself. One would therefore 
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expect that any issues of, for example in this case, limited views of the EU Commission, 
would be rooted in the objectives and presumptions of the overarching framework of the law. 
That is why the Chapter 2 sets out the objectives and presumptions of competition law and 
considers how they relate to free high technology. It discovers the conflicting conceptual 
issues that arise between EU competition law thinking and free high technology market 
features and in doing so betrays a harbinger of problematic issues in applying current 
competition law tests to free high technologies.  
 
At the end of Chapter 4 we are able to refer back to the findings in Chapter 2 to formulate our 
hypothesis. For example, we figure that the EU Commission has a lax approach to dominant 
free high technology companies because they are good for consumers. This is a plausible 
notion as we establish in Chapter 2 that the main objective of competition law is consumer 
welfare. Further, we infer that the EU Commission puts forward the proposition based on 
limited views that there is a lot of competition in the market because that is the only way it 
can justify allowing dominant free high technology companies to grow to the detriment of 
smaller competitors. Again, this is a plausible notion because we find in Chapter 2 that EU 
competition law strongly espouses the presumption that competition is good for consumers. 
 
Chapter 5 then proposes a new test to be applied to free high technologies based on the aims 
and problems reflected by Chapters 2, 3 and 4 i.e. that the test must either directly or 
indirectly recognise that dominant free high technology companies with increasing market 
power to the detriment of smaller competitors can be good for consumers and must not 
facilitate the need for putting forward confusing reasoning the likes of which are seen in 
Chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER 2: HOW FREE HIGH TECHNOLOGY FITS INTO THE OBJECTIVES 
AND UNDERLYING PRESUMPTIONS OF EU COMPETITION LAW 
2.1 Introduction 
 
As we can see from the ‘Introduction’ chapter of the entire thesis, this thesis attempts to 
resolve the inconsistencies and limitations of the EU Commission’s reasoning in its 
investigations and decisions concerning free high technology. We noted that the EU 
Commission implements a limited approach where it does not take into account all factors 
affecting whether or not the market is competitive. It therefore ends up presenting free high 
technology markets as competitive when they may not be in reality. 
 
The root of this inadequate reasoning can be traced back to the way that the objectives and 
underlying presumptions of competition law and economic theory on free high technologies 
interact with each other. In this chapter we set out to understand these interactions as this 
serves as necessary background against which the EU Commission’s reasoning operates and 
how it conceptually fits with free high technology services. Only then can we truly 
comprehend the inadequacy and limited manner of the reasoning at the competition analysis 
stages that we will explore in Chapters 3 and 4.  
 
In the process of understanding the objectives and presumptions and how they interact with 
the economics of free high technology the following questions are answered in this chapter 
with an interdisciplinary approach using economic literature;. 
a) What are the unique features of free high technology? 
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b) How are the features of the free high technology industry incongruent with the 
main presumption of competition law? 
We then address the following two questions: 
c) What is the current doctrine about the objectives of competition law?- this 
involves a descriptive discussion from which we extract particular findings in 
relation to the status of the different possible objectives of competition law.  
d) What should be the main objective in competition law investigations of free high 
technologies?- this is the normative question we answer in this chapter. 
 
In exploring these questions, two particular findings emerge that are vital to understanding 
the root problem of the legal uncertainty discussed throughout Chapters 3 and 4. We will 
infer from the literature on two-sided markets and disruptive technologies and the existence 
of zero-price, that in the free high technology industry, the presence of a dominant company 
in the current relevant market with fewer competitors is very good for consumers.1 However, 
our other finding is that the presumption in EU competition law appears to be that the more 
competition in the market, the higher consumer welfare would be. Hence the objectives of 
protecting competition and that of protecting consumer welfare are not meant to clash.2 
                                                          
1 A simple example of this is an online social network. Each user is more likely to benefit further should there 
be more users on the site. It means they simply need to sign up to one social network to get access to all social 
network profiles; this reduces the time and effort of users from having to sign up to other networks to get access 
to other people. When there are more social networks in existence, there are likely to be more users on different 
network platforms, meaning it would be harder for them to get access to each other. There will be further 
elaboration on this. 
2 See for example Kenneth Arrow ‘Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in The 
Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors’ in Universities-National Bureau 
Committee for Economic Research, Committee on Economic Growth of the Social Science Research Council 
(ed) The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors (Princeton University Press 
1962) 609-625; the author suggests that with a situation with more competitors, there is more incentive to 
innovate than there would be in the case of a monopoly. This is especially in the case of more revolutionary 
inventions that displace current products.   
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However, in the free high technology industry, this is not the case. That is, more competition 
could mean more harm to consumers.3 One can therefore already envisage how a legal test 
based on the current presumptions of competition law would not work in the free high 
technology industry. Given this clash between the two objectives in this industry, it is 
absolutely necessary to determine what the main objective is to be pursued by European 
competition authorities in free high technology cases. This is especially important with free 
high technology as in more traditional industries,4 the two objectives go hand in hand. In 
other words, in traditional industries, if one pursues the protection of competition, then one 
also ends up pursuing consumer welfare and vice versa; hence, it is nowhere near as 
important to choose between the objectives as pursuing either one is likely to yield the same 
results. This is because they are, so to speak, directly proportional to each other in traditional 
industries.5 A reduction in competition tends to lead to prices going up to the detriment of 
consumers. But in free high technology cases prices cannot go up or down as there is no price 
charged in the first place.  
 
Before discussing the issues in more detail, some limitations must be mentioned and the 
scope of the chapter must be appropriately limited. The descriptive discussion on the doctrine 
about the objective(s) of EU competition law is one that involves significant and complex 
                                                          
3 The credibility of competition as a means to consumer welfare has been questioned in the literature. For 
example, see Maurice Stucke ‘Is competition always good?’ (2013) 1(1) JAE 162; here it was considered that 
the presence of more competitors in the market meant that they potentially used more misleading ways to attract 
consumers who then end up benefiting less. However, the reason for supporting less competition as means to 
consumer welfare in this thesis is different. We consider that a dominant free high technology platform is able to 
provide all consumers with better quality service with the additional benefit of no price and a constant incentive 
to innovate.  
4 As will be explained, traditional industries in this thesis are different from the free high technology industry in 
the sense that they involve products/services that have to be paid for. This could range from food products to 
advanced technology products such as computers and software (but those that have a monetary cost to the 
consumer) 
5 See section 2.3 to see how competition is equated to consumer welfare in EU competition law related 
documents.  
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debate.6 This chapter does not intend to be a comprehensive analysis of this debate. Neither 
does it intend to determine what the objective of competition law should be on a critical or 
deep doctrinal basis.7 The scope of the issue that is looked at in this chapter is far more 
limited given that this is a thesis focussed on free high technologies; we therefore 
understandably cover the discussion to the extent that the objectives and presumptions 
controversially affect the free high technology industry. As already indicated, we will see that 
there are two fundamental objectives namely consumer welfare (which is directly concerned 
with benefits or the reduction thereof to consumers) and the protection of the competitive 
structure of the market (which relative to the former objective ends up protecting competitors 
in a more direct manner) that conflict with each other when it comes to free high 
technologies. Hence, our discussions will focus ont these particular objectives and and the 
potential conflict between the two.  
 
We find that with regards to the EU Commission’s rhetoric and documents such as the 
Guidance on the EU Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 (now 102) 
of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, consumer 
welfare is the main objective above all other ones. However, particular European court 
                                                          
6 See Ariel Ezrachi ‘Sponge’ (2016) JAE 1- competition law appears to have a multitude of values 
simultaneously. To add to the complexity is the fact that it is influenced by cultural and political constructs of 
the time. This makes it difficult to detect any intact core value in the first place.   
7 See for example Renato Nazzini, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law: the Objectives and 
Principles of Article 102 (Oxford University Press 2009)- the author provides a very comprehensive doctrinal 
discussion of what the objective of Article 102 should be in the sense that he relies fundamentally on 
Community provisions to come to his conclusion. For example, he logically ties Article 102 TFEU to Article 
3(3) which mentions the wider objectives of the internal market. From there he deduces logically what 
objectives can be reasonably incorporated into an EU competition regime. This is not the in-depth method we 
use in this thesis to come to our conclusion on what the objective of competition policy is. Instead, the method is 
as follows: we find out what the objective is strongly indicated/stated to be in the EU Commission’s competition 
policy (this is to be distinguished from what it appears to be in practice; this is a different matter); we then find 
out if there is any other body of law or authority that legitimately prevents consumer welfare from being the 
main objective in competition policy in the contact of free high technology. 
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judgements, as will be seen, may conflict with the notion of pursuing the consumer welfare 
objective. We will see that in Intel, 8 the General Court on the basis of a finding of reduction 
in competition on the basis of a particular rebates structure, held Intel to be abusing its market 
power without looking into the possible positive welfare effects on consumers the rebates 
might have had. After all, a rebate means a reduction in overall price. However, on further 
appeal by Intel, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that the General 
Court should not have inferred an abuse of market power solely on the basis of the structure 
of the rebate.9 The CJEU referred the case back to the General Court ordering it to take into 
consideration other factors.10 Both decisions will be discussed further in section 2.4.3. We 
will see that whilst the CJEU’s decision does not mention effects on consumers as the 
paramount consideration, it definitely steers towards, rather than away from, confirmation of 
consumer welfare as the prioritised objective. 
 
Finally, in terms of our normative question on what the objective should be in free high 
technology investigations, it is important to note that this question is answered in a strictly 
legal doctrinal context. This means that we consider our findings from our descriptive 
discussion of the current doctrine on the objectives of competition law and from there, in 
conjunction with the consideration of the presumption of competition law, we deduce what 
the main objective is to be pursued. In contrast, a normative approach within for example a 
socio-economic research context would be inappropriate here. That would include extensive 
debates about the wider socio-economic consequences of having larger digital technologies 
                                                          
8 Case T-286/09 Intel Corp v European Commission  [2014] 5 C.M.L.R. 9 
9 Case C-143/14P Intel Corp v European Commission [2017] available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d0f130d52395152ebfab48c9a83395ba597a1
009.e34KaxiLc3eQc40LaxqMbN4PaNqOe0?text=&docid=194082&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&di
r=&occ=first&part=1&cid=161936 accessed 24 December 2017 
10 Ibid para 147  
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on consumers’ lives, taking away from the main focus of the thesis which aims to uncover 
inconsistencies and limitations in the way the Commission applies doctrine to a particular 
category of cases. However, our main analyses in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 have to be predicated 
on certain assumptions about the wider context of competition law. Of course, those 
assumptions need to be safe and solid; the doctrinal analysis we carry out in Chapter 2 around 
these assumptions is sufficient to offer us this safety. 
 
2.2 The unique economics of free high technology 
 
Before considering competition law’s objectives and its application to the free high 
technology industry we need to have an understanding of the industry’s specific economics. 
A consideration of competition law objectives out of context (of the free high technology 
sector) will not enable us to understand how problems arise between the concepts in 
competition law and this specific industry. Furthermore, more generally accepted ideas on 
monopolies, as we will see, do not always conform to the business models of free high 
technology companies. It is common knowledge that economic theory definitely agrees that a 
monopolist can raise prices significantly11 and cause a concomitant loss of consumer 
surplus.12 Also the increase of monopoly power leads to the occurrence of allocative13 and 
                                                          
11See Massimo Motta, Competition policy: theory and practice (1st edn, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2004) Chapter 2 
12 Prices rise above marginal costs in monopoly situations; hence consumers end up paying more than the actual 
monetary value of the good. Consumer surplus is reduced because now there are fewer consumers willing to pay 
a higher price (value the good more than the monopoly price) for the good/service.  
13 Higher prices mean a lower quantity sold and demanded at that higher price. However, where the price is at 
the actual monetary value of the good/service (marginal cost) there is a higher quantity supplied and this is 
where there is allocative efficiency. That is, the correct amount of resources are employed in the economy to 
satisfy actual demand in the market.  
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general inefficiency14 and societally wasteful rent-seeking activities.15 Instead of re-investing 
significant profits into innovation and technology leading to more efficient production, companies 
with significant market power would rather invest in rent-seeking, that is activities such as forming 
lobby groups and attempting to bribe political figures for favours in the interests of the monopoly as a 
business.16 There is also an accompanying lack of innovation in a situation of fewer 
competitors.17 Hence, it would seem that the repercussions of the existence of a monopolist 
outweigh the positives. But as we will see, this is not necessarily the case for dominant free 
high technology companies that possess monopolistic powers. 
 
This section provides literature to support the notion that free high technology services are 
beneficial to consumers without requiring a competitive structure in the market. This is a very 
important aspect of this chapter. As we will see later on in the chapter,18 EU competition law 
appears to encourage the notion that generally only competition can lead to benefits to 
consumers. For example, we will see that the EU Commission’s proclamations making 
consumer welfare the core objective of competition law co-exists with a simultaneous 
implementation of competition law tests that look to ensure that the number of competitors is 
                                                          
14 See Harvey Leibenstein ‘Allocative Efficiency vs. X-Efficiency’ (1966) 56 Am.Econ.Rev 392- managers in 
monopolies are not motivated to select the most efficient methods/technologies for production as there is a lack 
of competitive pressure. This theory is also supported in Oliver Hart ‘The Market Mechanism as an incentive 
scheme’ (1983) 14 Bell Journal of Economics 366. For general support of the classic theory that competition 
leads to more efficiency see, for example, more evidenced based studies such as G Olley & A Pakes ‘The 
Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry’ (1996) 64 Econometrica 1263 and R 
Disney, J Haskel & Y Heden ‘Restructuring and Productivity Growth in UK Manufacturing’ (2003) 113(4890 
Econ.J. (London) 666. However, it has also been said that by further increasing competition in a market that is 
already competitive, one risks losing the advantage of economies of scale that only a larger entity can benefit 
from (See Massimo Motta, Competition policy: theory and practice (1st edn, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2004) 51,52 
15 See Richard Posner ‘The Social Cost of Monopoly and Regulation’ (1975) 83 J.Polit.Econ 807 and Anne 
Krueger ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society’ (1974) 64 Am.Econ.Rev. 291  
16 Ibid 
17 Massimo Motta, Competition policy: theory and practice (1st edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2004) Chapter 2 
18 See section 2.3 onwards 
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not reduced as a result of practices by a dominant company.19 Hence, competition law and the 
economics of free high technology are likely to be linked to conflicting theories.  
 
As mentioned, all free high technology services discussed in this thesis are known as two-
sided markets. The economic theory on two-sided markets can help us understand how, in the 
free high technology sector, monopolies and high benefits to consumers can exist. More 
specifically, through exploring the literature on two-sided theory, we aim to explain how free 
high technology companies can provide consumers with services that are free, of a good 
quality and highly innovative because of their own large-scale or dominant position. 
 
 
2.2.1 What is a two-sided market? 
Before we look at two-sided theory, it is important to ensure that free high technology 
markets are in fact two-sided markets and possess the important characteristics of such 
markets.  
 
The definition of a two-sided market must be ascertained carefully. One of the reasons for 
this is that it appears that a definitive and widely accepted definition of a two-sided market is 
not present in the literature. It becomes more complicated given the fact that to some extent 
all markets, quite literally, are two-sided; for instance any manufacturing business entity pays 
                                                          
19 See Commission, ‘Communication from the EU Commission — Guidance on the EU Commission's 
enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant 
undertakings’ (2009/C 45/02). Also see section 2.3 onwards 
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for raw materials on one side of the market whilst it sells the final product to consumers at the 
other end of the market.20 Two-sided markets have also been likened to something that can be 
recognised when seen and therefore cannot be boiled down to specific characteristics.21 
However, the very reason we are looking at the potential use of two-sided theory is because 
the thesis considers many high technology industries as uniquely two-sided markets which 
require tailored analyses to be applied to them. As we will see, it is the two-sidedness of these 
markets that enable free high technology services to have unique features that other industries 
do not possess. We look at the different definition of two-sided markets in more detail below.  
 
Rochet and Tirole state that on two-sided platforms externalities arise when one side (let us  
call this Side 1) of the platform cares extensively about the number of people that are present 
on the other side (let us call this Side 2) of the platform; Side 2 therefore brings more value to 
the platform for Side 1.22 Side 2, however, can only internalize this extra value it brings to the 
platform and Side 1 in the form of significantly lower prices charged to Side 2.23 Hence 
Rochet and Tirole go on to advocate that a leading characteristic of a two-sided platform is 
the presence of a pricing mechanism where the price Side 2 decreases whilst the price for 
Side 1 increases given the summation of the two prices always remain intact24; Side 1 gains 
                                                          
20 B Hermalin & M Katz ‘What’s so special about two-sided markets?’ (2016, Forthcoming in Economic Theory 
and Public Policies: Joseph Stiglitz and the Teaching of Economics Columbia University Press) 1 < 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/HKTwo-Sided_Markets.pdf> accessed 11 July 2017  
21 Ibid 
22 J Rochet & J Tirole ‘Two-sided markets: a progress report,’ (2006) 37(3) RAND J Econ 645 
23 Ibid  
24 It is important to note this pricing mechanism in two-sided markets as otherwise it can cause confusion in 
terms of competition analysis. A two-sided market can otherwise be accused of predatory pricing or excessive 
high pricing. For example, a more single-sided analysis on a two-sided platform could lead to these incorrect 
conclusions. For instance, a company may be found in breach of competition rules by applying prices to one 
side of the market below marginal cost; this may be considered as predatory pricing in the case of a single-sided 
analysis as the focus would only be on the one side (See Case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the 
European Communities [1991] I-3445). However, a two-sided analysis would consider the likely possibility that 
the loss of profits on one side can be recovered on the other side, who are charged a significantly higher price; 
hence, it should be considered whether or not profits are foregone across both sides (See David S. Evans ‘Two-
Sided Markets’ in Mark W. Nelson (ed) Market Definition in Antitrust: Theory and Case Studies- (ABA Book 
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more value from the presence of Side 2 as opposed to the reverse situation and therefore is 
charged a higher price.25 Rysman interpreted two-sided platforms more simply and went on 
to state that a two-sided platform is one where the strategy applied to one side is influenced 
by that applied to the other side.26 This has been criticized by Hermalin and Katz for being 
too broad a characterization as all businesses have to think of the different parties involved; 
for example, a classically one-sided platform such as a manufacturer will need to determine 
how much it will spend on raw materials (the supplier side) depending on how much demand 
is predicted by its consumer side.27 Therefore the notion that the strategies applied to 
different groups affecting each other is not something distinct and applies to a wide variety of 
firms. Hence, it is probably best to not have it as a distinct or defining characteristic of a two-
sided market.   
 
Weyl has described two-sided platforms as those that possess market power on both sides and 
where there are cross-platform network effects (significant benefits provided to the other side 
                                                          
Publishing 2012) p 13). This is likely to lead to a different conclusion; that is that predatory pricing does not 
occur as the concerned company makes up for lost profits from the other side and therefore is not deliberately 
and cunningly sacrificing profits in an attempt to foreclose competitors (See J Wright ‘One-Sided Logic in Two-
Sided Markets’ (2004) 3 (1) REV.NETWORK ECON. 44, 48). Another example is where instead of supposedly 
predatory pricing, the two sided platform is accused of extremely high monopoly prices that are significantly 
above marginal costs (Markets that are considered perfectly competitive will have a price which equals the 
marginal cost; any attempt to go above marginal cost will be met by a reduction in price by competitors. Hence, 
a price significantly above marginal cost could indicate the existence of a monopoly) However, such a theory of 
prices above marginal costs strongly indicating high monopolistic prices does not apply to two-sided platforms 
as those high prices subsidize the other side of the market where prices are significantly lower and probably 
below marginal cost; hence a part of the high profits made on the side where the customers pay is meant to 
cover the fixed costs and marginal costs on the side where customers pay less or nothing (G Parker & M Van 
Alstyne ‘InterNetwork Externalities and Free Information Goods’ in Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on 
Electronic commerce (ACM 2000) 115). Put another way, consumer welfare is not harmed by the high prices on 
the one side of the market because in a two sided market the positive externalities or consumer surplus is 
captured on the side of the free product (G Parker & M Van Alstyne ‘InterNetwork Externalities and Free 
Information Goods’ in Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce (ACM 2000) 115). 
25 J Rochet & J. Tirole ‘Two-sided markets: a progress report,’ (2006) 37(3) RAND J Econ 645 
26 Marc Rysman ‘The Economics of Two-Sided Markets’ (2009) 23(3) J Econ Perspect 125, 126 
27 B Hermalin & M Katz ‘What’s so special about two-sided markets?’ (2016) Economic Theory and Public 
Policies: Joseph Stiglitz and the Teaching of Economics (Columbia University Press) 1 < 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/HKTwo-Sided_Markets.pdf> accessed 11th July 2017 
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from one side).28 Hagiu characterised two-sided markets in a particular way that ensured that 
it did not include retail shops; he stated that retailers, unlike two sided platforms, take 
possession of goods and then sell to consumers in stores; on the other hand platforms do not 
have full control rights over goods and their role focuses on bringing the two sides into direct 
contact with each other.29   
 
Furthermore, a lot of the initial and pioneering literature on two-sided markets is closely 
linked to the literature on network effects.30 For instance, Rochet and Tirole have described 
network effects (or network externalities as they describe) as fundamentally being present 
when companies have a platform bringing at least two different sets of consumers together 
where they can and possibly need to interact with each other.31 Where network effects are not 
as great, a more single-sided analysis is appropriate.32 The network effects that are referred to 
in respect of two-sided platforms are known as ‘inter-group’ externalities as opposed to 
‘intra-group’ externalities; these ‘inter-group’ externalities can also familiarly be known as 
indirect network effects.33 Generally, direct network effects indicate a situation where the 
value of a product/service goes up as more and more people use it. For example, a video 
games console will have more value if more people use it as there will be more people to play 
with online;34 all players demand the same service of being able to play with each other and 
                                                          
28 E. Glen Weyl ‘A price theory of Multi-sided Platforms’ (2010) 100(4) Am Econ Rev 1642, 1644 
29 Andrei Hagiu ‘Merchant or Two-Sided Platform’ (2007) 6(2) RNE 115 
30 Network effects occur when the value of, for example, a service platform increases to users the more users 
join it. Network effects will be discussed further in this chapter and extensively in Chapter 2. At this point it is 
important to know that it is considered an important feature od two-sided markets. 
31 J Rochet &J Tirole ‘Platform Competition in Two-sided platform’ (2003) 1(4) J Eur Econ Assoc  990 
32 Delegation of the European Commission, ‘Roundtable on two-sided markets; a note by the Delegation of the 
European Commission’ DAF/COMP/WD (2009) 69, paragraph 14 
33 Ibid paragraphs 15 to 20 
34 Though recently console manufacturers are contemplating the possibility of allowing users of different 
consoles to play with each other online. See Kyle Orland ‘Why Microsoft is finally pushing for cross-platform 
online gaming’ (Ars Technica, 15 March 2016) <http://arstechnica.co.uk/gaming/2016/03/why-microsoft-is-
finally-pushing-for-cross-platform-online-gaming/> accessed 9th May 2016  
 
49 
 
are therefore can be considered to be in the same group of customer. However, an indirect 
effect occurs when there are two different groups of customers who want to make a 
transaction with each other and each group demands something different of the other.35 
Taking the consoles example again, the two sided platform of a console involves players and 
game developers; game developers will want to sell their games while players will want to 
purchase the games. Another way of putting it is that in a two-sided platform there is a 
demand not only for the main platform, but also other products/services that are compatible 
with the platform.36  
 
Although we have seen different definitions for two-sided markets there is a common theme 
that appears to make them all congruent with each other. All definitions involve two different 
groups of customers connected with each other via a particular entity/platform. We will 
therefore define a two-sided market as one where two or more groups exchange some form of 
value directly37 with each other through a common entity/platform. We can therefore 
conclude and observe that the free high technology sector is characterized by two sided 
platforms38 as a two/multi-sided platform’s core business, just like that of free high 
technologies, involves bringing together different groups of consumers who need each other 
                                                          
35 See M Katz & C Shapiro ‘Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility’ (1985) 75 Am Econ Rev 
424. Direct effect is described as ‘the direct physical effect on the number of purchasers on the quality of a 
product’. The immediate effect of having more purchasers of the console, for example, is that there will be more 
players online and therefore the quality of the console, so to speak, improves. The more long-term and indirect 
effect is for game developers to eventually realise the great number of players present on the platform and 
produce more games compatible with that console.   
36 See Delegation of the European Commission, ‘Roundtable on two-sided markets; a note by the Delegation of 
the European Commission’ DAF/COMP/WD(2009)69- Explanation in footnote 4 
37 There should be emphasis placed on the word directly. This is to distinguish from situations forseen by Hagiu 
where retail shops are mistakenly seen as two sided markets. In the retail shop, the purchaser engages with the 
retailer as opposed to the manufacturer. On two sided platforms, very often they are put into direct contact with 
each other via the platform.   
38 D Evans & R Schmalensee ‘Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms’ (2007) 3 
Competition Pol’y Int’l 150, 152  
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in some way and allowing them to interact and carry out transactions between each other.39 
With reference to the companies involved in the investigations discussed in this thesis there 
are a lot of two/multi-sided platforms involved. For instance, Google brings advertisers in 
touch with search users; Facebook does something similar by promoting Facebook pages of 
particular businesses to allow exposure to Facebook users; Microsoft brings software 
applications (for example web browsers) and computer users together via their operating 
system Windows.The thesis will also, however, be looking at other free high technologies 
such as communications applications such as Whatsapp. As a standalone product, a 
communication application does not appear to be two-sided. It does not for example, 
advertise to end users through the service. However, free services like these fundamentally 
aim to grow their user base to become more valuable. They become more attractive to larger 
entities looking for data on end users to enable them to carry out targeted advertising. Hence, 
the large communication application serves another customer type, running in a two-sided 
fashion, gathering data from consumers and passing that on to another entity for targeted 
advertising.   
 
Given the definitions we have seen, it is clear that these entities fall into all those definitions. 
For instance, the advertisers really care about the number of people using the search engine or 
social network as this means a likelihood of higher exposure. Another way to look at it is that 
all the search engine and social network users provide a significant amount of value to the 
advertisers on the other side of the market just by virtue of their presence on the platform. 
Businesses and advertisers would gain no value from a search engine unless it was able to 
provide a database of search users; search users would not gain any value from search 
                                                          
39 Ibid 
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engines unless they were able to provide information attained from businesses that have 
websites and an online presence.40 This value to advertisers is also increasingly enhanced by 
these free high technologies’ ability to gather user data and show highly targeted and 
customised advertising to each different user.41  
 
Both sides appear to therefore have a directly proportional effect to each other; less value 
from one side leads to lower value provided on the other side. Furthermore, one could 
interpret that there is a pricing mechanism similar to that suggested by Rochet and Tirole.42 
Advertisers are willing to pay a price for the value it receives to the platform and therefore a 
significantly lower price is charged to the other side (in the case of social network and search 
engine users this is price is zero).  
 
It may however be argued that when it comes to search engines and social networks that are 
involved in both a user side and an advertising side, the value is one directional in the sense 
that advertisers receive gain value from users directly, whilst users do not gain value from the 
advertisers; in other words users simply tolerate advertisements.43 As we have mentioned, 
                                                          
40 David S Evans ‘How catalysts ignite: the economics of platform-based start-ups’ in Annabelle Gawer (ed) 
Platforms, Markets and Innovation (Edward Elgar Publishing 2009)  99- David Evans provides examples of 
platforms where value exchanges are absolutely necessary and two parties on platforms are linked together very 
closely. Shopping malls attempt to get an ‘anchor tenant’ (a brand store, for instance, which is well-known and 
can attract many customers due to its pre-existing reputation) which can provide value for customers; nightclubs 
attempt to get popular figures to attend their opening nights to provide value to a crowd of nightclub goers. 
Similarly, a business like a search engine has to be able to provide value.  
41 See for example S Boerman, S Kruikemeier & F Borgesius ‘Online behavioural advertising: a literature 
review and research agenda’ (2016) 46(3) J Advertising 363 
42 Given that we know services such as search and social networking are free for users but not for advertisers, 
Rochet and Tirole’s theory that one side is charged a lot less (in these cases users are charged nothing) and the 
other which gains more value is charged significantly more applies See J Rochet & J. Tirole ‘Two-sided 
markets: a progress report,’ (2006) 37(3) RAND J Econ 645 
43 M.R. Patterson ‘Google and Search Engine Market Power’ [2013] Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 
Occasional Paper Series 1-24 
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two-sided markets involve an exchange of value between different groups. In that sense the 
argument could be that such free high technology services are not two-sided markets. 
However, this is not the case if we consider some of the subtleties involved in these markets. 
First of all, the idea that advertisements are tolerated could be a broad generalisation 
especially where advertising is increasingly targeted and relevant to a user; because there is a 
greater sense of customization of advertisements to every individual user (more so than any 
other type of platform such as television), it is equally possible that users gain value from 
being informed about exactly what they are looking for. 44 Secondly, if one were to pose the 
question as to whether users are willing to pay for high quality search results without the 
search engine being supported by advertising funding, the likely answer would be no.45 
Hence, users indirectly receive one of the most important advantages from the advertising 
side; that is zero-price services. Such externalities have been recognized as part of a two-
sided market model; for example, they have been specifically termed as a two-sided ‘non-
transaction’ market because a direct transaction does not take place between all the groups on 
the platform.46 Nonetheless they are two-sided markets given that the groups bring value to 
each other in one way or another.47 
 
Having considered the characteristics of two-sided markets we can see stark similarities with 
free high technology markets. Therefore we can safely conclude that this market is a two-
                                                          
44 Anca D Chirita  ‘Google’s Anti-Competitive and Unfair Practices in Digital Leisure Markets’ (2015) 11(1) 
The Competition Law Review 109 
45 As circumstances stand now, it appears users are far from willing to pay for search. In fact it has gone in the 
opposite direction with, for example, Bing paying users to use their search engines in the form of rewards. See 
Emma Munbodi ‘Google or...Bing? Microsoft is now PAYING customers to use its search engine - and this is how much you could 
earn’ (Mirror 6 June 2017) available at http://www.mirror.co.uk/money/microsoft-pay-customers-use-bing-10568726 accessed on 3rd 
September 2017 
46 E van Damme, L Filistrucchi, D Geradin, S Keunen, T Klein, T Michielsen & J Wileur ‘Mergers in Two-
Sided Markets—A Report to the NMa’ (Netherlands Competition Authority 2010) 
47 L Filistrucchi, D Geradin, E van Damme & P Affeld ‘Market Definition in two-sided markets: theory and 
practice’ (2014) 10(2) JCL & E 293 
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sided one. Having established free high technology markets as a two sided one we will see in 
the next section how even increasing market power on the part of a dominant free high 
technology company can lead to immense benefits for consumers. In the next section we 
consider how two-sided theory supports that a large dominant platform is good for consumer 
welfare.   
 
2.2.2 The link between competition and benefits to consumers 
The general theory, as will be seen, is that increased competition is good for consumers. It is 
imperative however that we clarify what we mean by increased competition and how we use 
it in this particular thesis.  
 
2.2.2.1 What we mean by ‘competition’ and the ‘protection of competition’ 
 
In this thesis ‘competition’ will refer to a situation where there are multiple competitors and 
the ‘protection of competition’ will refer to ensuring there is no reduction in the number of 
competitors.  
 
It is important to clarify this as it is a term that can be interpreted in different manners 
depending on context. We will consider the different possible contexts below in order to have 
a clear understanding of how its meaning can change. 
 
One will note that, for example, both the Merger Regulations and Guidance on the 
Enforcement of Article 102 aim to protect ‘effective competition’ as opposed to just 
‘competition’. This could be because in current competition policy narrative, the protection of 
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effective competition (sometimes also referred to as the protection of the competitive 
structure of the market) has been distinguished from the protection of competitors.48 As we 
will discuss in Chapter 2, 49  the idea of protecting competitors was born out of 
Ordoliberalism which strongly influenced the roots of EU competition law. 50 However, as we 
will also see, eventually the influence of a strict interpretation of Ordoliberalism waned and 
the protection of competitors was qualified on the basis of efficiency. 51 In other words, if the 
incumbent’s merger or unilateral action leads to higher efficiencies, this should be allowed 
even if it means the potential foreclosure of less efficient competitors. 52 Hence, the 
distinction between protecting competitors and effective competition is reflected even in 
early roots of EU competition law. 53 The protection of effective competition could be seen as 
a form of phrasing that distances ‘effective competition’ from a pure and unqualified 
protection of competitors. In other words, effective competition can be likened more to the 
looser interpretation of Ordoliberalism which rather offers more qualified protection to 
competitors.  
 
Furthermore, it has been indicated that competition can still be protected even where there is 
a reduction of competitors provided that competitors are not unnecessarily stopped from 
competing purely on merit.54 In that sense, the protection of effective competition does not 
                                                          
48 See Eleanor Fox ‘We protect competition, you protect competitors’ (2003) 26(2) W.Comp. 149    
49 See section 2.4.2 
50 David Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth-Century Europe, Protecting Prometheus (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1998) 240 
51 Frank Maier-Rigaud ‘On the normative foundations of competition law- Efficiency, Political Freedom and the 
Freedom to Compete’ in Daniel Zimmer (ed) The Goals of Competition Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 
International 2012) 145  
52 Ibid 
53 Also see Case C-95/04 P British Airways v Commission [2006] ECR I-02331 Opinion of Kokott para 68- the 
Advocate General clearly distinguishes protection of individual competitors/consumers from protectiong the 
competitive structure in the market.  
54 Eleanor Fox ‘We protect competition, you protect competitors’ (2003) 26(2) W.Comp. 149   - The author 
explains that in the US, companies who engage in practices that may threaten the existence of other competitors 
are not flouting competition rules as long as they do not limit output and raise prices for consumers artificially. 
In the absence of this limit in output and artificial price rise, the only conclusion is that the company in question 
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seem to refer to the number of competitors either; instead it appears to refer to ensuring that 
the market contains competitors that are effective in producing benefit for consumers (on 
merit). It is also observed that the difference between protecting competitors and protecting 
effective competition is alluded to whenever the goals of competition law are declared to be 
those such as consumer welfare or efficiency. 55 As we will see, consumer welfare and 
efficiency are not necessarily compatible with a situation where there are many players in the 
market competing against each other. Goals such as these can arguably be achieved via 
greater concentration of power in the hands of one company. In other words, a competition 
regime that favours consumer welfare or efficiency as goals is more likely to interpret the 
protection of effective competition as only protecting those competitors that improve 
consumer welfare and efficiency (whether or not it means a reduction of competition) as 
opposed to protecting competitors in general. 56 
 
However, it has been also indicated that in Europe, competition is interpreted as the process 
of protecting competitors and the concern is to prevent any reduction of competitors in the 
                                                          
is engaging in practices that are comparatively more efficient (See R Bork The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at 
war with itself (Free Press, New York 1978) 160; whether or not this increase in efficiency goes on to cause the 
foreclosure of competitors is not a concern of antitrust law  
55 See for example, David Spector ‘From harm to competitors to harm to competition: one more effort, please!’ 
(2006) 2 ECJ 145- the author associates the notion of harm to competition to a policy emphasizing consumer 
welfare.   
56 See Renato Nazzini ‘Article 81 EC between time present and time past: a normative critique of “Restriction of 
Competition” in EU Law’ (2006) 43(2) CML. Rev. 497 – ‘…competition law protects competition, a concept 
dependent, to a significant extent, on cultural, social, and economic constructs’. Here the author appears to 
indicate that the interpretation of the ‘protection of competition’ is something that can vary depending on what 
the narrative of the relevant time is. Also see David Gerber Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: 
Protecting Prometheus (Oxford University Press 2001) 10- ‘Competition is an abstract concept. It (is a)… 
cultural construct’. Also see EU Commission’s Discussion Paper on Article 82 para 54- ‘The essential objective 
of Article 82 when analysing exclusionary conduct is the protection of competition on the market as a means of 
enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. The concern is to prevent 
exclusionary conduct of the dominant firm which is likely to limit the remaining competitive constraints on the 
dominant company, including entry of newcomers, so as to avoid that consumers are harmed. This means that it 
is competition, and not competitors as such, that is to be protected. Furthermore, the purpose of Article 82 is not 
to protect competitors from dominant firms’ genuine competition based on factors such as higher quality, novel 
products, opportune innovation or otherwise better performance, but to ensure that these competitors are also 
able to expand in or enter the market and compete therein on the merits, without facing competition conditions 
which are distorted or impaired by the dominant firm.’   
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market.57 As we will see, the current competition law frameworks for analysis appear, in 
essence and effect, to be concerned with protecting any competitor who is at the risk of 
elimination. We will see generally throughout Chapter 3 that the direct analysis of efficiency 
and consumer welfare takes place to a very small extent; the number of competitors in the 
market is therefore of great relevance.  
 
In conclusion, what we see is that the meaning of effective competition itself is dependent on 
the circumstances and is malleable depending on the competition policy of the day. 58 Hence 
it is not a reliable phrase to be used when we refer to the protection of the number of 
competitors. Therefore, we instead simply refer to the protection of competition. 
 
2.2.2.2 How much competition is beneficial for consumers in two-sided markets? 
Increased competition is very often associated with increased benefits for consumers, as we 
will see later on in this chapter.  It has been pointed out specifically, for example, when it 
comes to search engines, concentration in the market gives the dominant incumbent the 
incentive to lower search quality. This has been attributed to the possibility of under-
investment in search quality.59 Search engines do not charge users for a service and hence 
their revenue mainly comes from advertisers. 60 This means that the focus is on raising 
revenue from advertisers meaning more advertisements. 61 Increased advertising on search 
engines is what lowers the quality for users as they would rather not be bombarded with 
                                                          
57 See for example William Kolasky ‘Conglomerate Mergers and Range Effects: It's a Long Way from Chicago 
to Brussels’ (2002) 10 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 533 
58 Renato Nazzini ‘Article 81 EC between time present and time past: a normative critique of “Restriction of 
Competition” in EU Law’ (2006) 43(2) CML. Rev. 497 
59 I Lianos & E Motchenkova ‘Market Dominance and Quality of Search Results in the Search Engine Market’ 
(Centre for Law, Economics and Society, Working Paper series 2/2012, September 2012) 30-31 available at 
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/research-paper-series/research-papers/cles-2-2012 accessed on 30 August 2017 
60 Ibid 
61 Ibid 
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advertisements.62 However, there are two issues in relation to this. Firstly, search engines 
focus on targeted advertising which means that it is likely to be good for consumers, as the 
advertisements they receive will most likely be relevant to them and at the least be the most 
relevant advertising across any medium including other search engines.63 The dominant 
incumbent search engine, as we will see later, has more data and therefore is likely to have 
the best targeting abilities in comparison to smaller search engines. Secondly, we will also 
see  in this section that search engines are rather incentivised to improve search quality as that 
is the main factor which actually enables them to continue attracting advertisers to its 
platform in the first place. We now turn to this literature below. 
 
There is literature on two-sided markets that seem to suggest that there is a greater amount of 
benefit for consumers where the market is composed of one large platform as opposed to 
several competing platforms.64 It therefore lends credence to the notion that a dominant free 
high technology company is good for consumer welfare.  
 
Hermalin and Katz, for example, explain how the existence of a single platform may be better 
in a market as opposed to multiple ones through the analogy of the bar scene. They have 
stated that two sided markets are characterized by idiosyncratic pairing and inefficient 
                                                          
62 Ibid 
63 RH Bork and JS Sidak ‘What does the Chicago School teach about internet search and the antitrust treatment 
of Google’ (2012) 8(4) J.C.L.& E. 663. However, it is important to note that this argument is not unchallenged. 
It has been suggested that personalised advertising can make consumers purchase things and in amounts that 
they do not need and do not increase consumer welfare. See for example, A Ezrachi & M Stucke ‘The rise of 
behavioural discrimination’ (2016) 37(12) ECLR 485, 490. However, given our conclusions in section 2.2.5 
below, such issues are best not dealt with competition law.  
64 B Hermalin & M Katz ‘What’s so special about two-sided markets?’ (2016, Economic Theory and Public 
Policies: Joseph Stiglitz and the Teaching of Economics, Columbia University Press) 1 < 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/HKTwo-Sided_Markets.pdf> accessed 11th July 2017 
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rationing, which shall be explained further.65 They consider that in two-sided platforms, each 
extra additional member on either side does not necessarily bring in extra benefit for each 
member of the other side.66  
 
The classic example used in the literature is a singles bar where the availability of a greater 
number of women brings extra benefit to men; however this is only the case if each woman 
takes a liking to any man on the other side of the platform (the bar in this case).67 The reality 
is much more complicated in the sense that members of both sides will have particular 
standards and will be unlikely to fancy just any and all members of the other side.68 Hence, 
there is no guarantee that an addition of an extra member on the other side will generate a 
positive network effect for the incumbent side. There is therefore inefficient rationing in the 
sense that the singles bar charges a man to come in when there is little surety as to whether or 
not he will match with someone romantically.69  
 
However, there is also the issue of idiosyncratic matching which actually advocates that it is 
actually socially optimal for more men to join regardless of whether or not they meet the 
standards of the women on the other side of the platform.70 This is because the higher the 
number of men in the singles bar, the higher the chance that there will be men amongst those 
that do meet the standards of women on the other end. Hence, each woman is more likely to 
get maximum value as there would be a greater chance of each finding one meeting her 
                                                          
65 Ibid 
66 Ibid 
67 Ibid 
68 Ibid 
69 Ibid 
70 Ibid 
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standards.71 We therefore see that a situation where there is one platform instead of several is 
advocated; there appears to be more consumer benefit on a single platform. This can be 
interpreted as advocating the existence of a single company in a market, in other words a 
monopoly.  
 
Similarly, the theory can therefore support the notion that a dominant free high technology 
platform is able to provide a better service to its users. Take a search engine for example. The 
more users using it, the more data it has to use to detect search patterns and improve search 
algorithms so that search results can become more accurate.72 The more data there is, the 
higher the chances of coming across relevant data that can help improve the user experience 
for other users.      
 
We therefore understand how the use of a larger dominant platform can bring more benefit to 
users. However, in the case of free high technology, as we will observe in section 2.2, a lot of 
users engage in multi-homing; this means that they use or have the option to use several 
platforms at the same time. This is because they are not tied to any particular platform 
emotionally as they have not had to pay for any of their services.  
 
One can therefore argue, that when it comes to free high technology, the simultaneous 
existence of several platforms should still allow all platforms to improve efficiency and 
quality. This is because many platforms should be able to share all users due to this ‘multi-
                                                          
71 Ibid 
72 We will discuss the idea of search engines improving the accuracy of their results based on large scale of 
users further in section 3.4.1 
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homing’ nature. Hence, it can be argued that dominance of a single platform is not necessary 
for consumer benefit on this basis. But, how good is multi-homing for consumer benefit 
really? The economics of two-sided analysis has in fact revealed that, especially when it 
comes to intermediary platforms that operate online, multi-homing is less efficient than a 
situation where single-homing exists.73 This is because there is an imminent possibility of the 
same people on the two sides of the market being matched across different platforms; 
resources are therefore wasted on achieving the same match or outcome multiple times.74  
 
Hence, two-sided theory, so to speak, advocates increasing network effects and allowing the 
concentration of power in a particular, say search engine, for the sake of better levels of 
efficiency. This is especially possible given the fact that, as we will see later, competition 
authorities are meant to take into consideration any potential gains in efficiencies resulting in 
mergers which could in turn benefit consumers; for example efficiency could lead to lower 
average costs and therefore possibly lower prices.75 The authorities need to balance the 
different considerations with each other. Hence, two-sided theory could consider network 
effects in a much more positive light as opposed to a factor that will be a threat to 
competition. However, other theories may suggest, as we will see, that efficiency from 
having a large number of users can disappear at some point and therefore become adverse for 
consumer welfare. Two-sided markets have been described as the continuous ‘reuse of a core 
component to achieve economies of scale while reducing the cost of creating a wide variety 
                                                          
73 B Caillaud & B Jullien ‘Chicken and Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers’ (2003) 24 
RAND J Econ 309, 310  
74 Ibid 
75 See E Elhauge and D Geradin Global Competition Law and Economics (Second Edition, Hart Publishing 
2011) 516 
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of complementary components.’76 However, at some point economies of scale can diminish 
as the size of the network gets larger.77  
 
This can happen in free high technology industries where, for instance with social networks, 
as more and more people join the platforms there is more congestion which in turn leads to 
slower services on the platform website which subsequently leads to a lower rated user 
experience.78 However, given this possibility, there is very little evidence in general literature 
that suggests congestion and slow user experience are major issues of complaint amongst 
users. Modern internet speeds and bandwidths possess high capacity for significant traffic so 
that slow user experiences are unlikely to occur. 
 
However, efficiency arising from the existence of a single large platform in a market would 
also cover any efficiency that the user experiences. Sometimes a larger platform that absorbs 
complements79 means that users can save time by simply reaching a single point from where 
they gain access to all services, a single point for customer service and by not having to 
search for competitors’ complements.80 In turn, users’ use of the dominant platform’s 
complements can lead to more efficiency on the part of the platform itself. Having a large 
platform with an absorbed complement can also have unique efficiency effects in terms of 
                                                          
76 C Baldwin & C Woodard ‘The architecture of platforms: a unified view’ in Annabelle Gawer (ed) Platforms, 
Markets and Innovation (Edward Elgar Publishing 2009) 19 
77 Delegation of the European Commission, ‘Roundtable on two-sided markets; a note by the Delegation of the 
European Commission’ DAF/COMP/WD (2009) 16 
78 Ibid 
79 An example of this could be a search engine acquiring a video streaming company or an operating system 
acquiring a video communications service and then subsequently incorporating them on to the main search 
engine and operating system platforms respectively.  
80 See Thomas R Eisenmann, Geoffrey Parker & Marshall Van Alstyne ‘Opening Platforms: how, when and 
why?’ in Annabelle Gawer (ed) Platforms, Markets and Innovation (Edward Elgar Publishing 2009) 146 
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resources; for example there are economies of scope in customer acquisition activities.81 For 
instance, one advertising campaign can cover both the main product and its complements at 
the same time; in other words less resources are used to communicate information about the 
products to the public.82  
 
Given the arguments above, whilst it is reasonable to conclude that there are efficiency gains 
that can translate into better quality, there is an argument that multi-homing may in fact be 
preferred by platforms themselves. Theory can explain how multi-homing is good for 
competitors in the market as opposed to consumers. It has been postulated that whilst single-
homing leads to more efficiency and lower prices for consumers, the existence of multi-
homing is preferable from the point of view of two-sided platforms.83 Single-homing can 
usually be a result of charging a price for joining the platform.84 Once a price is charged, 
users of the platform feel locked-in and would rather not use other platforms as they would 
have to invest more money.85 Hence, there is likely to be strong competition on price, leading 
to overall lower profits. With multi-homing however, the lack of joining fee means that 
platforms can take advantage of each others members and would therefore have access to a 
larger database of users.86 This in turn would lead to overall larger profits for the platforms.87 
This appears to match with the current reality of users being able to multi-home amongst 
online platforms. However, the reality is also that, although consumers could multi-home 
                                                          
81 See Steven J Davis, Jack MacCrisken & Kevin M Murphy ‘Economic perspectives on software design: PC 
operating systems and platforms’ in David Evans (ed) Microsoft , Antitrust and the New Economy: Selected 
Essays (Kluwer 2002) 361 
82 Ibid 
83 Ibid 
84 Ibid 
85 Ibid 
86 Ibid 
87 Ibid 
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should they wish, they do not always do so. For example, we will see literature in Chapter 3 
expressing numerical evidence suggesting that multi-homing in search did not take place as 
much; searchers tend to stick to a particular search engine. We will also see how behavioural 
economics explains certain aspects of consumer behaviour that make them unwilling to 
multi-home and test alternative services even if it is free to do so. 88  
 
Furthermore, it is also common knowledge that a small number of social networks (that do 
not charge a fee for having social network accounts) extensively dominate the market for 
social networks.89 For example, Facebook and Youtube are listed as most used with 
approximately 1.5 billion visits per month, whilst the third most popular site is Twitter with 
only 400 million visits per month.90 There is a huge gap between the top two and the rest, 
making Facebook and YouTube appear to have huge market shares. However, market power 
is arguably even more concentrated. From a competition law analysis perspective, it is likely 
that YouTube and Facebook will be considered to be in separate markets as they still offer 
very different types of social services that are not substitutable (we will explore similar 
analyses in more detail in Chapter 2). Given this, a company like Facebook would have very 
few competitors in its market. Also, Instagram is listed as the fourth most visited site. Given 
that Instagram is also owned by Facebook, the social network market would appear even 
more concentrated.   
 
                                                          
88 See section 3.3.3.1. 
89 See  eBizMBA ‘Top 15 Most Popular Social Networking Sites’ (eBizMBA May 2017) 
http://www.ebizmba.com/articles/social-networking-websites accessed on 15th May 2017;  
90 Ibid 
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Hence, the reality of the platforms that this thesis is concerned with is an environment 
dominated by single-homing. However, as we have just seen this is still good for consumers, 
but perhaps not for the platform as a business itself. It leads to more efficiency as just seen. 
 
Given our discussions above, we can conclude at this point that a dominant free high 
technology service with increasing market power can be highly beneficial for users. They can 
provide more efficiency. More importantly, a platform having a large scale can use it to 
provide better quality results and matches for users. Whilst multi-homing may be beneficial 
for competitors in the market, it may not be for consumers.   
 
2.2.3 How two-sided theory explains the inherent innovative nature of two-sided platforms 
One of the main arguments put forward in this thesis is that the increasingly large size of a 
free high technology company is what allows them to provide highly innovative services to 
the benefit of consumers. There are good reasons for this proposition and the price 
mechanism present on two-sided platforms especially may help explain why platforms in the 
high technology industry need to remain innovative or provide a consistently high level of 
quality.  
 
One of the unique characteristics of a two-sided platform is the effect of a price change; a 
price change will not only have an effect on the demand for the relevant product but also 
affect the demand for the product on the other side of the platform. 91 For instance, a price 
                                                          
91 See David S. Evans ‘Two-Sided Markets’ in Mark W. Nelson (ed) Market Definition in Antitrust: Theory and 
Case Studies- (ABA Book Publishing 2012) 
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rise on one side leading to less demand on that side would therefore lead to lower demand on 
the other side. This logically means that the two sided platform faces a potential loss of 
customers on both sides which is something that a traditional analysis of a single sided 
business would not take into account.  
 
The main point here is that two sided-theory explains how the adverse effect of increasing 
price is twofold compared to a one-sided company. Similarly, the adverse effect of 
decreasing quality or innovativeness would also be twofold.  The loss in customers in the 
additional side is an additional issue that the two-sided platform will need to be considered in 
terms of its future total profits and therefore will have an impact on the future actions it 
would take. Hence, a free high technology platform would think much more carefully about 
compromising quality given the proportionately larger loss of customers. Logically, it would 
rather work on increasing quality so it can increase its clientele to a proportionately larger 
extent. This in conjunction with the fact that there are no monetary switching costs for users 
to switch to other platforms, free high technology platforms are likely to think twice before 
making any compromises on quality.92  
 
Therefore, the motivation to keep innovation and quality to a high level appears even graver 
in free high technology markets given some further pricing theories on the operation of two-
sided platforms in general. There are particular pricing methods that can be taken advantage 
of in a lot of two sided markets to increase profits for the platform, but cannot be taken 
                                                          
92 In Chapter 3 we will see how the EU Commission espouses the idea that switching costs are really low in free 
high technology markets and therefore competitive pressure is high. Although the literature and this thesis does 
not fully agree with this, it cannot be denied that the specific lack of monetary costs for users to some extent 
puts free high technology companies under pressure to be more innovative than their competitors. There are 
however, other types of switching costs that are high in these markets which will be discussed in Chapter 3.  
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advantage of by free high technology markets. For example, some two-sided platforms can 
charge both sides to maximize profits,93 but in free platforms, one side is never charged. 
Hence there is more of a reason to keep innovation high to keep attracting more users so that 
it can increase its value to other sides of the platform to increase profits.  
 
Another phenomenon of price effects in some platform industries can also help explain how 
the platform can manage to raise prices significantly on the paying side (and thereby increase 
revenues) whilst not adversely affecting the size of the clientele on the free side. Again, this 
is by keeping the level of innovation high. It has been suggested that where prices are very 
low (or non-existent) on one side of the market and a large number of clients are present on 
that side, a price rise on the other side does not necessarily mean that there will be a reduction 
of demand on the other side.94 The fact that there is a massive clientele on the low priced side 
makes the demand on the other side of the market inelastic; hence even if prices are put up on 
the higher priced side demand on that side may lessen only to a minor extent (and perhaps not 
lessen at all) because the value of the large clientele on the other side is valued highly and the 
higher price tag may be considered worth it.95 For example, a very well-known and popular 
online music streaming service which has a significant number of users/listeners could raise 
the price for advertisers without losing a proportionally equal number of advertisers as most 
advertisers are likely to pay the higher price due to the value they put on the large database of 
                                                          
93 A good example of this is the video game industry. Both players and video game creators need to pay the 
platform and this is how the platform makes its own profits. However, in the case of free high technology, the 
custom is to never charge anything to the user side. Hence, in order for the platform to make high profits, it 
needs to charge advertisers very significant sums. The only way they can do this is if they can provide the 
advertisers with a very large number of users to view their advertisements. In order to attract a large number of 
users in the first place, it is very important to keep quality and innovation high. In the video game industry, the 
users pay for a console and games and are therefore financially invested in the platform. Free users cannot be 
locked-in this way and the only way to keep them is a good amount of innovation.  
94 Janusz Ordover ‘Comments on Evans & Schmalensee’s “The Industrial Organization of Market with Two-
Sided Platforms”’ (2007) 3(1) Competition Policy International 180, 185 
95 Ibid 
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listeners; demand is quite inelastic. But again this is only possible if there is a large number 
of users on the site who are kept attracted by an innovative service. This can therefore explain 
why free high technology markets would have high motivations to provide increasingly 
innovative services. Such a model is also somewhat reminiscent of widely used social 
networks and search engines, where the user database is massive and therefore is a great 
attraction for advertisers despite the price of advertising; this phenomenon is somewhat 
reflected by the constantly rising advertising revenues of social networks and search 
engines.96 Of course, in order to keep the user database massive, again it would be reasonable 
to conclude that the platform would have to maintain and improve the quality of the service 
especially given that there is no price competition.  
 
Finally, theory on multi-homing and single-homing also explains how some platforms 
operate to attract the paying side by focussing always to keep the side that pays nothing 
happy. The theory purports that a two-sided platform will usually aggressively target the 
single-homing side; in other words the platform is more likely to offer significantly lower 
prices (or even prices of zero) to the single-homing side in order to attract and maintain their 
presence on the platform.97 In the case of multi-homing there is no need for the platform to 
provide as much significant incentives (for instance in the form of lower prices) as multi-
homers use several platforms at the same time. However, with single-homing, once a 
significant part of the single-homing side is captured through such aggressive targeting, they 
provide a large externality to the multi-homing side of the market and will in then turn attract 
                                                          
96 See  Miriam Gottfried, ‘Facebook and Google: The $230 Billion Question’ (The Wall Street Journal, 12 April 
2016) < http://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-and-google-the-230billion-question-1460485612> accessed 26th 
May 2016 
97 See B Caillaud & B Jullien ‘Chicken and Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers’ (2003) 
24 RAND J Econ 309 
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more multi-homers to the platform.98 Again, attracting single-homers who do not pay will 
come down to the quality of service provided by the platform, which needs to be high to 
maintain them.  
 
2.2.4 ‘£0’ price of free high technology product/service and innovation 
In this section so far, we have focused considerably on showing that large free high 
technology companies are capable of and likely to provide a significant amount of innovation 
to the benefit of consumers more so than a situation of multiple smaller competitors would be 
able to. However, the notion that all large companies in general (whether or not they are in 
the free high technology industry or they are two-sided markets) with massive leading market 
share are good for consumers in terms of innovation has been present in the literature for 
quite some time.99 So one challenging question that could arise is why should the free high 
technology market be considered as uniquely separate from the other industries when other 
industries can also be just as innovative with large monopolistic companies?  
 
Well the first point to make here is the fact that the services are not only innovative but they 
have no monetary cost to the consumer in this particular industry.100 That is a characteristic 
                                                          
98 Ibid 
99 See for example Joseph Schumpeter Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Harper 1942); Richard Gilbert, 
‘Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the Competition-Innovation Debate’, in Adam B. Jaffe, Josh 
Lerner and Scott Stern (eds), Innovation Policy and the Economy, vol 6 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006) 
p.159- although the author in this article does not come to any definitive conclusion on whether monopolies are 
good for innovation, he clearly states that there is no evidence to show that competition encourages incentives to 
innovate. There is however, definitely evidence to show that the larger the business, the more likely investment 
in research and development will be higher (indicating a better possibility of innovation); J Sidak & D Teece, 
‘Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law’ (2009) 5 J.C.L.& E. 581- the authors suggest that dynamic efficiencies 
of large companies need to be taken into consideration as they can mean better innovation for consumers at the 
end;  
100 Such a practice is not to be confused with predatory pricing. See Evermaps v. Google 
, Paris Court of Appeals, November 25, 2011- it was acceptable and rational for multi-sided market platforms to 
offer free products/services on one side of the market as long as they recovered their costs from a paying side (in 
 
69 
 
that immediately sets it apart. However, it has been argued that consumers in general would 
rather choose an expensive product that is highly innovative, than a cheaper product that is of 
mediocre quality.101 In other words, price is an irrelevant factor in highly innovative 
industries and so the fact that consumers are receiving a service that is free should not set the 
free high technology industry apart.  Of course, this would obviously be a broad 
generalization to make especially given that if one were to rephrase the idea to say that 
consumers would not care how high prices got as long as it was innovative, it would not 
sound convincing.  However, it would of course also be reasonable to say that should the 
price increase match or stay below the level of improvement in innovation, consumer benefit 
at the least remains intact.102 On the other hand this gives rise to another problem which is the 
consumer’s inability to assess quality in relation to price.103 It is unlikely to be easy to make 
such an assessment.104 
 
Therefore, in markets which are highly innovative and involve companies with increasing 
market power but charge for the service, there can be uncertainty with regards to the 
price/quality issue. Especially in the case of a monopolist which has more relative unfettered 
                                                          
this case advertising revenuews). Also this business model is used by competitors in the same industry 
throughout.  
101 See Mark A. Lemley, ‘Industry-Specific Antitrust Policy for Innovation’ (2011) Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 637. 
The author indicates that innovation is probably the largest driver in an economy more so than other factors (like 
lowering prices). He asks a rhetorical question ‘Closer to today, ask yourself whether you would rather have a 
monopolistically-priced iPod or a perfectly competitive market for 8-track tapes?’ He appears to be making a 
point that prices may not matter as much if the product is really advanced. Note however, that he does not fully 
support the notion that innovation is spurred by monopolistic markets. It varies from industry to industry. 
102 See for example Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD), ‘The Role and 
Measurement of Quality in Competition Analysis’ (DAF/COMP(2013)17, Oct. 28, 2013) 44, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/Quality-in-competition-analysis-2013.pdf ; ‘In well-informed and effectively 
competitive markets, price plays an important role in signalling quality differences to consumers and enabling 
them to make rational decisions about the trade-off between higher price and higher quality’. Note here that 
consumers in competitive markets are considered to be able to assess quality and relate it to the price.  
103 A Ezrachi & M Stucke ‘The Curious case of Competition and Quality’ (2015) JAE 1, 2-3- the authors 
provide a comprehensive summary of the problems associated with assessing quality.  
104 Ibid 
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ability to raise prices, there is a risk that the price increase will be considerably above the 
level of innovation.105 In that case consumer benefit is likely to be reduced despite any 
increases in innovation. However, in the free high technology markets, the price is always £0. 
So any innovations arising from free high technology monopolies are more likely to result in 
overall increases in consumer benefit; there is no risk of a price increase that would offset 
that consumer benefit.   
 
For these reasons, the freeness of the technology should be considered as the additional factor 
which further separates the free high technology industry from other innovative industries. 
The £0 cost price shows that it is likely to deliver more consumer welfare with its innovations 
than other technology industries can.   
 
2.2.5 Big Data, Privacy Risks and Consumer Welfare in a competition law framework 
perspective; does this negate the idea that free high technologies have no costs to consumers? 
We have so far discussed how free high technologies are good for consumer welfare. 
However, we acknowledged before that whilst there is no monetary cost to the consumer, 
there are other costs according to recent literature in terms of privacy. We discuss these in 
this section as this can potentially negatively affect consumer welfare within the context of 
big data. However, before we move on to explaining big data it is important that we mention 
                                                          
105 See also how the same issue can happen in a competitive market. See R Gilbert & S Sunshine, 'Incorporating 
Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets’ (1995) 63 Antitrust L.J. 
569, 572- ‘Even when consumers unambiguously prefer more attribute of a product, the net effect on consumers 
is indeterminate when costs are taken into account. For example, even though consumers value greater product 
diversity, competition among firms to win consumers by providing a greater number of products can result in 
higher costs that make consumers worse off’. The authors appear to refer to the higher cost pushing price above 
a level where it goes beyond the value provided by the product to consumers. Hence, there is always some 
uncertainty as to the appropriateness of the price relative to the value of the good. In the case of goods/services 
that are free, consumer benefit will almost definitely be high since there is no monetary cost passed to the 
consumer.  
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an important point about how we look at privacy within this section. When we speak of 
privacy risks and intrusions or anything similar in meaning, we do not refer to actual breaches 
of privacy law as those are already covered by protective laws. Privacy risks and intrusions in 
this section refer instead to the potential reduction in privacy which leads to a reduction in 
consumer welfare. For example, data collected from search users utilised for highly targeted 
advertisements may reduce users’ sense of privacy; but this is not necessarily a breach of 
privacy law as long as the processing of the data in that way has been agreed by users and 
complies with data protection law. It can however, be perceived to be a reduction in 
consumer welfare. That is what we are focused on here as that is more relevant to 
competition law.  
 
Big data ‘refers to large amounts of data produced very quickly by a high number of diverse 
sources…either…created by people or generated by machines…’106 and is subject to ‘cost-
effective, innovative forms of information processing for enhanced insight and decision 
making.’107All free high technologies collect such vast amounts of data and process them 
efficiently in a way to provide a particular service. Search engines and social networks for 
example engage in it to deliver targeted advertisements. A lot of this big data is information 
                                                          
106 European commission ‘Digital Single Marker; Big Data’ available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/big-data accessed on 28 July 2017  
107 Nir Kshetri ‘Big data's impact on privacy, security and consumer welfare’ (2014) 38 Telecommunications 
Policy 1134- the author has extracted this from another source referred to in a footnote; Also see big data’s 
generally described characteristics- the four ‘Vs’: velocity, variety, volume and veracity (https://oup.silverchair-
cdn.com/oup/backfile/Content_public/Journal/jeclap/8/6/10.1093_jeclap_lpx039/2/lpx039f01.png?Expires=150
1871021&Signature=Rz9wmEn8egFW~~QrFC-
jhuAbwHsN7qpBECvQxP8KdZmCumr4a7y51hlX8~7XHEVNv0bNrt8HFXYct~YqkoY39GPTUw-
dxj7Q~7bpSz4xoKWCV1ZxsE3zUGTAAZ5-
sJREnXXYtOVg4jjoBPlx1q~SWMCqc4lIgFIE2jn9cwVeYAt5sNfgYqVRZloDQGYTe5XUdTU3g341IKxZN
HqF1WsORrsIKhcMxXhhj89CGm-sO5-pfCK5nWGf-DtKqrYqqrEN-gN-
PH6BxSOd0Aex4yQjOhUd2QOwk7x29lClu0zbVUEIBS3iPCn8cfdqyREzBWAD0gaQdqfEbT2rLuQ9h~JMiQ
__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAIUCZBIA4LVPAVW3Q)  
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on consumers/users that is personal. In other words the privacy of users is put at risk in 
exchange for these zero-price services.  
 
However, it is important to understand at this point that the big data issue can be looked at in 
two different contexts that are important to distinguish from each other. Firstly, it can be 
looked at from the angle of privacy. A merged company becomes larger in totality and is able 
to collect more personal information than previously, causing more possible intrusions of 
privacy. This is what we are concerned with in this section; big data and how it affects 
consumers’ privacy.  
 
Secondly, it can be looked at it in the context of market power; a larger merged company 
with access to larger sets of personal information can provide a more tailored service to 
consumers, hence having a huge competitive advantage over its competitors. We expand on 
this in section 3.4.1 and as will be seen is an important part of our evaluation of the EU 
Commission’s approach to free high technology investigations. However, it is not discussed 
in this section as here, we address the direct effect on consumer privacy as a result of big data 
as opposed to the notion of increased customisation for consumers.  
 
Finally, before we continue, it is important to remind ourselves that this thesis is about 
understanding the EU Commission’s limited approach to its analysis of substantive 
arguments in free high technology cases. As we will see throughout Chapter 3, the EU 
Commission has been lenient towards large digital companies. Therefore, the more likely 
explanation behind the EU Commission’s approach is that it believes that the digital services 
are free and innovative. The theory that these services are not free because they cost in terms 
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of privacy of consumer data is an unlikely explanation behind the EU Commission’s 
approach. If this was the case, the EU Commission would unlikely be lenient towards large 
digital companies. Given the scope and aim of the thesis, the big data and privacy issues are 
from a logical standpoint, irrelevant. However, the big data and privacy issues are prevalent 
in the current literature. They therefore need to be addressed to ensure that our premise for 
the next chapters that free high technologies are good for consumer welfare because they are 
free and innovative is not on shaky foundations. 
 
We start by discussing the dangers posed by big data mentioned in the literature in the 
context of competition law. We then discuss the potential flaws and uncertainties in the 
theories that big data and privacy issues are to be part of competition analysis. We then 
proceed to explain why these issues should not negate our premise that free high technologies 
are good for consumers.  
 
2.2.5.1 The potential risks of big data in the context of privacy 
In this section we provide examples of risks to consumers as a result of big data that have 
been put forward in the literature.  
 
One of the arguments is that there is too much personal information in the hands of 
companies that may not have the appropriate means of keeping that information safe.108  
 
                                                          
108 Ibid 
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Another example is that there is an asymmetry of information in the sense that digital 
companies would have more information on users and have an unfair disadvantage; by 
having access to so much detailed information on users’ tastes and preferences, 
advertisements may become more persuasive by speaking to the particular user directly 
without the actual product or service actually meeting the needs of the user and it being 
unnecessary.109 A specific instance could be an insurance company analysing data to find out 
that someone could potentially have a serious illness and then try to sell an unnecessary 
insurance policy to the user.110   
 
Furthermore, there could be more effective price discrimination; with analysis of big data, 
companies would probably be able to figure out which consumers are willing to pay the 
highest prices and therefore charge them accordingly.111  This is said to, overall, shift surplus 
from consumers to producers and potentially reduce consumer welfare.112 
 
Finally, there is also the risk of the data analysis itself being erroneous and the analysis 
generating inaccurate conclusions on the subject of the data. 113  
 
                                                          
109 See fore example, A Ezrachi & M Stucke ‘The rise of behavioural discrimination’ (2016) 37(12) ECLR 485, 
490 
110 Nir Kshetri ‘Big data's impact on privacy, security and consumer welfare’ (2014) 38 Telecommunications 
Policy 1134 
111 Howard A Shelanski ‘Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the Internet’ (2013) 161 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1663, 1680 
112 Ibid- the author cites this information from ‘R. Preston McAfee, Price Discrimination (discussing the welfare 
effects of price discrimination), in 1 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 465, 480-83 (ABA 
Section of Antitrust Law ed., 2008)’ 
113 For more information, please refer to K Waterman & P Bruening ‘Big data analytics: risks and 
responsibilities’ (2014) 4(2) IDPL 89. 
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2.2.5.2 Problems with the privacy risk argument in relation to consumer welfare and 
competition law 
As we have seen, the current literature is besotted with the lack of privacy as a cost to users 
and consumers for an otherwise fully free product/service. However, it is not exactly clear 
and definitive how it affects consumer welfare in the specific context of competition law.     
 
One of the most obvious issues is the question of whether consumers are indifferent to 
privacy issues. If they are, that is likely to mean that the level of associated consumer welfare 
is not affected by privacy issues in the first place. Those who do not want to interfere in 
privacy issues believe so because they believe that if consumers really were concerned with 
privacy, they would show it through their actions; but they do not as consumers continue 
using digital services that collect data on them.114 However, there is growing evidence to 
suggest that in reality most consumers are concerned with privacy issues and would rather 
want to give up less privacy for the very services they receive from these digital companies; 
in other words, at best, consumers are resigned.115  
 
Whilst this is the case, we need to also consider the counterfactual where all digital services 
stop collecting data from consumers. Could this affect the quality of the service adversely? 116 
Would greater protection from privacy risks lead to a considerable decline in the quality of 
search results? Would consumers then think that the high quality search results are definitely 
                                                          
114 M Stucke & A Grunes Big Data and Competition Policy (OUP Oxford 2016) 58 
115 A Acquisti, L John & G Loewenstein ‘What is Privacy worth?’ (2013) 42(2) The Journal of Legal Studies 
249; Inge Graef EU Competition Law, Data Protection and Online Platforms: Data as Essential Facility 
(Wolters Kluwer 2016) 322; T Singh & M Hill ‘Consumer privacy and the Internet in Europe: a view from 
Germany’ (2003) Journal of Consumer Marketing 20(7) 634; M Stucke & A Grunes Big Data and 
Competition Policy (OUP Oxford 2016) 57 
116 We will see in Chapter 3 how, for example, search engines are able to provide much higher quality search 
results because of the collection and analysis of big data. 
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worth giving up a level of protection from privacy risks? If quality does go down 
significantly, then there is a case to say that protections from privacy risks need to be lowered 
to increase consumer welfare. Hence, such questions need to also be considered.  
 
However, the problem is that currently there is no way of ascertaining the answer to these 
questions117 and consumers do not have access to enough information that would allow them 
to assess what level of privacy is worth giving up for the zero-price service in return.118 
Similarly a competition authority which has to prove harm, would find it difficult to analyse 
the privacy issue.119  
 
Secondly, competition law can only be concerned with consumer welfare from a particular 
perspective. It is only when there is an increase in market power and there is a possibility of 
reduced effective competition in the market that competition law comes into play. In other 
words, in terms of Big Data, a relevant question would be is consumer welfare reduced or 
increased due to the potential foreclosure of competitors? Reflecting on this question, let us 
take a scenario where the authorities have blocked a merger or a unilateral action of a 
                                                          
117 G Colangelo & M Maggiolino ‘Data Protection in Attention Markets: Protecting Privacy through 
Competition?’ (2017) 8(6) JECL&Pract 363- ‘So far, as the privacy paradox shows, no empirical study has 
clearly established that privacy-sensitive consumers would pay to use more privacy-friendly goods or would 
accept less-developed services and products in exchange for more privacy-enhancing solutions.‘ 
118 UK Competition and Markets Authority ‘The Commercial Use of Consumer Data: Report on the CMA’s 
Call for Information’(CMA June 2015) paragraph 4.39 available at 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/435817/The_commercial_use_o
f_consumer_data.pdf >accessed on 30th July 2017 
119 M Stucke & A Grunes Big Data and Competition Policy (OUP Oxford 2016) paragraph 9.13; Also see 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD), ‘Exploring the Economics of Personal 
Data: A Survey of Methodologies for Measuring Monetary Value’ (OECD Digital Economy Papers No. 220, 
DSTI/ICCP/IE/REG(2011)2/FINAL April 2 2013) available at http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5k486qtxldmq-
en.pdf?expires=1501439502&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=67A642777CCE70D4E88C9EBAF868FD9C 
accessed on 30th July 2017- when the benefit is direct and free, like with search engines, it is hard for 
competition authorities to assess the net value when there is low privacy protection. 
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dominant company. By doing so let us also say that it has prevented the foreclosure of some 
competitors and also allowed a prevention of decreased potential for new entrants to enter the 
market. From a privacy perspective, this is an auspicious situation as it means that 
competitors who offer more privacy and better handling of big data to enter the market and 
benefit consumers are provided a better chance to compete in the market.120 This seems to, 
for example, be some of the thinking behind the German Cartel Office’s approach to its 
investigation into the conditions imposed by Facebook on its users in terms of the amount of 
data collected on them.121 The present accusation appears to be that Facebook is abusing its 
dominant position by forcing users to accept a high level of intrusion of privacy.122  
 
The only problem is that by finding abuse or blocking a merger the privacy issue will not be 
resolved as the majority of players in the industry collect data and depend on it for 
survival.123 For example, Google’s main competitors Bing and Yahoo! both collect data as 
well. It has been said that what happens in such industries is that the incumbent comes up 
with a particular business model. In the case of free high technologies this model involves 
collecting increased amounts of data for targeted advertising which generates revenues. 
                                                          
120 Howard A Shelanski ‘Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the Internet’ (2013) 161 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1663, 1691 
121A White & K Matussek ‘Facebook investigated by Germany’s Federal Cartel Office over claims it ‘extorts’ 
personal data from users’ (Independent 3 July 2017) available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/facebook-germany-cartel-office-personal-data-user-
accounts-extorts-antitrust-eu-social-media-network-a7820331.html accessed on 30 August 2017 
122Ibid 
123 See for example Marixenia Davilla ‘Is Big Data a Different Kind of Animal? The Treatment of Big Data 
Under the EU Competition Rules’ (2017) 8(6) JECL&Pract 370- the author alerts us to the fact that whilst the 
Bundeskartellamt is investigating Facebook for unfair privacy terms as a possible abuse of dominance, 
competitors have similar privacy policies and do not offer better alternatives in terms of privacy protection. Also 
see Inge Graef EU Competition Law, Data Protection and Online Platforms: Data as Essential Facility 
(Wolters Kluwer 2016) 323- one way of making the privacy issue succeed, is by setting product variety or 
choice as a standard that competition policy is to achieve. In that way, authorities would limit actions on behalf 
of incumbents that reduce competition as it would simply reduce the number of competitors who are willing to 
offer more privacy. But as we see, the issue is that there are hardly any alternatives that do provide better 
privacy options in the first place. 
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Because this model allows the incumbent to be successful, smaller competitors follow suit 
and adopt the same model.124 They also start collecting more data to improve quality and 
develop enhanced targeted advertising. This is also a reason that it has been suggested that 
increased data protection may actually have a negative effect on users; not only could quality 
of service go down, 125 but stricter data protection will prevent smaller competitors from 
providing an equally good service. 126 
 
Furthermore, apart from the big players, a variety of websites associated with small 
companies collect data on users.127 For example, many inform consumers that the continued 
use of the website is conditional upon the placement of cookies on user computers. In other 
words competition law cannot directly remedy the big data issue.  
 
Stucke and Grunes who have both written extensively on Big Data strongly indicate this as a 
problem.128 Where consumers are concerned with the issue of privacy and data being 
collected on them, what would be expected to happen is that market forces would create 
competitors who provide better privacy and require less data collection for consumers.129 
                                                          
124 Anca D Chirita  ‘Google’s Anti-Competitive and Unfair Practices in Digital Leisure Markets’ (2015) 11(1) 
The Competition Law Review 109, 115 
125 Inge Graef EU Competition Law, Data Protection and Online Platforms: Data as Essential Facility (Wolters 
Kluwer 2016) 303 
126 J Brill ‘The intersection of consumer protection and competition in the new world of privacy’ (2011) 7(1) 
Competition Policy International 18 
127 For example see K Cukier & V Mayer-Schoenberger ‘The Rise of Big Data’ (2013) 92(3) Foreign Affairs 28, 
37- ‘lesser known “data brokers,” such as Acxiom and Experian—are amassing vast amounts of information on 
everyone and everything.’ 
128 M Stucke & A Grunes Big Data and Competition Policy (OUP Oxford 2016) 52; Also if you consider 
Howard A Shelanski ‘Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the Internet’ (2013) 161 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1663, 1691- although the author generally believes competition between digital platforms can eventually 
lead to alternatives that provide better privacy, there is still a level of intervention from consumer protection law 
required to resolve the privacy issue. 
129 K Cukier & V Mayer-Schoenberger ‘The Rise of Big Data’ (2013) 92(3) Foreign Affairs 28, 37 
 
79 
 
However, this has not happened; there is currently a lack of such competitors who provide 
privacy-enhancing services. 130 In other words, even if competition authorities were to, for 
example, prevent mergers of large digital companies that would potentially combine their 
huge big databases, consumers would simply be left with alternatives who engage in the same 
practice of collecting data on them. So the issue of privacy is not resolved.131 
 
This seems to be the reason that the EU Commission has not let the privacy issue determine 
its final decision in digital cases; Google/Doubleclick,132 Facebook/Whatsapp133 and 
Microsoft/LinkedIn134 involved the potential combination of huge sets of data on users and 
consumers, but all mergers were approved anyway.135 For example, in Google/Doubleclick it 
appeared that the issue of privacy was acknowledged but was clearly indicated not to be a 
competition issue; ‘irrespective of the approval of the merger, the new entity is obliged in its 
day to day business to respect the fundamental rights recognised by all relevant instruments 
                                                          
130 Peter Hustinx ‘Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor; Privacy and 
competitiveness in the age of big data: the interplay between data protection, competition law and consumer 
protection in the Digital Economy’(March 2014) page 11 available at 
https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/14-03-26_competitition_law_big_data_en.pdf accessed on 27th 
July 2017 
131 M Ohlhausen &  A Okuliar ‘Competition, Consumer Protection, and the right [approach] to privacy’(2015) 
80 Antitrust L J 121, 155- If blocking the merger or unilateral action cannot resolve the privacy issue, then 
competition law is not the appropriate body of law that is to deal with such issues. 
132Google/Doubleclick (Case No COMP/M.4731) [2008] paragraph 368 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4731_20080311_20682_en.pdf accessed on 24th July 
2017 
133Facebook/Whatsapp (Case No COMP/M.7217) [2014] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf accessed 
on 23rd July 2017 
134Microsoft/LinkedIn(CaseNo.M.8124)[2016]available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m8124_1349_5.pdf accessed on 28 August 2017 
135 G Colangelo & M Maggiolino ‘Data Protection in Attention Markets: Protecting Privacy through 
Competition?’ (2017) 8(6) JECL&Pract 363 
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to its users…(such as) privacy and data protection.’ 136 Hence, there are already fundamental 
rights that protect users from any extensive invasions of privacy. 
 
The most the EU Commission appears to have stated in terms of privacy issues is that the 
level of privacy can affect the quality of goods and services from a consumer point of 
view.137 However, there was no evidence to suggest that the low levels of competition in the 
market to provide privacy enhancing service was due to any anticompetitive agreements or 
abusive acts.138 Another way to look at this is that increasing the level of competition in the 
market will not necessarily affect the availability of privacy enhancing services. This again 
highlights the problem recognized by Stucke and Grunes that both incumbents and 
competitors in the market are simply not offering better levels of privacy; this can therefore 
only be resolved by direct regulation.139     
 
It is just difficult to see how competition law can resolve such privacy issues. But such 
difficulty is not just unique to the privacy issue. There could be many situations where it 
would be peculiar for competition law to interfere in a way to remedy a problem that 
consumers would face even if there was more competition in the relevant market. For 
example, let us say there is a merger between Burger King and McDonalds in the market for 
                                                          
136Google/Doubleclick (Case No COMP/M.4731) [2008] paragraph 368 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4731_20080311_20682_en.pdf accessed on 24th July 
2017 
137 See for example, Facebook/Whatsapp (Case No COMP/M.7217) [2014] paragraph 87 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf accessed 
on 23rd July 2017 
138 G Colangelo & M Maggiolino ‘Data Protection in Attention Markets: Protecting Privacy through 
Competition?’ (2017) 8(6) JECL&Pract 363 
139 Wolfgang Kerber, ‘Digital Markets, Data, and Privacy: Competition Law, Consumer Law, and Data 
Protection’ (2016) 11 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 856. Also see M Ohlhausen &  A Okuliar 
‘Competition, Consumer Protection, and the right [approach] to privacy’(2015) 80 Antitrust L J 121, 156 
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fast food burgers. There is without question, overwhelming evidence to suggest that such 
food is a long term health risk for consumers. Furthermore, consumers are fully aware of 
this.140 From a consumer welfare point of view, it would probably be best to abolish the 
industry all together. But it is very hard to picture a competition law framework designed to 
remedy the health scourge posed by the food directly. It cannot, for example, make the 
merger conditional on the two companies lowering the fat and salt content of their burgers 
and fries; it may however, make it conditional on them pledging to never engage in 
exclusivity practices by for instance, preventing Coca Cola from selling to competing burger 
fast-food restaurants who may depend on their supplies to be an effective competitor in the 
market.141 In other words, the most a competition law framework can do is ensure a better 
chance of competition, which in turn may enable the likely entrance of a healthier competitor. 
But there is no guarantee that a healthier competitor will enter the market. In the absence of 
this, competition law would have to allow both incumbents and competitors to continue 
serving unhealthy junk food and can do nothing about it. There is separate legislation, 
however, that can be imposed to protect consumers in such situations.142  
 
 
                                                          
140 See for example Allison Schiff  ‘Do consumers care about privacy in practice? The FTC digs into the debate’ 
(Ad Exchanger 14 January 2016) available at <https://adexchanger.com/data-exchanges/consumers-care-
privacy-practice-ftc-digs-debate/ >  accessed on 30 July 2017 – the author here draws a comparison between 
unhealthy food and privacy; “There seems to something more complex at play here and I think we see it in other 
contexts like, ‘I care about my health, but I still eat a cheeseburger,’ or ‘I care about the environment, but I still 
drive a four-wheel drive,’” Tene said. “Yes, consumers are ignorant and they just don’t know, but I think 
[Turow’s] surveys and research show that the more informed people are, the more resigned they become. Maybe 
it’s better to just be blissfully ignorant.” 
141 G Colangelo & M Maggiolino ‘Data Protection in Attention Markets: Protecting Privacy through 
Competition?’ (2017) 8(6) JECL&Pract 363- ‘…antitrust law focuses on business practices that worsen 
effective competition and not on those market structures and features that determine a failure in the supply of a 
given product or service.’ In other words market failures that do not stem from the level of competition in the 
market are not to be remedied by competition law. The lack of healthy versions of fast food in the same relevant 
market cannot be fixed by competition law.  
142 See for example Nick Triggle ‘UK pushes ahead with sugar tax’(BBC, 5 December 2016) available at  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-38212608> accessed on 30th July 2017 
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2.2.5.3 Privacy issues and the premise that free high technologies are good for consumers 
 
There are quite a few uncertainties as to the privacy issue which make it unreasonable for us 
to allow it to negate the premise that free high technologies are good for consumers in a 
thesis about understanding the EU Commission’s unique approach to analysis. 
 
Firstly, the issue of prices going up for consumers and making them purchase unnecessary 
products due to companies tracking them and collecting data on them is excluded from the 
scope of this thesis. We are concerned with free high technologies where there are no prices. 
Hence one of the remaining privacy related problems this thesis would be concerned with 
appears to be the sensation of discomfort and insecurity that someone feels when releasing 
their data. This is of course a legitimate problem that needs to be resolved; personal data in 
the wrong hands can be dangerous. However, how this is a competition law issue is difficult 
to understand. Both large and small firms collect equally sensitive and personal data on users 
and consumers. It is surely much easier and effective to have, for example, cyber security 
regulation directly oblige all companies to put up effective protective barriers around the data 
they collect to ensure it does not get into the wrong hands. Competition law frameworks 
would be slow and ineffective in comparison. The most it can do is prevent an incumbent 
from getting larger, allow more competition in the market and hope that at least some of the 
competitors will offer better privacy to users. There is no certainty as to whether this will 
actually happen. Instead, direct regulation would compel all incumbents and competitors to 
offer better privacy and security. They would have no choice.   
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Secondly, the most gaping problem is the fact that competitors, let alone incumbents, 
currently do not focus on providing better privacy. They all collect data on users and 
consumers. More competition is unlikely to resolve the privacy issues. However, there are 
some theories of harm that show that increases in market power can make privacy levels even 
lower than they already are. For example, a merger between two big digital companies would 
lead to more data collected on individuals meaning a higher level of privacy being invaded.143 
However, there is very little clarity as to what the adverse effects on consumers would be. 144 
The dissenting opinion of Pamela Jones Harbour in the Google/Doubleclick FTC 
investigation states: 
 
‘The truth is, we really do not know what Google/DoubleClick can or will do with its 
trove of information about consumers’ Internet habits. The merger creates a firm with 
vast knowledge of consumer preferences, subject to very little accountability.’ 145 
 
It therefore appears uncertain in what ways digital big data companies harm consumers for 
services that they do not charge. Yes, they hold vast amounts of personal/sensitive data on 
users. But what practices or actions are they engaging in that actually harm consumers in 
terms of the use of data? Until these claims are specified and explained with relevant 
evidence, the notion that the increased encroachment on privacy through a merger or 
                                                          
143Pamela Jones Harbour ‘In the matter of Google/DoubleClick F.T.C. File No. 071-0170; Dissenting Statement 
of Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour’ (Federal Trade Commission, 20th December 2007) available at 
<https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/statement-matter-
google/doubleclick/071220harbour_0.pdf >accessed on 3rd August 2017 
144Ibid 
145Ibid 10 
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unilateral action that increases the incumbent’s trove of data, would not be based on solid 
foundations.  
 
However, in fairness, it may have been convincingly shown that the large collection of data 
threatens fundamental civil rights and ability to participate in political life and leads to 
discrimination.146 As indicated earlier it increases the risk of cyber incidents in the form of 
data breaches.147 Whilst it would be tempting and interesting to delve into these issues 
further, these are again beyond the scope of this thesis. The reason goes back to the same 
conclusion that competition law is unable to cover such issues. Protection of fundamental 
rights is considerably beyond the remit of competition law and a recent example of a 
competition authority case may help illustrate this. Below, we consider a case concerning 
media plurality which, whilst not formally a fundamental right, is considered very important 
for keeping citizens well-informed in a well-functioning democracy. 148 
 
The UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is currently investigating the full 
acquisition of Sky plc by 21st Century Fox.149 Interestingly, the merger has already been 
cleared at the European level, but the CMA had been asked by the Secretary of State to 
                                                          
146 F Bosco, N Creemers, V Ferasaris, D Guagnin & B Koops ‘Profiling: A persistent core issue of Data 
Protection and Privacy’ in S Gutwirth, R Leenes & P de Hert (eds) Reforming European Data Protection Law 
(Springer 2015) p 10 & 15 
147 G Skoumu & L Leonard ‘On-line Behavioural Tracking: What may change after the Legal Reform on 
Personal Data Protection’ in S Gutwirth, R Leenes & P de Hert (eds) Reforming European Data Protection Law 
(Springer 2015) 45 
148 The Office of Communications (Ofcom) ‘Measurement framework for media plurality: Ofcom’s advice to 
the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport’(5th November 2015) 1 available at 
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0024/84174/measurement_framework_for_media_plurality_st
atement.pdf accessed on 28th November 2017 
149 Competition & Markets Authority(CMA) ‘ANTICIPATED ACQUISITION BY 21st CENTURY FOX, INC 
OF SKY PLC -Issues statement’ (10th October 2017) available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/59db8a2840f0b63118216841/fox-sky-issues-statement.pdf 
accessed on 25th November 2017  
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further consider whether the merger would be in the public interest in the context of genuine 
commitment to broadcasting standards objectives and sufficient media plurality. 150  The 
Secretary of State has the power to do this under Article 5 of the Enterprise Act 2002 
(Protection of Legitimate Interests) Order 2003 (the Order). 151 Furthermore, the CMA has 
made it very clear that it is not investigating competition issues in terms of this merger.152  
The scope of its investigation is very different here.  
 
Some compelling inferences can be drawn from this on the scope of competition law. Firstly, 
it appears that media plurality would not be considered a competition law issue. Otherwise 
the CMA or European Commission would have already considered it on their own accord as 
part of their regular investigations. However, instead the Secretary of State had to use specific 
powers to refer the case to the CMA in order for media plurality to be specifically 
investigated.  
 
What could this say about competition authorities’ ability to consider privacy issues and 
effect on fundamental rights? One could argue that compared to these issues, media plurality 
can be considered much closer to the scope of competition law issues. If competition is 
reduced, it automatically means fewer players in the market which then reduces plurality of 
persons in control of media. There would be fewer viewpoints available to people, who 
would then likely suffer from a smaller number of biased viewpoints. As consumers, this is a 
loss and a negative for consumer welfare.  
                                                          
150 Ibid Para 9 
151 Ibid Para 7 
152 Ibid Para 10 
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Of course, the analysis is much more complicated and sophisticated than this and requires a 
consideration of how much particular media proprietors exercise influence on the editorial 
viewpoint of the news. 153 However, the point is that if media plurality itself is not considered 
a competition law issue, how can privacy and fundamental rights be? As explained, at least 
with media plurality one can draw a connection with the number of competitors in the market 
and possibly link the idea of well-informed citizens with consumer welfare. Privacy and 
fundamental rights issues related to big data are a result of analysis that reaches beyond 
simply looking at the number of competitors in the market. It requires the consideration of 
other elements such as thoroughly analysing algorithms, how they work and how they may be 
adversely affecting our ability as citizens to make the best choices and act freely. It is quite 
apparent that such issues are way beyond the remit of the more conventional competition law 
focuses such as innovation and quality.  
 
Finally, the CMA’s current responsibility to determine whether Sky would have a genuine 
commitment to broadcasting standard objectives154 can be compared to the idea of preventing 
mergers that lead to the combination of huge data sets in order to prevent any risk of data 
protections breaches. Here, the CMA is, so to speak, looking into preventing a merger to 
prevent any future likely breaches of regulations in the first place. It is considering whether to 
take pre-emptive action in the context of breaches of other areas of law. This would be 
unusual for a competition law investigation. Then again, the CMA has clarified that this is 
not a competition law case and therefore indicating that competition authorities do not look 
into the possibility of future breaches of other areas of law as part of their analyses. Similarly, 
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just because there is a substantial risk of a significant breach of data in the future due to the 
sheer size of a combined data set, competition authorities cannot use this as a reason to 
prevent a merger.  
 
Given these uncertainties, the lack of definitiveness in the literature in terms of the actual 
harm to consumers and how competition law is not appropriately designed to remedy the 
privacy issue, we can confidently proceed on the premise that large free high technology 
companies are good for consumers as they provide free and innovative services.  
 
2.2.6 The unique economics of free high technology; Disruptive technologies and resulting 
competitive pressure 
Online free high technology industries are also characterized by the idea of disruptive 
technologies; these are technologies that replace the use of products and services provided by 
a dominant company.155 Disruptive innovations are associated very often with such industries 
because it is the internet that is used to distribute/provide the services allowing for the quick, 
so to speak, disruptive momentum.156 In other words, new innovative services can spread at 
extraordinary speeds facilitating the complete replacement of a previous category of 
products/services. The reason a particular emphasis must be placed on the phrase ‘previous 
category’ is the fact that it is important to understand that the disrupting technology does not 
merely provide a further improvement to the existing technology, but improves it to such an 
                                                          
155 J Bower & C Christensen 'Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave' (1995) 73(1) Harv Bus Rev 43 
156 Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development ‘Key Points of the Hearing on Disruptive Innovation’ 
(DAF/COMP/M(2015)1/ANN8/FINAL, 2015) 2 
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extent that the previous technology becomes obsolete and non-substitutable with it.157 
However, note that the disruptive technology does not have to be initiated by a competitor; it 
can also be created and implemented by the dominant incumbent.158 The reason behind the 
incumbent itself being able to push forward the disrupting technology is the notion that the 
fear of imminent disrupting technology from its competitors itself makes it paranoid and 
therefore motivates itself to keep pushing innovations forward.159 The competitive pressure 
therefore comes from a potentially disrupting innovation that could take the entire market by 
surprise. This is therefore another reason why free high technology companies are constantly 
trying to innovate. A large dominant incumbent may not be worried about its own market 
share being taken by a competitor for its current generation of products/service, but instead is 
worried by any future or current entity (including current competitors) which could come up 
with a revolutionizing item that makes the current generation completely useless to 
consumers.   
 
What is also interesting about market replacing disruptive technologies is that they have 
occurred in past high technology situations because the incumbent was solely focused on 
improving the current features of the current generation of technology. 160 Eventually the 
current generation technology would eventually reach the ‘S’ curve for quality improvement. 
                                                          
157 Ibid 3- ‘Disruptions challenge - and sometimes bypass - existing products… Disruptions threaten incumbent 
firms and business models by reducing or destroying their market shares.’ Also see Jeffrey Eisenach & Ilene 
Gotts ‘In Search of a Competition Doctrine for Information Technology Markets: Recent Antitrust 
Developments in the Online Sector’ in Fabrizio Cugia di Sant’Orsola, Rehman Noormohamed & Denis Alves 
Guimarães(eds) Communications and Competition Law- Key Issues in the Telecoms, Media and Technology 
Sectors (Wolters Kluwer Legal 2014) 72 
158 Ibid  
159 GSMA & NERA Economic Consulting ‘A new regulatory framework for the digital ecosystem’(GSM 
Association 2016) 19 
<http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2016/NERA_GSMA_Full_Report.pdf> accessed on 31 
May 2017  
160 J Bower & C Christensen 'Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave' (1995) 73(1) Harv Bus Rev 43, 46 
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Beyond that, the only improvement would be a radically different technology that introduces 
the consumer to a new set of qualities that he/she would have never thought of; but once the 
consumer starts using it, it fulfils all his/her needs more effectively and replaces the older 
technology.161 A very current example may be the introduction of voice controlled artificially 
intelligent home assistants that can act as a search engine. Amazon appears to be the first to 
have introduced a successful version of this product and uses Bing’s search engine. If more 
and more people started using Amazon’s home assistant, not only would less people browse 
on PCs, laptops and smart phones and replace search through those devices, but it may also 
take all traffic away from Google. In that way an incumbent is replaced.  
 
There are two important points to learn from the phenomenon of disruptive technology. 
Firstly, the looming threat of a disruptive technology keeps current incumbents on their toes 
and therefore they always have an incentive to invest in and develop new generation 
technologies that will improve consumer welfare. Secondly, there is a more important point 
to keep in mind within the entire context of the thesis. The competitive pressure comes from 
outside the current relevant market. It is important to note this. As mentioned at the beginning 
of the thesis, when we talk of competition in this thesis it refers to competition within the 
relevant market. We will see throughout Chapter 3 that all competition analyses 
fundamentally refer to competition within a specific product market. The analyses do not 
clearly take into account the competitive pressure that clearly exists from outside the relevant 
market which are presented by future potential disruptive technologies. Currently, the 
analytical framework is unable to systematically consider this type of competitive pressure. 
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But as will be seen, a test will be suggested in Chapter 4 which is better able to consider 
competitive pressure from outside product relevant markets.162 
 
2.2.7 The unique economics of free high technology; Conclusion 
The literature clearly explains how a single dominant platform in the free high technology 
sector can provide services that are not only free, but are also very innovative. The two-sided 
platforms can afford to offer end users a free product as they are able to charge the other side 
significant sums. In turn, it is absolutely vital for them to keep their services/products very 
innovative in order to maintain or increase their user base which can then be used as leverage 
to charge considerably to the paying side. In the end, it appears that consumers benefit from 
extremely low prices and perpetually improving innovation. This is of course, not just theory. 
The theory itself fits in nicely with the phenomena we observe today with regards to 
dominant search engines and social networks for example. Their services are free and they 
continually add new features at no extra monetary cost to the end-user.  
 
At this point we have therefore established that there can be a positive or directly 
proportional relationship between the existence of a dominant platform, innovation and 
benefit to consumers in the specific context of free high technology. The next point of 
discussion is how EU competition law would consider this relationship. As will be seen, it 
appears to have an opposing view.  
 
                                                          
162 Inge Graef EU Competition Law, Data Protection and Online Platforms: Data as Essential Facility (Wolters 
Kluwer 2016) 74 
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2.3 How free high technology fits in with the general theory on the relationship between 
consumers and EU competition law  
When one considers the literature on competition law, whether to a superficial or a 
meticulous degree, the prevalent mantra is that competition in markets is simply good for 
consumers. 163  One can already note the tension this would create with the theory we have 
already established on free high technology i.e. increased competition is unlikely to lead to 
higher benefit for consumers.   
 
The European Competition Commission website emphasizes from the very beginning in 
simple terms that the reason for competition policy is to provide consumers with benefits;164 
more specifically it states that competition leads to lower prices for consumers, better quality, 
innovation in products/services and more choice.165 More importantly this is officially stated 
in the ‘Guidance on the EU Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings.’166 Furthermore, it 
aims to ensure that consumers ‘benefit from the efficiency and productivity which result from 
effective competition between undertakings.’167 Hence, whilst efficiency and competition are 
goals that are to be achieved, the justification behind them as goals is the notion that they 
                                                          
163 Hans Vedder ‘Competition Law and Consumer Protection: How Competition law can be used to protect 
consumers even better- or not’ (2006) 17(1) Eur. Bus. L. Rev 83-85 
164 European Commission ‘Competition; Overview: Making markets work better’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/general/overview_en.html>  accessed 26 November 2016 
165 European Commission ‘Why is competition policy important for consumers’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/why_en.html> accessed 26 November 2016.  
166 Commission, ‘Communication from the EU Commission — Guidance on the EU Commission's enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings’ 
(2009/C 45/02) paragraph 5 
167 Ibid 
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bring benefits to consumers. Consumer welfare appears to therefore be the underlying value 
promoting efficiency and competition.  
 
Similarly, the mergers regulations also work on the assumption that effective competition is 
good for consumers; for example, paragraph 29 of the regulations states as follows: 
 
‘It is possible that the efficiencies brought about by the concentration counteract the 
effects on competition, and in particular the potential harm to consumers, that it might 
otherwise have and that, as a consequence, the concentration would not significantly 
impede effective competition…’168 
 
This indicates that the regulations view that concentration leads to a reduction in competition 
which then potentially harms consumers. Any resulting efficiency from the concentration 
may however, make up for the harm. 
 
Note however, as mentioned before in the definitions section in Chapter 1, that both the 
guidance and regulations always stress that they are concerned with the protection of 
‘effective’ competition as opposed to simply competition. The purpose of this is to show that 
the competition authorities will not simply protect competitors, but will only protect 
competitors who are good for competition. For example, if we specifically consider 
                                                          
168 Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) (2004) OJ L24/1 paragraph 29 
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paragraph 6 of the Article 102 Enforcement Guidelines the distinction between effective 
competition and competitors is strongly indicated; 
 
‘…the EU Commission is mindful that what really matters is protecting an effective 
competitive process and not simply protecting competitors. This may well mean that 
competitors who deliver less to consumers in terms of price, choice, quality and 
innovation will leave the market’169 
 
It would therefore appear that the regulations would support the exit of competitors who are 
unable to benefit consumers. Hence, one might reasonably argue that competition 
regulations’ and guidance’s principles cannot be reduced to the simple notion that 
competition is good for consumers. However, as we will discover in Chapters 3 and 4, the EU 
Commission never directly assesses the specific harm to consumers and the quality and 
innovativeness of the products/services of the different competitors and the incumbent. This 
is because it is difficult to do so and in practice competition authorities simply presume harm 
based on a reduction in the number of competitors in the market. Also, counteracting 
efficiency claims have a history of failure in competition law cases and investigations.170 
Hence, in essence, whilst the guidance suggests that it does not protect competitors that do 
not benefit consumers, it ends up doing so. 
 
                                                          
169 Commission, ‘Communication from the EU Commission — Guidance on the EU Commission's enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings’ 
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170 See for example Mitja Kocmut ‘The Role of Efficiency considerations under the EU Merger Control’ 
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As we will also see next, there are other sources related to competition law that also suggest 
that the dominating principle is that competition is good for consumers.  
 
The very official documents that form the seeds of, for example, UK competition law also 
refer fundamentally to the positive impact of competition on consumer interest. For instance, 
the UK government’s white paper entitled ‘A World Class Competition Regime’ states the 
following: 
 
‘The importance of competition in an increasingly innovative and globalised economy 
is clear. Vigorous competition between firms is the lifeblood of strong and effective 
markets. Competition helps consumers get a good deal. It encourages firms to 
innovate by reducing slack, putting downward pressure on costs and providing 
incentives for the efficient organisation of production.’171 
 
Furthermore, the UK Competition Commission in speaking generally about competition and 
consumers has stated that: 
‘…When working effectively, competition involves a process of rivalry between 
firms that strive to win customers’ business by achieving the lowest level of costs and 
prices, developing new products or services or exploiting particular strengths, skills or 
other advantages to meet customer needs more effectively than competitors.’172 
                                                          
171 Department of Trade and Industry ‘A World Class Competition Regime’ (White Paper, Cm. 5233 2001) 
paragraph 1.1  
172 Safeway plc and Asda Group Limited(owned by Wal-Mart Stores Inc); Wm Morrison Supermarkets PLC; J 
Sainsbury plc; and Tesco plc:A report on the mergers in contemplation (Cm. 5950, September 2003), at para. 
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Hence, the rivalry between firms revolves around gaining customers, meaning that customers 
need to be pleased the most and provided with as much benefit as possible.  
 
However, the most direct positive link drawn between competition and consumers is actually 
seen at the European Union level in the 1997 Green Paper on Vertical Restraints.173  It states 
the following: 
 
‘To further the interest of the consumer is at the heart of competition policy. Effective 
competition is the best guarantee for consumers to be able to buy good quality 
products at the lowest possible prices. Whenever in this green paper the introduction 
or protection of effective competition is mentioned, the protection of the consumer's 
interest by ensuring low prices is implied.’174 
 
Although the actual negative effect on consumers does not need to be ascertained to declare 
an abuse under Article 102 TFEU,175 the main concern of the authorities is to ensure the 
protection of the competitive process which is then presumed to be good for the consumer.176 
In this sense, one could argue therefore that consumer welfare is still a primary concern for 
the competition authorities. 177 It is just that consumer welfare is positively tied to the 
                                                          
173European Union Competition Commission Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Law (Com 
96/721,1997) 17 
174 Ibid paragraph 13 
175 P Marsden & P Whelan ‘“Consumer Detriment” and Its Application in EC and UK Competition Law’ (2006) 
27 (10) ECLR 569, 576 
176 Ibid 584 
177 Also see R O’Donoghue & A Padilla The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC (Hart Publishing Oxford 
2006) 221- The authors argued that one could equate a, so to speak, test for effective competitive structure with 
a test for consumer welfare. If there is consumer harm there is also relevant harm to the competitive structure. 
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protection of competition; the protection of competition is equated to the protection of 
consumer welfare.178 The protection of the competitive process therefore purportedly 
becomes a means (as opposed to a goal) to an end; the end being the protection of consumer 
welfare. 179 
 
So far, we observe that the relationship between competition and the benefits to consumers is 
considered to be a directly proportional and positive one; it is believed that as competition 
increases so do the benefits to consumers.  
 
 
We therefore already see how one of the fundamental assumptions on the relationship 
between benefit to consumers and competition could clash with the theory on free high 
technology. It is therefore possible that any application of competition provisions based on 
such an assumption to the free high technology industry could yield awkward results. For 
instance, with such an assumption, competition authorities are likely to conclude that 
consumer benefit is low in the industry due to the low level of competition as only high levels 
of competition can lead to high consumer benefit.  
 
 
As we will see in Chapters 3 and 4 in more detail, quite similarly, another possibility is that 
the authorities, having observed a great amount of consumer benefit in the industry, would 
                                                          
Note however the word ‘relevant’. The authors therefore go on to indicate that harm to the competitive structure 
is irrelevant when that harm does not subsequently lead to any consumer harm. Hence, intervention on the part 
of the competition authorities cannot be justified where there is harm to the competitive structure of the market, 
but there is no harm to consumers.   
178 Ibid 
179 Philip Lowe ‘The Design of Competition Policy Institutions for the 21st Century- the Experience of the 
European Commission and DG Competition’ (2008) 3 Competition Policy Newsletter 1 
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assume that there must be significant competition in the market. The EU Commission appears 
to observe high consumer benefit in the form of innovation, but then inadequately interprets 
the free high technology industry as involving significant competition. In fact, it is seen that 
there is less competition in the market with, at most, a few dominant players with very high 
market share.  Chapter 4especially argues that this leads to confusion and legal uncertainty.  
 
In order to understand and resolve this confusion the first step is to figure out what the 
objective of competition law should be in free high technology investigations . Without 
finding this out, one cannot comprehend the aims behind the EU Commission’s approach to 
rationalizing their decisions and determine a solution that will be coherent with the correct 
competition law objective. Again, from the assumption of EU competition law we see above, 
consumer benefit is assumed to be rooted in competition. From there we can see how 
competition itself then becomes an aim of competition law. But which one is the main aim in 
the first place? If its consumer benefit, then the aim of competition becomes a means to an 
end. If its competition, then the aim of consumer benefit only becomes a means to an end. 
The means to an end can change as it is subordinate to the main aim.  
 
With this in mind, if for example, consumer benefit is seen as the main objective of 
competition law, then we can readjust any assumptions and legal tests to fit the free high 
technology sector. In other words, we can alter the assumption of EU competition law from 
competition equals higher consumer benefit to say, for instance, ‘that in the case of free high 
technology consumer benefit can be derived from a situation of reduced competition’. 
However, should the main aim be the promotion of competition, then we cannot justifiably 
implement such an assumption into legal analysis. Monopoly power would have to be 
prevented despite its positive effect on consumers.  
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In the next section, we therefore consider the objectives of EU competition law. Once we 
understand the objective, why the EU Commission presents limited rationale in free high 
technology cases will become clearer.  
 
2.4 Objective of EU competition law to be pursued in free high technology cases 
2.4.1 Introduction and Limitations 
Having discussed how free high technology relates to competition and how competition law’s 
presumptions may clash with it, the next step is to understand what objective(s) of 
competition law should be pursued in free high technology cases. We found in the previous 
section that competition in free high technology is not necessarily directly proportional to 
consumer benefit. Hence, in order to come to a decision in a free high technology case we 
need to determine which objective competition law strives to achieve. Is it the protection of 
consumers or competition? Once we know who we are protecting, we can then evaluate the 
authorities’ investigations, the rationale behind Commission decisions and the 
appropriateness of any current and proposed legal tests all in relation to free high technology.    
 
The literature suggests that EU competition law is associated with multiple objectives. These 
objectives however, can be found at different levels and can be far removed from each other 
to the point that the links between them become tenuous. With EU competition law especially 
for example, on the first level there are the legal tests applied by the EU Commission in their 
decision making on the operational level. On the second level, the legal test itself will have its 
basis in Competition Policy set by the EU Commission. On the third level, the competition 
policy would be based on the main competition provisions i.e. Articles 102 and 101. Finally, 
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on the fourth level, Articles 101 and 102 would have their objectives rooted in those of the 
wider internal market.180 
 
Since this thesis addresses the coherency of the legal arguments of the EU Commission, its 
focus is on the congruence of Commission competition policy with the legal tests it applies. 
We will see that current competition policy indicates that consumer welfare is to be the main 
objective. However, as we will see, simultaneously, the authorities’ method of investigation, 
case law and the ideological roots of EU competition law may indicate the opposite; i.e. that 
the protection of competition is more important. Hence, some analysis beyond the authorities’ 
statement that consumer welfare is the most important objective must take place to ensure 
that this is a safe conclusion to base the rest of our thesis on. The analysis would also include 
how the authorities decide cases in practice.  
 
Market integration, raising the standard of living, prosperity and employment are wider 
internal market objectives to name a few. 181 However, a smaller number of particular 
objectives are used in practice as a means of achieving the more, so to speak, ultimate 
objectives.182 This generally boils down to competition, consumer welfare and efficiency. As 
we have indicated, free high technology potentially brings these three elements at odds with 
each other. Hence, this section will solely focus on these three objectives.  
 
                                                          
180 Renato Nazzini, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law: the Objectives and Principles of 
Article 102 (Oxford University Press 2009) 116- Article 3(3) TFEU appears to express the goals of the internal 
market . 
181 Alexander Schaub ‘Competition Policy Objectives (Working Paper VIII)’ in C Ehlermann & L Laudati  (eds) 
European Competition Law Annual 1997: Objectives of Competition Policy (Hart, Oxford 1998) 122 
182 Ibid 123 
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We begin by looking at the protection of competition as an objective.  
 
2.4.2 The protection of competition and the influence of Ordoliberalism 
Evidence of whether the protection of competition is the most important objective of 
competition law can come from sources such as legal provision texts and academic literature, 
but also from the possible ideological origins of the law. We therefore begin by looking at 
Ordoliberalism, an ideology that was considered to have influenced EU competition law 
tremendously from the days of its fruition.  
 
Ordoliberalism is an economic ideology that has said to have influenced European 
competition law extensively. For example, Philip Lowe, former Director General of 
Competition mentioned that initially, case law and judgements were all influenced by 
Ordoliberal thought. 183 The European Ordoliberalism-influenced focus, when compared to 
the focus of United States antitrust law for example, appears to be on ensuring that 
competitors have the opportunity to compete in the market.184 In the EU there is a special 
responsibility on companies with a dominant position towards their competitors; they must 
ensure that they do not act in a way as to harm them which will in turn harm genuine 
undistorted competition.185 Hence, the protection of competition would appear to have been a 
very important objective in mind at the time of the formation of EU competition law.  
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The influential German Ordoliberal thought strongly espoused the idea that competition is 
necessary for economic well-being.186 However, it appears that its main rationale is not 
grounded in economic effects. 187 It has been argued that Ordoliberlaism was born out of a 
post-war Germany with anti-dictatorial sentiments; the right to compete should be fiercely 
protected and encouraged to prevent any one enterprise from attaining too much power. 188 
Not only was such power reminiscent and symbolic of a dictatorship,189 but on a more 
practical level it was also feared that companies that attained a lot of market power would be 
able to influence politics and laws in their favour as they had the resources to do so. 190 In this 
sense the Ordoliberalistic right to compete was interpreted as a value that stood on its own 
and required no further qualifications for its existence (for example, conditions of productive 
efficiency).191 This is not to say that the Ordoliberalism-supporting literature ignores concepts 
such as efficiency and technical progress as ideals to be strived for; it simply associates these 
ideals as a positive product of the exercise of economic freedom by the various competitors 
in the market. 192  
 
                                                          
186 David Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth-Century Europe, Protecting Prometheus (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1998) 240 
187 See for example, Frank Maier-Rigaud ‘On the normative foundations of competition law- Efficiency, 
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Euken, explained that ordoliberlism was more about searching for a more humane order for society in general as 
opposed to economic freedom.  
188 Ibid 
189 Ibid 139-140- The author explains German writings by economic theorists: Rustow stated that freedom to 
compete should be upheld even at the expense of productivity as it is absolutely vital to maintaining a free 
society. Significant private economic power was considered a threat to democracy. 
190 Frank Maier-Rigaud ‘On the normative foundations of competition law- Efficiency, Political Freedom and 
the Freedom to Compete’ in Daniel Zimmer (ed) The Goals of Competition Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 
International 2012) 132-138.  
191 See Wernhard Moschel ‘Competition Policy from an Ordo point of view’ in A Peacock and H Willergodt 
(eds) German Neo-Liberals and the Social Market Economy (MacMillain, London 1989) 142  
192 Ibid 146 
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One could therefore argue that the essence of Ordoliberal ideology is a visceral reaction to 
dictatorships that existed shortly before/during its time and would only therefore be relevant 
and justified during that period of post-war Germany. Perhaps absent the European 
dictatorships Ordliberal ideology would have taken into better consideration the possible 
positive economic effects of having dominant companies and competition only be one of the 
objectives, as opposed to the fundamental one. Given this, perhaps Ordliberal ideas are not 
meant to be applied today to competition law. 
 
Furthermore, such a right to compete stemmed from the assumption that in order to exercise 
the right appropriately and effectively, a situation of ‘complete competition’ was required in 
the market to begin with.193 It is only such a situation that would breed the circumstances that 
would allow for the freedom to compete to take place. 194 This starting point assumption 
appears to pre-empt the argument that it is paradoxical to outlaw monopoly power when 
competitors’ freedom to compete may very well entail the right to take market share from 
another and therefore gain market power. In this way, the Ordoliberalisic freedom to compete 
is even further entrenched as an absolute value.  
 
However, although it has been said that Ordoliberalism had a great influence on EU 
competition law, 195 it appears that there is some debate over how much of the original strict 
interpretation of Ordoliberalism actually did so. It is said that the original idea of the right 
                                                          
193 David J Gerber ‘Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-Liberalism, Competition Law and the 
‘‘New’’ Europe’ (1994) 42 AJCL 25, 43 
194 Ibid 
195See Giorgio Monti, ‘Article 81 and Public Policy’ (2002) 39 CMLR 1057–99, Liza Lovdahl Gormsen, 
‘Article 82 EC: Where are we coming from and where are we going to?’ (2005) 2 The Competition L Rev 5, 10; 
Ekaterina Rousseva, ‘Modernizing by Eradicating: How the EU Commission’s New Approach to Article 81 EC 
Dispenses with the Need to Apply Article 82 EC to Vertical Restraints’ (2005) 42 CMLR 587, 590–1 
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and freedom to compete in its purest sense was watered down.196 Competition was considered 
a discovery process where a company, on merit, gain market power and itself would also 
have the right to compete (even if it encroached upon weaker competitors’ right to 
compete).197 A consideration of German draft law and German parliamentary texts in the 
1950s appears to show that the freedom to compete was never a main goal; the right to 
compete was only to be exercised provided that it would not encroach upon productivity and 
provide the best possible supply for consumers.198 We now see again, that the protection of 
competition may not have been the only fundamental objective in mind when the EU 
competition law provisions were being drafted. Therefore one can infer from the German 
parliamentary texts that other objectives such as productivity were probably construed as just 
as important.   
 
There are other early documents that also show the importance of productivity as an 
objective. For example, the ‘Spaak report’, which was a report made in preparation of the 
drafting of the treaties, contained recommendations for the provisions of the Treaty of 
Rome.199  The report explained that one of the main purposes of the Common Market should 
be to improve the region’s economic strength; to do this a more extensive specialised division 
of labour leading to less resource wastage and lower cost production is required. 200  Hence, 
efficiency appears to be a goal of the Common Market in this report.201 Companies in the 
                                                          
196 Frank Maier-Rigaud ‘On the normative foundations of competition law- Efficiency, Political Freedom and 
the Freedom to Compete’ in Daniel Zimmer (ed) The Goals of Competition Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 
International 2012) 145 
197 Ibid 144- the author refers to Friedrich Hayek ‘The use of knowledge in society’ (1945) 35(4) American 
Economic Review  519-530 
198 Ibid 152-161 
199 See Intergovernmental Committee of the Messina Conference, Report by the Heads of Delegations to the 
Foreign Ministers (‘Spaak Report’) 21 April 1956 (Provisional English Text) 
200 Ibid 
201 Pinar Akman ‘Searching for the Long-Lost soul of Article 82 EC’ (2009) 29(2) O.J.L.S 267, 280-81- 
Interestingly, however, in the very same Spaak report the creation of monopolies were to be prevented. 
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significantly larger market facing many more competitors would need the best production 
methods and produce products/services of the highest quality in order to survive. 202 In other 
words productive inefficiency was condemned quite clearly and with great emphasis.203 It 
also appears that the report accepted the notion of efficiency being achieved at the expense of 
competitors who were unable to match their counterparts in productivity. This is of course 
incongruent with the classic idea of Ordoliberalism where competitors should be able to 
compete despite their lower efficiency.  
 
Another way to find out whether the purer form of Ordoliberalism has a strong influence on 
EU competition law is to see what the early drafts for competition rules were and how they 
contrast with the current rules. Some of the early drafts seemed to be highly Ordoliberalistic 
in the phrasing.204 For instance, one of the early drafts mentioned that ‘Monopolies or abusive 
practices of the following type:… c- the full or partial domination of a product market by a 
single undertaking’ is incompatible with the common market.205 This appears to outlaw the 
monopoly position itself206 as opposed to only outlawing the abuse of dominance as seen in 
current Article 102 TFEU. Of course we know now that such an ordoliberalistic provision is 
not to be found in any of the current competition provisions; no provision condemns the 
                                                          
Although the author recognizes that this sounds like an ordoliberalistic policy, she notes that in the very same 
section of the report on monopolies there is mention of the prevention of discriminatory practices by 
monopolies. This appears to indicate that,  in fact,  the report would still support the existence of monopolies as 
long as they did not discriminate. A purely ordoliberalistic policy would not entail such reference to 
discrimination as monopoly power should not exist in the first place.  
202 See Intergovernmental Committee of the Messina Conference, Report by the Heads of Delegations to the 
Foreign Ministers (‘Spaak Report’) 21 April 1956 (Provisional English Text) 
203 Pinar Akman ‘Searching for the Long-Lost soul of Article 82 EC’ (2009) 29(2) O.J.L.S 267, 281; on page 
287 the author also refers to a speech of Mr. Pineau, Foreign Minister of France on the occasion of the signature 
of the Treaties founding the European Economic Community and the European Atom Community, 25 March 
1957; Mr Pineau states that the intention is indubitably to increase and improve productive capacity. 
204 Ibid 284 
205 Ibid - See author’s reference to this draft provision seemingly translated from German text.  
206 Ibid 
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existence of monopoly power. In that sense, one can conclude that the original attempts to 
include a pure right to compete in the competition rules was rejected207 and therefore it was 
never intended for EU competition provisions to be ordoliberalistic. As a matter of fact it was 
found that the President of the Common Market Committee who was also supposedly a 
German ordoliberal, was in full support of practices by companies that eliminated 
competitors as long as they reflected a sense of fair competition; in fact such practices, whilst 
strengthening market dominance, also strengthened competition.208 Here, the President was 
making a clear distinction between competition on merit and competition via the abuse of 
dominance (unfair competition).209 
 
Overall, it appears that a purely Ordoliberalistic view is not what EU competition law is 
influenced by. There is no evidence in the early documents of EU competition law that shows 
the protection of competition as the only objective, but only as one of the objectives.   
 
We now turn to other literature to determine where the protection of competition stands as an 
objective. We previously discussed in section 2.3 how EU competition law is very much 
based on a positive link between competition and consumer benefit. The purpose of that 
discussion was to show how such a link can clash with theories on the operation of free high 
technology markets. However, that link can also serve another purpose. If competition and 
                                                          
207 Ibid – The author refers to the comments made during the negotiations about the draft rules. It is quite clear 
that the German negotiators were in fact clearly against the imposition of any ban on monopolies and 
oligopolies without any qualifying conditions. It was the German side that suggested that such an outright ban 
be set aside and instead a ban on the abuse of a dominant position should be imposed. The existence of 
monopolies can be compatible with competition.  
208 Ibid 286 
209 Ibid- author also states that the President of the Common Market committee underlined the difference 
between protection of competitors and protection of competition. 
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consumer benefit are regularly linked together, it may also be a testament to the idea that 
consumer benefit is just as important as competition as a goal, if not more important.  
 
For example, whilst it has been argued that Article 102 TFEU cannot be used to protect 
consumers directly as its purpose is to protect the institution of competition and that this 
stems from the Ordoliberalism-like notion that all commercial entities should be able to 
engage in commercial activities without encumbrances,210 this in turn is also, so to speak, 
usually warranted by the idea that the competitive process will lead to the maximization of 
consumer welfare.211 Even in theories where consumer welfare has been dismissed as a main 
objective in favour of making competition a more important objective,212 there is a 
justification on the basis of positive effects on consumers.213 For example, long term social 
welfare has been mentioned as the main goal of competition law and the way to achieve it is 
through long term productivity growth; this in turn can be achieved through a competitive 
economy where the largest and highest quality output is produced at the lowest possible 
cost.214 If the source of justification of the ‘protection of competition objective’ is often 
consumer benefit, it can indicate that consumer benefit is the main objective above 
competition.  
                                                          
210 Thomas Eilmansberger ‘How to Distinguish Good from Bad Competition under Article 82 EC: In Search of 
Clearer and More Coherent Standards for Anti-Competitive Abuses’ (2005) 42 CML Rev 129, 133; Heike 
Schweitzer ‘The History, Interpretation and Underlying Principles of Section 2 Sherman Act and Article 82 EC’ 
in CD Ehlermann and M Marquis (eds) European Competition Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to Article 
82 EC  
211 Ibid 
212 Renato Nazzini, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law: the Objectives and Principles of 
Article 102 (Oxford University Press 2009) 120- the author considers the wider internal market goals of 
economic freedom and equality as those that can be incorporated into competition law as goals as well.  
213 Ibid 116- although the author does not directly state the benefits to consumers, he states the direct benefits of 
competition which are high output, high quality and low cost productions. It cannot be denied that one of the 
groups that immediately benefits from these factors are consumers.  
214 Ibid 116 &153 
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However, there is some, albeit minor, evidence in EU regulations that competition is to be a 
value in itself without any competing values. For example, EU competition law also appears 
to refer to the protection of Small and Medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This is, so to speak, 
reflected in the EU Commission’s notice on de minimis agreements.215 It, for example, states 
that where the aggregate market share held by the parties to the agreement does not exceed a 
total of 10% of any pertinent relevant market, the EU Commission will hold the view that 
such an agreement will not culminate in a restriction of competition.216 It appears to allow 
smaller enterprises to engage in practices that would be much more strictly scrutinized in the 
case of larger ones. This can quite reasonably be argued to stem from a policy of protecting 
competition in the market; as long as there are a number of companies with smaller market 
shares in the market, there is no need to worry about any menaces to competition. Hence, the 
objective of SME protection may be likened to that of protecting competition.  
 
Furthermore, there has been the rare instance where competition has been considered as a 
fundamental value in itself and must be protected regardless of its effect on consumer welfare 
or any other aspect of society for that matter; it is a fundamental of liberal democracy.217 Oles 
Andriychuck is a proponent of such a theory and states that in this context we should separate 
completely the right to compete from the effects on consumers that the exercise of or the lack 
                                                          
215 Laura Parret ‘The multiple personalities of EU competition law: time for a comprehensive debate on its 
objectives’ in Daniel Zimmer (ed) The Goals of Competition Law (Edward Elgar Publishing International 2012) 
72 
216 See section 8 of Commission, ‘Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict 
competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis Notice)’ 
Communication (2014) OJ C 291/01 
217 Oles Andriychuk ‘Thinking inside the box: why competition as a process is a sui generis right- a 
methodological observation’ in Daniel Zimmer (ed) The Goals of Competition Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 
International 2012) 95 
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of it may have on consumers; there is no need to justify the existence of the right and it is one 
that has a grounding in the sense that it is simply an established right.218  
 
It is also worth noting that Andriychuck writes his article in reaction to and in the context of 
his interpretation of current competition policy in both the EU and US, where consumer 
welfare is the main goal and competition is only treated as a means to achieve this goal.219 
This is importantly a further testament to the fact that the EU Commission, along with its 
policies, regulations and guidances, has projected consumer welfare as the main goal of 
competition law.  
 
At this point we can conclude that the protection of competition is an important goal of 
competition law. However, it is questionable whether it is the main goal or whether there are 
other goals that stand on par with it. We mainly see evidence of this in the fact that consumer 
benefit is virtually always used to justify the protection of competition as an objective. 
Evidence that competition is the most important goal above all others is rare. For example, 
Andriychuck’s proclamation that competition should be protected at all costs is a bold 
                                                          
218 Ibid 97- The author explains two different types of reasoning that may apply to the right to compete. One is a 
‘utility/wealth-based’ one whilst the other is a ‘rights-based’ one. The utility/wealth based right is one that is 
justified according to the positive effects it would have on some other aspect of, for example, the economy or 
society. A ‘rights-based’ right does not require any justification. The author argues that this is the type of 
reasoning that should justify the right to compete. Page 113- The author also compares competition as a right to 
that of free speech; generally free speech (I say ‘generally’ as under particular circumstances certain types of 
speech such as racial hatred-inciting speech is outlawed) is an exercisable right despite the possibility of it 
causing harm. 
219 Ibid 107, 108 & 109- For example, the author refers to how Brussels currently basis its policies on Chicagoan 
economic principles. Apparently Chicagoan economic theory supported certain conduct on the basis of positive 
outcomes for total welfare which would otherwise be considered anticompetitive. Such a process of reasoning 
then made it seem as if competition was no more than a means to an end; competition was justified only as long 
as it supported another cause (in this case efficiency and consumers) 
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statement that would be controversial today. As we have noted before, competition 
authorities always make it a point that they do not protect competitors.220 
 
2.4.3 The view of the courts 
The European Court of Justice has provided a lot of indications as to what the objectives of 
competition law are and what legal tests to use in competition analysis. The courts have the 
responsibility to ensure that the EU Commission is correctly implementing the law. Hence, it 
is imperative that we know what the court’s approach is. The major theme we will observe in 
these cases is that competition is to be protected most importantly. However, this is done 
without expressly relegating the effect on consumers; there is simply an assumption that by 
protecting competition, consumers are positively affected. Given how free high technology 
markets likely operate on the opposite idea i.e. that less competition leads to more consumer 
benefit, there is a danger that should such a case be determined at the General Court or CJEU, 
consumers will lose out.  
 
In the United Brands case for example, the judgement described a practice by United Brands 
to have interfered egregiously with the independence of downstream221 small and medium 
enterprises.222 This interference would then have led to the foreclosure of competitors of the 
company with the dominant position by only keeping the downstream enterprises that depend 
on the dominant company active.223 This was considered to lead to an abuse of a dominant 
                                                          
220 For example, also see the US Federal Trade Commission website https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do ; 
there is no mention of protecting competitors. It is only protecting consumers and competition.  
221 Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR- 00207 
222 Ibid 
223 Ibid 
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position.224 There was no link made between the effect on consumers and the abuse; the 
conclusion of abuse did not go beyond the effect on competitors in terms of their ability to 
stay in business.225 There appears to be a lack of concern for the effect on consumers.  
 
The prioritization of the protection of competition was also seen in other cases. In France v 
Commission226 the court stated that the only way to guarantee undistorted competition is to 
ensure that all operators in the market are given equal opportunities.227  In Michelin II228 it 
was stated that in order to be found foul of Article 102, it was sufficient that the conduct in 
question by the dominant company was likely to restrict competition.229 This means that one 
does not need to prove an actual effect on competition but simply that it tends to have an 
effect of restriction.230 At this point, according to the cases discussed thus far, it would be 
very difficult to argue that consumer welfare or efficiency is the main goal of competition 
law. This is due to the fact that we do not see any particular mention, evaluation or analysis 
of the potential effects on consumers. 
  
However, neither can it be concluded that the court views consumer welfare as an 
unimportant aspect of competition law. For instance, in Microsoft231 it was explained that it 
was not necessary to prove adverse effects on consumers since an impact on the market 
                                                          
224 Ibid 
225 Ibid 
226 Case C-202/88 France v Commission [1991] ECR I–1223  
227 Ibid para 51 
228 Case T–203/01 Manufacture Française des Pneumatiques Michelin v Commission (Michelin II) [2003] ECR 
II–4071 
229 Ibid 
230 Ibid 
231 Case T–201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3619 paragraph 355 
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structure would indirectly harm consumers.232 Hence, the question of consumer welfare is 
relevant.233 Whether consumer welfare is adversely affected however, is dependent on the 
effect of the abusive practice on competition. In other words, there is always an 
acknowledged presumption that an adverse effect on the level of competition will always lead 
to an adverse effect on consumers.  
 
More recently, abuse of dominance cases on rebates have also illuminated the debate over 
competition law objectives and especially the clash between the protection of consumers and 
the protection of competitors. Before we move on to the more recent case, it would be better 
to have an understanding of the earlier case on rebates, Hoffman-La Roche.234 This case, as 
we will see shortly, followed the theme of the cases we saw above such as United Brands and 
France v Commission; there is only a concern for the level of competition in the market and 
an apparent neglecting of the effect on consumers. The later General Court case on rebates, 
Intel,235 as we will see was determined in an era when the EU Commission was stating an 
increased level of concern for the consumer. Hence, a change in the way of analysis and 
justification would have been expected in Intel to reflect the renewed emphasis on consumer 
                                                          
232 Ibid. It should be noted however, despite this reference to consumers, that Microsoft is considered a landmark 
case that relegates consumer welfare to a lower level as an objective tremendously. For example, see C Ahlborn 
& D Evans ‘The Microsoft Judgment and its Implications for Competition Policy towards Dominant Firms in 
Europe’ (2009) 75(3) Antitrust. L.J. 887, 906-  the author infers that although the General Court did analyse 
some of the qualities of Microsoft’s competitors’ products, it appeared to selectively ignore a range of positive 
qualities that tying an application with the Windows operating system would have. Factors ‘such as the price, 
the quality of after sales service or the efficiency of a competitor’s distribution system (or quality of interaction 
of various products)’ that Microsoft could bring were ignored and not considered as elements in competition on 
the merits. Hence, consumer welfare issues were not considered in full and the selective focus on the positive 
qualities of the competitors reflected an ordoliberlistic approach, favouring competition over consumer welfare.  
233 Liza Lovdahl Gormsen ‘The conflict between economic freedom and consumer welfare in the modernization 
of Article 82 EC’ (2007) 3(2) ECJ 329, 340. The author seems to express the view that it can be left open 
whether the courts were ‘pursuing economic freedom only to promote consumer welfare’. However, this would 
have been more likely the case if it had shown more direct concern for consumer welfare by asking whether 
consumers would make benefit from lower prices, more choice and better quality.  
234 Case 85-76 Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission [1979] ECR 461 
235 Case T-286/09 Intel Corp v European Commission  [2014] 5 C.M.L.R. 9  
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benefit. However, this was not seen; it could be interpreted as an onslaught against 
prioritizing consumer welfare.  
 
Hoffman-La Roche236 concerned the offer of rebates to distributors conditioned upon the 
distributors meeting, at least, a high proportion of their needs from the dominant producer (in 
this case Hoffman-La Roche). 237 This was considered to be an abuse of a dominant 
position.238 What is relevant to the objectives of competition law is the rationale behind the 
conclusion of abuse in the judgment. It was emphasized that that these sort of rebates (known 
as fidelity rebates) were intended to incentivise purchasers to buying virtually exclusively 
from the dominant producer and therefore also coerce them into purchasing much less from 
competing producers. 239 It was strongly indicated that the effect of this would be fewer 
competitors in the market. 240 Furthermore, it specifically mentioned how the rebates fell 
under Article 102 (c) which mentions that applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
transactions as a very possible abuse. 241 There is no mention of the possible application of 
Article 102 (b), which considers limiting markets to the prejudice of consumers as an abuse. 
There is no consideration in the main rationale of the judgment of the fact that the rebates 
lead to lower prices that may, for example, be passed on to the final consumers. The 
judgment overall appears concerned with competitors’ inability to compete on the market due 
                                                          
236 Case 85-76 Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission [1979] ECR 461  
237 Ibid- Hoffmann-La Roche was found to be dominant in markets for various vitamins. Not only was its 
market share significant, it also had a highly developed customer base, technological advantages over some 
competitors and well developed customer services. They offered discounts of up to 20% to particular 
distributors depending on what percentage of their needs they were purchasing from Hoffman-La Roche as 
opposed to from other competing producers of vitamins.   
238 Ibid 
239 Ibid para 90 
240 Ibid- by restricting the purchaser/distributors choices of supply via the incentive of rebates, there was a denial 
of access to the market by other competing producers/suppliers.  
241 Ibid  
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to the rebates. In that sense, it can be argued that the position of the judges in the case was 
rather more Ordoliberal than not.  
 
However, as indicated before, more controversial was the 2014 rebates case of Intel Corp v 
Commission.242 Before discussing this case it is better to put it in the specific context that 
makes it controversial. Between the time of Hoffman-La Roche and Intel Corp there was the 
introduction of the Enforcement Priorities by the EU Commission. We saw above how this 
guidance aimed to shift the focus on the effect of allegedly abusive practices on 
consumers.243 Given this shift it would be reasonable to expect that any future cases on 
rebates would follow a less Ordoliberalistic approach and concentrate on the evidence of the 
actual effects of these rebates on consumers. However, in Intel rebates were categorized; the 
particular category of fidelity rebates was interpreted as automatically leading to an abuse of 
a dominant position. 244 As in Hoffman-La Roche, fidelity rebates were considered to be 
embedded with an intention and ultimate effect to reduce competition in the market.245 
Hence, it was illegal and there was no need to go on further and prove harm to consumers.246 
                                                          
242Case T-286/09 Intel Corp v European Commission  [2014] 5 C.M.L.R. 9 
243 See Massimo Motta ‘The European Commission’s Guidance Communication on article 82’ (2009) 30(12) 
ECLR 593, 598-599- The author, although critical of some parts, states that the enforcement priorities generally 
sets the stage for a more economics and effects based approach to Article 102 TFEU. He states also that the 
priorities document appears to definitely emphasize the importance of gathering actual evidence of harm to 
consumers as opposed to assuming harm based on practices that take certain form.  Anne Witt ‘The 
Commission’s Guidance Paper on abusive exclusionary conduct- more radical than it appears?’ (2010) 35(2) 
E.L. Rev 214, 220 & 235- the difference in the proposed aims of the enforcement priorities document and 
previous soft law is remarkable. The priorities clearly propose that the welfare of consumers is to be a primary 
concern of competition policy. M Gravengaard & N Kjaersgaard ‘The EU Commission guidance on 
exclusionary abuse of dominance- and its consequences in practice’ (2010) 31(7) ECLR 285, 304- the author 
predicted that the change in approach indicated by the Enforcement Priorities would allow dominant entities 
more freedom in their practices. This is because the focus is shifted away from protecting a competitive 
structure to the well-being of consumers. The author appears to somewhat infer this from the fact that the 
guidance document does not support the existence of a less efficient competitor in the market. In that sense the 
preventing of a reduction in competitors is subordinated.  
244 Case T-286/09 Intel Corp v European Commission [2014] 5 C.M.L.R. 9 
245 Ibid 
246 Ibid 
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It is important to note here however, that again the courts did not eliminate consumer welfare 
as an objective. The judgments stated as follows: 
 
‘It is apparent from the case-law that Article 82 EC is aimed not only at practices 
which may cause damage to consumers directly, but also at those which are 
detrimental to them through their impact on an effective competition structure (Case 
C-95/04 P British Airways, paragraph 74 above, paragraph 106)’247 
 
Hence, the judgement not only agrees that the direct effect on consumers is an important 
consideration under Article 102,248 but definitely agrees that an important reason behind 
protecting an effective competition structure is the protection of consumers.249   
 
What is also relevant apart from the lack of analysis of consumer harm in the Intel case is the 
approach towards the ‘as-efficient competitor test’. In the context of rebates this test is a 
prominent feature of the spirit of the Enforcement Priorities in the sense that it does not 
protect inefficient competitors from the potentially foreclosing practices by the dominant 
company.250 In terms of rebates the EU Commission indicates that they could be a form of 
                                                          
247 Ibid para 105 
248 This is probably in reference to Article 102 (b) which clearly indicates that the existence of any ‘prejudice to 
consumers’ through a particular practice will make that practice abusive. 
249 Also see the EU Commission’s Decision on Microsoft (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft) para 969-The EU 
Commission stated that an undistorted competition process is to be a value itself; but more importantly it stated 
it was a value because it is known to lead to efficiency and more innovation, both positive effects for consumers 
as well.  
250 J Molestina & P Picht ‘Conditional rebate schemes and the more economic approach: back to the future?’ 
(2015) 46(2) IIC 203 
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vigorous price competition that could benefit consumers with lower prices.251 Where the 
lower prices through rebates potentially force particular competitors out of the market 
however, this will only be considered more likely252 to be an abuse where the adversely 
affected competitor is as efficient as the dominant entity.253  
 
The idea behind this appears to stem from the theory that an as-efficient competitor should be 
able to match the lower price of the dominant company without incurring a loss.254 But what 
it also means is that if the as-efficient competitor can only match the price at a loss, the 
dominant company is also deliberately incurring losses255 with an obvious intention to 
foreclose the competitor.256 This is a form of predatory pricing which allows the dominant 
company to raise prices significantly after the foreclosure through the below cost pricing.257 
Hence, in the long run consumers suffer from even higher prices, even though there are lower 
prices in the short run; the effect on consumers is ultimately negative.258 Therefore the 
                                                          
251 Commission, ‘Communication from the EU Commission — Guidance on the EU Commission's enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings’ 
(2009/C 45/02) para 23 
252 The term ‘likely’ is used here as the Guidance does not set guiding principles in absolutes. If you look at 
paragraph 24 of the Guidance for instance, the EU Commission has to simultaneously recognize and take into 
consideration that even a relatively inefficient competitor can apply a constraint on a dominant company and 
prevent it from abusing its power.  
253 Commission, ‘Communication from the EU Commission — Guidance on the EU Commission's enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings’ 
(2009/C 45/02) para 23 
254 Ibid- See para 25 
255  See Richard Whish Competition Law (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 729-730 The deliberate 
incurring of losses is very often linked to the practice of predatory pricing 
256 Commission, ‘Communication from the EU Commission — Guidance on the EU Commission's enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings’ 
(2009/C 45/02) paras 25 and 26- in analysing whether there is likely to be foreclosure of a competitor, the EU 
Commission is to look at any below cost pricing. It is to look at specifically whether average avoidable costs 
and long-run average incremental costs are being covered after the application of rebates in this case. If these are 
not covered, it is to be understood that the company is sacrificing profits deliberately with an aim to foreclose its 
competitors.   
257 Richard Whish Competition Law (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 729-730. It should, however also be 
noted that below cost pricing does not automatically lead to the conclusion that dominance has been abused; a 
consideration of all other circumstances must be carried out (See Case C-549/10 P Tomra Systems ASA v 
European Commission  [2012] 4 C.M.L.R. 27 (ECJ (3rd Chamber))  
258 Ibid 
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Guidance seems to clearly introduce a new test for rebates that has to scrutinize the difference 
between costs and the prices after the rebate is applied. What this also means however, as 
long as the price is above cost, but it is albeit a relatively low price (at a major discount for 
instance) the discount is allowed as consumers benefit from it ultimately.  
 
Going back to the General Court Intel case, the judgement’s approach to the as-efficient 
competitor test was non-existent. In other words, this test was not used to determine the 
question of foreclosure of equally efficient competitors. The Court considered that the test 
was not needed since the form of a fidelity rebate is anti-competitive to begin with. Again, 
through the Court’s ignoring of the as-efficient competitor test, it seems that the requirement 
of considering the ultimate effects on consumers is not as important; consumer welfare 
appears as a less important objective.259 
 
However, this conclusion may not be accurate. Some have indicated that, in essence, the case 
law on rebates is still in line with a consumer welfare objective; labelling the court’s 
approach as ‘form-based’ apparently leads to a misinterpretation of the court’s rationale.260 
The conclusion that certain forms of rebates are anti-competitive is based on sound 
economics in the sense that rebates are a form of exclusivity and exclusivity is a particularly 
known harm in economics to the competitive process.261 Exclusivity allows more power to 
the dominant company enabling it to raise prices later.262 Hence, consumers suffer from 
                                                          
259 C Kanakari ‘Consumer Welfare as a guiding principle in competition law: reflections on the Intel case’ 
(2016) 22(1) Int. TLR 19,22- author states that the Court should have decided the case on a more sound 
economic basis taking special consideration of the harm to consumers. In this sense it is important that the 
consumer welfare objective is not undermined.  
260 Wouter Wils ‘The judgment of the EU General court in Intel and the so-called more economic approach to 
abuse of dominance’ (2014) 37(4) World. Compet 405, 421-425 
261 Ibid 
262 Nicholas Economides ‘Tying, bundling and loyalty requirement rebates’ in Einer Elhauge (ed) Research 
Handbook on the Economics of Antitrust Law (Edward Elgar 2012) 130-131 
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higher prices at the end.263 In that sense, the ‘form-based’ analysis does take into 
consideration the effect on consumers. Furthermore, the courts also add the caveat that the 
exclusivity rebates can be applied provided that there is an objective justification.264 In that 
way it appears to open the door to analyse and discuss the effects on consumers. For instance, 
the dominant company is allowed to bring forward evidence to justify the rebates objectively 
and therefore the form-based rule cannot be described as a per se rule.265  
 
Intel appealed the case to the CJEU, which set aside the General Court’s judgement. It was 
held that the General Court erred in ignoring Intel’s arguments on the EU Commission’s 
approach to the as efficient competitor test.266 The General Court was obliged to consider 
these given that the EU Commission had done its own analysis and application of the test in 
its own decision;267 in other words, the General Court should not have concluded its case on 
the basis of a form based rebates test. The case was referred back to the General Court so that 
it could reassess its decision based on a consideration of Intel’s arguments on the as efficient 
competitor test.268  
 
Although this case does not overrule the form based test, it indicates a couple of ideas that 
ensure, to some extent, court approval of consumer welfare as being the main objective of 
competition law. Firstly, it formally confirms the as efficient competitor test to be important 
in such rebate cases. It was noted before that this test was more concerned with the ultimate 
                                                          
263 Ibid 
264 Richard Whish ‘Intel v Commission: Keep calm and carry on’ (2014) JCL & E 1,2 
265 Ibid 
266 Case C-143/14P Intel Corp v European Commission [2017] paras 143-144 available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d0f130d52395152ebfab48c9a83395ba597a1
009.e34KaxiLc3eQc40LaxqMbN4PaNqOe0?text=&docid=194082&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&di
r=&occ=first&part=1&cid=161936 accessed 24 December 2017 
267 Ibid  
268 Ibid paras 148-150 
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effect on consumers as it potentially allows rebates at the expense of less efficient 
competitors. If it is found that the more efficient incumbent’s discounted prices are 
financially viable for the company (as opposed to being predatory below cost pricing), then 
there is a good chance that these discounts could be applied in the long term, benefitting 
consumers in the form of lower prices. Secondly, the judgement pays respect to the EU 
Commission as an authority whose principles and regulations are to be taken into 
consideration in court decisions. The judgement asked for specific consideration of the as 
efficient competitor test despite there being a form based test rooted in a history of clearly 
established case law. In other words, if the Enforcement Priorities269 document states 
consumers as a priority, and a Commission decision carries out a direct analysis of benefits to 
consumers, the courts will respect that.  
 
The earlier case law we have analysed in this section clearly seems to suggest that protecting 
competition is the most important goal above all else. Although, the recent Intel CJEU case 
definitely appears to steer the boat well away from a principle of unqualified protection of 
competition, even if not directly towards consumer welfare. Whilst there is no definite 
elimination of consumer welfare as an objective, in the absence of any clear proclamation of 
what the main objective should be by the courts, it makes one uncertain as to what EU 
competition law is meant to prioritize. From the theories we understood about free high 
technology earlier in the chapter,270 this will likely pose a major problem. This is because, 
given the relatively greater emphasis on the protection of competition on the part of the 
courts, it is likely that a free high technology case will be determined in favour of smaller 
                                                          
269 Commission, ‘Communication from the EU Commission — Guidance on the EU Commission's enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings’ 
(2009/C 45/02) 
270 See section 2.2 
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competitors which could lead to reduced innovation and quality for consumers. Hence, the 
issue of prioritization of objectives in the case of free high technologies is very important and 
more necessary than other industries where the objectives of competition law do not clash. 
Where they clash, it must be ascertained which competing interest takes over the other.  
 
2.4.4 The Consumer Welfare Objective and EU competition law 
2.4.4.1 Clarifying the meaning of consumer welfare in the context of this thesis 
 
Consumer welfare is another term that is central to this thesis. In economics, consumer 
welfare is considered to be the benefits derived from the actual consumption of goods and 
services (and these may be unique to different individuals who engage in the consumption); it 
is measured practically through a concept called consumer surplus;271 this is the difference 
between the value that is attached socially to the concerned product/service and the actual 
price paid in monetary terms for that product/service.272 Consumer welfare should be clearly 
distinguished from social welfare, which is consumer welfare plus producer surplus; producer 
surplus is the profit the producer makes (the difference between the cost of production and 
price of the goods/services sold).273 This is important as an increase in social welfare does not 
mean that there would be an increase in consumer welfare; it may just mean an improvement 
in producer surplus. An improvement in producer surplus may indicate a higher level of 
efficiency (lower cost of production and hence higher profit),274 but note that this does not 
                                                          
271 R. S. Khemani and D. M. Shapiro (eds), OECD Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and 
Competition Law (1993) as seen in OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms 
<https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3177> accessed 27 September 2016 
272 Massimo Motta, Competition policy: theory and practice (1st edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2004), 18 
273 Alison Jones & Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (5th edn, Oxford University 
Press 2014) 12   
274 Ibid 
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necessarily mean that the lower cost of production has been passed on to consumers in a 
beneficial way especially if prices have remained the same.  
 
The term consumer welfare appears to have been introduced to antitrust literature in the 
United States by Robert Bork who interpreted it as the maximization of allocative efficiency 
and productive efficiency; in other words he viewed it as an increase in total welfare.275 He 
viewed producers as consumers as well in the sense that the producer, if enriched, was also an 
enriched consumer given that in turn, he/she will spend that increased profit as a consumer of 
products/services in general.276 However, this has been considered an inaccurate 
interpretation of consumer welfare277 which is, as explained before, the maximization of 
consumer surplus involving either a decrease in price or an improvement in quality (for the 
same price) or both.278 Nonetheless, after EU competition law ‘imported (consumer welfare) 
as a goal’ there was some confusion as to what it referred to. 279 However, we can confidently 
gain a reliable interpretation of consumer welfare in EU competition by looking at, for 
example, policy documents.  
 
The meaning of consumer welfare in EU competition law is similar to the economics oriented 
one in essence; in other words they refer to identical goals such as lowering price and 
improving quality. It is important to note that the phrase ‘consumer welfare’ itself is not used 
frequently in EU competition policy documents, EU judgements or Commission decisions. 
                                                          
275 Robert Bork The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at war with itself (Free Press, New York 1978) 
276 Ibid 110 
277 Victoria Daskalova ‘Consumer Welfare in EU Competition Law: What is it (Not) about?’ (2015) 11(1) 
Comp L Rev 133, 144 
278R Claassen & A Gerbrandy ‘Rethinking European Competition Law: From a Consumer Welfare to a 
Capability Approach’ (2016) 12(1) ULV 1,2 
279Victoria Daskalova ‘Consumer Welfare in EU Competition Law: What is it (Not) about?’ (2015) 11(1) Comp 
L Rev 133, 144 
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However, for example, it did make an appearance in the 1997 Green Paper on Vertical 
Restraints.280 There was no explanation as to what the term consumer welfare meant. 281 
However, the document referred to consumer interests and the ability of consumers to 
purchase good quality products at lowest possible prices as an aim of competition policy.282 
Hence, in the wider context of the document, consumer welfare in EU competition law 
appears to refer to benefit283 to and interests of consumers; and good quality and low prices 
seem to be some of the prime forms of benefit.  
 
However, so to speak, there is understandably an additional limitation to the consumer 
benefit referred to in competition law; the benefit must be capable of being affected by 
market power; 
 
‘The consumer welfare model argues that the ultimate goal of competition law should 
be to prevent increases in consumer prices, restriction of output or deterioration of 
quality due to the exercise of market power by dominant firms.’ 284 
 
It is important to understand this as competition law is unable to remedy any loss to 
consumers that is not caused by a lack of effective competition in the market occasioned by 
the market power of dominant firms. This will be, for example, important to understand when 
we discuss the privacy issues posed by large free high technology companies in Chapter 2. 
                                                          
280 Commission, ‘Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy’(Green Paper on Vertical 
Restraints) COM (96) 721 final, 22 January 1997, 52 
281 Ibid 
282 Ibid 17 
283 Ibid 53- The green paper also refers to consumer benefit. See also supporting academic literature; Pieter 
Kalbfleisch ‘Aiming for Alliance: Competition Law and Consumer Welfare’ (2011) 2(2) JECL & Pract 108 and 
International Competition Network ‘Competition Enforcement and Consumer Welfare, Setting the 
Agenda’(ICN Tenth Annual Conference, The Hague, May 2011) 19 
284 Kati Cseres ‘The Controversies of the Consumer Welfare Standard’ (2006) 3(2) Comp L Rev 121, 124 
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We will see that although these issues may potentially decrease consumer welfare, it is 
unlikely that competition law can resolve them; hence, it is not a factor that should affect our 
understanding of consumer welfare in any markets related to privacy. For example, we will 
observe that from a privacy perspective, free high technology companies collect huge 
amounts of personal data on users for eventual commercial gain; users may not be 
comfortable with this forceful collection of data. 285 However, we will also observe, that 
because the majority of companies collect data, preventing a reduction in the number of 
competitors will not resolve the issue given all competitors behave the same way. 286 Hence, 
whilst the collection of data may be a negative for consumer welfare in a general sense, for 
the purposes of this thesis it would not be considered as an issue of consumer welfare as the 
level of competition in the market is very unlikely to have an effect on the collection of data 
from users.  
 
 
Therefore to conclude, in this thesis consumer welfare will mean the positive benefits that 
consumers experience from a product/service and/or from purchasing that product/service 
which can be affected by the levels of competition in relevant markets. Also, phrases like 
‘consumer benefit’ or ‘benefit to consumers’ will refer to consumer welfare and will be used 
interchangeably.  
 
2.4.4.2 How the consumer welfare objective is viewed in EU Competition law 
When the literature discusses the objectives of competition law, it will generally refer to the 
consumer welfare objective when speaking of the interests and benefits of consumers. Now 
                                                          
285 See section 2.2.5.2 
286 See section 2.2.5.2 
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that we have considered the objective of protecting competition, we now specifically look at 
how the consumer welfare objective has been directly interpreted in terms of its standing as 
an objective.   
 
Benefit to consumers has traditionally always been an important and virtually compulsory 
component of competition analysis; aspects such as lower prices and technological progress 
that affect the quality of benefit to consumers have historically been taken into 
consideration.287  The emphasis on the interests of consumers remains intact today.288 In 
terms of the high technology industry for example, it has been emphasized that one of the 
goals of competition law is to ensure that consumers have a choice amongst innovative 
products and services.289  
 
‘One of the primary aims of competition enforcement is to encourage all industry 
participants to innovate, whether they are start-ups or have a dominant market share. 
The aim is to ensure that European consumers have as wide a choice as possible of 
innovative products.’290 
                                                          
287 See cases such as Case 56/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 571- a significant part of the 
competition analysis in this case focusses on benefits to consumers in terms of quality and price. Also see 
Commission, ‘Sixth Report on Competition Policy’(1078 - Brussels-Luxembourg, April1977) page 9- 
‘(competition policy’s) aim is to ensure that business operates along competitive lines, while protecting the 
consumer by making goods and services available on the most favourable terms possible’ 
288 See for example Commission, ‘XXIInd Report on Competition Policy’ (2002) page 20- ‘One of the main 
purposes of European competition policy is to promote the interests of consumers, that is, to ensure that 
consumers benefit from the wealth generated by the European economy. This objective, which Commissioner 
Monti has emphasised on various occasions and continues to consider one of his top priorities, is horizontal in 
nature: the EU Commission thus takes the interest of consumers into account in all aspects of its competition 
policy, namely in countering anticompetitive agreements, in particular hardcore cartels, and abuses of dominant 
positions, but also in the control of concentrations and State aid granted by Member States.’ 
289 See Commission ‘Report on Competition Policy 2015’ COM(2016) 393 final page 5 
290 Ibid 
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Competition policies are said to be of a good quality when their main fundamental goal is to 
help markets and companies operate in a manner that serves consumers very well.291 More 
specifically consumers must be able to benefit from any of the innovation in production and 
efficiency that is created by producers/manufacturers292 in, for example, the form of lower 
prices. This sort of prioritization of the consumer welfare objective would be good news for 
consumers in the sphere of free high technology investigations. If the goal is consumer 
welfare then free high technology companies should be allowed to increase their market 
power as they bring better benefits to consumers.   
  
However, there is also evidence to suggest quite strongly in fact, that the emphasis on 
consumer interests alone should not be so pervasive. In the 2008 appealed cases of Sot Leelos  
kai Sia EE and Others v GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon Proionton  the European 
Court of Justice stated that the Court of First Instance had erred in law by determining that an 
agreement would have as its object to restrict competition under Article 101 TFEU only as 
long as it can be presumed that the agreement causes disadvantages and adversely affects 
consumers.293 However it is important to note that this case was in the specific context of 
                                                          
291 Philip Lowe ‘The design of competition policy institutions for the 21st century- the experience of the 
European Commission and DG Comp’ (2008) 3 Competition Policy Newsletter 1 
292 Jules Stuyck ‘EC competition policy after modernization: more than ever in the interest of consumers’ (2005) 
28 Journal of Consumer Policy 1 
293 See  C-501/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission of the European Communities [2009] 
E.C.R. I-9291 (ECJ (3rd Chamber)) paragraphs 62-63 ‘With respect to the Court of First Instance's statement 
that, while it is accepted that an agreement intended to limit parallel trade must in principle be considered to 
have as its object the restriction of competition, that applies insofar as it may be presumed to deprive final 
consumers of the advantages of effective competition in terms of supply or price, the Court notes that neither the 
wording of art.81(1) EC nor the case law lend support to such a position… First of all, there is nothing in that 
provision to indicate that only those agreements which deprive consumers of certain advantages may have an 
anti-competitive object. Secondly, it must be borne in mind that the Court has held that, like other competition 
rules laid down in the Treaty, art.81 EC aims to protect not only the interests of competitors or of consumers, 
but also the structure of the market and, in so doing, competition as such. Consequently, for a finding that an 
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parallel trade,294 which quite fundamentally deals with market integration; in such cases the 
goal of market integration may take precedence over any other goals including consumer 
welfare.295 Hence, the principle may not apply to a situation where there is no issue of 
parallel trade.  
 
However, apart from this distinguishing feature of the case, it has been criticized for 
relegating consumer welfare. The finding of a breach of Article 101(1) should be based on, to 
some extent, the consideration of negative effects on consumers in terms of price and supply 
as that would ‘correspond with a functional interpretation of the notion of a restriction of 
competition as referred to in Union competition law’.296 Furthermore, consumer welfare and 
market integration enhance each other and are therefore linked together; so where market 
integration is of fundamental importance as a goal, so should consumer welfare.297  
 
Furthermore, even where EU documents appear to advocate the protection of competitors at 
the expense of consumer welfare, it is justified on the basis of some form of ultimate 
                                                          
agreement has an anti-competitive object, it is not necessary that final consumers be deprived of the advantages 
of effective competition in terms of supply or price...’ 
294 Parallel trade occurs due to differential pricing amongst nations. The same company may sell the same 
product to different countries at different prices; hence the same medicine can be cheaper depending on what 
country it is being sold in. Some importers however may actually import the same product (even if available in 
the importer’s country albeit at a higher price) from a country where the medicine is cheaper and therefore be 
able to sell cheaper in their own country. In the GlaxoSmithKline case (see note 10 above) concerned parallel 
trade. GlaxoSmithKline sold a variety of medicine to Spanish importers. However, the Spanish importers were 
charged more for medicines which they would re-export to another country leading to a restriction in parallel 
trade. The EU Commission had alleged that this then subsequently led to a restriction of competition.  
295 Laura Parret ‘The multiple personalities of EU competition law: time for a comprehensive debate on its 
objectives’ in Daniel Zimmer (ed) The Goals of Competition Law (Edward Elgar Publishing International 2012) 
78, 79 
296 Edith Loozen ‘The workings of article 101 TFEU in case of an agreement that aims to limit parallel 
trade (GlaxoSmithKline services (C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P)’ (2010) 31(9) E.C.L.R. 
349, 351. Furthermore the author states that there are different ways to look at consumer welfare under article 
101. Art 101(1) must view allocative efficiency (as in ensuring that the agreement does not restrict/prevent the 
efficient allocation of resources according to what consumers preferences are) and Art 101(3) can only justify 
such an agreement where the productive efficiency (the max amount produced at the lowest price) and dynamic 
efficiency (innovation overtime that allows the cost of production to go down overtime). Hence any negative 
welfare effects that restricts supply or prices would trigger the application of Article 101. 
297 Ibid 352 
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advantage to the consumer. For instance, the 2005 EU Commission Discussion paper on the 
application of Article 82 (now 102) of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses, whilst discussing 
the ‘as-efficient competitor test’298 states that relatively inefficient competitors which could 
potentially, in the future, become more efficient may have to be protected. 299 Such wording 
seems to suggest a test with broadness that allows an authority to easily determine any 
inefficient competitor to seem potentially efficient in the future. 300 But this is still warranted 
in the Discussion paper by reference to the notion that it is actually in the best interest of 
consumers to have competitors that are not yet as efficient in the market.301 
 
Furthermore, the EU Commission’s shift towards an ‘effects-based’ approach has been 
widely interpreted as an official statement (on the part of the EU Commission) of the increase 
in the importance of consumer welfare , especially in the context of Article 102 TFEU.302 
This supposed shift towards an effects-based approach is embodied in the EU Commission’s 
enforcement priorities guidance; 
                                                          
298 The as efficient competitor test asks whether or not a practice carried out by a company is likely to foreclose 
competitors that are at least as efficient as the company. If they are found to be less efficient, the company is 
allowed to continue with the practice. If the other competitors are just as efficient, then the practice must stop. 
The as efficient competitor test is very much viewed as one that highly discourages the protections of 
competitors and encourages the protection of effective competition instead (See OECD Roundatable on 
Competition Policy: Competition on the merits). Relatively inefficient competitors should leave the market. 
Hence, any notion that prevents a practice that could eliminate inefficient competitors, may be viewed as 
supporting the objective of protecting competitors instead of consumers.  
299 DG Competition, ‘Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses’ 
(December 2005) para 67 < http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/others/discpaper2005.pdf> accessed 14th 
December 2016 
300 Liza Lovdahl Gormsen ‘The conflict between economic freedom and consumer welfare in the modernization 
of Article 82 EC’ (2007) 3(2) ECJ 329, 338. The author states the following: ‘Protecting competitors not yet as 
efficient as the dominant company signals that DG Competition is keen to increase the opportunities for other 
competitors in the market’ 
301 DG Competition, ‘Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses’ 
(December 2005) para 67 < http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/others/discpaper2005.pdf> accessed 14th 
December 2016 
302 See for example Leonardo Borlini ‘The “More Economic Approach” Methodological Issues of the “More 
Economic Approach” to unilateral exclusionary conduct. Proposal of Analysis starting from the treatment of 
retroactive debates’ (2009) 5(2) Euro.C.J 409, 414;  Anne Witt ‘The EU Commission’s Guidance paper on 
Abusive Exclusionary Conduct- More Radical than it appears?’ (2010) 35 E L Rev 214, 215; Pinar Akman 
‘Consumer Welfare and Article 82EC: Practice and Rhetoric’ (2009) 32(1) W. Comp. 71.  
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‘The emphasis of the EU Commission's enforcement activity in relation to 
exclusionary conduct is on safeguarding the competitive process in the internal 
market and ensuring that undertakings which hold a dominant position do not exclude 
their competitors by other means than competing on the merits of the products or 
services they provide. In doing so the EU Commission is mindful that what really 
matters is protecting an effective competitive process and not simply protecting 
competitors. This may well mean that competitors who deliver less to consumers in 
terms of price, choice, quality and innovation will leave the market.’303 
 
 
It can be seen from the guidance above that the competitive process is important, but only to 
the extent that it has a positive effect on consumers. It has been pointed out that although 
consumer welfare is purportedly the main goal, consumer harm is not directly assessed by the 
competition authorities or courts; instead, the conditions of competition such as entry barriers 
and market share are assessed and those are used as indicators of what the harm to consumers 
would be.304 These conditions, however, have been looked at with some scepticism. For 
instance, the literature, has questioned the actual effect of the enforcement priorities in 
practice; it is argued that it still retains a lot of form-based analysis305 which allows the EU 
                                                          
303 Commission, ‘Communication from the EU Commission — Guidance on the EU Commission's enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings’ 
(2009/C 45/02) 
304 Manuel Kellerbauer ‘The EU Commission's new enforcement priorities in applying article 82 EC to 
dominant companies' exclusionary conduct: a shift towards a more economic approach?’ (2010) 31(5) E.C.L.R. 
175, 184   
305 Form-based analysis can be considered as the opposite of the effects based analysis where effects on 
consumers would be considered. We will look into this further below when discussing the case law’s view on 
objectives of competition law 
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Commission a lot of flexibility in terms of focusing the analysis on effects on consumers.306 
In other words, it gives the EU Commission sufficient leeway to decide not to analyse the 
effects on consumers as much as the Enforcement Priorities at a glance may suggest. 307 
 
In this section, like previous sections, we have seen that the protection of competition 
objective is quite important but it is justified by the idea that competition brings benefits to 
consumers. In this section we also however, see that there are clear proclamations by 
competition authorities that the ultimate aim is to protect consumers. Whilst in practice the 
EU Commission utilizes form based tests/analyses (as we will see in more detail in section 
3.2), this does not take away from the fact that consumer welfare is still capable of being the 
main objective. The tests and analyses would still be justified by positive effects for 
consumers.  Given this, consumer welfare may be considered to be the priority. The aim of 
consumer welfare is never justified on that basis that it means more competition. Consumer 
welfare does not appear to need any justification like protecting competition does. It appears 
that, although there is some evidence to suggest that competition must be given extensive 
consideration as if it were a highly important objective, the current doctrine shows that 
consumer welfare is to be the prioritised as an objective over competition.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
306 Manuel Kellerbauer ‘The EU Commission's new enforcement priorities in applying article 82 EC to 
dominant companies' exclusionary conduct: a shift towards a more economic approach?’ (2010) 31(5) E.C.L.R. 
175, 184   
307 Ibid 
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2.4.4.3 Moving forward - excluding the notion of choice in our definition of consumer 
welfare for the purposes of this thesis 
 
It is important to note that the documents we considered above refer to choice as an important 
element of consumer interests.308 By referring to choice as an element of consumer interests, 
the meaning of consumer welfare in competition law may mistakenly be interpreted as 
including the concept. This poses a problem in terms of separating consumer welfare and 
competition as two independent concepts. The notion of choice, which is ‘the possibility and 
the right for customers to choose freely the products/services best corresponding to their 
needs,’309 appears to place the existence of competing products/services as a positive 
contributing factor towards consumer benefits. In other words, higher competition is seen as 
part of consumer interests. For example in France Telecom v Commission310 it was stated that 
due to the possibility of a reduction in competitors through foreclosure ‘customers suffer loss 
as a result of the limitation of the choices available to them.’311 From this point of view, in 
essence, both competition and consumer welfare would be equivalent in meaning; they would 
both, as concepts, encourage an increase in competition. The requirement for more choice, is 
the same as requiring more alternative competitors producing in the same market.  
 
However, this thesis’ hypothesis will fundamentally hinge upon the idea that the EU 
Commission in actuality views competition and consumer welfare as different objectives that 
                                                          
308 For example see European Commission ‘Why is competition policy important for consumers’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/why_en.html> accessed 26 November 2016, Commission, 
‘Communication from the EU Commission — Guidance on the EU Commission's enforcement priorities in 
applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings’ (2009/C 
45/02) 
309 Paul Nihoul ‘”Freedom of choice”: the emergence of a powerful concept in European competition law’ in P 
Nihoul, N Charbit & E Ramundo (ed) Choice- A New Standard for Competition Law Analysis? (Concurrences 
USA 2016) 
310 Case C-202/07 P France Telecom SA v Commission of the European Communities [2009] ECR I-2369 
311 Ibid paragraph 112 
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clash with each other in free high technology investigations;312 and that is the reason the EU 
Commission provides limited and inconsistent rationale for its decisions. Therefore, for the 
purposes of this thesis, consumer welfare and the interests of consumers will not include the 
element of choice.  
 
Instead, the view that the availability of choice is good for consumers can be considered 
tantamount to the presumption that competition is good for consumers. Competition analysis 
presumes in every situation that competition is good for consumers; this may not be the case 
in every situation, especially when it comes to free high technologies. The analysis of choice 
is similar in the sense that there is a presumption that choice is good for consumers; there 
does not seem to be a case by case analysis of whether choice will lead to higher consumer 
welfare in the particular situation. For example, there is no analysis/evaluation of whether the 
incumbent’s competitors or future competitors can provide better choice for consumers.313 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
312 An example would be Facebook/Whatsapp (Case No COMP/M.7217) [2014] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf accessed 
on 23rd July 2017- it will be explained in section 3.5 how this merger would have most likely led to the 
reduction of competition in the market, but most likely due to it being a free high technology good for consumer 
welfare, the merger seems to have been allowed.  
313 In the following cases for example, there was the possibility of a reduction of competition which would 
reduce choice for consumers. There was no follow up analysis of whether current competitors would be able to 
actually provide better choices Case C-202/07 P France Telecom SA v Commission of the European 
Communities [2009] ECR I-2369, Case T-286/09 Intel Corp v European Commission  [2014] 5 C.M.L.R. 9 
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2.5 Efficiency 
Efficiency is also regularly mentioned as a goal of competition law in the European Union. 314  
As a matter of fact, it is arguably the most important goal of competition law.315 In this 
chapter’s section on Ordoliberalism, particular literature on the pure form of Ordoliberalism’s 
actual influence on the EU competition provisions was looked at. It emerged that the 
intention of the original drafters was to design competition provisions which aimed at greater 
efficiency than anything else. Even the protection of consumers and consumer welfare were 
nowhere near as conspicuously mentioned as efficiency during the negotiations leading up to 
the Treaty of Rome.316  
 
It may therefore seem confounding that there is only a small section on efficiency in this 
chapter and that it is only mentioned towards the end as an afterthought.  As we will see, the 
reason behind this is that efficiency, in the case of free high technology services is assumed 
to be inherently of a good standard. In many of the EU Commission cases we will see in 
Chapter 3, efficiency arguments are hardly mentioned and are therefore not a focal point. We 
should note though that to some extent the Microsoft/Yahoo! joint venture (considered in 
more detail in Chapter 4) hints at the efficiency argument. However, firstly, the word 
efficiency was used only by the parties to make their case. The EU Commission did appear to 
                                                          
314 See for instance the speech by Comissioner Kroes at Competition Day London, 15 September 2005 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-05-512_en.htm?locale=en; Philip Lowe Director General, EC 
Commission Directorate-General for Competition. Consumer Welfare and Efficiency – New Guiding Principles 
of Competition Policy?. 13th International Conference on Competition and 14th European Competition Day. 
Munich: 27th March 2007; Daniel Zimmer ‘On the normative foundations of competition law’ in Daniel 
Zimmer (ed) The Goals of Competition Law (Edward Elgar Publishing International 2012) 167; R Moisejevas & 
A Novosad ‘Some thoughts concerning the main goals of competition law’ (2013) 20(2) 
Jurisprudencija/Jurisprudence 627, 629 
315 We can see this in our discussion above with regards to the SPAAK report (original consultation report 
building up to the Treaty of Rome), where efficiency appeared to be the main normative justification for the 
treaty. 
316 Pinar Akman ‘Searching for the Long-Lost soul of Article 82 EC’ (2009) 29(2) O.J.L.S 267, 300 
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acknowledge that the parties needed larger scale to effectively compete against the dominant 
search engine Google. But there was no direct mention of efficiency by the EU Commission 
itself. As we will see in Chapter 4, it is very questionable whether even this slight progress of 
the efficiency argument would be seen in cases where the mergers take place between highly 
dominant companies (both Yahoo! and Microsoft’s Bing had little market share in the search 
market). In other words, an efficiency argument would fare little in general. Furthermore, 
efficiency and consumer welfare, in the specific case of free high technology are less likely to 
be at loggerheads. As will be seen, efficiency and consumer welfare only clash where the 
lower costs occasioned by efficiency are not passed on to the consumer. The fact is that the 
consumer is not being charged for any service in the first place. The consumer is already 
getting a significant benefit pricewise. Hence, any increase in efficiency will be seen as to not 
have any negative effect on consumer welfare.  
 
The general theory is that competition improves productive efficiency.317 One of the reasons 
this is said to happen is because managers at firms will try to achieve lower costs to be able to 
pass this on to consumers and so try to take market share from rivals.318 Competition also 
improves allocative efficiency319 as competitors will eventually lower prices closer to the 
level of marginal cost, due to perhaps price competition; this is also good for consumers as 
the price is equal to the value they assign to the good or service. 320 Also, the efficient 
allocation of resources is usually specifically mentioned as the form of efficiency that is one 
                                                          
317 See footnote 186 for explanation of productive efficiency 
318 Damien Neven in ‘Competition Policy Objectives (Working Paper VII)’ C Ehlermann & L Laudati (eds) 
European Competition Law Annual 1997: Objectives of Competition Policy (Hart, Oxford 1998) 111, 115 
319 See footnote 186 for explanation of allocative efficiency 
320 OECD Policy Rountables ‘The Role of Efficiency Claims in Antitrust Proceedings’ (DAF/COMP(2012)23, 
2012) 5 at http://www.oecd.org/competition/EfficiencyClaims2012.pdf accessed 12th December 2016  
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of the objectives of competition law. 321 Finally, dynamic efficiency322 is also at times 
associated with competition.323 However, all three forms of efficiency could conflict with 
each other; allocative efficiency means that prices lower to the point of marginal cost whilst 
productive efficiency means that the actual marginal cost itself is lowered; dynamic 
efficiency indicates increased investments in capital324 (and hence increased costs) presently 
for better productive efficiency in the future. Furthermore, dynamic and productive efficiency 
can also be achieved where there is less competition; producers with larger market share can 
spread a larger output over capital reducing cost per unit and can further invest resources into 
more innovative and efficient capital.325   
 
However, how do all these efficiencies relate to free high technology and the consumer 
welfare standard? In order to ensure that efficiency is compatible with a consumer welfare 
standard, it must be ascertained that the benefits of efficiency are passed on to consumers; 
this is usually in the form of lower prices.326 In the context of free high technology services 
though, efficiency is not to be a crucial focal point. As we have seen in the theory of free high 
technology, having a single platform increases efficiency which translates to consumers in 
terms of better quality service. Hence, we are likely to have better productive and dynamic 
efficiency as a single large platform is better equipped to achieve these.  
 
                                                          
321 Pinar Akman ‘Searching for the Long-Lost soul of Article 82 EC’ (2009) 29(2) O.J.L.S 267, 300 
322 See footnote 186 for explanation of dynamic efficiency 
323 Damien Neven in ‘Competition Policy Objectives (Working Paper VII)’ C Ehlermann & L Laudati  (eds) 
European Competition Law Annual 1997: Objectives of Competition Policy (Hart, Oxford 1998) 111, 116 
324 Ibid 113 
325 OECD Policy Rountables ‘The Role of Efficiency Claims in Antitrust Proceedings’ (DAF/COMP(2012)23, 
2012) 5 at http://www.oecd.org/competition/EfficiencyClaims2012.pdf accessed 12th December 2016  
326Andreus Strohm ‘Efficiencies in Merger Control: All you always wanted to know and were afraid to ask’ 
available at <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/strohm3.pdf> accessed on 19 November 2017  
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Further, there is no price charged to consumers in the first place; we therefore do not need to 
worry whether the benefits of efficiency are passed on to the consumer in the form of lower 
prices. Hence allocative efficiency is not an issue either. Finally, the EU Commission 
decisions on free high technology services do not focus on efficiencies as a justification for 
mergers or unilateral action. Again, this is probably because efficiencies are assumed to be 
inherently high in such an industry. 
The belief in the inherent nature of efficiency in this industry can somewhat be seen in The 
EU Commission’s Microsoft Decision.327 Efficiency in distribution was raised as a 
justification for Microsoft tying its Windows Media Player to its operating system. Microsoft 
argued that by tying the two products, it would save costs by not having to set up a separate 
distribution channel for the media player. Customers would not only therefore be charged less 
in terms of monetary sums, but they would have to spend less time on selecting and 
installing. The EU Commission indicated that such arguments on efficiencies were virtually 
irrelevant. The distribution cost of software was very low; software can be replicated and 
distributed with very little effort. In such cases therefore, the focus is on consumer choice and 
innovation instead of efficiencies. Similarly, free high technology services are also forms of 
software that can be disseminated almost instantaneously through the internet. For instance, if 
you a search engine or social network wants to implement a new feature, it simply needs to 
upload the new feature on its website and suddenly all can access and use the new feature. 
With a media player it may take time to download a new feature. In that sense, search engines 
and social networks are even more efficient in terms of distribution than the already very 
efficient media player producers. Hence, efficiency plays an even smaller role in such cases. 
Furthermore, on a more general level, the nature of internet and online technology just leads 
                                                          
327 Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft- See paragraphs 958 & 969 
 
135 
 
to efficiency gains that benefit consumers immensely. Efficiency in the online world is 
extensively significant to the point that it appears to become a given.328  
 
In very simple terms, consumer welfare and efficiency are on the same page in the case of 
free high technology. We saw very early on in section 2.2 that this industry can increase 
consumer welfare by having a large dominant platform. And one of the main reasons behind 
this is that such a platform can be most efficient when it is at its largest.  
 
 
2.6 Conclusion- objective to be pursued in free high technology cases 
 
The aim of this chapter was not to determine the most important objective of competition law 
in general nor was it to establish what the main objective should be. One can appreciate the 
vastness, complexities and conflicts of the case law, Commission decisions, Commission 
regulations, competition policies and literature that have gone into the cause of the objectives. 
Hence, this chapter only aims to reach a conclusion as to the objectives of competition law in 
a very narrow context i.e. the objective of competition law that must be pursued by the 
competition authorities when investigating and deciding on free high technology cases.   
 
 
 
                                                          
328 See for example E Brynjolfsson, M Smith & Y Hu ‘Consumer surplus in the digital economy: estimating the 
value of increased product variety at online booksellers’ (2003) 49(11) Management Science 1580, 1581  - the 
internet’s ability to present a greater variety of products online for different consumers with different tastes 
lowers costs significantly. It leads to the saving of costs, in the book sales industry for example, on shelf space 
and expensive retail outlets.      
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Our conclusion is as follows: 
In the case of free high technology investigations and decisions by the EU 
Commission, the EU Commission must pursue a consumer welfare objective above 
all other objectives. 
The starting point of this conclusion is the discussion we had on the unique models and 
economics of the free high technology industry. It was seen that, unlike traditional industries, 
large dominant free high technology companies are able to provide consumers with a high 
amount of benefit without the need for competitive pressure within the relevant market. This 
is because larger companies have larger scale and therefore are able to provide a better 
quality service, they provide a service for free and they are always incentivised to innovate so 
that they can maintain a large number of users. Although other technological industries may 
be able to provide more innovation whilst involving monopoly power, they may charge 
unwarranted high prices to consumers. This makes free high technologies truly unique and 
therefore deserve to be considered in a narrow category of their own. From this we figured 
that if there are any companies that are able to provide high consumer welfare without 
competitive constraints in the relevant market, it would be free high technology companies. 
In other words competition does not equal consumer benefit in this industry.  
 
It was then observed that the justifications behind competition policies were based on the 
opposite notions. Competition law could subsequently lead to problems with the applying 
competition law to free high technology. Monopolies would be punished on the mistaken idea 
that increased competition can only lead to higher consumer welfare. Instead, consumer 
welfare would end up decreasing.  
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Since consumer welfare and competition are brought into loggerheads with each other when 
it comes to free high technology, it is imperative that we find out which objective of 
competition law is most important. This will not only help us understand why the EU 
Commission approaches free high technology in a particular way in Chapters 3 and 4, but 
will also help us understand what the result of competition law investigations into free high 
technology will be. If it is consumer welfare, any increase in the market power of a company 
would be allowed. If the main objective is protecting competition, then the increase in market 
power needs to be prevented.  
 
So what are our findings from our descriptive discussion on the doctrine on the objectives of 
competition law? Since the introduction of the EU Commission’s Enforcement Priorities 
document the emphasis of competition policy has been the prioritizing of consumer welfare. 
This one thing cannot be denied. Of course, we have seen literature to suggest that in 
practice, the legal tests and methods put forward by the Enforcement Priorities may not be the 
most effective in terms of pursuing a consumer welfare objective. However, that is a different 
matter in the sense that it is a question of effectiveness.  
 
However, one thing that cannot be denied is the fact that the EU courts have not been 
particularly helpful at promoting the consumer welfare objective. Even in the most recent 
rebate cases, for example, we saw that the assessment of consumer harm was not considered 
necessary. However, the latest CJEU appeal decision on the Intel rebates case shows possible 
court approval of consumer welfare as the main objective. Furthermore, it must be pointed 
out that the courts have not directly overruled consumer welfare as an objective. All it has 
stated is that it is not necessary to assess consumer harm or prove it. We have seen that on 
occasion the courts have made it clear that it believes that consumer harm is caused when 
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competition is reduced in the market. Hence, by ensuring that there is competition in the 
market, consumer welfare is automatically protected or improved. This can still fit well with 
the construction that consumer welfare is the prime objective. It is just that the method of 
pursuing that objective does not involve a direct method of evaluating consumer harm. 
Assessing the competitive conditions in the market is enough as that provides a strong 
indication of the eventual effects on consumers.  
 
In the absence of a clear rejection by the courts of consumer welfare as an objective and 
where the courts have made a positive link between competition and consumer welfare, 
consumer welfare is still a superior objective to competition. We have seen literature that has 
suggested that the courts’ methods of assessment are based on sound economics. In other 
words, when the courts do pursue the protection of competition, it does so based on economic 
theory that has already strongly established that competition is good for consumers. We also 
saw several Commission documents that justify pursuing an effective competitive structure 
for the sake of consumers.  
 
Overall the most likely conclusion is that consumer welfare appears to be the prioritised 
objective, with competition being the considered as the most important instrument to achieve 
consumer welfare. However, competition cannot be ruled out as, at the least, a very important 
objective; we have seen some evidence above to suggest that it is. However, as indicated 
before, it is not as important to resolve this where most industries are likely to become worse 
for consumers with less competition. When it comes to free high technologies though, 
determining which objective is the main one becomes very important.   
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If consumer welfare is to be prioritised (even slightly) over competition, given that there is a 
conflict between consumer welfare and competition in the case of free high technologies, 
then the logical conclusion is that consumer welfare should be the main objective of 
competition law in free high technology investigations. Competition should not be considered 
here as even a supporting objective or instrument to achieve consumer welfare as doing so 
would take the EU Commission away from consumer welfare than in any other industry.   
 
Given that consumer welfare is the main objective, we would expect competition law 
investigations to result in allowing large free high technology companies to increase their 
market power. In the next chapter we will observe throughout that the authorities have made 
decisions according to this theory and in line with the consumer welfare objective; however, 
the justification for their decisions is confusing. We will see how this pursuance of consumer 
welfare as an objective whilst sticking to the assumption that competition is good for 
consumers manifests in confusion in the context of Commission investigations into free high 
technology service. 
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CHAPTER 3- RELEVANT MARKET – UNDERSTANDING THE ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH LIMITATIONS AND INCONSISTENCY 
OCCURS  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 explored the theoretical tension occasioned by monopolistic free high technology 
companies in the realm of competition law. Free high technology monopolies do not fit in 
well with the theoretical competition law framework for the regulation of companies with 
dominance as they are highly innovative and quite importantly, provide services for free to 
consumers. Current competition law theory is based on the presumption that more 
competition and less dominance are good for consumers. Hence, we saw how one of the 
competition law objectives of protecting competition comes into conflict with the notion of 
protecting consumers. This led to a discussion on the objectives of competition law.  It was 
concluded that the literature appears to generally agree that EU competition law pursues a 
plurality of goals including consumer welfare and the protection of competition. Whilst that 
is the case, the protection of consumers seems to have a higher status. In this chapter and 
Chapter 4, we now turn to  look at how these theoretical tensions manifest in inconsistency 
and limitations in the analysis and reasoning of the EU Commission in free high technology 
investigations. In doing so, at the end of Chapter 4 we establish and justify our hypothesis 
about the obscured reasons why the EU Commission adopts a limited and inconsistent 
approach. 
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Chapter 3 specifically discusses the framework within which free high technology 
investigations are assessed. Before we begin our analysis of the substantive arguments of the 
EU Commission in Chapter 4 we must understand the analytical framework within which 
most of the arguments are put forward. Therefore, this chapter helps us understand how the 
required style of analysis favours the maintenance and increase of competition. It is important 
to understand this as the fundamental competition treaty provisions do not clearly indicate 
whether increases in competition are to be favoured. Article 102 TFEU does not directly refer 
to any outlawing of reductions in competition. The Merger Regulations indicate the 
outlawing of any ‘significant impediment to effective competition’. As discussed in the 
Introduction Chapter ‘effective’ competition will have to be interpreted according to what the 
fundamental objective(s) of competition law are at the time. Hence, only by understanding 
the operation of the current analytical framework can we understand whether increases in 
competition are being favoured. 
 
Market definition is the main analytical framework to start with. It is the exercise which 
determines the relevant market. In determining the relevant market, it must be shown how 
substitutable potential competitors’ products/services are. The question of substitutability 
then is very much affected by arguments about network effects and product/service quality. 
These will be looked into more closely in Chapter 4.  
 
This chapter serves two main purposes. First, we scrutinise how the analytical framework 
works and we discover how its very basic demands are incoherent with the theory on free 
high technology. In other words, the framework reflects a major concern over the level of 
competition in the market; the fewer competitors there are the more likely the 
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incumbent/merging parties will be prevented from taking any action that increases their 
market power. We therefore begin to see an inadequate framework for free high technologies. 
Second, simultaneously we consider several points where the EU Commission has analysed 
the relevant market in a potentially limited manner, contributing to our problem of legal 
uncertainty and confusing rationale. 
 
Market definition and substitutability analysis are some of the many manifestations in 
competition analysis of the wider presumption that competition is good for consumer welfare, 
which we saw in section 2.3. It will be seen that the exercise of market definition, which is a 
purportedly compulsory and important part of any competition case,1 strongly focuses on the 
number of competitors in a market and competition dynamics; it aims to help look at the 
number of competitors in the market and eventually determine whether there is enough 
competition. Hence, market definition is part of an analysis which is based on the idea that 
more competition is good for consumers. One can therefore already surmise that the market 
definition exercise contributes to building up a limited picture of the relationship between 
competition and consumer welfare in free high technology markets.  We remember from 
section 2.2 that free high technology companies can be large and increasingly dominant 
whilst simultaneously providing high benefits to consumers.  
 
However, there have been some anomalies in free high technology investigations that appear 
to have undermined the role of the relevant market.  Does this however mean that the EU 
Commission has replaced market definition with another form of analysis that is not as 
                                                          
1 See J Silhan ‘The Concept of Relevant Market: Some Critical Remarks’ (2012) 33(12) E.C.L.R 589 
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concerned with the protection of competition but with that of consumers directly? This is a 
question worth looking into given that market definition has a permanent place in every 
competition case. It is crucial as the final ultimate decision of competition cases is purported 
to depend very much on market definition.2 The purpose of market definition is to determine 
who the competitors of the concerned entity being investigated are.3 Market definition 
therefore very much revolves around determining the competition dynamics associated with a 
particular product/service; in other words it focuses on the amount of restrictions/pressure the 
concerned entity faces from other competitors.4 It is therefore very much centred on the 
objective of protecting competition.  
 
In short, here is an example of how market definition can theoretically affect the final 
outcome of a case including those concerned with free high technology services. A narrow 
market definition, for example, would mean that the relevant market would contain fewer 
substitutes supplied by competitors.5 This in turn, would give the company under 
investigation a larger share of the market; therefore it is likely that the company is to have a 
more dominant share under such a framework set by the narrow market definition and 
therefore faces less competition/competitive pressure. 6 A wider market definition would be 
one where the relevant market contains a significant number of substitutes 
(produced/provided by a significant number of different competitors) that consumers can 
                                                          
2 Ibid 
3 See Commission notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law 
[1997] OJ C 372 para 2 
4 Ibid 
5 See J Silhan ‘The Concept of Relevant Market: Some Critical Remarks’ (2012) 33(12) E.C.L.R 589   
6 Ibid   
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switch to; hence there is more competition faced by the entity, lower market share and 
therefore likely to have a less dominant position. 7  
 
When it comes to free high technology services, the way market definition is analysed in 
practice by the EU Commission appears to allow for a perceived situation where there are 
many alternative products/services and therefore a less dominant company. The Notice on 
Market Definition recommends that market definition be determined through the Small but 
Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) test.8 In this test one starts off with a 
hypothetical monopolist who is the entity under investigation.9 It is assumed that the entity is 
the sole producer of the relevant good/service in the market.10  
 
Next a SSNIP (usually of no more than 5%) is applied to the good; if consumers in that 
market can switch to another product in response to this SSNIP as an appropriate substitute 
and to a proportion that imposes losses on the hypothetical monopolist, then all producers of 
that product will become part of the market and become part of the hypothetical 
monopolist.11 This exercise is repeated until consumers switch to a proportion where the 
hypothetical monopolist makes a gain/profit in response to the SSNIP.12 At this point the 
potential substitutes are not of a high enough substitutability to cause a greater proportion of 
consumers to switch. The final hypothetical monopolist will therefore contain all the different 
                                                          
7 Ibid 
8 See Commission notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law 
[1997] OJ C 372 para 17 
9 Ibid 
10 Ibid 
11 Ibid 
12 Ibid 
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products by different producers and will become the relevant market for the good/service in 
question.13  
 
However the issue here is that price is irrelevant in the case of free high technology company 
services. Logically speaking, in the absence of price consumers will only switch provided the 
substitute is of a higher/unique/more innovative quality. What we see however, is that there is 
no discussion of this when it comes to substitutes of free high technology; there is just a 
simple discussion on substitutability without any discussion as to whether or not the 
substitutes are meritorious. By doing so, it makes it appear as though the pure focus is on the 
number of competitors in the market as opposed to the benefit that consumers gain from 
having more alternatives in the market.  However the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) has discussed the possibility of using a test similar in 
methodology; the small but significant non-transitory decrease in quality (SSNDQ) test has 
been considered as a possible complement to the SSNIP.14 The methodology of the test 
would involve asking whether a 25% decrease in major performance attribute of a particular 
type of product would lead to substitution by consumers with another product.15 If it did, 
those other products would be considered as part of the relevant market; if not, then the 
original product would constitute the relevant market.16  
 
                                                          
13 Ibid 
14 See OECD, ‘The Role and Measurement of Quality in Competition Analysis’ (DAF/COMP(2013)17, Oct. 28, 
2013) 8  available at http://www.oecd.org/competition/Quality-in-competition-analysis-2013.pdf accessed on 4 
August 2018 
15 Ibid 15 
16 Ibid 
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However, the approach to market definition in free high technology company investigations 
appears to be non-stringent. There are certain methods of analysis by the EU Commission for 
example that appear to undermine the role of market definition. My research reveals two 
methods that the EU Commission uses that reduce the role of market definition.  
 
First is the subsequent consideration of the closeness of substitutes and complements within a 
relevant market after it has already been defined. We will see how in Facebook/Whatsapp17 
such a practice can present a skewed version of market share (which is in turn indicative of 
market power). The EU Commission defined a market for communication applications 
placing both Facebook and Whatsapp in the same market only to then later on determine that 
they were complements. If they were determined to be complements from the very beginning, 
their respective relevant markets would have been narrower and their market shares would 
have been amplified.   
 
Second is the practice of leaving market definitions wide and open; in other words, the 
practice of not carrying out a full market definition exercise. We will see that the main issue 
with these practices of not adhering to a traditional market definition exercise leaves 
competition authorities with the option of being very flexible with its views on market share 
and power that may appear arbitrary. If the peripheries of the market are not well defined to 
begin with, a skewed view of market share can always be presented. However, despite these 
anomalies, it will be seen that whichever way market definition and substitution is analysed, 
                                                          
17 Facebook/Whatsapp (Case No COMP/M.7217) [2014] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf accessed 
on 23rd July 2017 
 
147 
 
the overall competition analysis very much still remains concerned with the availability of 
alternative competitors. Hence, again we will see how the EU Commission’s assessment is 
mainly relevant to the availability of competitors.  
 
Before we consider these in detail it would be logical to start with the place of market 
definition in free high technology cases.  
 
3.2 Market definition: Its supposed place in high technology investigations of the EU 
Commission 
 
There are no specific and special rules and regulations on market definition to be used in high 
technology cases. There are only general rules on market definition which apply across the 
board to all competition cases. By considering these rules one can determine the supposed 
place market definition should have in free high technology case.  
 
Generally market definition is a crucial part of competition law18 and a proper definition is 
required in concentration cases.19 It is considered a very necessary pre-condition in 
establishing dominance cases.20 The requirement of considering dominance is seen in both 
Article 102 TFEU and the Merger Regulations, which prohibits companies from abusing their 
                                                          
18 G Gerven & H Crossley ‘Market Definition: Where do we stand in Europe?’ in Barry E Hawk (ed) 
International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Competition Law 2012 (Juris Publishing 2013) 
19 Joined Cases C-68/94 & C-30/95 France v Commission [1998] ECR I-1375  
20 Case T-62/98 Volkswagen v Commission [2000] ECR II-2707 
148 
 
dominant position in a relevant market within the internal market and prohibits the 
impediment of effective competition through the strengthening of a dominant position 
respectively.21 An example of abuse would be ‘limiting production, markets or technical 
development to the prejudice of consumers’22.  
 
Dominance is a position where a company has the economic strength to prevent effective 
competition from taking place in the relevant market due to its ability to behave 
independently to a considerable extent without having to worry about the actions or reactions 
of their competitors, customers and consumers.23 Dominance is fundamentally equated to 
substantial market power in competition law cases under Article 102 TFEU in general.24 
Furthermore, courts generally rely on market share for an indication as to the level of 
dominance a firm possesses.25 It is market definition which makes it possible to calculate 
these market shares.26 It is a tool used to identify the relevant product market, which 
‘comprises all those products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or 
substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and their 
intended use’27. It also identifies the relevant geographic market which is a geographic ‘area 
in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the supply and demand of products or 
services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous…'28. 
                                                          
21 Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
22 Ibid 
23 Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] E.C.R. 207, para 38 
24 Vodafone/Singlepoint (COMP/M.3245) [2003] para 24 at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m3245_en.pdf  accessed on 15th August 2015 
25 Valentine Korah Cases and Materials on EC Competition Law (Third Edition, Hart Publishing 2006) pg 98 
26 Commission notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law 
[Official Journal C 372 of 9.12.1997] paragraph 2 
27 Ibid para 7 
28 Ibid para 8 
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Therefore an important role of market definition is to look for genuine substitutes that can or 
could be potentially supplied by alternative suppliers to consumers.29 Once all the substitutes 
are identified under a market definition exercise, the investigating authorities/courts can be 
assisted in understanding how competition operates amongst the specific substitutes.30 
 
However, although market definition is considered necessary in competition cases and 
investigations31, it is not always the main factor in the conclusion of a competition case or 
investigation and is not always the main goal.32 For instance in many of the European 
Commission’s investigations the product market definition associated with the concerned 
parties is left open especially when resources are limited.33 The EU Commission nowadays 
goes for a more wholesome analysis where market definition is one of many parts of it.34  
 
But even if market definition is not the main goal, it helps extensively in achieving one of the 
main goals; i.e. to get a clear picture of the competitive conditions in the market. This can be 
seen in the fact that, regardless of whether the market definition of a product is definitively 
                                                          
29 Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission [2002] E.C.R II-2585 paragraph 20 
30 A. Lindsay & A. Berridge The EU Merger Regulation: Substantive Issues (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 
pg 100 
31 Joined Cases C-68/94 & C-30/95 France v Commission [1998] ECR I-1375 paragraph 143 
32See speech by Joaquin Almunia ‘Policy Objectives in Merger Control’ (Fordham Competition Conference, 
New York, 8 September 2011) available at  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-
561_en.htm?locale=en accessed on 21st July 2017 
33 See Speech by former European Commissioner for Competition Policy, Mario Monti ‘Market Definition as a 
cornerstone of EU Competition Policy’ (Workshop on Market Definition - Helsinki Fair Centre, Helsinki, 5th 
October 2001) available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-01-439_en.htm?locale=en  accessed 
on 21st July 2017    
34 I. Gotts, B. Lasserre, L. Kaplow, K. Kuhn, R. Shehadeh, G. Gerven and J. Werden ‘Market Definition in 
Antitrust’ in Barry E Hawk (ed) International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Competition Law 2012 (Juris 
Publishing 2013) 
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determined in a Commission investigation, it is always discussed extensively. It is very 
important in determining the level of dominance of the concerned party(ies); abuse or a 
reduction in effective competition can only be established once dominance is established. For 
example, it is only when dominance is established that the abuse of it needs to be proved in 
order to establish an infringing action.35 Article 102 highlights particular actions that can be 
considered as abuse ranging from imposing unfair prices/trading conditions to imposing 
obligations that are unrelated to the subject of the contract.36 This is a non-exhaustive list. For 
instance, although there is no direct reference to mergers in Article 102, the strengthening of 
a company’s market position through a merger is also considered an abuse where it is found 
that the likely result of it is harm to consumers.37 
 
We can therefore conclude that whilst market definition is not the one determining factor in 
the assessment of a competition case, it is still a very necessary process that is required in all 
competition investigations under Article 102 TFEU. We can therefore justifiably include it as 
part of our analysis as an important factor in the determination of free high technology cases.  
 
3.3 Market Definition’s practical operation in high technology cases 
Now that we have elicited the necessary assumed role that market definition is to play in free 
high technology cases, we now have to consider how the role operates in practice. As already 
seen, once the market is defined, the case analysis is generally only meant to involve the 
companies in that bound market; only the competitive restraints emanating from the 
                                                          
35 Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
36 Ibid 
37 Case 6/72 Continental Can : Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Co. Inc. v Commission 
[1973] CMLR 199 Paras 25 to 27 
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companies operating in that market are to be analysed. Research for the thesis however has 
revealed that such analysis within clearly demarcated boundaries does not take place in high 
technology cases such as Facebook/Whatsapp38 and Microsoft/Skype.39 At times, the analysis 
includes considering restraints from outside the defined relevant market; at times the EU 
Commission, through their very own analysis, appears to cast doubt on whether two products 
they have placed in the same market are at all substitutable. Either way however, the 
questions are always based on the availability of and access to substitutes, which in turn 
reflects the presence of a degree of competition.  
 
What will be seen in the below analysis is that the EU Commission overall appears to treat 
the demarcation of a relevant market only as a loose guidance. This will be seen in the 
context of cases such as Facebook/Whatsapp. The EU Commission may for instance, define 
the market and then further question actually how substitutable the products within the 
market they have just defined actually are. The EU Commission may also at times, leave the 
question of market definition quite open and carry out what may appear to be an arbitrary 
analysis involving products/services that are not substitutable with each other. At the end 
more importantly though, we will see how these less strict approaches to market definition 
are simply replaced by alternative ways to consider the level of competition in the market.  
We begin by looking at ‘closeness of competition’ analysis with special emphasis on the 
Facebook/Whatsapp case where a possible arbitrary market definition exercise takes place. 
                                                          
38 Facebook/Whatsapp (Case No COMP/M.7217) [2014] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf accessed 
on 23rd July 2017 
39 Microsoft/ Skype (Case No COMP/M.6281) [2011] at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6281_924_2.pdf accessed on 5th February 2015 
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3.4 ‘Closeness of Competition’ analysis- a reflection of how the perceived relevant market is 
manipulated 
 
Research for the thesis reveals that the EU Commission’s approach to ‘closeness of 
competition’ analysis may appear to be at loggerheads with the market definition exercise of 
clearly determining which products are substitutable with each other. Facebook/Whatsapp40  
provides a good example of this potential conflict.  
 
In the Facebook/Whatsapp merger investigation a market was established for consumer 
communications applications for smartphones only and a market for online advertising.41  
Under both discussions with regards to the two markets, the analysis was in fact limited to the 
companies present only in that market.42 However, having defined the boundaries of the 
market, the EU Commission concluded that Facebook and Whatsapp were not really close 
competitors in that area. As we have already seen, a relevant market is to only include 
products or services that are genuinely substitutable. With that in mind it would be reasonable 
to expect the EU Commission to determine whether they are close competitors at the stage of 
defining the market. In the case of Facebook and Whatsapp this approach would logically 
narrow the market definition. That is, if they were not considered to be close competitors in 
the first place, theoretically this would mean that they would be placed in different and 
narrower relevant markets; each company would have a larger share in those markets due to 
the narrowness leading to a more likely finding of dominance. Even though this would mean 
                                                          
40 Facebook/Whatsapp (Case No COMP/M.7217) [2014] at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf  accessed 
on 3rd February 2015 
41 Ibid 
42 Ibid 
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that Facebook and Whatsapp would not be considered competitors and therefore they 
wouldn’t be eliminating themselves as a competitor through the merger, their respective 
dominance in their own markets could allow them to tip each other’s customers into using 
both their products.43  
 
Hence, we can see how the closeness of competition assessment reduces the effect of market 
definition. However, whilst it does that, it does not eliminate the focus on the objective of 
protecting competition. Although a strictly narrower relevant market is not advocated, the 
assessment is still very much concerned with whether or not there is another competitor 
restraining the incumbent.  
 
3.4.1 The legality of the ‘closeness of competition’ analysis 
 
Above, we saw the conceptual conflicts between market definition and ‘closeness of 
competition’ analysis. It is therefore important to determine whether this type of analysis is 
legitimate in the first place and can therefore be used as an additional tool that focuses on the 
level of competition in the market by the EU Commission. 
  
It would be incorrect to assume that all the products within a defined relevant market are 
close substitutes; it is possible for some level of differentiation to exist between the 
competing products, preventing them from being easily/closely substitutable.44 Because of 
                                                          
43 Ibid 
44 Richard Schmalensee ‘Another Look at Market Power’ (1984) 14(2) J. Reprints Antitrust L. & Econ. 701, 705 
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this, an exercise purely constituting market definition analysis is insufficient; other factors (as 
we have seen in Facebook/Whatsapp where after the market definition exercise the closeness 
of competitors was considered) need to be considered.45 Also, there is a strong indication in 
EU merger guidance that this sort of analysis of assessing levels of substitutability/closeness 
after the market has already been defined is acceptable.  
 
In the ‘Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on 
the control of concentrations between undertakings’ it states that products within a relevant 
market may be differentiated to the point where some products are closer alternatives 
compared to others.46 In other words, after the relevant market is defined, there can be a 
consideration of whether or not the alternatives available are close; this issue does not have to 
be resolved at the stage the market is defined. This is especially considered true for 
differentiated products within a relevant market where the difference in quality makes some 
substitutes closer competitors than others.47 Substitutes in these situations are known to be 
imperfect; the closer the substitution the more the merging parties exert competitive pressure 
on each other and therefore the more likely this competitive pressure will be lost in the 
relevant market post-merger.48 Even the US merger guidelines accepts a similar approach.49 
They also indicate that very often the evidence required for determining market definition is 
                                                          
45 Ibid 705-706 
46 Council Regulation (EC) of 5 February 2004 on Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the 
Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03 ) [2004] OJ C 31/5 at 
paragraph 28 
47 Stefan Thomas ‘Close Competitors in Merger Review’ (2013) JECL&Pract 1, 2 
48 The Merger Working Group ‘The Role of Economists and Economic Evidence in Merger Analysis (Presented 
at the 12th Annual Conference International Competition Network April 24-26 2013) p 20 available at 
http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc903.pdf accessed on 21st July 2017 
49 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (US Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, August 19th 2010) 
paragraph 6.1 
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the same used for determining the closeness of substitutes; however they are still two separate 
stages and therefore should not be confused with each other.50  
 
The second stage involving the assessment of closeness of competition is necessary as, for 
instance, assumptions that all products within a defined market are equally substitutable 
could lead to an incorrect assessment of competitive restraints within the market; the reality is 
that products hold varying degrees of substitutability.51 Such analysis of considering the 
varying closeness of products has come to be known as unilateral effects analysis; it is 
considered different from an analysis which is purely based on dominance determined by the 
share of a company within a defined relevant market.52  
 
It is, though, important to note that the EU Commission has on occasion placed significantly 
more importance on the market definition/share stage and dominance than unilateral effects 
analysis where the market share reaches particularly high thresholds.53 For instance, in the 
case of AKZO the then European Court of Justice stated that a market share of over 50% was 
to be considered as evidence of a dominant position.54 Despite this, the market definition 
stage can still be looked at only as the starting point of the analysis.55 This principle is 
reflected by other official merger investigations as well. For instance in the Nortel/Norweb 
merger investigation despite there being a determination of a post-merger market share of 
                                                          
50 Ibid 
51 John Vickers ‘Competition Economics and Policy’ (2003) 24(3) E.C.L.R. 95, 100 
52 Sven B Volcker ‘Mind the Gap: Unilateral Effects Analysis Arrives in EC Merger Control’ (2004) 7 E.C.L.R 
395 
53 See Case 85/76 Hoffmann-LaRoche & Co v Commission of the European Communities [1979] ECR 1979 -
00461 paragraph 50, 47% market share was considered to indicate a dominant position 
54 Case 62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities [1991] ECR 1991 I-03359 
paragraph 60 
55 Stefan Thomas ‘Close Competitors in Merger Review’ (2013) JECL&Pract 1, 7 
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100%, the EU Commission commented that this did not automatically or necessarily indicate 
a dominant position; it went beyond the market definition exercise and took into account 
other factors such as the possibility of other resourceful companies entering the market and 
applying competitive constraints.56  
 
This sort of treatment of market definition as a secondary factor at times appears to be a well-
established approach of the EU Commission and is therefore nothing particularly specific to 
free high technology cases. For example, the EU Commission has in the past placed products 
that have low levels of substitutability with each other in the same relevant market. In 2000, 
in the horizontal merger case of Volvo/Renault a market for heavy trucks was clearly defined; 
however, at the competitive assessment stage this did not prevent the EU Commission from 
agreeing to evidence that strongly suggested that Volvo and Renault were distant competitors 
due to their price differences (indicating that consumers had the impression that the heavy 
trucks of the two different companies were of different quality); this led to the conclusion that 
there concentration did not raise competition concerns in the market for heavy trucks in 
France.57  
 
In 2002, as a further example, the EU Commission’s merger decision in Barilla/BPS/Kamps a 
market for bakery products containing many differentiated products was mentioned; it was 
considered that within that market, particular companies specifically put more of a 
competitive constraint on each other as their corresponding products were closer substitutes 
                                                          
56 Nortel/Norweb (Case No IV/M.1113 )[1998] para 25 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1113_en.pdf accessed 21st July 2017 
57 Volvo/Renault V.I. (Case IV/M.1980) [2000] paragraph 34 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1980_en.pdf accessed 21st July 2017 
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than those of others.58 In both cases the EU Commission did not further subdivide the market 
according to the differentiated products.  
 
Furthermore, there is support for this approach in literature and other cases to the extent that 
the 'closeness of competition’ analysis is considered even more important than the market 
definition exercise itself. For example, the new merger test allows for situations where there 
are competition concerns in the absence of high market share; this can especially happen 
where two merging companies with small shares are very close competitors.59  
 
It also appears that since 2004 when the new merger regulations were implemented60 that the 
assessment of the closeness of competitors may actually take priority over market definition 
itself. For instance, in the EU Commission’s Decision in SCA/P&G, based on evidence 
showing that both companies were losing sales over the year in branded toilet paper (as 
opposed to losing sales to each other), it was decided that the merging of the two concerned 
parties did not remove a significant competitive constraint on them; the evidence was seen to 
indicate that the two companies were not close substitutes of each other when it came to 
branded toilet paper and therefore there were no serious doubts on that particular market.61 
Here the specific focus appeared to be on the relationship between the two merging parties. 
                                                          
58 Barilla/BPL/KAMPS (COMP/M.2817) [2002] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2817_en.pdf accessed on 21st July 2017 
59 See L Roller & M de la Mano ‘The Impact of the new substantive test in European Merger Control’ 
(European Commission 22nd January 2006) available at  
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/new_substantive_test.pdf> accessed on 17th February 2016, 
Thomas Buettner ‘Closeness of competition from an economic perspective’(2016) 7(10) J.E.C.L. & Pract. 690 
and Berg W & Sophia R ‘How close is too close? A critical review of the European Commission’s Assessment 
of Closeness of Competition’ (2016) 7(7) J.E.C.L. & Pract. 442 
60 Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
(the EC Merger Regulation) (2004) OJ L24/1 
61SCA/P&G (European tissue business)(Case no. COMP/M.4533) [2007] paragraphs 120–124 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4533_20070905_20212_en.pdf accessed on 21st July 
2017 
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That is, did they lose sales to each other? Since the evidence suggested that they did not, that 
in itself would be enough to suggest that they faced other competitors (without needing to 
carry out a formal definition of the market). This was further directly seen in the EU 
Commission’s decision in Porsche/Volkswagen where, despite it being found that both 
companies had very high market shares in a wider market, there was no significant 
impediment to competition as they were not close competitors; Porche’s main focus was on 
sports vehicles whilst Volkswagen’s was on passenger and commercial vehicles. 62 Again, 
market shares also took a back seat to a closeness of competitors’ assessment in the EU 
Commission Decision of T-Mobile Austria/tele.ring; here the two merging parties in fact had 
low market shares in the market but because they were very close competitors, the EU 
Commission concluded that there would be a possibility of significant impediment to 
effective competition.63 
 
Therefore, it appears from the above cases that an assessment of the closeness of competition 
post- market definition has become regular practice on the part of the EU Commission.64 
Such analysis has occurred in cases involving derivatives,65 postal operators66 and 
telecommunications67 as well. One cannot therefore vilify the EU Commission’s approach in 
                                                          
62 Porsche/Volkswagen (Case no COMP/M.5250) [2008] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5250_20080723_20310_de.pdf accessed 23rd July 
2017  
63 T-Mobile Austria/Tele.ring (Case no COMP/M.3916) [2006] paragraph 125 available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m3916_20060426_20600_en.pdf accessed on 23rd July 
2017 
64 Stefan Thomas ‘Close Competitors in Merger Review’ (2013) JECL&Pract 1, 2 
65 Deutsche Borse/ NYSE Euronext (Case no COMP/.6166) paragraph 543 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6166_20120201_20610_2711467_EN.pdf accessed 
on 23rd July 2017 
66 UPS/TNT (Case no COMP/ M.6570) [2013] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6570_20130130_20610_4241141_EN.pdf accessed 
on 23rd July 2017 
67Orange/H3G (Case no COMP/M. 6497)[2012] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6497_20121212_20600_3210969_EN.pdf accessed 
on 23rd July 2017 
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cases like Facebook. There are clear grounds in the guidance and previous case law for 
having an analysis of closeness post-market definition. More importantly, what it also means 
is that such analysis is grounded in EU competition law and therefore emphasizes, once 
again, that the main concern is with the level of competition in the market. Determining the 
closeness of competition refers to figuring out whether two products are competing. If they 
are close, the producers of the two products merging would be a problem. This is because 
competition in the market would be reduced. This again reminds us of how the theory on free 
high technology might come into conflict with the consumer welfare objective that the EU 
Commission has set itself to achieve. It strongly runs on the idea that competition is good for 
consumers.  
 
Next, we consider another form of analysis that takes the closeness of competition test a step 
further; putting two services together in the same relevant market before determining them as 
complements.  
 
3.4.2 Complements within a Defined Relevant Market 
The Facebook/Whatsapp decision expresses a peculiar method of analysing complements 
within a defined relevant market. The method merits consideration for two reasons. First, it 
displays another method of analysis that once again focuses on whether goods are 
substitutable and therefore whether the goods’ producers are competitors. It is concerned with 
competition above all else. Second, it is concluded to be a limited method of analysis in terms 
of market definition.  
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The Facebook/Whatsapp decision however, went beyond considering the companies’ 
different communications applications as substitutes and determined them to be complements 
in terms of the potential social network market (which was left open).68 The EU Commission 
went a step further and stated that the two applications were used simultaneously by most 
users and they both fulfilled different needs.69 Simultaneous use of products can be a good 
indication that they are complements.70 The notion of complements being present in the same 
market needs to be explored. It is important because if complements are allowed to be placed 
in the same relevant market, the market definition exercise becomes merely a charade of 
attempting to clearly group products that are substitutable.  
 
In the cases we saw in the previous section, the assessment of closeness involved products 
that were still considered as substitutes, just with different levels of substitutability. 
Considering them as complements that fulfil different needs for customers is probably a 
stronger indication that they are in different markets. Unless demand for complements is 
directly influenced by that of the original products, they should be placed in different 
markets.71 For instance, consumers may decide to purchase a photocopier depending on the 
price of toner; in other words if the price of toner is very high, the consumer may decide not 
to purchase the photocopier.72 In such cases the two products could be placed in the same 
                                                          
68 Facebook/Whatsapp (Case No COMP/M.7217) [2014] paragraph 151 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf accessed 
on 23rd July 2017 
69 Ibid paragraph 157 
70 See Cento Veljanovski ‘Case Comment; Markets in Professional Sports: Hendry v WPSBA and the 
importance of functional markets’ (2002) 23(6) ECLR 273, 276- Author described how a snooker player cannot 
be a complement to clashing tournaments as he/she cannot be present at both tournaments simultaneously. 
Hence one player can only be a substitute of another in these situations.  
71 A Fruh & D Mamane, ‘Switzerland: anticompetitive practices- motor vehicle distribution’ (2015) 36(5) 
ECLR. 56 
72 Cento Veljanovski ‘Markets without substitutes: substitution versus constraints as the key to market 
definition’ (2010) 31(3) ECLR. 122 
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relevant market despite not being directly substitutable with each other; demand for both 
products would move in the same direction in response to the same change in price.73 Below 
in sections 3.2.4.1 and 3.2.4.2 we will see the various scenarios in which complements can be 
justifiably considered to be in the same market in competition cases.  
 
3.4.3 Complements as a single product together 
It is imperative that we consider other cases to establish how complements have been 
historically approached. This will shed light on whether the complements analysis in 
Facebook/Whatsapp was accurate and appropriate.  
 
In the Google/Doubleclick investigation complementary products/services (provision of 
advertising space and ad-serving technology) bundled together were considered as potentially 
a single product competing against other bundled and unbundled solutions.74 It was 
determined that there was a lack of competitive concern with regards to this potential 
competition for other reasons;75 nonetheless it goes to show that the EU Commission is of the 
opinion that complements may be in the same relevant market at least where they are bundled 
together.  
 
                                                          
73 See Cento Veljanovski, ‘Assessing After markets: The Digital Undertaking’(Casenote, Case Associates 
Competition and Regulatory Economist 1998) available at http://www.casecon.com/data/pdfs/casenote14.pdf 
accessed on 23rd July 2017 
74 Google/Doubleclick (Case No COMP/M.4731) [2008] paragraphs 192-194 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4731_20080311_20682_en.pdf accessed on 24th July 
2017 
75 Ibid 
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This is also supported in other decisions.  In Pelican/Kyocera,76 Kyocera was said to possess 
dominance in the market for Kyocera printer compatible toner.77  Pelican argued that Kyocera 
was abusing its dominance in this narrow market by tying the toner to its printers for 
customers at an attractive price.78 The EU Commission did not agree to this statement and 
said that the market was wider and included both printers and toners of all companies.79 
Relatively low switching costs for hardware and the fact that consumers made an informed 
choice to enter into life cycling costs, meant that consumers could switch to a different 
company in a reasonable period should they find that the consumables are too high in price.80 
The same principle was enforced in a similar case namely Infolab/Ricoh which involved 
photocopy machines and toners for those machines.81 It was also emphasized in that case 
however, that the company must have a dominant market share in order to be found guilty of 
impeding competition.82  
 
Hence, a guiding principle could be that in order for complements to be in the same relevant 
market, whether or not they are tied/bundled would have to be taken into consideration . This 
is not to say that all tied/bundled products must be construed as being in the same relevant 
                                                          
76 Pelikan/Kyocera (Case no IV/34.330) [1995] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/34330/34330_21_3.pdf accessed on 24th July 2017 
77 Ibid 
78 Ibid 
79 Ibid 
80 Ibid 
81 Info-Lab/Ricoh (Case No IV/E 2/36.431) [1997] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/36431/36431_7_3.pdf accessed on 24th July 2017  
82 Ibid 
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market,83 but whether or not they are tied plays a factor.84 The Facebook/Whatsapp 
investigation did not mention any tying of their communications applications; therefore under 
this guidance their applications should not have been placed in the same relevant market.  
 
3.4.4 Complements in separate markets 
We now turn to other cases where complements have been placed in different markets. We 
can consider whether the principles from these cases allow Facebook and Whatsapp services 
to be placed in the same relevant market and hence assess the accuracy of the EU 
Commission’s analysis in Facebook/Whatsapp.  
 
In recent cases the EU Commission also placed complements in separate markets. The 
Intel/McAfee investigation, for example, stated that there was a strong possibility that the 
merging parties’ complementary products could give rise to anticompetitive conglomerate 
effects despite there being no horizontal or vertical overlaps in terms of relevant markets.85  
 
                                                          
83 See The Unilateral Conduct Working Group ‘Unilateral Conduct Workbook, Chapter 6:Tying and 
bundling’(April 2015, 14th ICN Annual Conference) paragraph 32 available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/2014-
15/icn%20unilateral%20conduct%20workbook%20-%20chapter%206%20tying%20and%20bundling.pdf 
accessed on 26 August 2018- the author distinguishes considering two complements forming a single product 
from putting them in the same relevant market. There is a possibility that complements, such as shoes and laces, 
form a single product, but may have different relevant markets depending on the circumstances.  
84See C Ahlborn  D Evans ‘The Microsoft Judgment and its Implications for Competition Policy towards 
Dominant Firms in Europe’ (2009) 75(3) Antitrust L.J 887, section 2- Although the EU Commission dismissed 
the argument, Microsoft tried to argue that because the windows media player and operating system were 
generally demanded together they both should be considered as a single product. 
85 See Intel/McAfee (Case No COMP/M.5984) [2011] paragraphs 120-121 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5984_1922_2.pdf accessed on 10th March 2015 
 - Conglomerates usually do not give rise to competitive concerns, but they can where practices such as 
exclusionary bundling and tying take place.  
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The EU Commission has also separated complements into different markets in the past. In the 
Digital Undertaking investigation the EU Commission defined two separate markets for 
complements; the company under investigation tied its hardware to its software services at a 
very attractive price causing the foreclosure of software services provided by competitors in 
the secondary aftermarket.86 It was found that the software services for the company’s 
hardware were not substitutable by that of any other company; customers were locked in and 
faced high switching costs (customers would have to purchase new hardware at high cost to 
avoid the software services cost).87 The company was found to be dominant in both relevant 
markets due to these factors and the EU Commission concluded that they were exploiting 
their position in the different markets.88 However, this decision was later criticized and 
considered to be incorrect in terms of the conclusion of dominance in both markets simply 
due to compatibility.89  
 
Such markets involving a single product with no substitutes whatsoever, (sometimes known 
as single brand markets) have been considered as too narrow by American Law Professor 
Thomas Kauper.90 He has criticized such narrow markets as being grounded in notions of 
fairness as opposed to economic concerns; the market is to be wider and the focus of the 
argument should be on lock-in effects and high switching costs independent of the market 
definition issue.91 Single brands are definitely considered to create some loyalty amongst 
                                                          
86 R Bell & J Cramer ‘Competition/antitrust challenges in technology aftermarkets’ (Bryan Cave, 5 March 2015) 
available at  <http://eu-competitionlaw.com/competitionantitrust-challenges-in-technology-aftermarkets/ > 
accessed on 16 September 2017- The author refers to ‘The Digital Undertaking (1998) 10 European 
Competition Law Review 176’  
87 Ibid 
88 Ibid 
89 Thomas Kauper ‘Article 86, Excessive Prices, and Refusals to Deal’ (1991) 59 Antitrust L.J 441, 451 
90 Ibid 
91 Thomas Kauper ‘The problem of market definition under EC Competition Law’ (1996) 20(5) Fordham Int’l 
L.J 1682, 1698 
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consumers to the point where demand will not change significantly in response to changes in 
demand; however a brand in itself is not to constitute the market.92  
 
As we saw above in the section with regards to complements put in wider markets together, 
the EU Commission itself is usually reluctant to define markets very narrowly; however, 
there are some exceptions to this where the market share of the company is dominant in the 
primary market. For example, in the IBM investigation, IBM was seen to have a dominant 
position in the primary market and therefore through negotiations with the EU Commission 
committed to provide other companies in the aftermarket the necessary information to 
provide an after service for IBM machines.93 This commitment seemed to suggest that the 
IBM after-service complement was considered by the EU Commission to have a market of its 
own with no alternative; hence, the negotiations with IBM to get the company to share 
necessary information with other would be competitors in the after-service market.   
 
Despite the criticism we saw above, the guidance  that can be extracted here is that where the 
company in the primary market has a very dominant share in the market the complement can 
be placed in a market of its own. This appears to be a strategy by which the authorities can 
paint a more effective picture to be able to address concerns regarding foreclosure. Where 
market share is very high, tying a complement threatens competitors producing 
similar/identical complements. Putting that tied complement in a market of its own with no 
other substitutes effectively creates the impression of a market with hardly any competition 
                                                          
92 See A Fruh & D Mamane, ‘Switzerland: anticompetitive practices- motor vehicle distribution’ (2015) 36(5) 
E.C.L.R. 56 
93 IBM Maintenance Services (Case COMP/C-3/39692) [2011] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39692/39692_1304_3.pdf accessed on 16th September 
2017 
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present. Where the authorities are not as concerned about foreclosure of competitors 
producing complements because the acquiring platform has a small market share and 
therefore tying is unlikely to cause foreclosure, the complement may be put in the same 
market. We can actually see again a manipulation of market perception, needing to control 
the number of competitors present in the market.  
 
 
 
3.4.5 Summary on when complements can be placed in the same market and when they 
cannot 
 
It appears that some principles can be derived for complements. In order for them to be in 
separate markets, switching costs need to be low and customers should have made an 
informed decision about costs cycling through their own will. One can also see that cases 
such as Pelican/Kyocera and Infolab/Ricoh involve complementary products that are 
absolutely necessary for the use of one of them; that is, one cannot print without ink and ink 
cannot operate without a printer. In the Facebook/Whatsapp case, there appears to be no 
absolutely necessary ties between the two. The different communications applications can 
operate independent of each other. Also, in order for abuse to take place the entity that is 
dominant in its market will usually have to be able to leverage its dominance in another 
market through tying its product to the complement; without this it would be difficult to place 
them in the same market.94 Given the way the business models work now, Facebook could 
                                                          
94 G Niels & H Jenkins ‘Reform of Article 82: where the link between dominance and effects breaks down’ 
(2005) 26(11) ECLR 605, 609 
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not tie its application to that of Whatsapp. Both applications are free of charge in the first 
place meaning that there is no situation likened to the previous cases where the accused 
companies were tying products/services together at a discounted price either. 
 
Furthermore, there have been cases where even identical products/services were in different 
markets based on their different uses by different groups of consumers.95 For example, in the 
Google/Doubleclick investigation, although there was no determination of separate markets, 
the ad serving technologies of Google and Doubleclick were considered not to constrain each 
other as they catered to different categories of customer.96 Therefore, potentially similar 
products which are considered to provide different functions should also logically therefore 
belong to different markets. However, as seen already, the EU Commission determined that 
Whatsapp and Facebook were both used simultaneously (the EU Commission usually terms 
this practice as ‘multi homing’) and in combination with each other; this would not pose any 
harm to competition as they would belong to separate markets where they would be 
competing with different sets of competitors.97  
 
                                                          
95 See Stergios Delimitis v Henninger Brau AG (Case C-234/89) [1991] available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:6eddc47b-6bf9-4ab0-be08-
52482c69641c.0002.03/DOC_1&format=PDF accessed on 24th July 2017- beer was separated into two different 
product markets; a beer market for consumers and another beer market for pubs. The pricing was different for 
the two markets and involved different forms of distribution and levels of distribution costs. Also see Case T-
7/93 Langnese-Iglo GmbH v Commission of the European Communities [1995] Report of Cases II-1539- ice 
cream divided into impulse buying market and take home market- both involved different processing equipment, 
packaging, forms etc.  
96 Google/Doubleclick (Case No COMP/M.4731) [2008] paragraphs 212-221 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4731_20080311_20682_en.pdf accessed on 24th July 
2017 
97 See J Westin, M Healy & B Batchelor, ‘Pharmaceutical co-promotion, co-marketing and antitrust’ (2014) 
35(8) E.C.L.R. 402, 404- Author discusses case of MSD/Roche (Turkey 2013) where two hepatitis C treatments 
were considered as a combination therapy and therefore on different markets; hence there was no restriction of 
competition.  
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It would be reasonable to observe that complements are therefore more distant from each 
other than close substitutes; the former can form separate relevant markets whilst the latter 
can be placed under the same market. The Facebook/Whatsapp decision stated the two 
different communication applications as complements in the same market; however, as we 
have already seen they do not fall under the principles that allow them to be in the same 
market.  
 
We can therefore conclude that the decision in this particular respect is potentially flawed.  
An accurate process of distinguishing complements from close substitutes is important as it 
can gravely affect the accuracy of the EU Commission decisions.98 Theoretically, had they 
been considered complements as part of the market definition exercise, they would be placed 
in separate relevant markets where they would each have even greater market share. The 
increased market share would lead to a more likely finding of dominance which in turn would 
more likely cause concern for competition. We can therefore see how the EU Commission’s 
practice of including what it would later consider as complements in the same relevant 
market, could be considered as an artificial way to present a picture of a market with many 
competitors. This is an important element to note and will be important in forming this thesis’ 
hypothesis.  
 
So far we have discussed the approach of the EU Commission to elements within an 
established and defined market. Next we will consider how the EU Commission approaches 
                                                          
98 See C Veljanovski & R Sarker ‘Fixed to mobile substitution: the evidence and its implications’ (2006) 27(9) 
Comp. Law 276- Authors state the high importance of correctly determining whether fixed and mobile phone 
lines are substitutes or compliments as they can have significant impacts on policy and regulation.   
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market definition before it analyses the elements within it. We will see that market definition 
is at times left open or is defined very widely.  
3.5 Potential effects of Open and Wide Market Definitions on the final decisions of 
Commission Investigations 
 
In the previous sections we considered cases where the market has actually been defined and 
how the products/services within that relevant market are compared with each other (i.e. 
complements and close substitutes). In this section we consider situations where the market 
definition is left open; in other words where the final boundaries of the market are not 
ultimately determined and a very wide and loose market definition is considered as a premise. 
Understanding width of the market definition is important. As we will see, adjusting the 
width of the relevant market can allow authorities to present the level of competition in a 
particular light that may be limited regardless of what the more realistic version of 
competition is. Furthermore, given that we will see how the width of market definitions 
colour the final decisions of the authorities, it is once again observed that the level of 
competition in the market is seen as central in all competition law cases.   
 
The lack of a market definition or the presence of wide market definitions may be 
problematic. Without setting the boundaries of the relevant market or by setting them too 
wide, the products to be compared may be barely substitutable. This is a potential problem 
for complainants in competition cases. Complainants will tend to argue that the company 
under investigation is involved in a very narrow market; the narrower the market the more 
likely the company would have a higher market share and less competitive constraints from 
competitors. This in turn, would make intervention by the authorities more likely, therefore 
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having a significant impact on the ultimate decision in competition investigations.99 Josef 
Silhan summarizes the effect of market definition briefly but comprehensively; 
  
‘Depending mainly only just on how narrowly the relevant market is defined, the 
conclusions on whether an agreement between competitors shall be banned, a merger 
permitted or market dominance claimed, stem from the applicable antitrust regulation 
often more or less automatically then…There are many interesting cases in which the 
results are strongly influenced by the narrowness or broadness of the defined relevant 
market in question…’100 
 
 
Hence, an open or wide market definition theoretically is likely to prevent a finding of 
dominance. As seen in Silhan’s statement above results can strongly be influenced by the 
broadness of a market; the broader the market, the more competition there appears to be. An 
open/wide definition provides the ability to competition authorities to flexibly present the 
level of dominance in the market in a particular way; including showing a broader market 
with lower market power.    
 
A good example of how the width of market definitions can determine the outcome of a case 
is seen in the judgement of Hilti AG vs Commission.101 Hilti was a company that sold power 
tools; of concern in this case were nail guns that used powder to drive in nails from 
cartridges.102 Hilti sold these cartridges (which were the only cartridges compliant with 
                                                          
99 See J Silhan ‘The Concept of Relevant Market: Some Critical Remarks’ (2012) 33(12) E.C.L.R 589 
100 Ibid 
101 Case C-53/92 P Hilti v Commission [1994] ECR I-693 
102 Ibid 
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Hilti’s nail guns and for which Hilti held patents) with nails only as opposed to empty ones; 
hence dealers in the aftermarket found it difficult to sell any of their own nails to consumers 
who own Hilti nail guns.103 The General Courtat the time declared that there was a 
completely separate market for cartridge and nails that were compatible with Hilti’s nail 
guns.104  This can be considered a deliberate narrowing of the relevant market with the 
specific purpose of making it appear as if though the Hilti-compatible nails held 100% market 
share and therefore absolute market power; this would more likely enable the court to find an 
abuse of a dominant position.105 Such a narrowing of the market especially made no sense 
given that any entity in the EU has the right to produce Hilti compatible nails if it wanted 
to.106  
 
Furthermore, in the United Kingdom case of Hendry v WPBSA the defendant, a league that 
specifically organized snooker tournaments and licensed them to broadcasters, attempted to 
argue that the relevant market was very wide and that it included the broadcasting of all 
sports similar to snooker (and not snooker alone); hence this prevented the defendant from 
having a dominant position in the market and therefore posed no competition concerns.107 
Although the judgement of the case did not conclude on this particular element of the 
defendant’s case because it was not central to the complaint of the claimant, it goes to show 
how the manipulation of market definition is used to attempt to establish or deny market 
power. 
 
                                                          
103 Ibid 
104 Ibid I-697 to I-698 
105 Thomas Kauper ‘The problem of market definition under EC Competition Law’ (1996) 20(5) Fordham Int’l 
L.J 1682, 1712-13 
106 Ibid 
107 See Hendry, Williams & Sportsmaster Network v. World Professional Billiards & Snooker 
Association [2002] UKCLR 5 
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However, such a strategy of manipulating market definition is not possible in many of the 
competition cases we have discussed. As we will see, the EU commission has refused to 
define the market into narrower segments in these cases. It is important to note at the outset 
that there is, in fact, no specific obligation to define the market clearly in investigations108; 
market definition can be left open in situations where resources needed for accurate definition 
are limited109 and where in any alternative market definition (narrower or wider) the results of 
the investigation would be the same.110  
 
3.5.1 Defined Markets 
It would be appropriate to start off by considering cases where markets have actually been 
definitively defined so we can have a comparison with the subsequent sections where the 
market definitions are left open or wide. 
 
In the EU Commission’s investigation into the Cisco/Tandberg merger a broad market for 
video communications services (VCS) was further subdivided into three separate relevant 
markets of dedicated room VCS, multi-purpose room VCS and executive office VCS.111 At 
the competitive assessment stage the EU Commission analysed the factors within each 
                                                          
108 See Commission notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law 
[1997] OJ C 372 paragraphs 26-27. 
109Mario Monti ‘Market Definition as a cornerstone of EU Competition Policy’ (Workshop on Market 
Definition - Helsinki Fair Centre, Helsinki, 5th October 2001) available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-01-439_en.htm?locale=en  accessed on 21st July 2017    
110 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ‘Policy Roundtables: Market Definition’ 
(DAF/COMP(2012)19, 11 October 2012) page 337 
111 Cisco/ Tandberg (Case No COMP/M.5669) [2010] at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5669_2153_2.pdf accessed on 8th February 2015 
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market and came to separate conclusions under each separate category with regards to 
impediment to competition and market share .112  
 
Also, in the Facebook/Whatsapp investigation, a specific market for communications 
applications on smart phones only was defined.113 At the competitive assessment stage the 
EU Commission considered the market shares according to this relevant market; also it stuck 
to considering competitive constraints from companies that were only within the ambit of this 
particular relevant market.114 Of course, as we have seen before, the high market shares of the 
merging parties was not enough to raise concerns as their applications were considered as 
complements as opposed to substitutes; in the previous section it was questioned whether 
they should have been placed in the same market in the first place. But in this section the 
purpose is to see whether the EU Commission’s analysis sticks within the boundaries of the 
market it has itself defined. And in Facebook/Whatsapp the EU Commission restricted its 
analysis to the boundaries of the market for communications application on smart phones 
only.  
 
However, in the Intel/McAfee investigation such a restriction of analysis did not take place; 
the EU Commission definitively defined a market for central processing units (CPUs) based 
on x86 architecture but in the competitive assessment stage considered other forms of 
architecture (not based on the x86 architecture) as a potential future competitive restraint on 
                                                          
112 Ibid 
113 Facebook/Whatsapp (Case No COMP/M.7217) [2014] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf accessed 
on 23rd July 2017 
114 Ibid 
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the x86 CPU.115 Hence, this may indicate that the market definition exercise is not as 
determinative of the outcome as one may think given that the EU Commission appears to be 
fine with considering the potential effect of products/services that are outside the ambit of the 
relevant market once that market has already been defined. It has been mentioned with 
regards to market definition however, that the EU Commission does not strictly follow any 
specific method of assessing competition cases and may instead take a holistic view of the 
circumstances of each case.116  
 
One may therefore interpret this as the EU Commission having flexibility in its approach; in 
other words, just because the EU Commission carries out a market definition exercise, it does 
not necessarily have to rigorously stick to the ambit of the relevant market and may consider 
other possible factors. However, in general, we see that where the market is definitively 
defined, there is a very structured analysis indicating a clear separation between products 
according to the defined relevant markets. Through this sort of structure, the competitive 
pressures analysed will be limited according to the relevant market and there will be no 
consideration of any potential pressures from outside the market. This appears to be the 
logical and appropriate method of analysing markets once the market is defined. 
Consideration of products/services outside the defined relevant market may however indicate 
that an unreliable picture of competition emerges. We will see how this happens in market 
definitions that are left open or are too wide below.  
 
                                                          
115 Intel/McAfee (Case No COMP/M.5984) [2011] paragraphs 30 & 69 at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5984_1922_2.pdf accessed on 10th March 2015 
116 ‘Panel Discussion on Market Definition in Antitrust’ in Barry E Hawk (ed) International Antitrust Law & 
Policy: Fordham Competition Law 2012 (Juris Publishing 2013) 
175 
 
3.5.2 Open and Wide  markets  
The idea of the EU Commission leaving market definitions open or wide may initially appear 
as though the pro-protection of competition exercise of market definition is done away with. 
However, it is important that we analyse situations where market definition is left open 
because, as we will observe, in essence, the analysis of defined markets still takes place 
regardless. Once again we see the important place that the analysis of competition is to hold 
in high technology cases.  
 
The Facebook/Whatsapp investigation is an example of where market definition for social 
networking was left open.117 The EU Commission had however discussed prior to this that 
the evidence suggested that there was a possibility of distinguishing social networking sites 
based on specific functions (LinkedIn for example, has more of a professional function than 
Facebook, yet the market investigation indicated that there were significant overlaps) and 
also stated that there were clear differences between Whatsapp application service and social 
networking sites.118 However, at the competitive assessment stage the analysis entailed the 
assumption that Whatsapp and Facebook were competitors in the market for social 
networking; the competitive constraints they placed on each other was analysed as well.119 
Hence, the analysis that had taken place was in practice based on a particular market 
definition of the market for social networking even though the EU Commission decided to 
leave the market definition open.    
                                                          
117 Facebook/Whatsapp (Case No COMP/M.7217) [2014] paragraph 62 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf accessed 
on 23rd July 2017 
118 Ibid Paras 53-56 
119 Ibid Para 146 
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Furthermore, the EU Commission Investigation into the Microsoft/Skype merger is also an 
example of where the definition was left open for several likely potential markets.120 Initially 
a wide market for consumer communications was defined as separate from the enterprise 
communications markets.121 These markets however were not further subdivided into 
relevant markets in terms of, for example, video calls, voice calls and instant messaging; they 
were neither subdivided according to platform or operating system.122 Those issues of 
subdivision were left open.123 However, when it came to the competitive assessment stage, 
the EU Commission appeared to compartmentalize its analysis as if the markets had been 
further subdivided into narrower relevant markets.124 It considered the merging parties’ 
market shares in voice, video and instant messaging communications separately and came to 
conclusions about significant impediment to competition for each single different category.125 
Such an analysis was even observed in the Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business 
investigation.126 Having discussed the clear differences between horizontal search, vertical 
search and specific site search, the EU Commission left the market definition of online 
internet search open; there were no subdivisions of the market.127 However, the competitive 
analysis entailed a close consideration of market shares of several search engines in the 
market for horizontal search.128 The search engines whose market shares were considered in 
the analysis (Google, Yahoo!, Microsoft’s Bing, Ask, AOL) were all independent horizontal 
                                                          
120 Microsoft/ Skype (Case No COMP/M.6281) [2011] at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6281_924_2.pdf accessed on 5th February 2015 
121 Ibid 
122 Ibid 
123 Ibid 
124 Ibid 
125 Ibid 
126 Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business (Case No COMP/M.5727) [2010] paragraph 114 at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/M5727_20100218_20310_261202_EN.pdf accessed on 
4th February 2015 
127 Ibid paragraphs 30-32 
128 Ibid paragraph 114 
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search engines. Hence the EU Commission appears to have taken into consideration a 
narrower subdivision of the search market i.e. the market for horizontal search. The EU 
Commission then went on to conclude that from the perspective of market share alone there 
was no effect on competition.129  
 
It therefore clearly appears that leaving a market definition open or very wide does not 
usually eliminate analysis of and within130 defined markets in favour of any test that does 
away with the scrutiny of the level of competition in the market.  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
The purpose of this section on market definition and substitutability was to show that the 
underpinning objective of the exercise is to ensure the protection of competition in free high 
                                                          
129 Ibid paragraph 119 
130 See Symantec / Veritas (Case No COMP/M.3697)[2005] paragraph 16 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m3697_20050315_20310_en.pdf accessed on 24th July 
2017- It is important to note however, that this kind of analysis where market definitions are left wide but an 
analysis of further segmented market shares are considered is not necessarily present in all cases. For instance, 
in the EU Commission’s investigation into the Symantec/Veritas merger the further segmentation of the relevant 
market of backup and archive security was left open; the relevant market was not further subdivided according 
to the operating systems that the different software particularly worked on. In the competitive assessment stage 
however, market shares in each operating system were not considered separately; market shares and/or positions 
were only considered in the backup and archive security software market as a whole. Here it may be of concern 
that by leaving the market definition wide and the possibility of further segmentation open, the analysis treated 
the market as one that was wide and therefore would likely reflect an inaccurately smaller amount of market 
power. However, it should be noted that unlike, for instance, the previous case of Microsoft/Yahoo! Search 
Business, in Symantec/Veritas the EU Commission appeared to have comparatively more evidence to suggest 
that most backup and archive security software was geared to work on various operating systems. This would 
allow such software vendors to reach wider markets. Furthermore, the evidence available to the EU Commission 
indicated there was great difficulty in detecting different categories of customer purchasing particular types of 
backup and archive software. On the other hand in the Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business investigation the EU 
Commission was confident that there was a definite separation between, for example, vertical and horizontal 
search (See Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business (Case No COMP/M.5727) [2010] paragraphs 31 and 32 at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/M5727_20100218_20310_261202_EN.pdf accessed on 
4th February 2015). The EU Commission made statements using definitive language;‘General internet search 
must be distinguished from vertical internet search, which focuses on specific segments of online content such 
as for example legal, medical, or travel search engines… Internet search must also be distinguished from site 
search covering only the content of one particular website.’130    Hence, this can justify the different approaches 
used in the two investigations.  
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technology markets and that market definition in free high technology markets has at times 
been presented in a limited fashion.  
 
We saw that market definition is an exercise that has a strong permanent role in competition 
analysis and therefore would have such a role in a free high technology case as well. Even 
where the market definition exercise appears to be somewhat undermined, the alternate 
analysis still involves the consideration of competitive pressure from potential substitutes 
(whether or not they belong to the same relevant market). This was observed in other forms 
of analysis such as ‘closeness of competition’ and where market definitions were left wide or 
open. Regardless of whether the market definition is definitively defined, left open or kept 
wide a complete analysis of competition within the possible narrower sub-markets usually 
tends to take place. This analysis is then therefore taken into consideration as part of the final 
decision of the EU Commission. One can therefore conclude that in practice, the analysis is 
carried out as if the market has been defined.  
 
Hence, our first conclusion here is that the analytical framework, which involves market 
definition, is what is currently applied in all competition cases including free high technology 
ones. It is an exercise which is a fundamental part of assessing competition in the market and 
its strong place in competition law analysis possibly indicates dangers ahead for decisions in 
free high technology cases. We recall once again that competition does not equate to 
consumer welfare in free high technology cases. But if the market definition exercise is 
applied, the desired results for consumer welfare may not be achieved as it runs on an 
underlying idea that competition is good for consumers.  
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Another important part of this section, which will later on be important in formulating the 
hypothesis, is what was learnt about the potential limited approach related to market 
definition analysis in free high technology cases. We saw how in Facebook/Whatsapp 
complements were put in the same relevant market; this was a likely mistake in the sense that 
they were put in the same relevant market before they were determined to be complements. 
One may interpret this as presenting a general picture of the market definition being wider 
than it actually is, making it seem as if the market shares of the companies are low. In 
addition we saw how several market definitions in free high technology cases were left open, 
possibly giving the same impression of lower market shares. In the next sections about 
network effects and other factors involved in analysis of free high technology markets, we 
will see how competition in free high technology is, in reality, likely to be quite restricted and 
involves much more concentration in market share. Hence, we must note at this point that the 
EU Commission’s approach to market definition that gives an impression of many effective 
competitors in the same market (through leaving the definition open or wide) is limited and 
confusing. Furthermore, when it comes to our hypothesis, it may appear that this limited and 
confusing method of defining markets may be a deliberate strategy by the Commission, 
revealing much of the Commission’s true thinking.  We will expand upon this in the next 
chapter. But it is imperative to understand at this point that the approach to market definition 
is the beginning of a series of arguments/analyses by the EU Commission that shows a 
limited view of the broader range of substantive arguments that are actually present
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CHAPTER 4- MARKET POWER 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3 we concluded that the exercises used to define the relevant market applied to 
free high technology investigations necessitates a consideration of the amount of competition 
in the market. Once we have a defined market, the next step for the EU Commission is to 
determine whether the companies being investigated possess market power or in the case of 
mergers, will possess market power to the extent that it will cause a substantial reduction in 
competition within that framework.  
 
In this chapter we consider the substantive arguments related to market power the EU 
Commission uses in free high technology cases. These substantive arguments concern 
network effects and market share, which are dealt with separately in this chapter in two 
different sections. We evaluate these arguments based on three factors; consistency of the 
arguments used within a particular case, consistency of arguments amongst different cases 
and the substantive arguments in the current literature. 
 
We conclude that the EU Commission applies a limited and inconsistent approach to its 
arguments on network effects and market share. Furthermore and importantly, the research 
finds that the limited approach is applied to a particular sub-category of cases within the 
sphere of high technology, that is free high technology. We expand on this later in the 
chapter.1 At the end of the chapter, we scrutinise this conclusion in conjunction with our 
                                                          
1 For example, we will see a conspicuous difference between the approach in cases involving Microsoft, and 
those involving free high technologies such as Facebook and Skype.  
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knowledge from Chapter 2 on the economic theory on free high technologies and the tensions 
with the presumptions of competition law. In doing so we formulate our hypothesis on the 
true rationale behind the EU Commission’s inconsistent and limited approach at the end of 
the chapter. 
 
The EU Commission currently appears to allow technology characteristics such as ease of 
switching for consumers, rapid innovation and regular changes in market shares to determine 
the decisions in their competition investigations. 2 This has led to many controversial 
mergers3 to take place despite concern4 that characteristics such as network effects allow 
technology companies to maintain and increase their market power immensely which 
subsequently makes it easier for them to abuse it.5  
 
Furthermore, the decisions are not simply controversial because they are not justified to 
particular academics and competitors of the merging companies, but also because the EU 
Commission was seen to treat network effects with more importance in landmark cases 
involving Microsoft. 6 Hence, the change in attitude comes as a surprise especially due to the 
                                                          
2 See following as examples: Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business (Case No COMP/M.5727) [2010] at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/M5727_20100218_20310_261202_EN.pdf accessed on 
4th February 2015, Microsoft/ Skype (Case No COMP/M.6281) [2011] at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6281_924_2.pdf accessed on 5th February 2015, 
Cisco/Tandberg (Case No COMP/M.5669) [2010] at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5669_2153_2.pdf accessed on 8th February 2015 
3 Ibid 
4 See for example, H Stakheyeva & F Toksoy ‘Merger control in the big data world: to be or not to be 
revisited?’(2017) 38(6) ECLR 265, 267; Violette Grac-Aubert ‘A love and hate relationship? Recent 
developments in data protection and competition law’ (2015) 36(5) E.C.L.R. 224, 226 
5 See especially Chapters 11 to 13 of M Stucke & A Grunes Big Data and Competition Policy (OUP Oxford 
2016)- the authors provide a comprehensive explanation of how free high technologies benefit from immense 
network effects, which allow them to improve their services significantly and in turn makes users stick to them. 
6 See Case T–201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3619, EU Commission  ‘Commission concludes 
on Microsoft investigation, imposes conduct remedies and a fine’ (European Commission Press Release 
Database, 24 March 2004) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-04-382_en.htm?locale=en accessed on 20th 
April 2015, EU Commission  ‘Antitrust: Commission accepts Microsoft commitments to give users browser 
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lack of an explanation on the part of the EU Commission.7 Such conflicts amongst cases and 
Commission investigation decisions appear to reflect a lack of consistency in the application 
of principles by the EU Commission.  
Consistency 
Whilst this thesis aims to consider consistency of application of principles by the EU 
Commission as part of its evaluation of approach, it has no intention of carrying out an in 
depth analysis of the importance and crucial role of consistency. However, the concept itself 
and its role must still be explained briefly. Consistency is what leads to legal certainty and is 
therefore a coveted goal to achieve; it is considered as an important and desirable element in 
any area of law. 8 Consistency occurs when ‘two rules… produce the same result on the same 
facts or raise a similar legal issue’.9 Legal philosophers have strongly supported the notion 
that the law must be consistent in the understanding that it should make logical sense 
holistically, be rational and be orderly.10 Furthermore, this chapter not only analyses 
inconsistency amongst cases, but substantially within cases. This is important in assessing the 
strength of a substantive argument. Where the authorities present conflicting substantive 
arguments within the same cases, it may indicate the weakness of their substantive arguments 
and a lack of apparent conviction in those arguments on the part of the authorities. 
 
 
                                                          
choice – frequently asked questions’ (European Commission Press Release Database 16 December 2009) 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-09-558_en.htm?locale=en accessed on 20th April 2015 
7 See, for example, Suiyi Zhang ‘How have network effects affected the European Commission's enforcement of 
competition law in technology enabled markets?’ (2015) 36(2) E.C.L.R. p 82-92 
8 E Herlin-Karnell & T Konstadinides ‘The Rise and Expressions of Consistency in EU Law : Legal and 
Strategic Implications for European Integration’(2012-2013) CYELS 139, 141 
9 Ibid  
10 See Neil MacCormick Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978, reprinted 
paperback edn 1995) xiv, Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1978) and 
Stephen Guest Ronald Dworkin (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1991) 39–40) 
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Piecing together the limitations and inconsistencies of the EU Commission’s approach, 
objective of competition law and the economic theory behind free high technology 
 
The inconsistencies and limitations occur within a wider context i.e. the objectives and 
presumptions in competition law that we saw in Chapter 2. By piecing together the wider 
context and the EU Commission’s approach and looking at them closely side by side, one can 
hypothesize on the reason behind the EU Commission’s seemingly limited approach to free 
high technology investigations.  
 
We conclude in our hypothesis that the EU Commission ends up applying an inconsistent and 
limited approach as a strategic way to justify the increase in size of the incumbent market 
players under the particular analytical framework it is required to follow. The objective of 
competition law is consumer welfare. Also, we saw in Chapter 2 how larger free high 
technology companies can maximise consumer welfare. The analytical framework that the 
EU Commission must use however requires there to be sufficient competition in the market 
to allow a merger or unilateral action of a company to take place which is assumed to lead to 
consumer welfare. Therein lies the conflict that the EU Commission resolves by strategically 
arguing that there is sufficient competition in the market (despite there being extremely high 
market shares and network effects) to allow the mergers and unilateral actions to take place.  
 
4.1.1 Article 102 and the Merger Regulations 
One issue to note with regards to methodology is that Chapter 3 will carry out a comparison 
amongst cases that involve both mergers and unilateral action. The source of rules for 
184 
 
competition cases on mergers is specific guidelines/regulations issued by the European 
Union11 whilst Article 102 TFEU is the central provision governing unilateral actions.12 Even 
though the sources of law are different, the wider tests/forms of analyses used in the different 
types of cases, as we will see, utilize fundamentally similar elements.   
 
Both tests require an exercise to determine dominance and the ability to prevent effective 
competition; these in turn are absolutely necessary parts of both tests.13 In essence the 
assessment of non-horizontal and horizontal mergers very often entails an analysis of the 
ability of the merged entity to act in a way in the future that would be tantamount to an abuse 
under Article 102; the substantive analysis is therefore similar.14 There is however, a 
                                                          
11 See Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings [2004] OJ L 24/1, Council Regulation (EC) on Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers 
under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings  (2004/C 31/03 ) [2004] OJ 
C 31/5  and Council Regulation (EC) on Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the 
Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2008/C 265/07) [2008] OJ C 265/07  
12 See Article 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and E Elhauge & D Geradin Global 
Competition Law and Economics (Second Edition, Hart Publishing 2011) p 270 
13 The following provisions and guidance in merger related regulations show the importance of dominance. 
Article 2(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 states that ‘A concentration which would significantly 
impede effective competition, in the common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the 
creation or strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the common market.’ Note 
the emphasis placed on requirement of a ‘dominant position’. Paragraph 2 of Council Regulation 2004/C 31/03 
considers the strengthening of a dominant position as a primary form of competitive harm, whilst paragraph 4 
states the expectation that incompatibility of a concentration with the common market is very likely to be based 
on the finding of an increase in the dominant position of the merged company. 
In terms of Article 102, the test is that an abuse of dominance is to be declared incompatible with the common 
market. A lot of abuse analysis under Article 102 comes in the form of considering foreclosure, which is also 
discussed extensively under non-horizontal merger guidelines. Also as seen in para 38 of Case 85/76 Hoffmann-
La Roche & C. AG v Commission of the European Communities [1979] ECR 1979 -00461, dominance refers to 
a position of strength that allows the relevant undertaking to prevent effective competition on the relevant 
market independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately consumers.  
14 Renato Nazzini, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law: the Objectives and Principles of 
Article 102 (Oxford University Press 2009) 333-334. See also  
Carles Esteva Mosso ‘The Contribution of Merger Control to the Definition of Harm to Competition’ (European 
Commission Speech, Brussels  GCLC Conference 1st February 2016) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2016_03_en.pdf> accessed 3 July 2017: ‘In sum, personally I 
would argue that, to a large extent, substantially the same test and standard of intervention apply in the context 
of antitrust and mergers…As such, this convergence should not be particularly surprising. Merger control and 
antitrust enforcement address different forms of negative effects on competition, but they ultimately serve the 
same purpose: protecting competition and consumer welfare. Hence it is only natural that both instruments are 
based on many common concepts and methodological tools and that this convergence tends to increase over 
time.’ 
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difference in the standard of proof;  unlike investigations of unilateral action under Article 
102, under merger regulations the authorities must predict the competitive conditions and 
effects on effective competition in the future i.e. once the merged entity is in operation.15  
Under Article 102 however, an assessment of the current effect of conduct of the company 
with a dominant position is carried out. In other words, there is an additional burden of 
showing whether that future unilateral act itself is likely to occur in the first place before 
analysing whether it could lead to a significant reduction in competition. But once the 
unilateral action is supposed in the counterfactual, then a similar analysis of market 
definition, market share and network effects must take place as they do in Article 102 cases. 
 
Hence any analysis that is assessed under either provision is capable of casting light on the 
other; therefore the way a dominant position is assessed by the EU Commission or the CJEU 
in a merger case is certainly capable of comparison with and explaining the way it is assessed 
in an Article 102 case and vice versa. 16 
 
In the next section we justify a further methodology in our analysis that will be seen later on 
in this chapter in terms of the comparison of types of cases that involve slightly different 
facts. 
 
 
                                                          
15 Bo Vesterdorf ‘Standard of proof in merger cases: Reflections in the light of recent case law of the 
Community Courts’ (2005) 1(1) ECJ 3, 15 
16 Renato Nazzini, The Foundations of European Union Competition Law: the Objectives and Principles of 
Article 102 (Oxford University Press 2009) 333-334 
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4.1.2 Important note on types of cases considered in Chapter 4 
First thing to note here is that we will be looking into a wide variety of cases, not just free 
high technology ones. This will enable us to draw comparisons and therefore put the free high 
technology cases into context and help us understand the EU Commission’s particular 
approach to them.  
 
The analyses and evaluations in this chapter will entail comparisons between categories of 
cases that may initially appear to be very different in terms of their facts and hence 
incomparable. For example, we will be comparing mergers in the high technology market 
such as Microsoft/Skype and Facebook/Whatsapp with unilateral action cases such as 
Microsoft vs Commission.17 There will then be comparisons with cases regarding tying as 
well. For example, we will also look into the cases of Microsoft tying media players and 
browsers and drawing possible parallels or lack thereof with the free high technology 
mergers.  
 
It is important to keep in mind that these are not inappropriate comparisons involving random 
categories of cases. In fact, there are several issues that bind them together and therefore 
make them justifiably comparable. They are all competition law cases that have been 
determined on the basis of arguments related to market power and network effects. There are 
no principles or reason that, for example, the Microsoft cases are relevant to different rules 
simply because they are interoperability/tying cases and therefore cannot be compared to high 
technology merger cases. All these cases’ results hinge upon whether the party/parties 
                                                          
17 Case T–201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3619 
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has/have market power through network effects. Due to this common element, one should be 
able to draw a necessary comparison between these cases to assess consistency. 
 
4.2 Consistency and Evaluation of substantive arguments surrounding network effects 
 
This section assesses the EU Commission’s view of their substantive analysis of network 
effects and concludes that network effects, contrary to the EU Commission’s opinion, in the 
free high technology market have a strong presence and is harmful to competition only. 
Hence the EU Commission’s view on network effects is limited. Network effects in the free 
high technology sector are considered in both Article 102 TFEU and merger investigations as 
part of the assessment of potential harm to competition. According to the ‘Glossary of EU 
Competition Policy’ by the European Commission itself, network effects refer to effects that 
‘…arise when a product is more valuable to a user, the more users adopt the same product or 
compatible ones.’18 Network effects can be subdivided into direct and indirect network 
effects.19 Direct effects are those that occur when the value of a product/service to consumers 
increase as others use the product/service20; indirect effects occur when others and the 
company providing the product/service are incentivised to produce complements to the 
primary product/service.21  An example of a direct effect would be when consumers decide to 
use a social network, they most likely will be doing so as they have other friends on the 
                                                          
18 See the European Commission’s ‘Glossary of EU Competition Policy’ (page 33) available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/glossary_en.pdf  
19 M. Rato and N.Petit, ‘Abuse of Dominance in Technology-Enabled Markets: Established Standards 
Reconsidered?’ (2013) 9(1) ECJ 1, 4 
20 M. Kaatz and C. Shapiro, ‘Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility’ [1985] 75 Am.Econ.Rev p 
424 
21 M. Lemley & D. McGowan ‘Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects’ [1998] 86 Cal. L. Rev 
479,483 
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network they would want to communicate with; without this, the social network service 
would be of very little use to them.22  In this way, network effects are purported to lead to the 
growth of a company’s customer base and help prevent their customers from switching to any 
other competitors’ product or service23 regardless of whether or not the company’s 
product/service is inferior.24 In other words network effects can be seen to be harmful to 
competition.  
 
As we will see, the existence of network effects in free high technology markets may prevent 
competition in the market place; it makes it less substitutable with alternative technologies.25 
However, our knowledge from Chapter 2 in general enables us to understand that the 
existence of network effects may not be bad for consumers when it comes to free high 
technologies; network effects enhance the ability of firms to increase market share and that is 
good for consumers. Hence, one can already see how the protection of competition and the 
protection of consumers come into conflict. Therefore it is absolutely imperative that an 
assessment of the EU Commission’s arguments with regards to network effects is made as it 
directly highlights the very tension within the presumption that competition is good for 
consumers.   
 
                                                          
22 See Matt Buchanan, ‘Network Effects and Global Domination: The Facebook Strategy’ (Wired, 17 May 
2012) < http://www.wired.com/2012/05/network-effects-and-global-domination-the-facebook-strategy/> 
accessed 29 February 2016- Mark Zuckerberg, owner of Facebook, indicated that part of Facebook’s success is 
attributable to network effects; “I think that network effects shouldn’t be underestimated with what we do as 
well…” 
23Aysem Diker Vanberg ‘From Archie to Google- Search engine providers and emergent challenges in relation 
to EU Competition law’ [2012] 3 EJLT 1, 6 
24 See Paul A. David ‘Clio and the Economics of QWERTY’ (1985) 75(2) Am Econ Rev 332, 336. It was 
argued that the traditional ‘QWERTY’ keyboard arrangement was dominant despite being inferior to other 
keyboard arrangements.  
25 Consumers become increasingly drawn to products that become more valuable as more people use them; this 
prevents other companies from attracting those consumers even if they have a better product.  
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In both the academic and general literature there has been criticism that the network effect 
argument itself is being overlooked in investigations of free high technology markets.26 The 
EU Commission acknowledges a weak presence of network effects; it appears to be of the 
opinion that network effects can be overcome easily in this sector. This will be seen in cases 
such as Facebook/Whatsapp27 and Microsoft/Skype.28  This chapter concludes that the EU 
Commission’s substantive arguments with regards to network effects is limited and that 
network effects in the free high technology sector are in fact very potent; they can lead to 
consumers being locked-in to using one company’s services. In this sense the EU 
Commission’s argument is limited and confusing. 
 
Compared to the other substantive arguments, a large section of the thesis has been dedicated 
to network effects as it is the main characteristic that is present on a more extensive and 
potent scale in free high technology markets than any other market. The internet is a massive 
communications infrastructure29 and is a ‘network of networks, all inter-networking with 
each other’;30 it involves networks that do not pass through one central point but several 
unlike those of for example in telephone networks.31 This strongly indicates the potency of 
network effects experienced in high technology industries operating online. The success of 
                                                          
26 See, for example, Suiyi Zhang ‘How have network effects affected the European Commission's enforcement 
of competition law in technology enabled markets?’ (2015) 36(2) ECLR. 82-92 
27 Facebook/Whatsapp (Case No COMP/M.7217) [2014] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf accessed 
on 23rd July 2017 
28 Microsoft/ Skype (Case No COMP/M.6281) [2011] at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6281_924_2.pdf accessed on 5th February 2015 
29 C Reed Internet Law: Text and Materials; Second Edition (Cambridge University Press 2004) 10 
30 L Davies ‘The Internet and the Elephant’ (1996) International Business Lawyer 151 
31 A Guadamuz Networks, Complexity and Internet Regulation; Scale Free Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 
2011) page 72 
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companies that are social networks, search engines and blogs all depend connecting more and 
more users together; each user becomes a central point in connecting more users.32  
 
Both direct and indirect network effects can take the shape of more specific aspects namely 
barriers to entry, switching costs and lock-in.33 As we will see, barriers to entry are faced by 
competitors whilst lock-in and switching costs are faced by consumers, but indirectly have an 
effect on competitors. We discuss each type of network separately below and see how they 
have been treated by the case law. However, it must also be understood that they are very 
closely related in the sense that the presence of one will usually indicate the presence of 
another. For example, in the case of a free communication application, if switching costs are 
high for consumers, that means more consumers are likely to stick to the application. In turn 
it means more consumers are locked in due to the more people staying on it. Finally, it also 
means barriers to entry in the communication application market are high because it would be 
hard for a new entrant to take away customers. Hence, where, for example, the EU 
Commission considers that lock-in is very high, it is also indicating that it believes barriers to 
entry are high. However, we still discuss them separately as the authorities may put emphasis 
on a particular type of network effect in their arguments.  These are discussed further below 
in more detail. 
 
 
 
                                                          
32 Ibid 
33 T. Hoehn, S. Rab & G. Saggers ‘"Breaking up is hard to do": national merger remedies in the information and 
communication industries’ (2009) 30(5) ELCR  255, 257 
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4.2.1 Barriers to entry 
Entry barriers are factors that, to a significant degree, prevent companies from entering 
specific markets; the factors can range from the financial cost of entry to customer brand 
loyalty to competing companies.34 However, within the context of this particular section we 
discuss the specific barriers to entry that are directly caused by network effects. As we have 
already seen, network effects cause consumers to stay on the consumer’s network because 
others are using it; this makes it difficult for any consumer to use another company’s services 
and therefore presents a barrier to access to those consumers and therefore a barrier to entry 
for competitors. Hence we can see and will see further how the barriers to entry argument 
revolve around the issue of competitors’ ability to enter the market and compete.   
 
We will see that the barriers to entry are approached differently according to the medium of 
operation of the companies. Two distinct categories seem to emerge; markets involving free 
high technology and markets involving interoperability between software or between 
software and hardware. Barriers are considered low (and therefore less harmful to 
competition) in the former category whilst they are considered high in the latter. However, 
what links all cases across the two categories is the fact that the companies under 
investigation all benefit from network effects. However, the network effects only appear to 
cause high barriers to entry in the second category (interoperability cases) and not in the first. 
As we will see, this reflects a generally inconsistent approach to barrier to entry on the part of 
the EU Commission.  
 
 
                                                          
34 See Glossary of EU Competition Policy (page 17) available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/glossary_en.pdf 
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4.2.1.1 Low Barriers to entry in free high technology markets where network effects are 
present- an inconsistent approach 
 
In certain cases concerning high technology services the presence of low barriers to entry is 
consistently a recurring theme. Hence, harm to competition is considered low. For instance, in 
the European Commission’s Google/Doubleclick35 merger investigation it was considered 
that Doubleclick had many competitors; some of these competitors were to include foreign 
online ad serving companies that were not even currently active in the geographic market (but 
had the intention of being so) since there were low barriers for such technology, allowing a 
transcending of borders of the host country.36 The consideration of competitive pressure 
potentially from companies that are not even present on the market reflects the idea that the 
EU Commission strongly opines that barriers to entry are low and shows that they would 
approach a free high technology service as always under competitive pressure.  In the 
Microsoft/Skype merger decision, despite the EU Commission’s allusion to strong consumer 
branding and the presence of network effects as potential high barriers to entry, it decided to 
support the notion that barriers were low; monetary capital costs were considered relatively 
low, downloads of alternative services to Skype were free and consumers usually multi-
home.37  
 
                                                          
35Google/Doubleclick (Case No COMP/M.4731) [2008] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4731_20080311_20682_en.pdf accessed on 24th July 
2017- Although, in this particular case Google is not a free service as this case concerns selling advertising space, 
it displays the EU Commission’s general interpretation of the competitive conditions on the internet which would 
also affect its interpretation of the competitive conditions related free high technologies that operate online.  
36 Ibid 
37 Microsoft/ Skype (Case No COMP/M.6281) [2011] Paragraphs 85 to 95 at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6281_924_2.pdf accessed on 5th February 2015 
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The EU Commission also, for example, uses the fact that large players like Facebook and 
Google introduced messaging services as a testament to the ease of entry38 (we now also 
know that Facebook has introduced video communications services). Along with this, the 
entry of Viber as a communications application was shown as evidence of how a relatively 
small player can easily enter the market and gain a significant number of users from scratch.39 
Similar arguments were made in Facebook/Whatsapp to present a competitive landscape. It 
stated that previously Blackberry had its own messaging service that had the most market 
share, but this changed as more innovative smartphones came out and therefore alternative 
messaging applications became more dominant. Again, this was seen as evidence of low 
barriers to entry. 
 
It once again appears that low barriers to entry along with other factors are given more 
importance than other factors such as network effects. However, such arguments from the EU 
Commission are well justified in cases concerning online digital markets especially when 
seen in juxtaposition with other cases concerning other types of technology. For instance, in 
the Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria40 merger decision, the EU Commission was 
definitive in its statement that barriers to entry were high for both mobile network operators 
(MNOs) and mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs). This was due to the necessity of 
bidding for limited spectrum, the necessity of negotiating network interconnection 
agreements and fees with others and high prices for wholesale access for MNVOs.41 In other 
words any new company wanting to the enter the market as a MNO would have the extra 
                                                          
38 Ibid Paragraph 69-72 
39 Ibid Paragraph 90 
40 Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria (Case No COMP/M.6497)[2012] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6497_20121212_20600_3210969_EN.pdf accessed 
on 16th September 2017   
41  Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria (Case No COMP/M.6497)[2012] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6497_20121212_20600_3210969_EN.pdf accessed 
on 16th September 2017 Pararaph 6.7 
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burden of attempting to attain spectrum that they may not even receive in the first place due 
to its limited nature and negotiate mandatory agreements with other MNOS and MNVOs 
without which their customers would not be able to contact anyone using a different mobile 
network. These are the barriers to entry to be faced in mobile network markets. Such barriers 
as limited spectrum are not present in online digital market cases.  
 
In the context of the previous cases discussed (Google/Doubleclick and Microsoft/ Skype) 
neither Google nor Microsoft, for instance, are required to bid for limited internet space or 
require any vital interconnections with other companies to be in operation. They are able to 
launch independent web services without the need for specific permission and are able to 
operate unencumbered by other parties. It may be argued that Skype, for example, faces 
barriers as it would require an interconnection agreement with another online video call 
provider (eg Facetime) for users of different software to communicate with each other. 
However, it is relatively straightforward for a user to download the free Skype application. 
Whereas a mobile network user would have to pay for a new chip to be inserted into his/her 
mobile phone if he/she wanted to speak to someone using another network in the absence of 
interconnection agreements amongst the different MNOs and MNVOs.  
 
It therefore may be controversial to even entertain the idea that barriers to entry in the online 
context are present to a considerable extent. Hence, considering this comparison, the notion 
of low barriers to entry in online digital markets appears justified; the obstacles in the free 
high technology cases seem relatively lower. Therefore, the EU Commission may be right in 
its opinion and the low barriers characteristic means that competition is less likely to be 
harmed.  
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There are, however, particular instances where we observe that the EU Commission itself has 
inconsistent views on barriers to entry within the same cases. For instance, going back to the 
Google/Doubleclick merger, the EU Commission seems to have subtly taken a different view 
with regards to the issue of barriers to entry. In discussing whether the merger is a horizontal 
one and competition in the market could be reduced post-merger, the EU Commission 
alluded to the fact that prior to the EU Commission’s decision, Doubleclick was 
experimenting with an ad network product which did not turn out to be a financial success in 
Europe and success was limited in the United States. 42 A Doubleclick ad network could 
technically be a competitor against Google’s ad network. Despite the possibility of such a 
scenario, the evidence brought before the EU Commission indicated otherwise and the EU 
Commission found that, at least in the short term Doubleclick could not compete effectively 
in both markets. Therefore, competition would not be affected by removing Doubleclick from 
the market as a competitor against Google in Europe. 43  Removal of a competitor would have 
to have ‘significantly impeded effective competition’44 in order for it to be prevented under 
the merger regulations.  
 
This conclusion offers an important insight towards our comprehension of the actual validity 
of the entry barriers argument. Firstly, although barriers to entry are on a cursory glance low, 
there may be qualifying requirements for market entry, namely that the competitors need to 
actually be effective in order for real competition to be maintained. This has an important 
implication as although market entry may be feasible, the barriers can only be considered low 
where the concerned competitors possess the necessary degree of effectiveness and 
                                                          
42 Google/Doubleclick (Case No COMP/M.4731) [2008] paragraph 224 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4731_20080311_20682_en.pdf accessed on 16 
September 2017 
43 Ibid  
44 Ibid  
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credentials45 to compete in the market. This is in contrast to the narrative that barriers to entry 
are low as seen previously in the Google/Doubleclick decision; as seen, the EU Commission 
took into consideration the potential of foreign companies to enter the market without 
discussing whether they would be effective/successful/financially viable competitors in the 
market.  
 
Furthermore, in terms of the Microsoft/Skype decision the EU Commission may have 
overlooked certain factors when justifying the notion of low barriers in the market. We saw 
above that it used Viber, Facebook and Google messaging services as evidence of low 
barriers. However, this may be considered inconsistent with the EU Commission’s analysing 
of these factors within the narrowest possible market, that is consumer communications 
services on windows based personal computers.46 Firstly, Viber at the time was only 
available on mobile phones.47 How therefore Viber was of significant competitive relevance 
on the PC market, is hard to understand. The EU Commission’s comments on foreclosure 
may provide some insight however. It stated that foreclosure of a lot of alternative 
communication applications was unlikely as some of them had more prominent positions on 
different platforms other than PCs like smartphones.48 In other words, the survival of these 
other applications is not hampered should Skype be tied to the Microsoft PC platform.  
 
                                                          
45 The exact necessary degree of effectiveness is not something that can be ascertained under the case 
Google/Doubleclick case. However, given the EU Commission’s comments that have been analysed, 
competitors cannot have a failed operation in the market and need to therefore be able to sustain itself in the 
market.    
46 Microsoft/ Skype (Case No COMP/M.6281) [2011] Paragraph 102 at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6281_924_2.pdf accessed on 5th February 2015 
47 It was not till 2013 that Viber launched a PC version. See Ellis Hamburger ‘Viber expands to PC and Mac as 
competitors preach “mobile only”’ (The Verge, 7 May 2013) available at 
https://www.theverge.com/2013/5/7/4305350/viber-pc-and-mac-apps-200-million-users accessed on 22nd 
August 2017 
48 Microsoft/ Skype (Case No COMP/M.6281) [2011] Paragraph 163 at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6281_924_2.pdf accessed on 5th February 2015 
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Whilst this is understandable, it appears to ignore the potential reduction in competition in the 
concerned relevant market of communications applications on windows based PCs. The EU 
Commission did seem to suggest however that the PC market was becoming less important as 
more and more consumers switched to usage of smartphones and tablets. This suggestion 
may ignore significant competitive concerns though. It is obvious that windows based PCs 
are still widely used both in businesses and homes; there is no sign of them being replaced by 
smartphones and tablets anytime soon or in the distant future. Hence, there is in fact a 
massive market where Microsoft’s windows based PCs are dominant and users face the 
prospect of mainly using Skype as a tied service/product; this would no doubt potentially lead 
to a reduction in competition on the PC market.49 Hence, on the particular PC market barriers 
can still be high and the fact that there are other applications with better presence on other 
platforms does not change that.  
 
Secondly, Google and Facebook had admittedly very low shares in video communications 
compared to Skype.50 Hence, with Skype’s already dominant position in video 
communications and Microsoft’s established dominance in PC operating systems, the 
integration of Skype could strongly entrench Skype’s market position and reduce the 
competitive significance of Facebook and Google. The barrier to entry becomes raised due to 
a dominant operating system tying another dominant application. Hence the EU Commission 
presents only a partial picture which is inconsistent with the dominant position of the merging 
parties.  
 
                                                          
49 Ibid paragraph 155- The EU Commission states that Microsoft would not have any incentive to tie Skype and 
Microsoft. However, given the EU Commission's history with Microsoft in terms of previous cases such as the 
tying of internet explorer and windows media player, it is difficult to see why the EU Commission overlooked 
the serious possibility of Skype being tied. Also, we now know that Skype is in fact tied to Microsoft products.  
50 Microsoft/ Skype (Case No COMP/M.6281) [2011] Paragraphs 125-126 at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6281_924_2.pdf accessed on 5th February 2015 
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The EU Commission’s conflicting views on barriers to entry as seen above possibly indicate 
a flaw in its legal justifications and reasoning in determining the potential competitiveness of 
a market in the context of online entities. If barriers to entry are determined to be low without 
considering the effectiveness of competitors who pass through these low barriers, we would 
end up with an incomplete analysis overall. The incompleteness of the analysis will become 
even more pronounced as we start comparing cases later on in the thesis. For example, the 
oversights we observed above in the Microsoft/Skype investigation will become even more 
concerning when we compare it with the EU Commission’s starkly different treatment of 
Microsoft51 in the browser and media player cases.    
 
In summary, at the beginning we saw that when one considers alternative technology cases 
like telecommunications where there are literally lots of barriers from attaining spectrum 
bandwidth to negotiating appropriate agreements, barriers in online technology markets do 
appear low. However, the EU Commission casts doubt on its own reasoning by then 
appearing to insinuate that low barriers do not matter if the competitor is not effective. The 
other way to interpret this is that barriers cannot simply be assumed to be low because the 
entity operates in the online world. If the potential competitor is ineffective, it must indicate 
other forms of barriers that are preventing it from effectively competing that must also be 
taken into account. As we discuss network effects further, we will see how there are many 
more factors that in reality make barriers to entry higher. Therefore, the EU Commission’s 
subtly inconsistent views reveal potential incomplete analysis here that must be taken note of.  
 
 
                                                          
51 Microsoft (Case COMP/C-3/37.792)[2004] at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/37792/37792_4177_1.pdf accessed on 4th February 
2015  Case T-201/04  Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3619 
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In the next section we look at other forms of high technology where barriers of entry were 
considered high. We will see how against the background of these next cases, it is also 
reasonable to view that barriers to entry are actually high in the online world. It therefore 
casts further doubt on the EU Commission’s opinion on barriers in high technology.  
 
 
4.2.1.2 High barriers to entry in interoperability cases where network effects are also present- 
a consistent approach by the EU Commission 
 
There have been cases involving other forms of high technology where the network effects 
leading to potential high barriers have led to cautionary decisions by the EU Commission. 
These cases are worth exploring and comparing with the high technology cases where we just 
observed that entry barriers were considered low.  
 
It would be appropriate to start with one of the earlier technology cases considered by the EU 
Commission where a significant barrier to entry for software and hardware producers was 
removed.52 In 1984, the EU Commission having investigated IBM (at the time a company 
with a very large share of the personal computer market; hence other hardware and software 
producers would most likely need to produce IBM compatible products to survive) for its 
bundling of IBM hardware with its own central processing unit, negotiated an undertaking on 
the part of IBM to provide interface information to competing software and hardware 
producers enabling compatibility, and hence allowing them to compete in the market; this 
                                                          
52 IBM Personal Computer (Case IV/30.849)[1984] available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31984D0233&from=en accessed on 16 September 2017 
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was of course to be done in exchange for a reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) 
charge to be paid to IBM.53 
 
In fact, the requirement of the release of interoperability information by companies with large 
market shares is generally well established in the EU Commission’s investigations history. 
For instance, network effects in the form of high barriers were also a determining factor in 
the decision of the EU Commission’s investigations into Microsoft’s proposed merger with 
Liberty Media in 2000.54 Microsoft would be integrating cable television by Liberty Media 
into set-top boxes with their software. The EU Commission was specifically concerned with 
the notion that such a move, especially given that this was the first product of its kind, would 
lead to application developers to only develop add-ons for this particular set top box 
product.55 The more applications available to it, the more consumers would be attracted to it 
as the value of the product would go up because more applications would be written for it.56 
Also the more applications for a particular platform, the more the chance of the applications 
being tested on that platform the more valuable and therefore attractive the platform 
becomes.57 The EU Commission was of the opinion that there was a risk that Microsoft 
would not allow interoperability with its platform and this would lead to it abusing its 
network effects; the EU Commission was inclined to block the merger.58  
 
                                                          
53 Ibid 
54 European Commission ‘Commission opens full investigation into the Microsoft/Liberty Media/Telewest 
concentration’ 22nd March 2000 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-00-287_en.htm > accessed on 15th 
April 2015. 
55 Ibid 
56 B Bishop & C Caffara ‘Merger control in "new markets"’ (2001) 22(1) ECLR  31 
57 Ibid 
58 Ibid 
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Also in 2002 a venture between Siemens and Drägerwerk caused concern that Dragerwerk 
would potentially be obligated to and therefore solely have the ability to enable their 
equipment to interoperate with Siemens monitors. 59 In response to these concerns of creating 
barriers for Dragerwerk’s competitors to produce Siemens monitor compatible equipment, 
Siemens agreed to release interoperability information. 60 Hence, this is a case which does not 
involve the various barriers to entry faced by MNOs and MVNOs, but is considered by the 
EU Commission to involve strong barriers by virtue of network effects.   
 
All the companies we have considered in the previous section where barriers to entry were 
considered low (Skype, Microsoft and Google), also entail strong network effects. In other 
words, Google/Doubleclick and Microsoft/Skype are potentially inconsistent with the IBM, 
Liberty and Siemens cases/investigations. All of them entailed strong network effects, but 
they were distinct in the sense that the EU Commission considered they presented high 
barriers to entry due to the network effects. The IBM, Siemens and Liberty cases are all over 
10 years old and it may be questioned whether the same arguments apply today.61 However, 
as we will see in the next paragraph, there have been more recent cases where this argument 
of high barriers to entry in interoperability cases plays a very important role.   
 
                                                          
59 Siemens/ Drägerwerk (Case COMP/M.2861) [2003] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2861_20030430_600_en.pdf accessed on 16 
September 2017 
60 Ibid 
61 See for example, Cases T-125/97 & T-127/97 Coca-Cola v Commission [2000] ECR II-01733, paragraph 85- 
The European Court of Justice said that no national court is bound by the previous Commission Decisions in 
terms of the EU Commission’s decision on whether or not a company possesses a dominant position. Hence it is 
still technically possible for courts and possibly the EU Commission itself to, in the future, assess whether the 
arguments surrounding barriers to entry have changed; this could in turn change the decision on dominance. 
Hence, just because IBM and Siemens emphasized the importance of barriers to entry arising from network 
effects, does not mean that future decisions have to rely on this if, for instance, in the future the market 
circumstances change in terms of competition.   
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In the EU Commission’s 2010 decision in Cisco/Tandberg62, the occurrence of barriers to 
entry was considered in the context of interoperability from two different perspectives; 
namely indirect and direct network effects (although these terms were not used directly). On 
the one hand, it was considered an acceptable argument that Cisco was likely to allow 
interoperability between its products and complementary products of competitors because 
this would allow it to take advantage of network effects, making it a more attractive product 
(this is an indirect network effect as other companies would be able to produce more 
complements for Cisco’s software, making Cisco more popular and attractive to users).63 
However, the EU Commission considered that it was most likely that following its horizontal 
merger with Tandberg (leading to a reduction in competitors), Cisco would block 
interoperability relying on the confidence that its combined larger network would enable it to 
tie its own complementary products due to direct network effects (this is a direct network 
effect as the company can rely on the size of its own network to tie consumers into using their 
complements).64 The EU Commission did approve the merger; however, having recognized 
the risk of the creation of high barriers to entry, approved of it on condition that the merging 
parties release interoperability information as it did before the merger.65  
 
Furthermore in 2011, the EU Commission’s Intel/McAfee merger decision shows how the 
merging of different networks can lead to significant entry barriers that can subsequently lead 
                                                          
62 Cisco/ Tandberg (Case No COMP/M.5669) [2010] at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5669_2153_2.pdf accessed on 8th February 2015 
63 Cisco/ Tandberg (Case No COMP/M.5669) [2010] at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5669_2153_2.pdf accessed on 8th February 2015 
64 T Hoehn and A Lewis ‘Interoperability remedies, FRAND licensing and innovation: a review of recent case 
law’(2013) 34(2) E.C.L.R. 101, 102 
65 Ibid 
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to a potential significant impediment of effective competition.66 Both Intel and McAfee 
possessed large market shares; Intel in the market for chips and central processing units 
(CPUs); McAfee in the market for end-point security.67 Intel was able to benefit from 
network effects by having prominent customers like Microsoft use their CPUs and produce 
software based around Intel specifications.68 In other words, the value to the customer of 
having a device using an Intel CPU is multiplied due to complementary products being 
produced for it.  
 
Post-merger the EU Commission believed that there would be a strong possibility that 
McAfee could use Intel’s leverage in the CPU market by getting Intel to pre-install the 
security software in all its CPUs, which could potentially eliminate competition from other 
security software developers let alone raise entry barriers significantly.69 As a result, the 
merger was allowed but with certain conditions on the part of the merging parties; Intel had 
to commit to providing the same full interoperability information to McAfee’s rivals just as it 
would do to McAfee and to ensuring that it would not hamper the use of McAfee on 
competitors’ CPUs.70  
 
Finally, in the 2012 investigation of the acquisition of Motorolla Mobility by Google, Google 
had to pledge to the EU Commission that all the newly acquired patents from Motorolla 
would continue to be licensed to other companies including its competitors; the licensed 
                                                          
66 Intel/McAfee (Case No COMP/M.5984) [2011] at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5984_1922_2.pdf accessed on 10th March 2015 
67 Ibid 
68 Ibid 
69 Ibid 
70 European Newsletter ‘Alumnia reflects on 20 years of the Merger Regualtion’ Euro. News. 2011, 76/77(Apr), 
1-3 
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patents are what would enable, for instance, mobile application creators to still be able to 
produce applications for Motorola mobile phones. 71  
 
These three recent cases demonstrate that the presence of high barriers to entry arising from 
network effects is still a very valid determinant in competition investigations where 
interoperability is a fundamental issue. It forces one to question the validity of the 
subordination of the barriers to entry arguments in cases such as Microsoft/Skype and 
Facebook/Whatsapp where strong network effects are also present. We therefore see an 
inconsistency between the treatment of interoperability cases and free high technology cases 
for which there is no convincing explanation by the EU Commission. As we have seen and 
will see further when discussing the other forms of network effects,  free high technology 
companies with the largest market shares actually do present high barriers to entry and by 
that logic should be treated with the same level of strictness as interoperability. For example, 
perhaps Microsoft should have been required to commit to not pre-install Skype on to its 
platform and Facebook should have been required to not exchange data with Whatsapp.  As 
mentioned previously and will be seen, data gives companies increased competitive 
advantages, and such a commitment on the part of Facebook would at least ensure to some 
extent that competition will not be reduced in the market.   
 
So far, we have carried out a critical assessment of the EU Commission’s approach to the 
‘barriers to entry’ argument by mainly looking at inconsistency not only between different 
cases, but also by looking at inconsistency of rationale within the same cases. We note that 
                                                          
71 Google / Motorola Mobility (Case COMP/M.6381) [2011] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6381_20120213_20310_2277480_EN.pdf accessed 
on 16 September 2017 
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the EU Commission has justified its approach in the free high technology cases by stating 
that the cycles of innovations in the industries allows smaller companies to take away market 
share from incumbents and therefore barriers can be overcome. Another way to put this is to 
simply say that therefore barriers are low. In the next section we consider this argument in the 
context of the literature that discusses the ability of innovativeness to lower barriers to entry. 
 
4.2.1.3 Assessing the merits of the EU Commission’s approach from the perspective of 
innovation  
 
Here, it is important to note that we speak of innovation as opposed to ‘disruptive 
innovation’. As we know from section 2.2.6, disruptive innovation virtually replaces a current 
technology and therefore the current relevant market. Innovation on the other hand, in this 
section, refers to improvements on the current technology in the current relevant market. 
 
Innovation and good quality service by non-dominant entities in the free high technology 
sector have been known to be a positive for competitors as they lower the barriers to entry.72 
Members of the industry compete on merit and a highly innovative service/product by a 
company can steal away customers from a company with a relatively dominant position.73 It 
                                                          
72 See A Gawer & M Cusumano ‘How companies become platform leaders’ (2008) 49 Sloan Manage Rev 28- 
In order to switch customers away from the incumbent/dominant firm, the competitor must be able to provide an 
alternative service/product which is arguably an improved/more innovative product. The authors were speaking 
of this in the context of platforms for which complements were made; for instance a computer operating system. 
They suggested that the new entrant must also have the additional burden of rallying the producers of 
complements in order to be successful. In the case of most free high technology this may not be an option. Most 
complements in these markets are produced by the incumbent itself. For instance, social networks may provide a 
complementary search service on the same site of the social network; or a search engine can also provide its 
own mail service. Hence, with the absence of the option of rallying complement producers, it is important for 
new entrants to have a very innovative product as the incumbent has a lot of market power due to its established 
‘core’. 
73 See Melissa A Schilling ‘Protecting if diffusion a technology platform: tradeoffs in appropriability, network 
externalities and architectural control’ in Annabelle Gawer (ed) Platforms, Markets and Innovation (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2009) 201- Aside from network effects technological functionality is also very important. The 
author gives the example of Sega taking share from the then dominant company Nintendo in the video games 
console market because it was able to offer better graphics processing.  
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has still been argued however, that the EU Commission has been ignoring the fact that the 
largest entities engaged in the high technology world, especially when they merge, benefit 
from massive barriers to entry (faced by competitors and potential competitors) arising from 
combined network effects.74 It has been argued that network effects lead to incentives for 
anti-competitive behaviour and lead to barriers to competition from others even if 
competitors offer a more innovative and higher quality product.75 New entrants/competitors 
would need a huge number of users to be able to compete as each additional user enhances 
the value of the product (which may also imply that lower price of competitors may not be 
relevant as consumers would be willing to pay the high value of the product).76 This then 
leads to a cycle involving other companies in the downstream market producing further 
complements for the massive network allowing it to grow even larger.77 As Argenton and 
Prufer explain, there needs to be a recognition that network effects lead to high barriers to 
entry which in turn lead to higher incentives to engage in anticompetitive behaviour; the 
network effects of search engines, for example, with even a slight lead in the market can keep 
their users locked in due to user habits and perceptions which leads to much less actual 
competition in the market.78 The authors also mention the argument that opposes the high 
barriers argument on the basis of past examples where smaller competitors have entered the 
market and defeated a monopolist.79 But the authors state that this does not change the fact 
that entry barriers still leads to anti-competitive effects.80  
 
                                                          
74 S Sheppard ‘The EU’s Traditional Analysis of the Facebook, Whatsapp deal- do we like it?’ (2015) 25(5) 
Comps. & Law 11,12 
75 A Melamed & A. Douglas ‘Network Industries and Antitrust’ (1999) 23(1) Harv JL & Pub Pol’y 147, 149 
76 Ibid 150 
77 Ibid 
78 See C Argenton, & J Prufer ‘Search Engine Competition with Network Externalities’ (2012) 8(1) 
JECL&Pract 73- 
79 Ibid 
80 Ibid 
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Successful companies simply have to have had a head start in order to have massive network 
effects which lock users in; that way, both current and potential competitors would have a 
difficult time even getting their foot in.81 Such ideas have academic support in the earlier 
days of modern technology. For instance, economist Paul David in 1985 wrote a paper 
arguing that industries like these involve monopolists gaining power on the basis of 
premature ‘standardization… of the wrong system’.82 Let us look at this case study as an 
example comparable to the modern search engine. Paul David argued that the early entrance 
of the traditional QWERTY arrangement on typewriters and keyboards allowed it to benefit 
from network and lock-in effects that would defeat Dvorak’s superior keyboard arrangement 
and that it would be expensive and time consuming to retrain anyone on a different 
arrangement when virtually all users at the time were using the QWERTY system. 83 
However, subsequent academic literature has attacked the notion of Dvorak’s superiority. 84 
Liebowitz and Margolis have contended that Paul David ignored other strong evidence that 
QWERTY was superior and therefore failed to take into consideration that QWERTY 
possessed market power due to merit and not solely lock-in effects. 85  
 
However, Paul David has counter-argued indicating that too much focus on the historical 
evidence behind the specific QWERTY case unfairly reduces the strength of the theory that 
lock-in effects can result in prevention of effective competition.86 The presence of empirical 
evidence for a particular case does not make the theory incorrect.87 This is a similar argument 
                                                          
81 Paul A. David ‘Clio and the Economics of QWERTY’ (1985) 75(2) Am Econ Rev 332, 336 
82 Ibid 
83 Ibid 
84 S Liebowitz & S Margolis ‘The Fable of the Keys’ (1990) 33 J Law Econ  26 
85 Paul A David ‘Path Dependence, its critics and the quest for “historical economics”’ (All Souls College , 
Oxford and Stanford University Paper 2011 -024) available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.8.1129&rep=rep1&type=pdf accessed on 16 
September 2017 
86 Ibid 
87 Ibid 
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to that made by Douglas who stated that even if there are real world examples where entities 
benefitting from massive lock-in effects leading to high barriers are overtaken by other new 
emerging companies, the fact of the matter is that those effects can still lead to anti-
competitive behaviour. Hence the theory of the renowned scholar Paul David remains valid. 
If there were such valid concerns with regards to the early days of the keyboard, the very real 
potential of the high entry barriers of technologically advanced digital products/services must 
be taken seriously as well.  
 
We therefore see that innovation from smaller entities may not be sufficient to overcome 
barriers to entry. However, there is also another argument from the innovation angle that is 
interesting and shows that barriers are high. That is the notion that larger companies due to 
their size are able to innovate better than their competitors. We saw this in section 2.2.1 in 
terms of the literature on two sided networks. Here, we see it in recent literature specifically 
addressing competition law issues of search engines from an economics perspective.  
 
 
Economists Jens Prufer and Cedric Argenton have concluded that large search engines are 
able to overtake and foreclose competitors in the market, not necessarily because of the 
quality of the algorithm applied on search data but because of their unique access to a 
massively larger amount of data (such as saved search queries from users) owing to the fact 
that they have been in operation longer and before their competitors and new entrants; this, 
so- to-speak ‘first mover advantage’ allowed them to accumulate data from their 
comparatively larger network of users88 which is a very necessary ‘critical mass’ for a 
                                                          
88 See also Viktor Mayer-Schonberger & Kenneth Cukier Big Data: A Revolution that Will Transform How we 
live, work and think (London: John Murray, 2013) 36-39- The belief is that simple algorithms with a lot of data 
will outperform sophisticated algorithms with little data. 
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successful platform. 89 This is also supported by EU Commission officials90 who have 
commented: 
‘In the digital economy, large sets of data (so-called 'big data') are becoming 
increasingly valuable as they reveal patterns of information that enable companies to 
understand user behaviour and preferences and improve (or target) their products and 
services accordingly. This makes the availability of 'big data' a significant competitive 
advantage for companies active in, for instance, targeted online advertising, online 
search, social networking services and software products. From a competition law 
perspective, a possible theory of harm is that combining the merging parties' datasets 
could provide them with a competitive advantage, by helping them to improve the 
merged entity's product or service post-merger in a way that competitors are unable to 
match’91 
 
This data is therefore a huge barrier to entry that cannot be taken advantage of by new market 
entrants or smaller search engine companies. Prufer and Argenton take this argument very 
seriously to the point that they have recommended that all search engines should allow access 
to each other’s data and compete purely on the algorithms the different engines apply.92  
 
                                                          
89 See David S Evans ‘How catalysts ignite: the economics of platform-based start-ups’ in Annabelle Gawer 
(ed) Platforms, Markets and Innovation (Edward Elgar Publishing 2009) 101- Although the author states that 
critical mass is required for a successful platform, he acknowledges that a high quality product is necessary to 
gain the critical mass. But this still means that once critical mass is gained (like established free high technology 
markets already have) it can lead to multiplied success, so to speak. 
90 See E Ocello, C Sjodin & A Subocs ‘What’s up with merger control in the digital sector? Lesson from the 
Facebook/Whatsapp EU merger case’ (2015) 1 Competition Merger Brief 1 
91 Ibid 6 
92 Ibid page 13 
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The ‘first mover advantage’ argument in the area of digital markets is not unchallenged.93 For 
instance, in 2001 economist Neil Gandall used Yahoo! as an example to support the argument 
that first mover advantages help companies in the beginning; but as time goes by, a 
company’s success is dependent on its ability to produce innovative products and services.94 
Other literature also supports this argument by pointing out previous examples of leading and 
pioneering technology companies in the industry, such as AOL and Kodak.95 Gandall’s 
article was published in 2001, a time when Google was in their early days and Yahoo! was 
the search market leader. It would seem that Google’s current success over Yahoo! lends 
credence to Gandall’s article. However, it must be noted that the business model of Google 
currently is much different from that of Yahoo! when it possessed the greatest market power; 
search engines and other high technology companies nowadays merge with other large 
companies and create stronger network effects that would not have been realised in past 
search engine models.96  
 
                                                          
93 See for example, D Evans and R Schmalensee Matchmakers- The New Economics of Multisided Platforms 
(Harvard Business Review Press 2016) 26- the authors use the situation of VHS and Betamax (two formats for 
watching video tapes in earlier days) as an example to show that the first mover advantage is not a determinant 
of the success of a platform. Firstly, they start by explaining that both formats were virtually equal in terms of 
quality. But VHS had a slight lead when it came to numbers of users. VHS eventually drove Betamax out of the 
market. The authors state that it would be wrong to attribute this to the lead (or first mover advantage in the 
sense that they got more users based on equally good technology) and subsequent network effects. They argue 
that it should rather be attributed to VHS’ efforts and investments in getting more content producers to produce 
in the VHS format. Betamax could have done the same and survived despite it not having a lead. In other words, 
the argument here is that network effects do not lead to a perpetual and automatic spiral of increasing the 
number of users on both sides. Further efforts to get users and content producers aboard need to be made and 
network effects cannot be relied upon on their own. However, it is doubtful that such arguments are relevant to 
large platforms that are already well-established and have a huge number of users. The very same authors 
suggest in a later chapter (see page76) that once a platform gains critical mass (a very large number of users on 
both sides), from that point network effects can operate themselves to increase the number of users on both 
sides. This is more likely to apply to, for example, the search engines and social networks we consider in this 
thesis.      
94 N.Gandall ‘The dynamics of competition in the Internet search engine market’ [2001] 19 International 
Journal of Industrial Organization 1103-1117. 
95 M Rato & N Petit ‘Abuse of Dominance in Technology-Enabled Markets: Established Standards 
Reconsidered?’ (2013) 9(1) Eur Competition J 1, 2 
96Kristine Devine ‘Preserving Competition in Multi-Sided Innovative Markets: How do you solve a problem 
like Google?’ (2008) 10(1)  North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology 60, 76 
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Interestingly, Gandall in a later paper in 2002 acknowledged that generally network effects 
created by an early lead of a company can be extremely hard to overcome.97 After all the 
‘first mover’ by virtue of being the earliest one to be in the market has the advantage of 
having comparatively more time, which provides more opportunity to learn by doing and 
therefore becoming more efficient. 98 This is true in modern digital companies where software 
products require a massive input from human capital (software programmers or engineers); it 
is said that industries that are more labour intensive than capital intensive as compared to 
machines, humans can correct their mistakes or change their skills much quicker.99  
 
Furthermore, despite prominent network economist Nicholas Economides’ opinion that it is 
in fact ideal for the modern digital company to hold a very high market share as long as 
consumers are not affected, he nonetheless clearly acknowledges that these industries involve 
network effects that lead to exponential effects that subsequently allow a company to have 
disproportionately more market share than even the second largest company.100 Therefore 
even though there may be merit in the argument that ‘first mover advantage’ does not have 
long lasting effects, it is still an important factor that must be taken into consideration when 
deciding competition cases involving digital markets as it can still present a significant entry 
barrier.  Given these arguments, it should be of major concern that this is an argument that 
has not featured as a determinant in, for examples, the EU Commission’s decision in the 
                                                          
97 N Gandal ‘Compatibility, standardization and network effects: some policy implications’ (2002) 
98 Kenneth Arrow ‘The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing’ (1962) 29(3) Rev Econ Stud 155, 156. 
Also see William B Arthur Increasing Returns and Path Dependency in the Economy (University of Michigan 
Press 1994) FIND PAGE NUMBER- the more a complex technology is used, the more improved it becomes.  
99 E Wiersma ‘Conditions that shape the learning curve: factors that increase the ability and opportunity to learn’ 
53(12) (2007) Manag Sci 1903 
100 Nicholas Economides ‘Antitrust issues in network industries’ (2010) in Ioannis Lianos and 
Ioannis Kokkoris (eds.), The reform of EC competition law: new challenges. Alphen aan 
den Rijn: Kluwer International Law, 343-376 
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Google/Doubleclick  and Microsoft/Skype mergers. A company’s early advantages gained 
via network effects can lead to a long upwards spiral towards increasing power despite the 
quality of the product or service provided.101  
 
Therefore in the category of Commission cases concerning free high technology the EU 
Commission should also consider that the barriers to entry are in fact high due to factors such 
as first mover advantages and high capital requirements. Innovation on the part of smaller 
companies may therefore be insufficient to lower barriers to entry to the relevant market. 
User inertia increases barriers and the relatively larger size of incumbents enables them to be 
the only ones to innovate extensively in the first place. Hence the notion that high barriers to 
entry can be present in the free high technology sector is valid and does present a threat to the 
status quo for competition. 
 
4.2.1.4 Conclusion on consistency and merits of the EU Commission’s approach to barriers to 
entry 
In this section we began by seeing how on the surface, it was quite reasonable for the EU 
Commission to view barriers to entry to be low in the free high technology sector. This was 
especially true in light of the consideration of the many more barriers that are present in other 
sectors such as telecommunications. However, we also saw that the EU Commission revealed 
in its analysis that barriers to entry may not be that low given that not all online competitors 
are successful. This reflected some inconsistency in rationalization. Furthermore, in terms of 
comparison with interoperability cases, there is an inconsistency between the two categories; 
                                                          
101 M Katz and C Shapiro ‘Systems Competition and Network Effects’ (1994) 8(2) Journal Econ Perspect 93, 
107 
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this is in the sense that both categories in fact involve high barriers to entry and network 
effects, but in the online high technology sector the EU Commission considers barriers to 
entry to be very low. Through consideration of academic literature we considered that there is 
great merit in the argument that barriers to entry are high in such markets for factors such as 
‘first mover advantage’. Even innovation on the part of a smaller potential competitor may 
not be enough to put competitive pressure on the larger dominant company, again indicating 
that barriers to entry are in fact high.  
 
Overall we see that the EU Commission’s approach is inconsistent. It is confusing that 
barriers are considered low in one category of cases and high in another category with very 
similar features in terms of network effects. We need to keep this in mind as we move 
forward as it will help us formulate our hypothesis on why the EU Commission approaches 
free high technology cases in this particular fashion. In the next section we consider the EU 
Commission’s approach to lock-in, another form of network effect. Again we will see a 
number of inconsistencies and critical evaluation which make one question the 
comprehensiveness of the EU Commission’s approach. 
 
4.2.2 Lock-in: An inconsistent approach on the part of the EU Commission 
In the context of competition law lock-in occurs when a consumer uses a particular product 
or service and is not motivated to switch to an alternative due to psychological and economic 
reasons.102 Lock-in therefore does not necessarily have to be from a strict legal obligation 
resulting from a contract between parties to purchase a particular product or service from a 
                                                          
102 T Bjorkroth ‘Loyal or Locked-In and why should we care’ [2014] 10 J.C.L. & E. 47, 48 
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company but could result from the costs in terms of investing time and money into knowing 
how to use an alternative.103 For instance, if a consumer chose to switch from one computer 
word programme to another, he/she would have to not only pay for the new program but also 
learn how to use it given the different settings and formatting. Some may consider this as an 
extra burden and simply decide to stick to the original program that they are used to. Such 
phenomena could prevent competitors from competing in the market for customers as 
customers get stuck on a particular company’s product. Hence lock-in, like high barriers to 
entry is a threat to the protection of competition but also in a sense limits consumer choice. 
However, lock-in overall is discussed within the context of the ability of competitors to 
compete in the market and as an obstacle to exercising this ability. 
 
On the other hand, some view this as a misinterpretation of a situation where the majority of 
consumers resolve to stay with the same product/service (as opposed to being coerced into 
doing so); there is opinion stating that the innovativeness of a product (as opposed to lock-in) 
can attract and retain customers and that this is misinterpreted as an unfair lock-in.104 Italianer 
explains this type of misinterpretation would discourage companies from innovating and 
investing in their products and services further; companies would fear penalization by 
authorities for experiencing the benefits of network effects and therefore view achieving 
innovation as a lost cause.105 In fact, it has also been argued that the high level of innovation 
that characterises the market is a clear testament to the lack of lock-in.106Where an economic 
                                                          
103 J Farrell & C Shapiro ‘Dynamic Competition with Switching Costs’ (1988) 29 Rand J Econ 123  
104 Alexander Italianer ‘Innovation and Compeititon’ (2012) Chapter 15, International Antitrust Law & Policy, 
Competition Law Institute [Fordham University School of Law] 
105 Ibid 
106 See Giacomo Luchetta ‘Is the Google Platform a Two-sided Market?’ (2014) 10(1) JCL & E 185, 205. The 
author comments on the nature of a free high technology service like Google. He states ‘If searchers could trade 
their personal information with another search engine that delivered a higher utility (that is, a higher and non-
biased search quality), they would have every incentive to do so, just as workers can leave a firm if it offers 
 
215 
 
entity is unable to lock in consumers, it must maintain its clientele by consistently 
innovating.107  
 
In this particular section, we will assess the EU Commission’s arguments on lock-in effects 
that arise from network effects.  
 
4.2.2.1 Current view of the EU Commission of Lock-In Effects 
 
The EU Commission has expressed its views on lock-in in several high technology cases. 
Like barriers to entry, it is another argument that centeres around whether there is enough 
competition in the market to justify a merger or dominance-enhancing unilateral action. We 
therefore need to consider these cases to assess the accuracy of the analyses.  
 
In the Google/Doubleclick merger investigation one of the major complaints against the 
merger arose from the idea that the newly merged entity would gain an unfair advantage from 
each other’s client base.108 For instance, Google could purely bundle its ad network service 
with Doubleclick’s ad serving product, creating a lock-in.109 The concern was that all of 
Doubleclick’s customers would be locked into using AdSense (by Google) and vice versa 
through coercion; Google could state in their terms and conditions that they would only 
provide a service if the customer also used Doubleclick. Collectively, with such exclusionary 
                                                          
lower wages than does its competitors.72 It has already been stressed that Google is not Microsoft, as it cannot 
rely on network externalities, both intra- and inter-side, to lock in consumers. This ensures a better alignment of 
Google’s and consumers’ incentives. For this reason, Google has strong incentives not to dilute the quality of its 
search results—at least to a certain extent—because users could migrate, thereby shrinking ad Revenues’ 
107 Ibid 
108 Google/Doubleclick (Case No COMP/M.4731) [2008] paragraph 224 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4731_20080311_20682_en.pdf accessed on 16 
September 2017 
109 Ibid 
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terms, the merged entity could unfairly gain a larger customer base. However, the EU 
Commission found that there was enough competition in the ad serving market and 
Doubleclick customers could simply switch away to a competitor; customers were free to do 
so as they were not bound by any contractual terms to stick to the Doubleclick service for a 
particular period of time.110  
 
Another concern that was raised had to do with the search engine effecting its ability to tweak 
its system in a fashion that would force more Doubleclick customers to use AdSense and 
hence get locked-in.111 This concern was not substantiated however; the EU Commission 
acknowledged that such a strategy was unlikely given that the terms and conditions of 
Doubleclick customers obligates Doubleclick to keep all information they gather private.112 It 
is important to note that these lock-ins discussed thus far are contractual and technical in 
nature. However, the EU Commission’s views on these types of lock-in would not be based 
on the wider picture, which should entail a serious recognition and consideration of more 
subtle, yet potent, lock-in effects;113 in other words one must look beyond the legal terms and 
conditions and consider whether the practical effect leads to a lock in. Kristine Devine has 
argued that each user of a search engine creates a ‘positive feedback loop’114 leading to an 
extensive network effect.115 The European Travel Commission has stated that Google has a 
                                                          
110 See S Lewis & A Lofaro ‘Google/Doubleclick; the search for a theory of harm’ (2008) 29(12) E.C.L.R 717, 
720. The authors noted that one of the concerns in the Google/Doubleclick investigation was tipping through 
network effects; advertisers using Doubleclick could end up having to join Google’s ad network. The authors 
recognized however that such concerns were mainly valid in cases where customers typically used one platform. 
However, the authors comment that the evidence in the case of Google/Doubleclick suggests strongly that 
advertisers and publishers can easily switch in a costless manner.   
111 Google/Doubleclick (Case No COMP/M.4731) [2008] paragraph 316 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4731_20080311_20682_en.pdf accessed on 16 
September 2017para 316 
112 Ibid 
113 Kristine Devine ‘Preserving Competition in Multi-Sided Innovative Markets: How do you solve a problem 
like Google?’ (2008) 10(1) NC JL & Tech 60 
114 Ibid p 63 
115 Ibid 
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major share in terms of users, especially in the search and search ad markets. 116 For instance, 
if Google/Doubleclick were to bundle together their products, Doubleclick’s customers could 
see the benefit of having new access to Google’s massive database of users who will 
potentially click their advertisements. In such scenarios, Google/Doubleclick could exercise 
more bargaining power with regards to changing their terms and conditions and create a 
system where customers’ information is no longer private and can be used to strongly 
persuade them into using Google’s other products.  
 
It must be noted of course, there is no obligation for search engine users to use Google only 
and they can still switch to another engine for free; it has been argued that currently users 
share information quickly and freely and can therefore get to know about alternative search 
engines of higher quality.117 Hence, if search engine users are not happy about their privacy 
being invaded, they will have the information needed to switch to an engine they like better; 
therefore search engine users cannot be locked-in. Given this, one could state that the market 
power of Google in search can vary and therefore its ability to lock-in customers through the 
allure of a large base of search users may be short lived.  
 
However, Dorsey and McGuire argue that, despite a high technology’s lack of coercion 
power in the most literal of senses, its beneficially strong lock-in effects allow it to leverage 
in a way that is tantamount to possessing coercion powers.118 Devine argues that companies 
like Google merge with innovative companies to attract more customers.119 Such mergers can 
                                                          
116 European Travel Commission Digital Portal ‘Search Engines’ http://etc-digital.org/digital-trends/consumer-
behaviour/search-engines/regional-overview/europe/ accessed 16th November 2014 
117 Daniel F Spulber ‘Unlocking Technology’ (2008) 4 J.C.L.&E. 915, 916 
118 E Dorsey & M McGuire ‘How the Google Consent Order Alters the Process and Outcomes of FRAND 
bargaining’ (2012-2013) 20 Geo. Mason L. Rev 983 
119 Kristine Laudadio Devine ‘Preserving Competition in Multi-Sided Innovative Markets: How do you solve a 
problem like Google?’ North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology Volume 10: Issue 1: Fall 2008) p 63 
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take place with companies that produce a service/product which is a complement to that of 
the other merging company and can create massive value for the main platform, such as a 
search engine. 120 With more mergers, such companies can offer various products to the same 
users and customers across all of their product markets. These links to other related services 
could generate lock-in effects.121 For instance, when one visits a prominent search engine, 
he/she may see an ‘Apps’ tab conveniently placed on the top right hand corner. This tab leads 
to all of the search engine’s other products and services without forcing the user to browse 
elsewhere or open a new tab and enter a different URL for a different service of that search 
engine. These lock-in effects are the very elements that may give such companies the 
bargaining power to carry out business on their own terms and conditions whilst maintaining 
and further obtaining customers.122 In turn, this can lead to very high switching costs and 
barriers to entry for competitors.123  
 
Despite the arguments above stating that lock-in effects are indeed very strong, it appears 
quite clear that the EU Commission’s view in Google/Doubleclick is that lock-in effects can 
be easily overcome even where very large companies with network effects are involved. It is 
important to realise that both companies themselves have huge shares in their respective 
markets. This also reflects the idea that Google is able to provide better advertising spaces as 
                                                          
120 Annabelle Gawer ‘Platform dynamics and strategies: from products to services’ in Annabelle Gawer (ed) 
Platforms, Markets and Innovation (Edward Elgar Publishing 2009) p 64. Also see A Gawer & M Cusumano 
‘How companies become platform leaders’ (2008) 49 Sloan Manage Rev 28 (NEED TO READ TO ENSURE 
INFO IS THERE)- The authors state that Microsoft benefits from the competition between PC manufacturers 
which produce complements for Microsoft products so to speak. This competition leads to innovation in the 
complements which then in turn provides a lot of value for a company like Microsoft.  
121 See B Edelman & J Wright ‘Debate on Antitrust Scrutiny of Google’ (2012) 2 J.L 445, 446. ‘…(A)ny user 
who wants Google search is forced to receive Google’s other services too’  
122 See T Eisenmann ‘Managing networked businesses: course overview for educators’ (2007) Harvard Business 
School Note 807-103- customer retention rates improve with this sort of bundling even if users have a bad 
experience as they will think twice before switching to another service as they are, so to speak, tied to the 
additional convenience/value provided by the complements.  
123 Kristine Devine ‘Preserving Competition in Multi-Sided Innovative Markets: How do you solve a problem 
like Google?’ (2008) 10(1) NC JL & Tech 60, 84  
219 
 
it has the most users. In turn, it could easily lock-in customers to Doubleclick by 
conveniently placing it in their reach. In such a way customers are coerced and locked-in. It is 
therefore confusing that the EU Commission would not consider these arguments.   
 
We will see under the next sub-heading how the European Court of Justice has historically 
had a very different view of lock-in effects. We will therefore see another major 
inconsistency. 
 
4.2.2.2 Courts’ Views on Lock-in Effects 
It would be logical to start looking at earlier cases and consider how the General Court has 
viewed lock-in effects historically. In this section we start of by looking at Microsoft v 
Commission.124 This case is not only looked at as a classic case of lock-in and network effects 
in general, but also considered as an important milestone in a series of refusal to supply case 
law.125 This is very relevant to the thesis because Microsoft v Commission does not, as we 
will see, directly meet the classic requirements for a refusal to supply claim to be successful; 
however, it succeeds. It stands out amongst the rest of the refusal to supply case law as 
uniquely involving strong lock-in arising from strong network effects. In this section we 
therefore analyse this set of case law with the purpose of distinguishing Microsoft v 
Commission and hence demonstrating the courts’ historical view that lock-in effects cause 
concerns for competition. 
     
                                                          
124 Case T–201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3619 
125 M Reynolds & C Best ‘Article 102 and Innovation The Journey since Microsoft’ Chapter 16, International 
Antitrust Law & Policy, 2012 Competition Law Institute 
220 
 
In 1998, Sun Microsystems Inc complained to the EU Commission that Microsoft (the 
dominant entity in the market for operating system) disclosed solely standard interoperability 
information and protocols as opposed to a comprehensive set of information; a 
comprehensive list would allow Sun Microsystems and other companies downstream to 
produce a network group server operating system which could compete on the same level as 
Microsoft’s own network operating system.126 The court agreed with the EU Commission 
that lock-in of consumers with Microsoft’s network operating system was more likely and 
that Microsoft was abusing a dominant position in the market of operating systems. 127   
 
One of the major differences between prior case law on refusal to supply and Microsoft v 
Commission is the presence of lock-in and network effects in general. The case of Radio 
Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission of 
the European Communities128 (otherwise known as Magill) in the European Court of Justice 
is considered to set out the basic principles129 by which it is to be determined when a refusal 
to supply a certain resource or service constitutes a breach of Article 102.130 This case 
involved three different television broadcasting channels who published lists of their own 
daily programs every day in newspapers; lists over which they had copyright.131 What Magill 
TV guide wanted to do was to publish a unique and innovative product i.e. a weekly 
comprehensive television guide containing program lists from all three channels; the 
broadcasting channels refused to grant the copyright license.132 The court judged this action 
                                                          
126 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v Commission of the European Communities [2007] CFI 
127 Ibid para 606 
128 Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television 
Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission of the European Communities [1995] ECR  I-00743 
129 Inge Graef ‘Tailoring the essential facilities doctrine to the IT sector: compulsory licensing of intellectual 
property rights after Microsoft’ (2011) 7(1) CSLR. 1, 3 
130 Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television 
Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission of the European Communities [1995] ECR  I-00743 
131 Ibid 
132 Ibid 
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to be an abuse of a dominant position for the following factors. The refusal prevented the 
emergence of a new product in a new market; the licensing of the individual channel program 
lists was an indispensable raw material for the production of a weekly guide; the refusal 
would mean that the television channels were exclusively reserving to themselves a 
secondary market where they obliterated any probability of competition; and finally there was 
no justification of any sort provided for the refusal.133  
 
Microsoft v Commission can be distinguished on the fact that it did not involve the creation of 
a completely new product, but the same product with perhaps some modifications. 
Furthermore in the case of Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und 
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co.KG134  Bronner was the owner of a daily Austrian 
newspaper known as Der Standard which had a small share of 3.6% of the national daily 
newspaper market.135 It distributed its newspapers through postal delivery, which meant that 
the time at which the newspaper was delivered to households was in the hands of whichever 
company they contracted with for the post; Mediaprint on the other hand published two 
different newspapers, which together held a market share of 46.8% of the national daily 
newspaper market.136 However, Mediaprint also distributed these two papers themselves 
directly to customers through their own home delivery system (which was the only of its kind 
in Austria).137 Bronner requested the use of this home delivery service in return for a 
reasonable price as it allowed the earlier delivery of papers in the morning; but this access 
                                                          
133 Ibid 
134 Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. 
KG [1998] E.C.R. I-7791 
135 Ibid 
136 Ibid 
137 Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. 
KG [1998] E.C.R. I-7791 
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was denied by Mediaprint.138 The European Court of Justice ruled that this was not an abuse 
of a dominant position and that whilst the postal service may be slightly less advantageous, it 
still enabled Bronner to carry out its business.139  
 
The facts in Bronner generally appear similar to Microsoft v Commission in the sense that 
like Oscar Bronner, Sun Microsystems wanted to be able to make improvements to its 
program so it could compete on the same level with Microsoft. Oscar Bronner wanted to do 
the same with Media Print. Yet the decision in Microsoft v Commission  was to find abuse 
while in Bronner it was not. As we will find out in the next paragraph, this is likely to be 
because of the significant lock-in effects present in Microsoft.  
 
It can quite easily be argued that the Microsoft case is not completely consistent with these 
classic ‘refusal to supply’ cases.  Sun Microsystems was not trying to create a wholly new 
product as seen in the Magill case; furthermore, they already had the codes to create a 
competing network operating system. Also, they had similar desires as Oscar Bronner in the 
sense that they wanted access to something that would enable them to improve their product 
so it could compete on the same level as rivals (in Oscar Bronner it was improving the 
delivery of the product to allow it to compete on the same level as its rival Mediaprint which 
could deliver on time).  
 
So why was it that the courts ruled that access should be granted to Sun Microsystems for the 
improvement of a product that was not new and was already being produced in the market 
and already had a level of interoperability with the dominant platform? One of the unique 
                                                          
138 Ibid 
139 Ibid 
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standout issues in the Microsoft case appears to be network effects and this could therefore be 
a reason why it was treated differently given previous principles on refusal to supply.140 As 
we saw, due to Microsoft having the most widely used operating system platform, there was a 
danger that it could eliminate competition as users could be locked-in to using Microsoft 
servers, not only because it controlled the platform and could make it accessible more easily 
to users and lock-in, but mainly because it was able to produce a better product/service as it 
solely had access to full inter-operability information.   
 
Furthermore, and very importantly, the idea of lock-in on a platform was further enhanced in 
other investigations into Microsoft.  In the years 2004 and 2009 there were investigations into 
Microsoft’s tying practices concerning services which could alternatively be downloaded for 
free. In both years Microsoft had remedies and fines sanctioned against it by the EU 
Commission for bundling their own media player and web browser respectively to their 
operating system; the bundling would lock consumers in due to the network effects stemming 
from Microsoft’s dominant position in the operating system market. 141  
 
In conclusion, the Microsoft v Commission judgement along with the other Microsoft 
investigations, not only accentuates the real impact of lock-in effects where there is a 
company with a dominant position, but also the difference in the treatment of lock-in effects 
when compared to the EU Commission’s cases on the free high technology sector. Therefore 
lock-in effects should be considered as high in the free high technology sector as well and as 
                                                          
140 See for example Anneleen Straetmans ‘The EU Microsoft case: not as soft a case’ (2007-2008) 44(4) Jura 
Falconis Jg. 563 available at https://www.law.kuleuven.be/jura/art/44n4/straetemans.pdf accessed on 28 August 
2017- ‘With regards to operating systems, indirect network effects can cause greater disadvantages to potential 
market entrants than in other high technology markets, due to the special features of the PC operating system 
market’ 
141 EU Commission  ‘Commission concludes on Microsoft investigation, imposes conduct remedies and a fine’ 
(24th March 2004) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-04-382_en.htm?locale=en accessed on 20th April 2015 
224 
 
a constraint on the ability of potential competitors to enter the market and of current 
competitors to compete.  The EU Commission’s views on lock-in in free high technology 
cases and Google/Doubleclick can be said to be limited. Again, this needs to be kept in mind 
when we formulate our hypothesis later on in the chapter, in section 3.5.  
 
We will now turn to the final form of network effects to be discussed; switching costs. 
 
 
4.2.3 Switching costs- A consistent but unmeritorious approach on the part of the EU 
Commission 
Switching costs are those that are borne by the consumer when he or she decides to switch 
from one product or service to another; these can take the form of learning costs (the cost of 
learning and getting used to the new product/service) and are more than capable of preventing 
a consumer from switching all together.142 For example, a consumer could have been using a 
particular email service for a very long time and is very used to the format and operation of 
those services. If he/she decides to switch to a different email service, he/she faces a different 
format and possibly different type of operation. The time taken to learn and get used to the 
new format would be considered as a cost and an encumbrance by the consumer and would 
play an important part in his/her decision as to whether or not to switch.  In this particular 
sub-section, we fundamentally consider switching between free high technology services.  
 
                                                          
142 Ulla-Maija Mylly ‘An evolutionary economics perspective on computer program interoperability and 
copyright’ (2010) 41(3) IIC 284, 297 
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Eventually in this subsection, a lot of discussion will revolve around switching between 
search engines. As we will see, this is an argument that is contested in the academic literature 
143 and therefore needs to be evaluated to see how accurate the EU Commission’s views are. 
The reason that search engine switching is specifically considered is because it appears to 
epitomize perhaps the easiest and least costly possible switching between economic entities 
by consumers; all the user has to do is type in a different web address in the same browser 
and another search engine can pop up for free. The general consensus in the EU Commission 
is that switching costs are very low when it comes to search engines.144 Competition is 
therefore protected due to low switching costs as customers can easily switch to another 
service.145 Yet, the literature does not always agree that switching costs are low;146 and given 
that many of the EU Commission’s current high profile investigations concern search 
engines, it is important that this thesis addresses switching in this specific area. Furthermore, 
search engines are one of the most appropriate examples of the type of company this thesis 
concerns i.e. a large company with large market share in a market where an easily accessible 
free service is provided to consumers.  
 
 
                                                          
143 See for example, Ryen W. White & Susan T. Dumais, Characterizing and Predicting Search Engine 
Switching  
Behavior, presented at the 18th ACM Conference on Information and Knowledge Management (2009);< 
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/CIKM2009-Switching-fp1012-
white.pdf > accessed on 11th March 2014 – this will be discussed in greater detail below.   
144 We will see this in our analysis of Microsoft/ Skype (Case No COMP/M.6281) [2011] at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6281_924_2.pdf accessed on 5th February 2015, 
Facebook/Whatsapp (Case No COMP/M.7217) [2014] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf accessed 
on 23rd July 2017, Google Inc ‘Commitments in Case COMP/C-3/39.740- Foundem &Others’ 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_8608_5.pdf accessed 16th February 2014 
145 Ibid 
146 See for example, David G Yosifon ‘Consumer Lock-In and theory of the firm’ (2012) 35(4) Seattle 
University Law Review 1429 and Gal Zauberman, ‘The Intertemporal Dynamics of Consumer Lock-In’ (2003) 
30 J. Consumer Res. 405   
226 
 
4.2.3.1 The EU Commission’s View on Switching Costs 
 
In determining the consistency with which the arguments surrounding switching costs is 
applied we can start off with recent online high technology market cases where the general 
opinion of the EU Commission is that switching costs are extremely low. In Microsoft/Skype 
the EU Commission considered that switching costs were low and it gave a very specific 
reason for this. Skype communications were used for keeping in touch with a small group of 
five or six individuals which included family members and close friends.147 Hence, if there 
was a competing communications application it would be easy to switch to it as it would 
simply be a matter of a small number of individuals switching to a different communications 
platform.  
 
Furthermore, in the European Competition Commission’s investigation of the 
Facebook/Whatsapp merger one of the main legitimate148 concerns raised by opposing parties 
was the fact that Facebook (a social networking online/mobile phone/tablet application) 
would immensely benefit from the network effects of Whatsapp (a mobile phone 
communications application) which connects over 1 billion users and keeps adding 
significant numbers of users to the network on a daily basis.149 However, the EU Commission 
stated that the switching costs were low; downloading alternative communications 
                                                          
147 Microsoft/ Skype (Case No COMP/M.6281) [2011] paragraph 130 at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6281_924_2.pdf accessed on 5th February 2015 
148 See M Stucke & A Grunes Big Data and Competition Policy (OUP Oxford 2016) 168- the authors argue that 
the EU Commission may have missed the important point that Whatsapp and Facebook users would find it very 
hard to simply switch to a different communications application because they would be locked-in by the fact 
that they have most of their friends on it who may also be in communication groups.   
149 Facebook/Whatsapp (Case No COMP/M.7217) [2014] paragraph 132 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf accessed 
on 23rd July 2017 
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applications was completely free and most people multi-homed with several applications 
simultaneously on the same device.150 This reflects that the EU Commission is of the opinion 
that switching costs would typically be low where the use of technology is free and there is a 
typical use of multiple services that are similar. 
 
Other examples of this could be switching between search engines, free media players (for 
example iTunes and Windows Media Player) and online shopping applications.  However, 
one inconsistency that can be seen here is that the EU Commission ignored the fact that users 
of both Facebook and Whatsapp have multiple contacts on these networks and therefore 
switching can be difficult whilst in Microsoft/Skype it indicated that the more people there are 
on the network that keep in touch regularly, the higher the switching cost. There is an 
inconsistency in logic here that could make one question the completeness of the EU 
Commission’s analysis in Facebook/Whatsapp. 
 
Furthermore, the EU Commission’s support for the idea of low switching costs for consumers 
in these types of online high technology markets can also be inferred from some of the EU 
Commission’s acceptance of commitments from parties under investigation. On 13th 
November 2010, on the basis of its authority151 to apply Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty of 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the EU Commission opened up an anti-trust 
investigation into Google as a search engine; it had been spurred by complaints raised mainly 
by vertical search engines. 152 Vertical search engines are specialist engines that only search 
                                                          
150 Ibid para 133 
151 See Articles 5  and  11(6) of Council TFEU Regulation No 1/2003 of 16th December 2002 on the 
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.  
152 European Commission ‘Antitrust: Commission probes allegations of antitrust violations by Google’ 30th 
November 2010 Press Release <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-1624_en.htm?locale=en> accessed 
11th February 2014.  
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in specific areas as opposed to the entire web like Google and Yahoo. For instance, Yelp is a 
search engine which specifically provides reviews on businesses such as restaurants. Such 
vertical search engines have complained that Google favours and displays either its own 
vertical results or advertisements it has charged for to other entities over others. 153 On 3rd 
April 2013 Google published its proposed Commitments towards resolving competition 
concerns. 154 As we will see, the EU Commission’s acceptance of these Commitments was 
strongly indicative of its opinion that free high technology markets are associated with low 
switching costs.  
  
The first aspect the EU Commission deals with is the issue of Google’s own services being 
put in top priority over all other rival vertical search results. 155  The EU Commission looked 
at examples of search results as part of their investigation. If an internet user were to type a 
product such as ‘camera’ into Google’s search box, Google’s own specialised shopping 
results would be coming up first on the top of the page. Google has made a commitment 
saying that ‘if for more than 5% of page views by EEA users… (at least one paid specialized 
search result was shown) ’156 it would firstly highlight it with a large conspicuous icon that 
would indicate the link as a culmination of a specialised google search result. 157 Secondly, 
the icon would clearly explain that it was a specialized search result by Google. 158 Thirdly, it 
would clearly refer and direct the user to pertinent links from rival vertical search results. 159  
                                                          
153 Ibid 
154 Google Inc ‘Commitments in Case COMP/C-3/39.740- Foundem &Others’ 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_8608_5.pdf accessed 16th February 2014 
155 Ibid 
156 Ibid   
157 Ibid 
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Although Google has stated that it would provide information about rival links, it does not 
actually address the priority of its different search results.160 Hence Google shopping, for 
instance would still remain on the top of the search results. This is a competition issue 
because it ‘concern(s) behaviour where the dominant undertaking favours its own products or 
services on an ancillary market over its competitors’ products and services’.161 Visually 
(especially with all the large images linked to the specialised results) the specialised results 
look more attractive and prominent above the rest.  
 
In summary the acceptance of these commitments meant that Google is still allowed to rank 
its own services and products on top even if the results are inorganic. However, leaving the 
ability to prioritise Google’s own vertical results is still a competition issue that some 
literature indicates the accepted commitments by Google do not resolve;162 there have been 
suggestions for the implementation of stricter measures that are apparently viable. For 
example, there have been calls to go beyond simple labelling of sponsored results and to 
actually set up a committee that investigates in detail Google’s algorithm to see whether 
                                                          
160 Fair Search ‘A letter on restoring competition in online search’ (18 September 2012) 
<http://www.fairsearch.org/content-scraping/a-letter-on-restoring-competition-in-online-search/ > accessed 13th 
November 2014 ‘Simply requiring Google to accurately label its products, paid search results and 
advertisements will not undo the harm to competition that Google already has inflicted… In the end, placement 
matters far more than labeling’. Also see D Hyman & D Franklyn ‘Search Neutrality, Search Bias and the 
Limits of Antitrust: An Empirical Perspective on Architecture and Labeling Remedies’  (Univ. of Ill. Program in 
Law, Behavior & Soc. Sci. Research Paper No. LE13-24; Univ. of S.F. Law Research Paper No. 2013-15, July 
2015) 2  available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2260942 accessed on 16th September 2017-  placement in the 
ranking is more important than labelling to users 
161Sophie Van Loon ‘The Power of Google: First Mover Advantage or Abuse of a Dominant Position’ in A. 
Lopez-Tarruella (ed) Google and the law (Information Technology and Law Review) (Asser Press, Netherlands 
2012) 
162 For example, prioritization of own vertical search results could mean sacrificing considerable advertising 
revenue from vertical competitors could strongly indicate an exclusionary strategy which fall foul of 
competition rules. See Lars Wiethaus ‘Google’s Favouring of Own Services: Comments from an Economic 
Perspective’(2015) 6(7) JECL & Pract 506, 511 
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there are any deliberate biases.163 Google’s ranking algorithm needs to be closely scrutinized 
as competition is not really ‘one click away’; the company has the resources to have massive 
competitive advantages. 164 A more straightforward and obvious remedy would have been to 
simply order Google to stop placing its own vertical search results on the top of the page or 
to stop placing it in this manner less often. 165 A more stringent measure would be to order 
Google to cease all activities in the vertical search market.166 
 
Given the viability of the above stricter alternatives that directly tackle the level of 
competition in the market, the EU Commission’s acceptance of the Commitments could 
reflect a belief that switching costs are low and that network effects in general are not that 
potent. This, after all, generally fits into the narrative of the presence of low cost switching, 
which in turn leads to the concomitant effects of lock-in and high entry barriers that we have 
seen so far. Google’s Eric Schmidt and its supporters have regularly used the argument that 
‘competition is a click away’167 to justify such practices.  
 
In light of the EU Commission investigations and decisions above, it appears as though the 
EU Commission concurred with them on this point.  The EU Commission’s strong indication 
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that consumers would simply switch away seems to be based on a strictly logical economic 
sense; it is assumed that users are simply rational when it comes to deciding whether or not 
to switch away from a product/service.168 It has been recognised that despite the commonly 
held idea that ‘switching cost lock-in is perhaps “irrational” in the sense that fully rational, 
preference maximizing actors would anticipate and safeguard against it,’169 consumers are 
still very likely to act in the opposite way due to general human psychology.170 Consumers 
tend to fail anticipation of future switching costs as they only think rationally in terms of the 
present costs.171 So when the future arrives they are faced with unanticipated costs which 
prevent them from switching.172 Zauberman mentioned with specific reference to the internet 
that even when switching costs are objectively low as they are on the internet, the lock in 
effects lead to the avoidance of such costs and subsequent switching.173  
 
In terms of this merger for instance, with Google’s bundling and access to massive data, the 
cost of switching is high in the sense that the consumer would have to give up access to that 
data. In terms of just general search engine users, for instance, it would mean the user giving 
up easy access to Google’s other products which are conveniently available on their main 
web page such as maps, shopping and YouTube. In other words leaving those behind would 
be the switching cost.  This goes to show that online high technology companies with 
massive network effects can prevent switching due to the perceived switching costs faced by 
consumers.  
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The EU Commission itself has previously, in fact, been a proponent of this notion. In 2009 
Microsoft had to negotiate a remedy with the EU Commission for pre-installing its web 
browser in its operating system; competing web browsers complained that the pre-
installation made it more unlikely for consumers to download alternative browsers.174 The 
EU Commission agreed to a remedy involving Microsoft presenting an option to users to 
download alternative browsers when they first start using the operating system.175  
 
The recent Commission investigations (for example Facebook/Whatsapp and 
Microsoft/Skype) do not at any point distinguish these Microsoft cases in the context of 
network effects. Alternative media players and web browsers can be downloaded for free and 
switched to with the same level of convenience as one can switch between search engines 
and communication applications/programs.176 If there are such arguments with regards to the 
difficulty of switching in a case where one can download an alternative software (media 
player or browser) for free, the same arguments could justifiably be applied to a situation 
where a company concerning search engines and communication applications with a massive 
network of users can tie its users. Hence, there appears to be an inconsistency in the way the 
EU Commission treats network effects.  
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Some particular knowledge on search engine switching can provide us with a unique 
perspective on the reality of switching in the search engine market.177 By looking at some 
prominent opposing American literature, we can also more specifically consider the debate 
with regards to switching being easy in the search market.  We can then come to a well-
informed conclusion as to whether or not switching should be considered low in the high 
technology sector. 
 
Some of the literature suggests that the zero switching cost concept of switching between 
search engines we saw above may be questioned. The information collected from users on 
websites can be considered as an economic good;178 Newman and Grunes argue that the 
search company with most data on consumers are able to provide a more specialised service 
for them,179 leading to a high switching cost (the cost of giving up a specialised service), let 
alone high entry barriers for new companies. This is not congruent with the EU 
Commission’s current view on switching costs being low. Newman and Grunes appear to 
suggest that even when evaluating the possibility of switching between high technology 
products/services which are free, one must take into consideration the quality level provided 
by that product/service; if the quality (or specialized service as mentioned before) is high, 
switching may be more difficult for a consumer benefitting from the quality even if switching 
is cost-free and relatively hassle-free.  Hence, the EU Commission’s argument that switching 
cost is low may not be accurate. 
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Furthermore, the idea that switching to a different search engine is at no cost cannot go 
unchallenged in the presence of the theory of heuristics in behavioural economics.180 
Conventionally,  ‘authorities-- when assessing the merging parties’ incentives to degrade 
quality for the free product--assume that consumers (can)…detect the degradation in quality 
and would want to switch to rival products or services.’ 181 However, heuristics looks at the 
other factors beyond this assumption about the ability of consumers and apart from price 
changes that effect consumer behaviour.182 Consumers will generally purchase particular 
products because they are used to buying them and because of their biases. 183 Even if there is 
a better product as an alternative out in the market, a good portion of consumers are not 
simply going to switch to it. 184  This is a form of brand loyalty that may weaken competition 
(as alternatives will be ignored even if they provide better quality) despite the existence of 
numerous online alternatives.185 This is helped by the fact that many users simply assume a 
large search engine’s ranking is correct186 without carrying out any further searches and 
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hence evaluations of their own. 187 There is a risk that in attempting to find a potentially better 
product, time is wasted. 188  
 
In the context of search engines, the cost of switching to a different one is therefore not zero, 
but it is the potential of wasted time.189 Even though Google’s CEO Eric Smicht has stated, 
like Bork and Sidak have indicated in their paper, that switching is easy.190 However, in the 
digital world the click away can be considered as a waste of time. In fact it is not simply a 
click away. Users may very well have to click on the URL box and type in a URL before they 
can arrive at a different search engine site. Studies have shown that the two most commonly 
used methods of navigation are through hyperlinks and the back button.191 Similar studies 
have then gone on to specifically show that navigation through typed in URLs formed a very 
small portion of navigation on web browsers.192 They would account for no more than 3% of 
navigation.193 This could very well clearly indicate that users view navigation via hyperlinks 
and back buttons as much easier than typing URLs.194 This makes the idea of competition 
being ‘only’ a click away much weaker.  
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An experimental study by Microsoft Research is reflective of general search engine switching 
behaviour.195 The research involved two aspects; log-based experiments and data survey.196 
The log-based experiment entailed a total number of 1.1 billion search sessions which took 
place over a six month period and carried out by hundreds of thousands of users who 
consented to take place in the experiment.197 Search sessions would begin with a query 
entered into one of the major search engines, which in this experiment was Google, Yahoo! 
or Live Search.198 It was found that only 4% of all these search sessions involved a switch to 
a different search engine for the same line of queries.199 The likelihood of switching increases 
with the length of the search session; but even then, it was found that within a session of as 
many as 10 queries the probability of switching was no more than 14%.200 The survey-based 
research centred on the completed surveys of 488 Microsoft employees.201 Although it was 
found that 70.5% of the survey respondents switched to a different search engine, 66.8% of 
this group switched only sometimes.202 This indicates that although the majority of users 
switch between search engines, they only do so rarely in the context of the total number of 
queries they carry out. This also fits in with the fact that it was found that only 4% of 1.1 
billion search sessions involved a search engine switch.203  
 
The idea that users do not use several alternate services around the same time can also be 
supported by the theory we saw in section 2.2.1 about how it was the single-homing side that 
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would be targeted for a free and innovative service. Since searchers are provided at £0, this 
theory would support the idea that they are therefore single-homers and therefore stick to one 
platform.  These figures, along with theory on multi-homing, appear to suggest that just 
because the physical step of switching at first glance is easy, does not mean that actual 
switching is easy and that it will in fact take place. We have already discussed that the 
reasons behind this could be brand loyalty, consumer behaviour of saving time and the 
perception that alternative engines may provide no better result. Given that search engine 
switching can be argued to be difficult or costly, the same may be said about other high 
technology areas. Under this narrative for instance, switching between smart phone 
applications could also be considered difficult given that switching involves a few more steps 
than switching between search engines (there is the extra step of searching and downloading 
another application which also take more time than switching between search engines on a 
web browser).  
 
Another question is whether switching from one search engine to another actually yields any 
positive results.204 This was reflected in the amount of time elapsed with no activity after 
inserting the query into the new search engine.205 A period of inactivity for more than 30 
seconds would indicate that the results on the new engine were useful and therefore the 
switch leaded to desired results.206 However what was seen mostly was that after the new 
search engine switch, there would be more activity and clicks that indicated that the user was 
still trying to find the desired answer to his/her query.207 This provides credence to 
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Patterson’s statement that many users may in the long term stick to a particular search engine 
because they think that other search engines are unable to perform any better.208  
 
It appears from these studies that clicking to a different website for information is considered, 
not only time consuming, but also potentially fruitless in the context of internet search.209 
Hence an internet search engine with a very large share of the market and has already been 
present in the market for a long time will make it difficult for new competitors to enter due to 
the propensity of consumers to stick to a particular search engine; hence switching costs can 
reasonably be considered high.  
 
The EU Commission’s view of low switching costs may therefore be limited. The theory on 
the high switching costs with regards to search engines can also similarly reflect high 
switching costs when it comes to free social networking and communications applications. If 
users perceive the switching cost to be high with regards to search engines, it is certainly 
understandable how it can be high in social networking where users have invested time and 
effort in building profiles with information and pictures.  
 
4.2.3.2 Consumer Perception and Switching  
 
As we have seen above, consumer perception plays an important role in the realities of 
switching between search engines; but this can also be reflective of its role in other high 
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technology areas such as smartphone applications. Even though these realities have not been 
considered so much in competition cases and investigations, we see that generally consumer 
behaviour is considered in other areas of law.  
 
Some of the most relevant cases would be found in trademark cases. In the case of Cosmetic 
Warriors Limited, Lush Limited v Amazon.co.UK Limited, Amazon Eu Sarl210 consumer 
behaviour and perception was a major determinant in the case.  Lush never sold their 
products on Amazon, yet Amazon’s software would allow words and phrases like ‘lush’ and 
‘lush bath bomb’ to pop up in a drop down list when someone typed ‘lu’ as Lush’s 
competitors had purchased ‘lush as a keyword for their own rival products.211 Lush 
complained that this was an unfair use of their trademark as competitors’ products appeared 
when the trademarked phrase was clicked and some, but not all, of their competitors’ ad links 
had the word ‘lush’ written on them. 212 The judgment stated that there was no infringement 
to be found as consumers perceived that shopping search engines including Amazon would 
display rival links despite the fact that they clicked on a trademarked word such as lush. 213 
Hence, although there was a clear use of the trademark by Lush’s competitors to lead 
searchers to competitors’ products, due to the average searcher’s perception of the way online 
search works, there was found to be no infringement of the trademark directive 
2008/95/EC.214    
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In a similar case in the UK (Interflora Inc v Marks & Spencer Plc), the Court of Appeal even 
reversed a lower court’s decision; the lower court had decided that there was a risk of 
confusion between brands as the competitor had bid for the claimant’s brand as a search 
keyword that linked up to its own products; again it was emphasized that there was no such 
risk of confusion as the average internet user were aware that this is how keywords were used 
by companies and that such use of keywords was considered fair use. 215 Hence, if particular 
consumer behaviour and habits can be taken into consideration in trademark cases, it should 
also be able to be taken into consideration in competition law cases where it affects the view 
of whether or not consumers find switching easier.  
 
In comparison to the literature and cases we have considered with regards to consumer 
behaviour/perception, the EU Commission appears to have considered network effects from a 
rational economic standpoint only; in other words consumer behaviour/perception has played 
little to no role in its decision-making. The EU Commission’s view assumes that consumers 
act rationally i.e. they will always switch to alternatives when prices rise, they will always 
switch in search of a higher quality product at the same price etc.  Maurice Stucke has argued 
that rationality in the context of economics and competition law needs to be relaxed in order 
to achieve a more dynamic theory of competition.216 Rationality can be questioned by aspects 
of behavioural economics where price is not the only factor determining consumers’ 
choices.217 The utility that one can derive from a product or service depends on who else is 
using the service or the number of others using the service.218 Consumers prefer to use 
technology platforms which are popular, giving them a chance to interconnect with 
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others.219Such a preference may very well involve the choice of a product/service which is 
most popular, but not necessarily of the highest quality.220 In other words popularity, and not 
quality, allows the consumer network to grow much larger. When this happens the online 
entity can gain further information from their consumers and understand their preferences, 
which would subsequently lead to a more tailored service.221  
 
The contention appears to be that a large network based solely on consumers just wanting to 
stick to what they are used to, could lead to an advantage over other competitors in providing 
better quality; hence the least a competition authority can do is prevent networks from 
growing larger through, for example, the potential combining of networks via mergers (this is 
given the fact that all competition analyses as we have seen aims to ensure there is enough 
competition in the market). This advantage is a luxury that new entrants in such a market 
would not have access to and therefore presents a substantial barrier as consumers are 
unlikely to switch even if a competitor provided a better quality service.222  
 
Such arguments from a behavioural perspective are not just theoretical. Phenomena in the 
search industry, for example, reflect low levels of switching in all forms. For instance, 
collaboration between Microsoft’s Bing search engine and Facebook was still not enough to 
compete against Google’s search engine (which has the largest network in the search 
market).223 The collaboration aimed to enrich the quality of search for both companies.224 
Facebook is able to provide information on its users’ likes based on the different Facebook 
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groups/pages/ads that they like. 225 In turn, Bing can use this to provide search results of 
higher relevance. 226 Despite the improvement in quality, Bing has struggled to compete with 
Google on the same level. 227 The reason behind this is that consumers have seen Google as, 
so to speak, the default search engine which is a reputation gained over years of trust. 228 
People use Google without thinking about their other options. 229 Again, this can be grounded 
in classical behavioural economics theories such as ‘search heuristics’. 230   This concept 
subscribes to the idea that people will purchase particular items simply because they are used 
to purchasing those items.231 Consumers are biased in favour of what they are used to and 
they consider it risky and a waste of time to test out other products232 which could result in 
‘foregone utility’233.  
 
 
Therefore, it may be justified for the EU Commission to take into consideration the 
perception of internet users when deciding merger cases involving high technology 
companies. In doing so the EU Commission’s perception of switching costs in the high 
technology sector may change and it may consider switching costs to be higher due to 
consumers’ perceptions and behaviours as we have just seen. In that sense it is confusing that 
the EU Commission views switching costs are low given what we know from the literature. 
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4.2.4 Conclusion 
 
In this section we conclude on network effects as a whole and its effects on the protection of 
competition. We also consider some literature on network effects generally (as opposed to its 
three main components we discuss above). Considering the cases and investigations above, 
in summary it appears as though the presence of network effects is definitely acknowledged, 
but historically has been considered inconsistently. In the more recent cases, taking the 
Google/Doubleclick and Facebook/Whatsapp mergers as examples, it seems that network 
effects are not considered strong; in the older Microsoft v Commission case and the more 
recent Commission decisions on Microsoft, network effects are considered much stronger 
and have a negative effect on competition in the sense that they could cause foreclosure. 
 
Having said this, at this juncture it would be apt to consider a specific point made in 
Facebook/Whatsapp which could offer us insight into why the EU Commission treated the 
older Microsoft cases differently. It stated that neither Facebook nor Whatsapp had a 
platform on which they could tie or pre-install their service applications and therefore 
switching costs would be low.234 The EU Commission explained that it was pre-installation 
of software that made it very hard for users to switch to alternatives.235 The EU Commission 
appears to attempt to present a specific fact to distinguish free high technology cases from 
the Microsoft operating system cases.  
 
However, there are two reasons that this may not be as convincing as it first seems. Firstly, 
although Facebook and Whatsapp do not have an operating system platform where they can 
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be pre-installed, they still benefit from the power of popularity which we discussed above as 
part of the literature on behavioural economics. They are therefore, so to speak, must-have 
applications that actually make switching costs higher for users. This can be explained by 
another concept in behavioural economics known as the ‘sunk cost fallacy’.236 This occurs 
when consumers stick to a product/service simply because they have invested more time and 
effort on it which cannot be recovered; it would not matter whether there is a higher quality 
alternative available.237 Facebook and Whatsapp are applications where people have spent 
time and effort building profiles and gathering a network of contacts and hence users are 
influenced by a sunk cost fallacy. For example, if a user who uses Facebook purchases a 
smartphone, he/she will likely download the application even if there is an alternative pre-
installed application; this is because he/she has put in the time and effort in building a 
Facebook profile and is less likely to want to start from scratch on a new social network.  
This therefore raises switching costs and the lack of pre-installation is unlikely to create a 
more level-playing field.  
 
Secondly, it does not explain the EU Commission’s lack of concern for tying and pre-
installation of Skype in Microsoft/Skype. The EU Commission prior to Microsoft/Skype had 
already dealt with Microsoft tying its browser and media players; it is puzzling that it did not 
offer a convincing explanation as to why it thought there would be no incentive to pre-install 
Skype. The EU Commission explained that the reason it did not believe there was this 
incentive was for the same reasons that Microsoft would have no incentive to degrade the 
interoperability of Skype with other competing platforms; Microsoft needed Skype to be 
equally functional and of good quality on all platforms so that the Skype brand could retain 
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its reputation, which in turn would increase the value of Microsoft. However, degradation on 
alternative platforms and pre-installation/tying on the incumbent platform are two separate 
issues. Microsoft may not want to degrade quality on competing operating systems, but that 
does not explain why it would then not want to pre-install it on its own platform. For these 
reasons pre-installation is not a convincing feature that distinguishes the Microsoft tying 
cases in terms of explaining the level of switching costs for users.  
 
Therefore in conjunction with our previous discussions, in terms of the comprehensiveness of 
the EU Commission’s substantive arguments we find that it did not take into consideration 
many important factors that could affect the final outcome of cases. We observed that barriers 
to entry were high and may not be overcome even by high levels of innovation on the part of 
potential competitors. This is because of first mover advantages. Lock-ins are likely to occur 
because of positive feedback loops and network sizes that allow platforms to grow 
exponentially, motivating users to stay on the same platform. Finally, we saw how 
behavioural issues mean that switching costs are in fact high; consumers have a propensity to 
stick to what they are used to. We especially observed this in the use of search engines. None 
of these crucial aspects were taken into account by the EU Commission in the online 
technology cases. On the other hand, the truth is that network effects do not always lead to 
market dominance. Clear examples of this can be found in the area of attempted tipping. 
Google was unable to create a successful social network,238 Bing has very small market share 
despite being associated with Microsoft especially through its web browser Explorer239 and 
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Amazon is relatively much more successful in online retailing than Google shopping.240 But 
these examples cannot simply be used to dismiss the potential potency of network effects in 
terms of them providing significant competitive advantages to companies. For example, it 
may be the network effects benefitting Facebook that prevented Google’s social network 
from succeeding. The main point is that competition authorities must be made aware of these 
as well in order to get a full picture of the reality of competition in these particular markets.241  
 
 
However, the literature indicates that there is a tension between the argument that online 
entities gain success via network effects and the argument that they gain success due to 
innovation.242 In other words some literature argues that it is innovation and the higher 
quality of particular products that attract consumers, locks them in, prevents them from 
switching to other lower quality alternatives and therefore raises a higher entry barrier for 
competitors; technology platforms need to constantly attract attention from users, and in 
order to do so, must constantly innovate and improve product/service quality.243 For instance, 
Sidak and Bork have looked at the concept of manipulated search engine ranking as a form of 
innovation in favour of consumers, as opposed to a practice that a large search engine can get 
away with due to network effects. As we have seen though, network effects such as perceived 
high switching costs on the part of users and lock-in cause consumers to use the same free 
                                                          
240See how Amazon reigns supreme in the online retail sector; Fung Global Retail & Tech ‘Identifying E-
Commerce Winners: Our Ranking for Western Europe’ (Fung Global Retail & Tech 2015) 
<https://fungglobalretailtech.com/research/identifying-e-commerce-winners-the-fung-global-retail-technology-
internet-retailers-ranking-for-western-europe/>  accessed 19 June 2017 
241 See M Stucke & A Grunes ‘Big Data and Competition Policy’ (2016 Oxford University Press) 161 
242 RH Bork and JS Sidak ‘What does the Chicago School teach about internet search and the antitrust treatment 
of Google’ (2012) 8 (4) JCL & Econ 663 
243 See David S. Evans ‘Attention to Rivalry among Online Platforms and Its Implications for Antitrust 
Analysis’ (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 627, 2013) 17 available at 
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1067&context=law_and_economics accessed 
on 20th September 2017 
 
247 
 
high technology service; so opponents of Bork and Sidak would argue that due to these 
network effects, users tolerate the advertisements. They do not see them as an innovation; 
whereas Sidak and Bork try to argue that the sponsored links/advertisements is an innovation 
in itself that keeps consumers coming back to use the search engine.244 Sidak and Bork state 
that Google for example, despite the sheer size of its market power cannot afford to make 
compromises on search quality by manipulating search results in favour of advertisers who 
pay them huge sums of money as it would risk losing a lot of users.245  
 
Rather, it has been considered that ranking sponsored links on top or in a particular order 
enhances the welfare of search engine users especially where there are reserve (minimum) 
prices associated with higher ranks.246 When advertisers have to pay a minimum to be placed 
on higher ranks, there is greater chance that the advertisement will be of higher quality to a 
search engine user in terms of relevance.247   
 
Furthermore, according to Sidak and Bork, the fact that all search engines across the board 
use search ranking for advertising means that there is an actual demand on the part of users 
for advertisements and sponsored specialised search.248 In other words, punishing search 
engines for ranking according to paid advertisements leads to consumer welfare being 
adversely impacted and anti-competitive effects.249   
                                                          
244 Ibid 
245Ibid 
246 S Athey & G Ellison’Position auctions with consumer search’ (2011) 126 QJ Econ 1213 available at 
<http://economics.mit.edu/files/7560>  accessed on 20th September 2017  
247 Ibid 
248 Ibid 
249 Mark Patterson ‘Google and Search Engine Market Power’ [2013] Harv JL & Tech available at 
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/assets/misc/Patterson.pdf accessed on 16 September 2017 
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It has also been argued that any form of advertising technology that is more targeted is 
increasingly good for consumer welfare as it allows the delivery of relevant information 
about differentiated products that is actually required by the person who experiences the 
advertising; highly targeted advertising is more efficient and therefore reduces costs and can 
lead to lower prices.250 Therefore Sidak and Bork similarly consider displaying and 
prioritizing its specialized search results over other vertical search engines as a ‘product 
improvement’251 and indicate that it is pro-competitive.252 Forcing a search engine to stop its 
additional specialized search displays would be at the expense of search quality and would 
dissuade search engines from investing in innovation.253 Sidak and Bork argue that all other 
major search engines also display specialised search results on their pages in a similar 
fashion, which should mean that customers value this type of service; otherwise any search 
provider could simply remove its display of specialised search and increase the number of 
users.254 With online entities, lock-in and switching costs are irrelevant and the only reason 
consumers stick to a particular product/service is because the product is genuinely innovative 
and therefore beneficial; the argument is that there is a tenuous link between network effects 
and the growth of a user base.255  
                                                          
250 G Grossman & C Shapiro ‘Informative Advertising with Differentiated Products’ (1984) Rev Econ Stud 63, 
77-78 
251 RH Bork and JS Sidak ‘What does the Chicago School teach about internet search and the antitrust treatment 
of Google’ (2012) 8(4) JCL.& E 663 
252 Ibid 
253 Ibid 
254 RH Bork and JS Sidak ‘What does the Chicago School teach about internet search and the antitrust treatment 
of Google’ (2012) 8(4) JCL & E 663. Also see A Broder ‘A Taxonomy of Web Search’ (2002) 36(2) Special 
Interest Group on Information Retrieval (SIGIR) Forum 3, page 5- The purpose behind web search is either 
navigational (to find the URL of a particular website), informational (to acquire information that may be spread 
amongst several web pages) or transactional (finding pages where further information can be retrieved). There is 
no mention of viewing advertisements. See also B Jansen, D Booth & A Spink ‘Determining the Informational, 
Navigational and Transactional Intent of Web Queries’ (2008) 44 Info. Processing & Mgmt 1251- Over 80% of 
web queries are informational in nature.  
255 Stefan Stremersch ‘Indirect Network Effects in New Product Growth’ (2007) 71(3) J Marketing 52, 68 
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This argument can be questioned however. When describing advertisements as a burden, 
Randal Picker used the example of television channels stating that commercial breaks on a 
channel could not to be a good idea for the quality of service or a benefit to the viewers.256 He 
argues that interrupting a scheduled programme, indubitably, would not improve the quality 
of the programme and the viewer experience.257 A testament to this notion is the fact that ad 
avoidance technology is nowadays rife amongst internet users who want to avoid ads; for 
some consumers advertising clutter is the price of viewing/experiencing content.258 Just 
because all channels show advertisements does not mean that it is demanded by viewers. 
Similarly, just because all search engines allow advertisements does not mean that it is 
demanded by consumers.259 Hence, the ranking of sponsored links is not seen as an 
innovation by consumers but is rather an encumbrance. Looking at Sidak and Bork’s 
literature, one can conclude that it would still be inappropriate to rule out that many 
consumers stick to a particular technology due to network effects. When one considers 
consumer behaviour and perception (as we have done in the previous sections), the reality of 
the impact of network effects on preventing consumers from switching to alternatives is all 
the more likely, leading to a reduction of competition/competitors in the market.  
 
Stronger recognition of the effect of network effects in the context of mergers such as that of 
Google and Doubleclick has actually been given encouragement by a dissenting authority in 
                                                          
256 Discovery Channel Documentary on Google http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tooR9K4LUDg 
257 Ibid 
258 See S Anderson & J Gans ‘Platform Siphoning: Ad-Avoidance and Media Content’ (2011) 3 Am. Econ. J. 
Microeconomics 1 
259 See David S Evans ‘How catalysts ignite: the economics of platform-based start-ups’ in Annabelle Gawer 
(ed) Platforms, Markets and Innovation (Edward Elgar Publishing 2009) 105- Advertising can be considered a 
negative indirect effect which is a negative externality which is dealt with by providing good content. In other 
words the advertisements are made tolerable by the redeeming quality of the content the user experiences.  
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the United States. In general, the EU Commission’s analysis was limited to the relationship 
between Google as an advertisement platform and Doubleclick as an ad serving technology 
platform. Former FTC Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour disagreed with this sort of 
analysis.260 She was the one dissenting individual on the panel overlooking the 
Google/Doubleclick merger in the United States.261 She advocated a market for ‘data for 
behavioural advertising’262as a more appropriate market for investigations into large online 
companies263 By not doing so one would be ignoring all the other data collected by such far-
reaching companies from its other products and services and its then subsequent ability to 
combine data effectively to provide a more tailored/targeted service.264 The data for 
behavioural advertising so to speak is an important aspect of what allows the network effects 
to occur. For example, data from search engines can benefit the advertising side in the 
context of highly targeted advertising and it can make complementary products increasingly 
suited to customers’ desires.265 This could potentially lead to a lock-in effect, giving such 
companies the ability to abuse their market power. In such a market as described by former 
Commissioner Harbour, online entities with so many users would obviously have massive 
market share and would reflect the realities of how online data is used.  
 
                                                          
260 See P Harbour & T Isa Koslov ‘Section 2 in a Web 2.0 World : An expanded vision of relevant product 
markets’ [2010] 76 Antitrust LJ 769 and J Johnson ‘Targeted Advertising and Advertising Avoidance’ (2013) 
44 RAND J. Econ. 128 which explains annoying advertising on search engines as a cost that equals the benefit 
of using a search engine; so to speak, it is tolerated in the context of the gains made from using a search engine. 
261 Ibid 
262 Ibid 
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264 Ibid 
265 For instance, if a search engine also owns a video streaming site, it can pull out behavioural information from 
the search engine site on a user and put forward his/her preferences on the video streaming site, making it a 
much more useful service. The more people using the search engine, the more behavioural information the video 
streaming site can receive and readjust to make their video streaming site more relevant. This is clearly a 
network effect as the more people joining leads to more value for the video streaming site.  
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However, there is a danger also that this is a limited way of showing a company’s power. For 
instance, a blogging website would also have a massive amount of data, and in Commissioner 
Harbour’s market its data would also have to be included. But this would indicate that a 
blogging site presents a search engine with constraints in the market for, as a possible 
example, search. However, the reality is that a blogging site does not present such a threat. 
Both entities probably have the same amount of behavioural data on its vast users, but the 
two entities have become successful in using that data in different manners. So such an 
expansive view may have the same effect of making it incorrectly seem that a company such 
as Google has many more competitors then it really does. 
 
We conclude that the arguments surrounding network effects are inconsistent and limited. 
Network effects definitely showcase a strong presence in the free high technology industry 
and therefore have a real ability to cause foreclosure and affect competitors adversely. In 
scrutinizing the arguments surrounding network effects we also come back to the 
understanding that competition analysis in these cases very much relate to considering the 
level of competition in the market. 
 
Network effects are a part, amongst other parts, of the substantive analysis which falls under 
the ‘abuse of dominance’ test and ‘significant impediment to effective competition’ 
narratives. There are other arguments that are also considered in determining anti-competitive 
effects. We look at these other arguments in the next section. We next consider the market 
share argument.  
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4.3 The ‘Market Share’ argument 
 
As we saw in the previously, one of the main purposes of market definition is to enable the 
calculation of the market shares of a company within a relevant market. Hence, market share 
is also a very necessary step in determining whether or not a company is dominant. Market 
share is a common way to establish whether or not there is a dominant position in economics 
and is considered necessary in competition cases.266  Just like market definition however, it is 
a factor that focuses on competitive structure. A large market share is taken as an initial 
strong indication of dominance and any strengthening of it (in merger cases) or abuse of it (in 
Article 102 cases) is likely to mean foreclosure of competitors and harm to competition.267 As 
we have already seen in section 2.3, harm to competition is theorized to also mean harm to 
consumers.  
 
                                                          
266 See W Landes & R Posner ‘Market Power in Antitrust Cases’ [1981] 94(5) Harv. L. Rev 937, 938. Also see 
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foreclosure. Here we see that the proportion of customers, which can also be interpreted as a reference to market 
share, is an determinant; Also paragraph 37 states ‘Conditional rebates are not an uncommon practice. 
Undertakings may offer such rebates in order to attract more demand, and as such they may stimulate demand 
and benefit consumers. However, such rebates — when granted by a dominant undertaking — can also have 
actual or potential foreclosure effects similar to exclusive purchasing obligations.’ Here we see that it is the 
existence of dominance itself which is the main factor that turns the rebate into an abuse. Finally also see 
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products in the bundle. The greater the number of such products in the bundle, the stronger the likely anti-
competitive foreclosure.’ In other possible way of interpreting this is, where there is dominance over a bundle of 
products, the more likely the bundling would be considered an abuse.   
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According to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines,268 the combining market shares of merging 
companies are considered to be initially indicative of their competitive importance.269 In this 
section we observe that the importance of market shares varies between particular types of 
cases which have some facts unique to them. However, these differences in importance levels 
are not clearly explained and therefore, in general the EU Commission’s approach to market 
share is inconsistent. Before we start analysing the EU Commission investigations, it is 
important to look at the background legal framework with regards to market share.  
 
Although this thesis does not concern Article 101 TFEU, the influence of market share on 
general competition law and policy is demonstrated by a relevant guidance notice. The De 
Minimis Notice applicable to Article 101, for example, exempts agreements involving parties 
with an aggregate market share of 10% or below from scrutiny under Article 101(1) which, 
amongst other things, prohibits the restriction of competition.270 This is an increased 
percentage figure which was previously 5% and the EU Commission now appears quite 
confident that the 10% threshold is most appropriate.271 Furthermore, Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 states that vertical agreements (agreements between upstream 
and downstream entities) involving a combined market share of 30% and below will be 
presumed to have beneficial effects for consumers and the production process.272 However, it 
has been argued that the market share cannot provide a realistic view of the restraints a 
                                                          
268 Council Regulation (EC) of 5 February 2004 on Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under 
the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03 ) [2004] OJ C 31/5 
269 Ibid Section 14  
270Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under 
Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (de minimis) (2001/C 368/07) 
271 A Scordamaglia-Tousis ‘New de minimis communication: "de minimis" and "by object" restrictions of 
competition law’ (2014) JECL & Pract 5(10), 699 
272 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the 
Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices- Para 7 
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company can place on competition; for instance an entity could have a huge market share in 
its local relevant market but it may not be able to exert power on its supplier, to whom the 
company is a small client.273  In terms of mergers, a 50% combined market share and above 
is usually considered as evidence of a dominant position; however the market share needs to 
be looked at in conjunction with other factors and therefore cannot be the sole factor 
determining whether there is a dominant position.274 Therefore market share technically 
forms a part, among many parts, of the analysis. In some jurisdictions such as Japan, the role 
of market share has diminished even where merging parties possess very large combined 
market shares.275  
 
We therefore see that the legal framework consistently emphasizes market share as one of the 
preliminary factors to be considered and hence an analysis of the EU Commission’s approach 
to it in high technology markets is absolutely necessary. However, despite this, the high 
market shares in the investigations do not appear important to the EU Commission. This is 
not because the high market share on its own is innocuous, but because it is considered 
temporary. This section therefore analyses the market share argument in two parts. It first 
analyses the consistency and merits present in decisions where the EU Commission has 
subordinated market share; whereas in the second part they are analysed in cases where 
market share is considered important. This section concludes that high market share in this 
industry is in fact a really important factor in that it is a strong determinant of dominance and 
therefore the EU Commission’s analysis is limited. 
                                                          
273 Evelyne Friedel ‘Going Vertical’ (2010) European Lawyer 11 available at https://united-
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4.3.1 Commission Investigations that subordinate market share to other factors 
At present, the EU Commission appears to believe that the high market shares of companies 
is not considered a strong determinant of dominance.276 This is in contrast to what we have 
seen above according to official guidance and Commission notices277 i.e. high market shares 
are considered as a necessary consideration in competition cases and is important as other 
factors. Instead, the EU Commission in high technology cases considers that the nature of the 
industry is such that it negates the effect of any high market shares.278  
 
An important aspect of the nature of the industry the EU Commission considers is innovation. 
A high degree of innovation present in a market is considered a classic indicator that there is 
no monopolistic enterprise present in that market.279 In one of its latest relevant decisions, 
namely the Facebook/Whatsapp merger, the EU Commission acknowledged that there would 
likely be a high combined share between Facebook’s messenger application and Whatsapp’s 
communication application of 30-40%; however, because the consumer communications 
applications industry is innovative in the sense that it is fast-growing and characterized by 
high numbers of entry by other start-up entities the EU Commission considered that any 
                                                          
276 Facebook/Whatsapp (Case No COMP/M.7217) [2014] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf accessed 
on 23rd July 2017 
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calculated market shares would be fleeting.280 Therefore the market share in this type of 
industries does not indicate any potential serious damage to competition.281 Economics 
Professor Mika Kato describes such types of market share as involving transitory market 
power.282 She is a proponent of the notion that market share can be temporary depending on 
the circumstances of the industry and that industries involving higher levels of transitions 
should not be of concern to competition/anti-trust enforcement agencies.283 However, she 
states this without eliminating the importance of market share completely; market share 
should still play a role in the sense that industries with higher amounts of transitions should 
require a relatively more significant market share to warrant competition investigations.284 
Hence, it is still safe to assume that market share should have a significant role in high 
technology cases and therefore it needs to be approached both consistently and correctly 
especially given how high market shares can be in search and social networking.  
 
However, the EU Commission at times actually seems uncertain as to the role of market 
share. There appears to be some subtle inconsistencies in the EU Commission’s position 
towards market share within the same case. This is seen in its analysis of the concern that 
Facebook would gather data from Whatsapp users’ communications and gain a significant 
advantage in acquiring it for the purposes of advertising. 285 This concern was dispelled, 
however, because of the potency of the large market share of other entities.286 A change in 
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privacy policy would likely cause a large portion of Whatsapp’s clientele to switch away 
from the application.287  Should such a policy change occur, Facebook would still only have 
access to a small portion of available data for advertising compared to companies like search 
engines which are in possession of a much larger amount of data.288 The EU Commission 
appears to indicate here that it believes scale and market share are important matters in this 
particular industry; in other words had a dominant search engine been under investigation 
instead, there would be a much more dire concern about anti-competitive behaviour due to 
their larger control over data giving it a significant competitive advantage.289  
 
In fact, previously in 2008 even in the Microsoft and Yahoo! Search business merger 
decision, data appeared to be seen as a precious commodity by the EU Commission; it 
suggested that should the merger between the search businesses of the two parties cause 
prices for advertisers to go up, the effect of the price rise would be negated by higher 
returns.290 This would be enabled by the larger amount of data from the combined databases 
of the two parties (as we observed in the previous section on network effects, it can be argued 
that larger databases allow for better targeted advertising).291 In turn, being in possession of 
larger amounts of data would mean a larger market share.   This argument comes into direct 
conflict with the notion that this particular type of industry entails fleeting market shares. 
Under that narrative it should not matter that Google has a larger share in the data market as 
the nature of the industry (fast paced nature) renders that larger share temporary. 
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http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/M5727_20100218_20310_261202_EN.pdf accessed on 
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The aforementioned analysis demonstrates that although the EU Commission starts off with 
the narrative of market share being a weak determinant, it simultaneously hints at its 
importance; this is arguably an inconsistency in its approach which is not explained or 
justified.  
 
Despite the inconsistencies seen above, observing other cases, one can see how the narrative 
of fleeting market shares is still strongly subscribed to by the EU Commission. For example, 
in 2011 the Microsoft/Skype merger investigation the EU Commission was of the opinion that 
the communications applications market of Windows Live messenger and Skype was a fast-
changing sector and therefore market shares did not provide a direct indication of 
dominance.292 The EU Commission referred to the fact that the use of many of the 
communications applications had shifted away from PC to other platforms where there are 
other competitors and the making of voice calls are also increasing rapidly.293 For instance, 
Skype and Microsoft’s Windows Live Messenger may have a dominant position in a narrow 
market such as that specifically of communications applications on the personal computer, 
but because a lot of users are now using smartphones that are owned by other companies to 
communicate using the smartphone’s own applications (like Facetime for Apple IPhone), 
there is much more competitive pressure despite their dominance on the PC.294 Such a 
constantly changing environment makes it difficult to define the market which subsequently 
                                                          
292 Microsoft/ Skype (Case No COMP/M.6281) [2011] paragraph 78 at 
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makes it very hard to calculate market share in the first place; market share appears to 
therefore be unreliable according to the EU Commission.295  
 
Facebook/Whatsapp and Microsoft/Skype therefore demonstrate how large market shares do 
not matter as much according to the EU Commission. However, the EU Commission also 
considers the presence of low market shares in high technology companies not to be directly 
indicative of a lack of market power; hence, staying congruent with the narrative that 
generally market shares, high or low are not much of a great determinant. For example, going 
back to the Microsoft/Yahoo!Search Business merger investigation in 2010, the EU 
Commission was generally consistent with this attitude towards market share even where the 
merging companies’ combined market share was very low and was to a level which would 
not cause any concerns. The combined market share of Microsoft and Yahoo! in search was 
significantly low compared to that of Google; but the EU Commission went on to state that it 
was still necessary for them to carry out a full assessment of the merger in the context of 
competition because the companies in this sort of industry competed on innovation and 
quality and therefore indicated again that market share, regardless of being low or high, is not 
reflective of dominance.296 However, at the same time, the EU Commission did not dismiss 
the relevance of market share completely; some have interpreted the low market share to be a 
                                                          
295 See Morten Broberg ‘Improving the EU Merger Regulation's delimitation of jurisdiction: re-defining the 
notion of Union dimension’ (2014) 5(5) JECL & Pract 261, 266. 
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strong determinant of the final decision in the investigation.297 In fact it clearly stated that the 
low market share, specifically of Yahoo! was indicative of its low levels of innovation.298 
 
One of the reasons mentioned to justify allowing the merger to go ahead was the fact that 
Yahoo! as a search engine was experiencing receding market share meaning that they were 
becoming a weaker competitor.299 This was despite the fact that before this statement the EU 
Commission also stated that Yahoo! was likely to be innovative as they had regular increases 
in revenues.300 The EU Commission having considered the evidence before them from their 
market investigation concluded that the reason why both Microsoft and Yahoo! were unable 
to compete with Google was because of their lack of scale.301 In other words, Google had a 
significantly larger amount of consumers and therefore had more feedback to loop into their 
search engine to offer a better quality service. In particular, the EU Commission considered 
the fact that the traffic received by the merging parties was considerably lower than that of 
Google and this was something that a low market share reflected.302  
 
Hence, whilst still maintaining that market share is not important in such industries, the EU 
Commission contradicts itself in this matter. Given the nature of the justifications that the EU 
Commission made, it appears that the merger would have been repudiated had the market 
shares of the merging parties been significantly larger. Larger shares would mean both 
companies together would have larger scale and would be effective competitors against a 
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much larger search engine without the merger. But in this case the merger was allowed to 
take place so that the new entity could in fact increase their market share so that there can be 
more effective competition in the market.  
 
As far back as the 1980s, John Temple Lang pointed out that the EU Commission is willing 
to accept joint ventures where they bring a strong ‘counter-weight’ against a current 
dominant player.303 Hence, it appears that the EU Commission did view that market share is a 
strong indicator of power. In addition, many concerned entities who took part in its 
investigations welcomed a merger between Microsoft and Yahoo!’s search business as it 
would create competition against Google, allowing advertisers a better bargaining position in 
general.304  
 
Despite the importance of scale and hence market share indicated above by the EU 
Commission in Microsoft/Yahoo!, prominent academics such as Geoffrey Manne have argued 
that success from innovation in the digital world is said to be highly dependent on the 
individual company’s ability to make better use of the information that is available to it; the 
actual amount of information or in other words scale involved is irrelevant. 305 A lot of online 
entities such as Twitter and Pinterest also started off with no scale whatsoever to finally gain 
a large user base. 306   Hence, we also see that there is academic literature that also supports 
                                                          
303 John Temple Lang European Community Antitrust Law and Joint Ventures Involving Transfer of Technology 
in 1982 FORDHAM CoRP. L. INST. 203 (Barry Hawk ed., 1983) 244- 252 
304Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business (Case No COMP/M.5727) [2010] paragraphs 235 and 237 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/M5727_20100218_20310_261202_EN.pdf accessed on 
4th February 2015 
305 G. Manne & B. Sperry ‘Debunking the Myth of a data barrier to entry for online services’(Truth on the 
Market, 26th March 2015) available at  http://truthonthemarket.com/2015/03/26/debunking-the-myth-of-a-data-
barrier-to-entry-for-online-services/ accessed on 23rd September 2017 
306 Ibid  
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the notion that market share (indicating the size of a company’s clientele) is not a key 
determinant as it is always under pressure from other innovative competitors. However, it 
cannot be denied that large scale has some contribution towards being able to provide a better 
quality service; for example, the more data available, the more algorithms have to work with 
in order to improve themselves.307 
 
The notion that market share does not play an important role was perpetuated in a later case 
as well. For example in the Microsoft/Skype merger investigation the EU Commission 
repeated and emphasized the theme of market share providing a limited account in this 
particular industry.308 Both Skype and Microsoft would have a post-merger combined market 
share of around 90% in the market for video calls.309 However, the EU Commission did not 
view this as a menace to competition for various reasons, some particular ones which should 
be explored.310 The EU Commission cited that other companies such as Facebook and Google 
were entering this particular market and that they would potentially be effective competitors 
despite their low market shares. This is because these two companies specifically have huge 
networks and a strong brand and reputation.311  
 
                                                          
307 See Maurice Stucke & A Grunes Big Data and Competition Policy (OUP Oxford 2016) 45- the authors refer 
to Lukas Biewald, co-founder and CEO of CrowdFlower who commented that a lot of large tech players reveal 
a lot of their algorithms without worrying about giving away secrets. This is because it is the large amounts of 
data that enable effective targeting and not the algorithm itself. Also see Ariel Ezrachi & M Stucke Virtual 
Competition- The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy (Harvard University Press 2016) 16 
308 Microsoft/ Skype (Case No COMP/M.6281) [2011] paragraph 78 at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6281_924_2.pdf accessed on 5th February 2015 
309 Ibid- para 101 
310 Ibid 
311 Ibid- para 125 
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Economists Timothy Tardiff and Dennis Weisman in fact argue that modern high technology 
companies, despite having large market shares, do not possess much market power because 
they are restrained by the fact that most of their competitors are engaged in multiple markets, 
some in which they may be dominant; competitors in such markets always have the potential 
to leverage their market power in other areas to prevent any abuse by the concerned 
monopoly312 and potentially cause foreclosures amongst competitors.313  This economic view 
of tipping power into other markets is seen in some of the statements by the EU Commission; 
the EU Commission appears to be of the opinion, in this particular investigation, that 
Facebook and Google have the ability to tip their current customers into any market (such as 
that of video calls) and be effective competitors due to their large networks and strong brand 
recognition.  Ironically, as seen in the discussion regarding the Facebook/Whatsapp merger, 
such arguments do not hold the same degree of importance when these companies are the 
ones being investigated. Facebook/Whatsapp, as seen, indubitably possess large networks 
and brand recognition which could potentially lead to foreclosure of competitors post-merger 
through, for example, making Whatsapp tip it’s consumers into Facebook and vice versa;314 
but these did not prevent the EU Commission from allowing the merger or imposing 
                                                          
312 T Tardiff & D Weisman ‘The Dominant Firm Re-visited’ (2009) JCL & E 5(3) 517,519 
313 See Michael Whinston ‘Tying, foreclosure and exclusion’ (1990) 80 Am Econ Rev 837-859- Bundling may 
allow a monopolist to extend power in to a complement market. See also D Carlton & M Waldman ‘The 
strategic use of tying to preserve and create market power in evolving industries’ (2002) 33(2) Rand J Econ 194-
220 
314 Although, a couple of years after the Facebook/Whatsapp decision, the EU Commission fined Facebook for 
misleading the EU Commission by saying that they did not have the technical capability to match Facebook and 
Whatsapp accounts. It was found that in fact they did. This seems to reflect a clear ability to bundle services, 
making either Whatsapp or Facebook more attractive as they can easily be linked to each other, making 
information flows between the two applications easier (lets say for example, a new user could find it much 
easier to open a Whatsapp account by simply importing information from facebook, including profile pictures 
on to the new Whatsapp account).  This would clearly allow the companies to extend market power into 
complement markets. However, whilst the EU Commission did fine Facebook, they clearly stated that the their 
decision on the Facebook/Whatsapp merger would not change regardless of the fact that they now know 
Facebook in fact had the ability to extend market power. This goes to show that the EU Commission still 
appears to turn a blind eye to real potential increases in market power and therefore continues to remain 
inconsistent. See European Commission ‘The European Commission has fined Facebook €110 million for 
providing incorrect or misleading information during the EU Commission's 2014 investigation under the EU 
Merger Regulation of Facebook's acquisition of WhatsApp’ (European Commission- Press Release, 18 May 
2017) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1369_en.htm > accessed 18th May 2017 
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commitments on the merging parties. This could be seen as an instance where the approach 
adopted by the EU Commission departs from its standard position according to which high 
market shares are less likely to indicate market power in the free high technology industry 
operating online. This may be interpreted as an inconsistency that creates legal uncertainty. 
 
Overall, whilst it appears that the EU Commission provides an explanation for its stated 
conclusion that market share is not a strong indicator of market power, its indication that it is 
in Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business can make one question whether this stated conclusion is 
a fully genuine opinion of the EU Commission. This sense of inconsistency becomes 
magnified in the next section where we discuss situations where the EU Commission 
embraces market share as a strong indicator of market power.  
 
4.3.2 Commission Investigations embracing market share as a significant factor 
Some high technology market cases definitively reflect the view that market share can be a 
strong determinant of a case and is seen as a threat to competition. In the investigation of the 
merger between Boeing and C-Map, from a horizontal point of view, the combined market 
share of both companies put together was too small to cause concern.315  The EU 
Commission’s decision in this case was short as there was no need for any extensive 
investigations given the very low level of market shares. In this investigation there was no 
mention of innovation and quality as being the main drivers of competition as opposed to 
market share. After all, one of the main products of concern was software, which by its very 
                                                          
315 Boeing/C-Map (Case No COMP/M.4395) [2007] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4395_20070116_20310_en.pdf accessed on 23 
September 2017 
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nature allows computer engineers to make huge leaps forward just as those involved in apps 
such as Facebook and Whatsapp might.  
 
Hence the Boeing/C-Map case is an example of where a very low market share immediately 
leads to the conclusion on the part of the EU Commission that there are no competition 
concerns. Also as previously seen in the merger investigation of Symantec and Veritas, the 
fact that a very small market share (less than 10%) would be added to that of Veritas to their 
combining share in the overlapping market of storage software did not worry the EU 
Commission.316 This was also against the back drop of there being other competitors in the 
market who were also established.317 However, again there was no discussion of the 
innovation and quality levels of the different competitors as discussed in some of the other 
cases.318 Amongst the different reasons that the merger was allowed to take place, one of the 
main ones was that the small size of the additional market share was unlikely to affect 
competition in any significant way.319 Of course there may be one fundamental difference 
from the previous cases considered. Perhaps the reason that innovation was not mentioned in 
Symantec/Veritas and Boeing/C-Map was because it is not characterized by fast paced 
innovation as cases such as Facebook/Whatsapp are. In that case, due to the possible 
difference in facts, there is no inconsistency in the approach of the EU Commission. Where 
there is less innovation, market share plays a more significant role than when an industry 
involves more innovation.  However, in the next paragraph we will ironically see another 
                                                          
316Symantec / Veritas (Case No COMP/M.3697)[2005] paragraphs 22-24 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m3697_20050315_20310_en.pdf accessed on 24th July 
2017  
317 Ibid 
318 Ibid 
319 Ibid 
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case where market shares did play a much more significant role where innovation was of a 
high level.      
 
In the 2004 Commission investigation into the joint venture between ARM, Giesecke & 
Devrient and Gemalto high market shares led to major concerns.320  This case involved a high 
technology market which shares similar characteristics with digital companies such as 
massive network effects and fast growth in terms of innovation. ARM had a market share of 
between 90% and 100% in the relevant market of licensing intellectual property rights over 
their semi-conductor designs.321 Giesecke & Devrient (G&D) and Gemalto are companies 
involved in the software stage and can produce specific type of security software that is well-
suited to ARM’s semiconductor designs.322 It was found that ARM’s superior market share 
would enable it to favour G&D and Gemalto; ARM, as a result would likely intend to license 
an inferior version of specifications to the competitors of G&D and Gemalto, allowing them 
to produce a much more effective product.323 As a result of this the parties of the joint venture 
had to officially commit to keep an open platform so that the parties’ competitors would have 
access to equal information allowing a level playing field.324 We therefore see a case where 
innovation and growth were major characteristics; but these characteristics were not 
considered impactful enough to reduce the role of a large market share in the assessment of 
competition concerns. The approach the EU Commission takes here may be said to have 
departed from their previous one.  In the next paragraph we consider another case where the 
                                                          
320 ARM/ Giesecke & Devrient/ Gemalto (Case No COMP/M.6564) [2012] paragraph 145 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6564_20121106_20212_2779342_EN.pdf accessed 
on 23rd September 2017 
321 Ibid paragraph 161 
322 Ibid  
323 Ibid 
324 Ibid para 191 
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EU Commission adopts this approach of allocating more importance to market share despite 
the presence of innovation in the relevant market.   
 
The more recent merger investigation into and decision with regards to Intel and McAfee is a 
case that also exhibits high technology characteristics such as powerful network effects. Intel 
possessed a noticeably large market share in the x86 Central Processing Unit (a type of 
processing unit widely used in personal computers, laptops, tablets and smart phones) market 
in the eighty to ninety percentage figure range.325 The EU Commission acknowledged clearly 
that this level of market share reflected immense seller power on the part of Intel and that 
Intel is a must have component. This allows them to have the ability and intention to bundle 
their processing units with McAfee’s security software, which is only second to Symantec in 
terms of market share in the market for security software. The EU Commission viewed this as 
a threat to competition and demanded certain commitments on which the merger would be 
authorized; for example Intel had to commit to releasing full interoperability information to 
McAfee’s competitors downstream. It appears as though market share is a very important 
factor and has not been subordinated to arguments regarding innovation and quality. This is 
surprising given that these companies producing hardware also invest significantly in 
research and development just like the digital companies do.326 Hence, the markets that 
concern companies like Intel and McAfee are also potentially characterized by innovation 
that is possibly fast-paced. But unlike Facebook/Whatsapp, market share is still considered a 
very powerful indicator of dominance.327  
                                                          
325 Intel/McAfee (Case No COMP/M.5984) [2011] at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5984_1922_2.pdf accessed on 10th March 2015  
326Ibid 
327It is important to note however, that there have been other types of technology cases where there was very 
high market share, but that was not the main reason behind the merger being required to be conditional. In some 
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We therefore observe that there are cases concerning companies showing similar 
characteristics to that of free high technology markets; but high market shares are considered 
a major concern and determinant of the outcome in other technology cases but not in free 
high technology ones. For example, if ARM and Intel were said to have been intending to 
reduce compatibility with other platforms post-merger, by that logic Microsoft could have 
intended to do the same with competitors of Skype. We of course saw that the EU 
Commission explained that Microsoft would not do this because it needed Skype to have a 
great deal of value by being compatible on several other platforms. But this could be said the 
same for Intel for example. The more platforms compatible with McAfee, the more value for 
McAfee which in turn would mean more value for  Intel. However, this argument was not 
seen in Intel/McAfee.328 In the absence of a clear explanation on the part of the EU 
Commission distinguishing free high technology cases, the EU Commission’s approach 
appears inconsistent. 
 
                                                          
cases it is merely coincidental that high market shares and serious concerns with regards to the concerned 
merger are simultaneously present. For example, in 2013, the EU Commission dealt with a technology case that 
entailed similarly high market shares. In its decision with regards to Syniverse and MACH the EU Commission 
allowed the merger; however, only on condition of a divestment (COMP/M.6690—Syniverse/MACH, 
Commission decision of 29 May 2013. Summary decision at: OJ C 60, 1.3.2014, pp 7–16). Collectively, in the 
market for data clearing services, the two parties possessed a market share high enough to the extent that it 
would create a virtual monopoly. Economists, however, have pointed out that this case in fact reflects the 
diminishing role of market shares and the increasing importance of simply having contestability in the market 
(G Goeteyn, P Smith & S Ashall ‘Away from market shares? The increasing importance of contestability in the 
EU Competition Law Cases’ (2015) J.E.C.L. & Pract. 6(3), 197-199). They point out that the EU Commission 
was more concerned that the remaining smaller competitors were not a credible alternative for the merging 
parties’ larger customers, not because of their smaller shares in the market, but because they did not provide the 
same specifications required by those larger customers. Hence, there may not always be a causal link between 
high market shares and the EU Commission’s desire to prevent a merger; in such cases it appears the presence 
of high market share only plays a nominal role amongst the many roles of other factors.  
 
328 Intel/McAfee (Case No COMP/M.5984) [2011] at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5984_1922_2.pdf accessed on 10th March 2015 
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4.3.3 Conclusion- The EU Commission’s inconsistent approach and the recognition that 
market share does adversely affect competition 
 
When it comes to free high technology cases the EU Commission maintains the narrative of 
fleeting market shares. However, it does not appear that the EU Commission is very certain 
in this concept itself. This is reflected by the inconsistencies in arguments that we observed 
especially in Facebook/Whatsapp329 and Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business.330 In 
Facebook/Whatsapp case some of Whatsapp’s competitors had very high market shares that 
presented competitive pressure on Whatsapp. However, the high market shares of Whatsapp 
and Facebook were considered as fleeting and not a cause for concern. In Microsoft/Yahoo! 
Search Business Google’s high market share was considered a potent threat to competition to 
the point where the joint venture between the two parties’ was encouraged to produce a force 
against the search engine. This high market share argument certainly did not stop the 
Google/Doubleclick331 merger or require stricter commitments from Google in terms of the 
investigations into its ranking practices. The EU Commission’s approach, one could 
reasonably say is quite inconsistent with its opinions on high market share. If market share 
really is fleeting in these types of industry, then the market power and threat from Yahoo!’s 
and Whatsapp’s competitors should have been disregarded by that logic.    
 
                                                          
329 Facebook/Whatsapp (Case No COMP/M.7217) [2014] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf accessed 
on 23rd July 2017 
330 Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business (Case No COMP/M.5727) [2010] at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/M5727_20100218_20310_261202_EN.pdf accessed on 
4th February 2015 
331 Google/Doubleclick (Case No COMP/M.4731) [2008] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4731_20080311_20682_en.pdf accessed on 24th July 
2017 
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By contrast, in the Intel332 and ARM333 cases, the EU Commission is much clearer in its 
stance on market share. A high market share was seen as a strong indicator of market power. 
The EU Commission does not offer any reasonable explanation to distinguish the way it 
treats market power in free high technology cases and these platform cases. The only hint of 
an explanation comes from the idea that market share in free high technology cases are 
fleeting. However, it is questionable whether this is a reasonable statement. After all, some of 
the free high technology sector parties have in fact had a majority market share over a very 
significant period of time.334  Again, these inconsistencies are a reminder of legal uncertainty 
which could leave individuals in the industry unsure as to the legitimacy of their actions.  
 
4.4 Hypothesis; the obscured reason behind inconsistency and lack of merit in the substantive 
arguments  
This is the point where we formulate and justify the thesis’ hypothesis. In Chapter 2 we 
considered the theory behind free high technology and how consumer welfare can be 
inversely related to competition. We also importantly established that consumer welfare is the 
main objective that is pursued in competition law. Then, in section 3.2 we looked at how 
competition analysis is based on the idea of ensuring an appropriate level of competition in 
                                                          
332 Intel/McAfee (Case No COMP/M.5984) [2011] at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m5984_1922_2.pdf accessed on 10th March 2015 
333 ARM/ Giesecke & Devrient / GEMALTO/ JV (Case No COMP/M.6564) [2012] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6564_20121106_20212_2779342_EN.pdf accessed 9 
December 2017 
334 See for example Jason Matthews, ‘What are Google’s Competitive advantages?’ (Turbofuture, 29 April 
2016) available at <https://turbofuture.com/internet/What-are-Googles-Competative-Advantages> accessed 29 
August 2016 Also see Pete Kallas, ‘Top 15 Most Popular Social Networking Sites and Apps [June 2017]’ (Dreamgrow May 
20 2017) available at  <https://www.dreamgrow.com/top-15-most-popular-social-networking-sites/ > accessed 
19 June 2017  If one looks at the top sites, they are names that have been present for significant periods of times 
(over a decade), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ‘The Digital Economy’ 
(DAF/COMP(2012)22, 7 February 2013) 7- if a company remains unchallenged for five years, it is likely to be 
dominant.   
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the market. Given our knowledge from Chapter 2, this would not have the appropriate 
outcome for free high technology cases in terms of consumer welfare. However, what we find 
is that the EU Commission has been allowing free high technology companies to potentially 
increase their market power; but in doing so, it is using inconsistent and limited rationale. We 
now look at the findings in Chapter 2 and those in Chapter 3 in conjunction to formulate our 
hypothesis.  
 
In the previous sections of this chapter a few things have been established; 
a) The protection of competition is the fundamental framework that is used in free 
high technology investigations. All factors i.e. network effects, market share, 
innovation etc. are all analysed within the context of their effect on competition. 
 
b) The EU Commission expresses inconsistent views on the effect of network effects 
and market share on competition within the same free high technology cases 
 
 
c) The literature and the inconsistency in the EU Commission’s views show that the 
EU Commission’s main narrative that network effects and market share have very 
little effect on competition in the free high technology sector is based on a limited 
view. 
 
d) The EU Commission clearly treats factors such as network effects, innovation and 
market share differently in free high technology cases than in those concerning other 
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types of high technology. In other technology cases, 335 they are seen to have a 
significant impact on competition. 
 
This concluding section hypothesises that the EU Commission treats the two categories of 
cases differently because of the fact that the free high technology sector provides highly 
technical and innovative services that are free to consumers and has a major positive effect on 
consumer welfare.336 In other words, regardless of the competition structure in the sector, 
consumers receive a free service that is innovative. Hence, consumer welfare is inherently 
high. Therefore, the EU Commission’s finding that there is no abuse of a dominant position 
or that there is a lack of significant impediment to effective competition in free high 
technology companies appears accurate from a consumer welfare point of view.  
 
However, the EU Commission’s reasoning is limited and confusing. This is because it 
attempts to justify this finding from a competition perspective as opposed to a consumer 
welfare perspective. Under the ‘protection of competition’ framework, in order to justify its 
finding it therefore cannot straight away assess the direct impact on consumers. Instead, it 
must show that there is no adverse effect on competition, which in turn would indicate that 
                                                          
335 Note that software such as media players are not actually free, hence they are not free high technologies. See 
Case T-201/04  Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3619 paragraph 968- Windows media player is not 
necessarily free of charge. Price of media player is included in the total price of windows operating system (see 
if u can also find any theories in behavioural economics where when u pay a price for something it makes you 
want to use it)… also explain that although switching cost is definitely high in complimentary high tech, 
switching cost is even higher in Microsoft WMP case. See also John Temple Lang ‘Comparing Microsoft and 
Google: The concept of exclusionary abuse’ (2016) 39(1) World Compet 5, 7-8- the author notes that one of the 
main differences between Google and Microsoft is the fact that Google is a free platform whilst Microsoft’s 
Window’s operating system is not. The cost of an operating system is high and users only upgrade them every 
few years.   
336 Although the EU Commission has never directly stated that such dominance is good for consumers, it is 
reflected in, for example, the FTC’s statement in its investigations into Google. See Federal Trade Commission 
‘Statement of the Federal Trade Commission’ (FTC file no.111-0163, 3rd January 2013) available at 
<https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/295971/130103googlesearchstmtofcomm.pdf>  
access on 23rd September 2017- Google’s conduct may harm competitiors, but not competition and consumers 
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there is no adverse effect on consumers. Although, in the context of free high technology 
services, the relationship between competition and consumer welfare is not necessarily, so to 
speak, directly proportional to each other; they may in fact even be inversely proportional. 
This is what we saw in Chapter 2 overall.   
 
Hence, the EU Commission appears to be applying an ‘ends justifies the means’ approach. It 
believes that the free high technology company’s actions are good for consumers or are at the 
least not harmful to consumers even where the free high technology company has a dominant 
position; but because of the ‘protection of competition’ framework the only way it can justify 
this is to present a narrative that somehow there is no dominant position (hence the argument 
that network effects and high market share are weak). This has become especially clear where 
in the other high technology investigations the EU Commission does believe there is a strong 
dominant position and therefore there is a finding of abuse or impediment to effective 
competition. However, in these other cases the technology does not come for free for 
consumers. There is an issue of prices. In the investigations into telephone networks for 
example, there is a real possibility that prices may rise after a concentration. In the 
investigations into Microsoft as a platform, the consumer invests a great amount of money in 
purchasing the hardware and operating system. The platform has complete control over what 
can and cannot be allowed on the platform. Switching to a different operating system would 
be expensive.  
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4.4.1 Two test cases that prove hypothesis; Microsoft/LinkedIn and the record fine on 
Google’s practices in comparison shopping service 
 
Up till now we have developed a hypothesis based on previous cases, the latest being in 2014 
(Facebook/Whatsapp). However in late 2016 and the middle of 2017 there were the 
Microsoft/LinkedIn337 merger and the Google fine.338 These cases provide us with a chance to 
test the thesis’ hypothesis. What we will see is that they both confirm it.   
 
Looking at the Microsoft cases side by side provides a convincing inference that supports the 
hypothesis. We have the interoperability case, the media player case, the browser case, the 
merger with Skype and finally the most recent merger with Linkedin.339 We already know 
that in the first three situations, the EU Commission found Microsoft to be abusing its 
dominant position. As mentioned before, none of these relevant services are free and are 
included in the price of the Windows operating system platform. A more interesting 
comparison can be drawn between the merger cases however. Both involve a merger with an 
independent application that was/is dominant in its own relevant markets at the relevant time. 
We know that the Skype merger was allowed with no conditional commitments. However, 
with the Linkedin merger, it was authorized on the basis that Microsoft pledged to never pre-
install Linkedin and integrate it into its Office suite and allow hardware assemblers to have 
the option not to pre-install the application on to the operating system.340 Why is it that the 
                                                          
337Microsoft/LinkedIn(CaseNo.M.8124)[2016]available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m8124_1349_5.pdf accessed on 28 August 2017 
338European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission fines Google €2.42 billion for abusing dominance as search 
engine by giving illegal advantage to own comparison shopping service’(European Commission Press Release 
Database 27th June 2017)< http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1784_en.htm >  accessed 28th June 2017 
339Microsoft/LinkedIn(CaseNo.M.8124)[2016]available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m8124_1349_5.pdf accessed on 28 August 2017  
340 Ibid paragraphs 403 to 407 
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possibility of the pre-installation of Skype on the Windows operating system was not a 
concern for the EU Commission like it was for the pre-installation/integration of Linkedin? 
The Microsoft/Skype decision justified a lack of concern for pre-installation by stating that 
there were other platforms such as smart phones where operating systems such as Android 
and Apple(IOS) pre-installed their own applications for video communications. But it cannot 
be ignored that in the market for PCs and laptops where the windows operating system is 
dominant,341 there would be significantly less competition and therefore pre-installation 
should by that logic be a legitimate concern. The difference in treatment of Linkedin and 
Skype may, again, be explained by the fact that Skype is a free product and Linkedin is a 
service that is not.342 Hence, that is the reason the Skype merger was treated differently from 
the rest.  
 
Furthermore, whilst on the topic of an operating system like Microsoft’s Windows, a few 
words must be mentioned on the recent initiation of investigations into Google’s Android 
mobile operating system platform.343 There are no decisions on the investigation at the 
moment, but it appears from the EU Commission’s press release that there is a clear 
allegation that Google is forcing manufacturers to tie its own applications such as Google 
search to Android.344 Given what we know about the Microsoft tying cases, it is likely that 
the EU Commission will eventually outlaw such tying on the part of Google. If this were to 
                                                          
341 Microsoft/ Skype (Case No COMP/M.6281) [2011] paragraph 148 at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6281_924_2.pdf accessed on 5th February 2015 
342 It is acknowledged that opening an account on Linkedin and viewing professional profiles of others is free. 
But now, the ability to send emails and communicate with others is limited. Details on profile views from others 
and profile visibility are also limited. Users are required to subscribe to a premium service. After all, the main 
purpose of a professional social network is to be able to make impact on careers through communication. 
However, with Skype, all communications which are the purpose of the application are all free.   
343 European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Google on Android 
operating system and applications – Factsheet’  (European Commission Press Release Database 20th April 
2016) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1484_en.htm accessed 5 June 2017 
344 Ibid 
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actually happen, it may initially be argued that our hypothesis is incorrect. This is because 
Android is a free operating system for all, whilst Windows is not. However, such a 
conclusion would only be based on a cursory glance at the issues surrounding Android. The 
products/services in question in this case are the applications that are installed on the Android 
device. 345 In order to install these products/services, manufacturers must enter an agreement 
with Google and pay a license fee.346 These fees can eventually trickle down to the consumer. 
Hence, the products/services are not free. Another way to look at it is that consumers 
purchase a handset and pays the price for a device that has a pre-installed operating system 
with pre-installed applications. The price includes all these features.  
 
The recent fine on Google for its comparison shopping service is an even starker example 
supporting the hypothesis.347 Google was imposed with a record fine of over 2 billion Euros 
for giving its own comparison shopping service priority in user search results.348 The EU 
Commission appears to have accepted in this situation that Google’s dominance in general 
search could be and is being tipped into its comparison shopping service and consumer 
behaviour dictates that they will simply use results that are ranked highly and will therefore 
be locked-in.349 As seen throughout this chapter, these are the type of arguments we saw 
missing in the other free high technology cases. Why has the EU Commission suddenly 
accepted the potency of network effects in search to lead to an abuse of dominance?  
                                                          
345 Ibid 
346 See Charles Arthur & Samuel Gibbs ‘The hidden costs of building an Android device’ (The Guardian 23 
January 2014)< https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jan/23/how-google-controls-androids-open-
source> accessed on 5 July 2017 
347European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission fines Google €2.42 billion for abusing dominance as search 
engine by giving illegal advantage to own comparison shopping service’(European Commission Press Release 
Database 27th June 2017)< http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1784_en.htm >  accessed 28th June 2017 
348Ibid 
349Ibid 
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A more than reasonable conclusion again is the fact that price comparison services are not 
free high350 technologies and therefore price is a concern for consumer welfare.351 Users of 
these services ultimately want to find a product to purchase at a price from the service. With 
regards to the previous Google investigation and commitments, the concern was not only 
with price comparison services, but more generally with Google’s practice of highly ranking 
its own results for vertical search services that included, for example, reviews of hotels and 
restaurants.352 Looking at reviews is a free service. In that case the EU Commission was 
satisfied with Google prioritizing its own vertical search as long as it clearly showed that they 
were sponsored.353 But this time, the EU Commission has refused to accept this with the 
specific category of price comparison shopping service.  In other words, we see again, a 
priced high technology service company being subjected to the argument that they are 
dominant and the insinuated argument that competition is limited in these markets. Free high 
technology services on the other hand are not subjected to such a narrative.  
                                                          
350 See Google ‘Google Shopping Campaigns’ <https://www.google.co.uk/intl/en/retail/shopping-
campaigns/how-it-works/> accessed on 5 July 2017- ‘Shopping campaigns put your product images, price and 
business name right in front of people searching on Google, no matter what device they’re using. You only pay 
when people click through to visit your website or view your local inventory.’ 
351 David Ronayne, ‘Price Comparison Websites’ (2017) Warwick Economics Research Papers 1056 
https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2015/twerp_1056b_ronayne.pdf 
accessed on 28th June 2017- the concentration of power within the hands of one price comparison website is 
likely to increase prices for consumers. Sellers have to pay price comparison websites for the sales they make 
through the website and these are passed on to final consumers. With less competition amongst price 
comparison websites, dominant ones will be able to raise the prices they charge to sellers which will ultimately 
raise prices for consumers across all competing products on the one price comparison site.  
352See European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission probes allegations of antitrust violations by 
Google’(European Commission Press Release Database 30th November 2010)< http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-10-1624_en.htm?locale=en >  accessed 28th June 2017  
353 See European Commission, ‘Statement on the Google Investigation’(European Commission Press Release 
Database 5th February 2014< http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-93_en.htm> accessed 28th June 
2017 and Google Inc ‘Commitments in Case COMP/C-3/39.740- Foundem &Others’ 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_8608_5.pdf accessed 16th February 
2014- For example, note towards the end of the commitments document Google proposes changes to the way it 
ranks its own summary of the news (Google News) from its own specialised vertical search engine, summary of 
places (Google Places) and display of a summary of a search term (in this document the search term is ‘Frog’ 
and culminates in Google displaying information it has copied from Wikipedia as a result of crawling 
prominently on the right top side of the page). These are all information that the customer seeks and does not 
expect to pay for.  
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4.4.2  Possible Limitations; Google/Doubleclick and the nature of search 
A limitation to this hypothesis is the Google/Doubleclick case. Whilst Facebook/Whatsapp, 
Microsoft/Skype, Google Investigations and Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business all involve 
products/services that are free, the Google/Doubleclick merger concerned a service for which 
advertisers as customers had to pay. Hence, it may be argued that it does not fit into the 
hypothesis that the EU Commission gives cases special treatment by misinterpreting the 
market when the service is monetarily free and therefore it disproves it.  
 
Even though this might be the case, nonetheless Google/Doubleclick contributes consistently 
to the current narrative of the EU Commission that competition on the internet is generally 
high despite network effects. In terms of the fact that the merger concerned a priced service, 
it could be counter-argued that Doubleclick’s ad serving costs were such a small proportion 
of the total cost of advertising, 354 any price rises would have been an insignificant burden on 
advertisers.   
 
Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that Google/Doubleclick does present itself as an anomaly in 
these line of free high technology cases. 
 
                                                          
354 Google/Doubleclick (Case No COMP/M.4731) [2008] paragraph 195 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4731_20080311_20682_en.pdf accessed on 16 
September 2017 
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Finally, the nature of search ranking itself may be a reason behind the results of the EU 
Commission’s Google investigations. In an article, John Temple Lang discusses how when 
compared to Microsoft, in the Google investigation there was no actual plausible remedy for 
the search rank problem.355 The whole purpose of a search engine is to be able to sort out the 
most relevant websites for users and to rank them on top; there cannot be an obligation to 
help competitors reach a higher rank and receive more exposure.356 However, it is 
questionable whether complainants in the Google case were even suggesting such a solution 
in the first place. The main complaint behind the Google investigation did not indicate that 
the desired result was for Google’s competitors to be featured in equal rank or to gain 
exposure in top ranks.357 The simple desire was for Google to get rid of sponsored links that 
had been prioritized without the use of its more organic ranking system, the organic ranking 
reflecting more directly what users considered as most relevant.358 Getting rid of sponsored 
ranking is not in itself impossible. 
 
4.4.3 Possible alternative hidden reasons for the EU Commission’s approach 
 
It is acknowledged of course that the EU Commission can potentially have alternative hidden 
explanations behind its limited and inconsistent reasoning. In this section we look at literature 
that attempts to explain the more obscured reasons it approached cases in particular ways. 
                                                          
355 John Temple Lang ‘Comparing Microsoft and Google: The concept of exclusionary abuse’ (2016) 39(1) 
World Compet 5, 17 
356 Ibid 
357 European Commission ‘Antitrust: Commission probes allegations of antitrust violations by Google’ 30th 
November 2010 Press Release <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-10-1624_en.htm?locale=en> accessed 
11th February 2014. 
358 Ibid 
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However, what we do see is that a lot of the literature does not help explain the EU 
Commission’s lax approach towards free high technology cases.   
 
For example, it has been put forward that European competition authorities are protectionist 
and therefore very strict towards mergers involving American firms.359 The authorities have 
an agenda that involves thwarting the growth of foreign firms so that local firms are able to 
gain a better footing.360 In this thesis however, we see the complete opposite problem. We see 
the European Competition Commission approach some of the highest valued American firms 
in the world with a lot of leniency in the sense that unconditional mergers have been allowed.  
 
Another point of view is very different. Whilst it may be true that American business 
communities have been highly critical of the EU’s decision to challenge mergers that the 
American authorities would not, the EU Commission has been lenient towards merger 
decisions in general.361 Furthermore, this can also be compounded by an opposing political 
notion; that is that foreign political pressure can have a considerable influence on the EU 
Commission’s decisions.362 For example, a large country like the United States could 
politically pressure European Competition authorities to be lenient towards American 
companies.363  
                                                          
359 See for example N Aktas, E de Bodt & R Roll ‘Is European M&A Regulation Protectionist?’ (2007) 
117(522) Econ. J. 1096 
360 Ibid 
361 Thomas E Kauper ‘Merger Control in the United States and the European Union: Some Observations’ (2012) 
74(2) SJLR 305. Furthermore, see J Grant & D Neven ‘The attempted merger between General Electric and 
Honeywell: A case study of transatlantic conflict’ (2005) 1(3) JECL & Pract 595- The General Elctric and 
Honeywell merger is an example of where the European authorities refused to allow the merger but the 
Americans did. However, it is a rare example.  
362 T Duso, L Roller & D Neven ‘The Political Economy of European Merger Control: Evidence using Stock 
Market Data’ (Forthcoming in the Journal of Law and Economics 2007) available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/stockmarket.pdf accessed on 29 August 2017 
363 Ibid 
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This cannot be the most convincing explanation behind the EU Commission’s approach. 
Firstly, there are very recent examples where the European Competition Commission has 
shown that it will not succumb to political pressure and be influenced by its counter-parts 
across the pond. For example, whilst the US competition authorities quickly cleared the 
Microsoft/Linkedin merger, the EU probed it and made it conditional on a number of 
commitments.364 Furthermore, the EU’s record fine of Google aroused accusations of a trade 
war with the United States.365 
 
Secondly, even if the political issue does have an influence, it does not explain why the EU 
Commission is lenient towards some American companies and are stricter with others. Our 
hypothesis fundamentally infers an explanation from the difference in treatment of two 
categories of cases. It is true that all mergers discussed in this thesis were allowed by the EU 
Commission. However, some were conditional upon commitments whilst others were not. So 
the EU Commission has overall been lenient in all cases. However, amongst those cases some 
have been treated with an additional degree of leniency by making the merger between two 
very large entities unconditional.  
 
In conclusion the literature on the general approach of the EU Commission and the obscured 
political reasons behind it does not provide an alternative explanation as to why the EU 
                                                          
364 Joon Ian Wang ‘The EU’s top antitrust cop proved Marc Benioff wrong about Microsoft and Linkedin’ 
(Quartz, 6th December 2017) available at https://qz.com/854609/the-microsoft-msft-and-linkedin-lnkd-merger-
is-cleared-by-eus-antitrust-regulator/ accessed on 29 August 2017  
365 Nils Pratley ‘Google fine: EU is not waging underhand trade war against US Tech firms’ (The Guardian 27th 
June 2017) available at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/nils-pratley-on-finance/2017/jun/27/eu-
google-fine-us-european-commission accessed on 29 August 2017 
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Commission treats free high technologies leniently. Again, it is true that there has been a 
general drop in competition enforcement in mergers and acquisitions366 and therefore it can 
be argued that leniency on the part of the EU Commission is a general problem and not 
limited to free high technologies. However, our hypothesis is not formulated simply on the 
basis of the EU Commission’s general leniency. It is formulated against the background of 
comparative leniency where the EU Commission has been tougher on others than some 
whilst overall allowing mergers and certain unilateral actions to continue. The EU 
Commission treats two categories of cases differently with a lack of convincing justification. 
That must say something about the difference in intentions between those two categories.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
RH Bork and JS Sidak, two prominent competition law specialists in the US, were 
commissioned by Google to research the complaints regarding anti-competitive conduct.367 
They both express Google’s practices as being pro-competitive and legal.368 One of the first 
points that is made in their research paper is the fact that search is a completely free service 
and that users can simply switch to a different search engine ,369 given that they have not had 
to invest money into the incumbent search engine in the first place. This is pro-competitive as 
there is provision of a free high quality service and any form of authoritative intervention in 
their practices could stifle innovation and efficiency.370Their opinion sums up perfectly the 
reason why a dominant company in the free high technology market has a positive impact on 
                                                          
366 F Maier-Rigaud & K Parplies ‘EU Merger Control Five Years After The Introduction Of The SIEC Test: 
What Explains the Drop in Enforcement Activity?’ (2009) ECLR 565 
367 RH Bork and JS Sidak ‘What does the Chicago School teach about internet search and the antitrust treatment 
of Google’ (2012) 8(4) J.C.L.& E. 663 
368 Ibid 
369 Ibid 
370 Geoffery A. Manne ‘The Problem of Search Engines as Essential Facilities: An Economic & Legal 
Assessment’ International Center for Law & Economics (January 17 2011) ICLE p434 
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consumer welfare. Not only do they provide a free service, but a highly innovative and 
beneficial one as well. When economists speak of welfare and they consider the user side of 
the market, consumer welfare is always considered as user benefit minus price; in other 
words the price that a user has to pay reduces the benefit to that and hence consumer 
welfare.371 There is no monetary price to pay in free high technology markets and hence the 
consumer is able to enjoy the full benefit of the service; naturally consumer welfare is much 
higher in such an industry than in others.  
 
We have hypothesized that the EU Commission is also of this belief and is therefore forced to 
justify mergers and unilateral actions inconsistently and in a limited manner. It has to paint 
the picture of a highly competitive market. We saw in section 2.2.6 that this is unlikely to be 
true of free high technology markets in the sense that the competitive pressure does not 
usually come from competitors within the same relevant market but from a possibly uncertain 
future disruptive product/service that would create a new market of its own and replace the 
current market; this is not the same as competition within the same relevant market.372 We 
now need to find a way for the EU Commission to justify these mergers and unilateral actions 
in a more convincing way and in a way that is suited to free high technologies. 
 
                                                          
371 See M Armstrong ‘Competition in Two-Sided Markets’ (2006) 37(3) RJE 668,669 
372 Even if there is competition in the market it does not preclude the finding of a dominant position. See Case 
85-76 Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission [1979] ECR 461 paragraph 70; ‘The Court has already held inter 
alia in its judgment of 14 February 1978 in Case 27/76, United Brands Company v. E.C. Commission, 30 that 
even the existence of lively competition on a particular market does not rule out the possibility that there is a 
dominant position on this market since the predominant feature of such a position is the ability of the 
undertaking concerned to act without having to take account of this competition in its market strategy and 
without for that reason suffering any detrimental effects from such behaviour.’ 
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It has been argued however, that competition law already possesses flexible tools to assess 
market power and dominance of companies involved in the new digital economy.373 The 
recent Commission fine in the Google Shopping case has been cited as an example of a 
Commission decision where, despite lively competition in the market, the authority was able 
to clearly detect market power and an abuse.374 It was seen that Google’s high market share 
had been established for a long period of time, and therefore it could not be concluded that its 
market power was short-lived.375 It is therefore without question that competition law tools 
are flexible enough to capture the unique attributes of the digital economy. However, this 
could be a reflection of excessive flexibility to the point of legal uncertainty. For example, 
there is no clear reason put forward by the EU Commission, as we have seen in Chapter 3, as 
to why this argument of long-sustained market power does not apply to cases such as 
Facebook/Whatsapp and Microsoft/Skype.376 As we will see in Chapter 4, the problem 
therefore is not a lack of tools, but perhaps the lack of an appropriate selection of available 
tools to be applied to a particular category of cases involved in the digital economy. Hence, 
for the sake of legal certainty we require more than an overall flexibility available in 
competition law. We need a test that aligns with and clarifies the EU Commission’s belief 
that free high technologies are good for consumer welfare. 
 
                                                          
373 Hedvig Schmidt ‘Taming the Shrew: There’s no need for a new Market Power Definition for the Digital 
Economy’ (Stockholm Faculty of Law Research Paper Series no 17, presented in June 2017) 17 available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3048266 accessed on 30 December 2017 
374 Ibid 
375 Ibid 26 
376 Ibid 8- the author does state that there are problems with current merger regulations and appears to therefore 
mainly focus on Article 102 cases as specifically having the correct available tools. However, this thesis, as 
explained earlier in sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4, does not make a distinction between merger cases and Article 102 
type cases as both still require the same determination of questions/arguments regarding market power. Hence, 
the same tools/methods of rationalising pertinent arguments as to market power should also be available in a 
merger context.  
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We now know from section 2.4 that consumer welfare is arguably the most important 
objective in competition law. Hence, one can argue that when it comes to any tension 
between consumer welfare and the protection of competition objectives (as we have seen in 
the free high technology market), consumer welfare should take precedence. In this chapter 
we have established that this tension between the two objectives has caused confusion and 
incoherence in the reasoning of Commission decisions. Hence, in the next chapter, we 
propose specifically for investigations into the free high technology market, the use of a 
different test that fundamentally shifts the focus away from the idea of protecting 
competition, and hopefully shifts the focus on consumer welfare.  
 
The necessity for the search for a clearer test for, for instance, consumer harm is something 
that is emphasized in some of the literature.377 Pinar Akman, for example, points out that 
despite the EU Commission’s rhetoric that consumer welfare is the main objective of 
competition policy in the EU, it is very unclear whether it is in fact the case in decisional 
practice.378 The majority of investigations and EU cases do not have a clear test for consumer 
harm.379 Furthermore, a lot of them, just like we have seen in the EU Commission’s 
investigations into free high technology services, appear to emphasize the protection of the 
competitive structure in its reasoning.380 This chapter has detected a similar problem, albeit in 
a more specific and crucial context of free high technologies where there is a more unique 
and clearer danger of equating the protection of the competitive structure to the protection of 
consumers. The aim in the next chapter is to figure out an appropriate test. As we will see, 
although the hope was to find a test that analyses consumer benefit directly, it would be more 
                                                          
377 Refer to Pinar Akman ‘“Consumer Welfare” and Article 82EC: Practice and Rhetoric’ (2009) 32(1) W. 
Comp. 71 
378 Ibid 
379 Ibid 
380 Ibid 
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appropriate to formulate one that still focuses on competition in the market; albeit in a 
fashion which avoids all the limitations and inconsistencies seen here in Chapter 3.  
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CHAPTER 5- FORMULATING AN APPROPRIATE TEST FOR FREE HIGH 
TECHNOLOGY INVESTIGATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
We have concluded from the previous Chapter 4 that, for free high technology 
cases/investigations we require a test that is not based on the assumption that competition is 
good for consumer welfare. This is because we concluded that in the free high technology 
industry there is a very good chance that consumer welfare can be improved without the need 
for competition; a dominant company is capable and likely to be able to contribute to 
consumer welfare positively. We therefore require a test that recognizes this theory whilst 
also making room for false positives.1 In finding such a test the EU Commission would be 
able to avoid having to provide statements based on limited rationale about the market power 
that many free-high technology companies hold in reality. Ideally the types of questions we 
want answered in the test are as follows: 
 
a) Does the merger/unilateral action improve/reduce the likelihood of innovation in the 
industry? 
b) Does the merger/unilateral action improve/reduce the likelihood of innovation in the 
industry on the part of the dominant company? 
c) Does the merger/unilateral action improve/reduce the likelihood of innovation in the 
industry on the part of competitors? 
 
                                                          
1 See A Devlin & B Jacobs ‘Antitrust error’ (2010) 52(1) Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 75. False positives in 
competition law occur when all conditions for a test to determine whether a unilateral action or merger is 
anticompetitive are met; but the test does not appropriately take into account pro-competitive effects that impact 
consumer welfare positively. For example, under Article 102(c) a dominant company may be found guilty of (c) 
‘applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a 
competitive disadvantage’ by giving certain trading parties discounts and not to other; however, this conduct 
may also overall seem as a positive as it means cheaper products for more consumers. The test, by punishing a 
dominant company, has prevented lower prices. Hence the phrase false positive.    
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These questions in essence try to find out whether any increase in market power of a 
dominant company will allow it to maintain, improve or reduce consumer welfare. However, 
they solely focus on the innovation aspect of consumer welfare. This is because prices for 
consumers are irrelevant as the product/service is free; the only aspect that can affect 
consumers is an increase or decrease in innovation/quality as we saw in section 2.2.6.2 We 
have therefore seen that innovation should be a major aspect of analysis for the free high 
technology sector; any competition law test should fundamentally therefore revolve around 
the analysis of innovation.3 
 
We observed that consumer welfare is the main objective of competition policy and the EU 
Commission has stated on various occasions, through its guidance papers and statements,4 
that this is so. Yet, we also observed in section 2.3, that despite this, the structure of analysis 
in competition cases of free high technology services is still based on the assumption that 
competition is good for consumers. The analysis fundamentally focuses on the competitive 
structure of the market i.e. for example, the number or strength of competitors in the market 
capable of restraining the dominant player.  
 
Given the free and innovative nature of free high technology, one can already guess that what 
we are looking for is an analysis/test that directly assesses the consumer harm or welfare 
likely to be occasioned to the benefit of consumers following a merger or unilateral action by 
                                                          
2 We also of course recall seeing that choice is stated as an aspect as well, but it is not a standalone standard by 
which consumer welfare is determined. We also discussed how the issue of choice is more closely related to the 
protection of competition objective, and if it were strictly integrated into the meaning of consumer welfare, there 
would be an inbuilt presumption that increased competition is always good for consumers.  
3 Rupprecht Podszun ‘The More Technological Approach: Competition Law in the Digital Economy’ in G 
Surblyte (ed) Competition on the Internet (Springer Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015) 108 
4 See Commission, ‘Communication from the EU Commission — Guidance on the EU Commission's 
enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant 
undertakings’ (2009/C 45/02) paragraph 6, Commission, ‘XXIInd Report on Competition Policy’ (2002) page 
20, Commission ‘Report on Competition Policy 2015’ COM(2016) 393 final page 5 
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a dominant player. We do not desire a test that makes assumptions on the effect on 
consumers based on the competitive structure. Although it has been said that there is space in 
current analysis for the EU Commission and courts to take into consideration the quality of 
products5 (which has a direct effect on consumer welfare), it is also admitted that decision 
makers put significantly more weight on the possibility of foreclosure6 or reduction in 
competitors as decision-making factors.  
 
However, calls for a more direct assessment of consumer7 harm have been prevalent in the 
literature for a while now.8 The evidence available in literature does not provide a definitive 
conclusion as to what market structures will encourage innovation.9 What this could mean is 
that the majority of the competition law tests used, which operate on the presumption that 
only a competitive market structure leads to innovation, may be committing mistakes and 
making incorrect conclusions. The most difficult question to answer appears to be how to 
determine whether conduct of firms harm consumers.10   A direct consideration and analysis 
                                                          
5 See Hedvig Schmidt ‘Article 82: is technological integration checkmated?’(2009) 4 JBL 354, 375- the author 
appears to suggest that had Microsoft focused on showing ‘superior technical product performance’ of an 
operating system with a tied media player in the CFI Microsoft v Commission case, the courts could have 
possibly allowed the tying. 
6 Ibid 374 
7 We have defined consumer welfare and consumer benefit as the positive benefits that consumers experience 
from a product/service and/or from purchasing that product/service which can be affected by the levels of 
competition in relevant markets. Consumer harm is therefore any negative aspects that consumers suffer from as 
a result of changed levels of competition in the market. Standard examples are lower quality and higher prices. 
8 See for example, Adrian Majumder ‘The Role of a consumer harm test in competition policy’ (2008) 20(2) 
Loy Consumer L Rev 144, P Marsden & S Bishop ‘Editorial Article 82 Review: “What is your theory of 
harm?”’ (2006) ECJ 257, 262, P Rey & J Venit ‘An Effects-Based approach to Article 102: A response to 
Wouter Wils’ (2015) 38(1) W. Comp. 3, Report by the Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy 
(EAGCP), An Economic Approach to Article 82 (July 2005) page 3 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf  accessed on 8 February 2017- The 
economists in this report stated that it was important to understand the effect on consumers of conduct. The only 
way to do this is to analyse on a case by case basis also taking into consideration the empirical evidence; 
positive effect on consumers on can be taken as a sign that competition is working regardless of whether there is 
an increase in market power.  
9 Marcus Glader Innovation Markets and Competition Analysis (Edward Elgar 2006) 17 
10 P Marsden & S Bishop ‘Editorial Article 82 Review: “What is your theory of harm?”’ (2006) ECJ 257 
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of innovation may be quite difficult.11 The quality of technological progress is hard to assess 
and  also there is no price that consumers pay for it12 to indicate to what extent it is demanded 
by them.13 
 
The most obvious and ideal solution to the problem of legal uncertainty we have detected 
thus far would be to propose a test that directly assesses the effects on consumers as a result 
of an increase in market power of a firm. In that way the analysis could reveal how a larger 
company with a larger market could bring about all the benefits to consumers we discussed in 
section 2.2. However, as we saw in Chapter 3 (especially section 3.2), virtually all tests 
currently in competition law analysis fundamentally focus on market structure. If the market 
structure changes so as to reduce the number of competitors in the market, negative effects on 
consumers are inferred. Negative effects on consumers are barely assessed directly; for 
example we saw in Chapter 3 that the motives to innovate to the benefit of consumers are 
dependent on how much competition there is in the market. There must be a reduction in 
competition in order for the authorities to feel justified in taking any remedial action. For 
example, we will see this when we discuss arguably the only clearly structured and most 
direct consumer harm test in the MaGill14 case. The test assesses the newness of a product 
and if there would be a demand for such a product; the demand indicates consumers could 
benefit and therefore it should not be prevented from entering the market. The consumer 
benefit element seems to take priority here. But even then there is the caveat that competition 
                                                          
11 Pablo Colomo ‘Restrictions on Innovation in EU Competition Law’ (2016) 41(2) E.L.Rev 201, 219; it is 
difficult to see how an authority or claimant for that matter could provide strong reliable evidence to determine 
the likely effects on innovation will be due to particular conduct.  
12 Research and development is carried out by companies on their own accord and not by consumers. 
Consumers only pay for the product that stems from research that leads to innovation. Hence, whether or not the 
research is demanded in the first place is unknown. 
13 Robert Bork The Antitrust Paradox- A Policy at War with itself (1978/1993 The Free Press New York) 132- 
the author in addition states that due to such difficulties with assessing innovation, it should be taken out of 
competition law/antitrust analysis. 
14 Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television 
Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission of the European Communities [1995] ECR  I-00743 
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is reduced in the market. Direct assessment of the benefits or disadvantages to consumers is 
difficult to carry out;   
 
‘…quality is a subjective concept and therefore much harder to define and measure 
than prices. In addition, microeconomic theory offers little help in predicting how 
changes in the level of competition in a market will affect quality and it is usually up 
to empirical analysis to determine how quality will change in response to varying 
degrees of competition in the context of particular markets.’ 15 
 
5.1.1 Current suggestions in the literature 
 
The proposal to take into deeper consideration quality and innovation factors has been 
prominent in the literature. However, the method of analysis is still based very much on the 
idea of competition being good for consumers. For example, Keith Waehrer has suggested 
using something similar to an upward pricing pressure16 model in predicting the effects on 
quality.17 However, this is a model which appears to be on the basis of the idea that a merger 
can afford to lower quality (motivated by saving the higher costs arising from providing 
better quality services) because it can recapture some of the arising lost customers between 
                                                          
15 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD), ‘The Role and Measurement of Quality 
in Competition Analysis’ (DAF/COMP(2013)17, Oct. 28, 2013) 44, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/Quality-in-competition-analysis-2013.pdf accessed on 23 September 2017 
16 Upward Pricing Pressure model predicts the change in price post-merger depending on how close the parties 
are as competitors prior to the merger. If they are close competitors (their products are substitutable with each 
other) after the merger there is more incentive for the price to be put up significantly. This is because some of 
the lost consumers due to the price will be recaptured by the other merging party; since both are under common 
ownership, both are able to earn increased profits. (For more explanation you may refer to L. Wiethause & R 
Nitsche ‘Upward Pricing Pressure Analysis: Critical Issues in Recent Applications’ (2015) 6(1) JECL & Pract 
48)  
17 See K Waehrer ‘Online Services and the Analysis of Competitive Merger effects in Privacy Protections and 
Other Quality Dimensions’ Draft, 12 January 2016 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.726.2142&rep=rep1&type=pdf accessed on 27 March 
2017; the authors main focus is actually on the assessment of how privacy will be affected post-merger but 
clearly states that the same suggested method of assessment can be applied to other quality dimensions.   
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each other as a result. 18 Such a theory again suggests that quality will be lowered due to a 
lack of pressure from a higher number of competitors in the market.19 Hence if we were to 
use such a model in free high technology cases, where such services are good for consumer 
welfare, we would have to be working on the assumption that a reduction in the number of 
competitors as a result of a merger in the market would lead to a subsequent reduction of 
quality for consumers. 20 
 
In the specific context of mergers, it has been indicated that a focus on efficiencies can 
clearly illuminate the cost savings passed on to consumers and put mergers in a positive light 
in terms of them directly and positively affecting consumer welfare. However, the success 
rate of efficiencies arguments appears very bleak in merger cases. 21 The Microsoft/Yahoo! 
Search Business22 decision appears to be cited as a case which shows that the argument of 
efficiencies in terms of their benefits to consumers can be a major factor in the EU 
Commission’s decisions;23 we can recall that the merger would allow access to a wider pool 
of data from which better search algorithms can be formulated to produce improved search 
results for users. However, it is no mere coincidence that both Microsoft and Yahoo! had and 
still have small market shares in the search market. We can also recall that the merger was 
partially encouraged by the idea of having a stronger competitive force against the dominance 
                                                          
18 Ibid 
19 Ibid 
20 Ibid 
21 See for example M Kocmut ‘The Role of Efficiency considerations under the EU Merger Control’ Working 
Paper (L) 09/05 < https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/cclp_l_09-05.pdf> accessed on 5th May 2017 
22 Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business (Case No COMP/M.5727) [Commission Decision of 18/02/2010] 
23 See M. Stucke & A Grunes Big Data and Competition Policy (2016 Oxford University Press) 312- The 
authors suggest that as long as customers in support of the merger (with specific reference to Microsoft/Yahoo!) 
state that the increase in data will lead to better results as a result of efficiencies, the EU Commission will more 
likely pay heed to the efficiencies.  
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of Google.24 It is therefore still doubtful that efficiencies can protect a merger between parties 
where at least one of the parties has a very large market share. 
 
5.1.2 Considering a wider product market? 
From our analyses so far, a very obvious solution may have started to emerge that we cannot 
ignore and should address. It is quite clear at this point that free high technology companies 
are capable of entering each other’s markets with ease; whether or not they do it successfully 
is another matter. It can be argued that there are definitely multiple large powerful high 
technology corporations presenting potential competitive constraints on each other. And one 
of the reasons behind this is because competitors in the free high technology market desire 
establishing a platform; it does not matter what that platform’s main service is, but as long as 
it has a huge user base it can introduce other services and attempt to tip their users into those 
services.  
 
If different platforms can compete regardless of whether they are fundamentally known for a 
particular service, why not put these platforms in the same market? This scenario would 
therefore entail, for example, a search engine, online social network, email service, news 
website and a shopping website all in the same product market. Technically any website that 
experiences traffic can become a competing platform as long as it has the potential to add 
more services. 
 
The idea does sound extreme and difficult to make sense of on a visceral level. The truth is 
that most of the time, seeing how the industry is, there are several giant technology 
                                                          
24 Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business (Case No COMP/M.5727) [2010] paragraph 145 at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/M5727_20100218_20310_261202_EN.pdf accessed on 
4th February 2015 
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companies that are extremely dominant; but they are each dominant in a different field. 
Occasionally, they may introduce a service that fundamentally another company is known for 
and it will take away considerable market share from its competitor. A lot of the time 
however, the technology giants cannot steal each other’s customers in the context of their 
competitor’s core service, but simply remain highly dominant in their own core service. 
Therefore, unless the industry regularly observed massive shifts in clientele for different 
online services, it would be hard to justify having all the technology giants operating online 
in the same product market.     
 
5.1.3 What we are left with 
As mentioned, the current case law and even literature are far from ditching traditional 
competition analysis in favour of direct analysis of consumer harm.25 To suggest a test that 
takes the latter form would appear to be radical and would only be appropriate in a thesis that 
solely researches the viability of formulating a test that directly assesses consumer harm.  
 
Instead, it would be more acceptable to have a test that conforms to some extent to current 
norms, or at least to tests that have already been used in the case law, but have been 
somewhat controversial. Two forms of analysis seen in competition law appear to be able to 
potentially help us formulate an appropriate test for free high technology companies without 
                                                          
25 For example see Pinar Akman ‘”Consumer Welfare” and Article 82EC: Practice and Rhetoric’ (2009) 32(1) 
World Compet. 71, 88- ‘However, it must be remembered that Article 82EC is … a provision of competition 
law. As also held by the EC Courts, although Article 82EC contains no reference to the anticompetitive object 
or anticompetitive effect of the practice referred to, in the light of the context of Article 82EC, conduct will be 
regarded as abusive only if it restricts competition. Thus, mere consumer harm should not be sufficient for 
conduct to be abusive if it is not tied to some effect on competition or due to some conduct affecting 
competition. Hence, just like mere harm to the structure of competition not being enough for conduct to be 
abusive, mere consumer harm should not be enough on its own either: if the standard is ‘consumer welfare’, 
then harm to consumers resulting from a restriction of competition should be the test for finding conduct abusive 
under Article 82EC.’ In section 2.4.3 we also saw the Intel rebates judgements refusing to relinquish a form 
based test in favour of a more direct consideration of consumer harm.  
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suggesting any radical departures. The first is the consideration of innovation markets and the 
second is the Magill26 test.   
 
Innovation markets allow us to consider the competition for innovation in a particular 
market.27 We have discussed how a lot of dominant free high technology companies are well-
suited (due to their size and concomitant ability to innovate better than smaller competitors) 
to maximizing benefits to consumers themselves in section 2.2. Also as we saw in section 
2.2.6 with disruptive innovation, one of the few likely ways that benefits to consumers can 
increase at that point is when either the dominant company itself or one of its competitors 
comes up with a completely revolutionizing product/service (or a product that is just 
substantially good enough to the point where it can no longer be interchangeable with the 
current product) that completely replaces the current product. In that sense, current dominant 
free high technology companies are under competitive pressure from potentially displacing 
products/services but not necessarily from those within the current product market.  
 
We will see that the innovation market allows for the analysis of this unique type of 
competitive pressure that free high technology companies feel. More importantly however, in 
relation to our quest for a more appropriate test, the innovation market is convincingly more 
competitive than a current product market ever would be. We will observe that in the 
innovation market we need only detect the number of alternative competing research and 
development projects to conclude competitiveness in the market. In free high technology 
markets this sort of competition is definitely omnipresent. In current product market analysis 
(as we have seen in Chapter 3 throughout), in order to show competitiveness questions on 
                                                          
26 Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television 
Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission of the European Communities [1995] ECR  I-00743 
27 R Gilbert & S Sunshine ‘The Use of Innovation Markets: A Reply to Hay, Rapp and Hoerner’ (1995) 64 
Antitrust L.J 75 
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market share, market power and network effects are much more important. Given a dominant 
free-high technology company’s display of all these three aspects at a very high level, we 
argued in Chapter 3 that the authorities have found it difficult to convincingly explain that 
such companies’ unilateral actions and mergers are not a threat to competition. However, as 
we will conclude through analysis, the use of an innovation market would convincingly show 
that the market is competitive in free high technology markets. 
  
So the innovation market analysis is a viable solution.28  There is just one gaping problem. 
Generally, in competition law, one cannot simply discard current product market analysis. 
Hence, any analysis of the innovation market will have to run parallel to a current 
product/service market analysis. As long as there is a market where the authorities conclude 
that there is a chance of significant reduction in competition, there is always the risk that the 
authorities will have to block the companies from continuing their unilateral acts and 
mergers.  
 
So the next question is, is there any way to have a competition analysis that solely looks at 
the innovation market? The Magill case, in conjunction with other cases such as Microsoft, 29 
IMS30 and Bronner,31 on refusal to supply appears to provide a test that could allow us to 
                                                          
28 See European Commission ‘EU competition law in innovation and digital markets: fairness and the consumer 
welfare perspective’ (Brussels 10 October 2017) available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2017_15_en.pdf accessed on 22 August 2018- the EU 
Commission places emphasis on how the analysis of digital markets requires a shift of focus on innovation in 
general. Also, see the recent case of Dow/Dupont (Case M.7932) [2017] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7932_13668_3.pdf accessed on 22 August 2018- a 
significant concern was concentration in the innovation market where there were only five players to begin with. 
The merger was allowed on certain conditions, on of them being the divesture of Dupont’s R&D organisation to 
maintain competition in the relevant innovation market.  
29 Case T–201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3619 
30 Case C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG [2004] ECR I-05039 
31 Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. 
KG [1998] E.C.R. I-7791 
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specifically look at the innovation market without doing a conventional analysis of the 
current product market. We will see that the test mainly revolves around the question of 
whether the unilateral action of refusing prevents the emergence of a new product for which 
there is no market currently. If it does, the refusal is found to be anti-competitive. Of course, 
there are other elements of the test that involve some form of competition analysis, but as we 
will discover, they are not the fundamental parts of the test and the analysis itself is not the 
most conventional.32  
 
Our evaluation of the Magill cases along with other refusal to supply cases will show that the 
‘new product’ requirement does not have to be interpreted strictly in the sense that there is no 
need to show that a specific product with certain features is looking to be created. It is enough 
to show that the unilateral action prevents incentives to attempt to innovate in the market 
(which in turn increases the chance of new products and improvements in the market). Hence, 
we combine some of the innovation analysis with the Magill test and adapt it to free high 
technology markets. 
 
5.2 Current analysis of innovation in competition law 
 
Analysis of innovation markets may be an answer to our quest to finding an alternative legal 
test that fits well with the unique nature of free high technology. As already stated, product 
markets such as search and social networking involve companies with very potent market 
power. Competitive pressure mainly comes from outside the relevant market and through any 
significantly superior or revolutionizing products/services produced by other companies. 
                                                          
32 Conventional analysis aims to find out whether there is or there is a high chance of a significant reduction in 
competition. In Magill the question is whether competition in a secondary market is completely eliminated. 
Hence, there appears to be a higher standard to reach to prove anti- competitiveness. It must be much more than 
a significant reduction to satisfy this test.     
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Hence, by looking at the innovation market, which would for example, include all competing 
research and development we can avoid the analysis of the current product market which 
forces the EU Commission to show that there is low market power, the EU Commission can 
avoid having to use a limited approach.   
 
Furthermore, such analysis makes sense. As discussed previously in section 2.2.6, whilst 
competition in the free high technology sector can involve innovation efforts in the relevant 
product market, a lot of competitive pressure emanates from innovation from completely new 
technologies that may also be revolutionary to the point that they replace the current 
technology available. This then leads to a whole market being virtually replaced. Given this 
nature of the technology market, research and development and innovation in completely new 
or significantly improved products should be taken into consideration when it comes to 
competition analysis; it would give a better picture of the actual competitive pressure the 
concerned company would experience and of where that pressure comes from.33 Ignoring this 
form of analysis could lead to the wrong conclusion about innovation being low in a market 
due to increase in market share. Companies may hold market power in the current product 
market but unlike more traditional scenarios, they fear the replacement of the entire market as 
a whole as opposed to being replaced within the same market. That fear is one of the factors 
that drives companies with high market power to push innovation forwards. 
 
                                                          
33 Marcus Glader Innovation Markets and Competition Analysis (Edward Elgar 2006) 195. The author makes a 
distinction between analysis for innovation in current markets and that of potential future markets. In current 
markets a structured analysis of competition in research and development needs to be considered. When it 
comes to analysing new products that are possibly going to replace the current product, the analysis cannot 
really directly involve research and development of current products as there is quite a lot of uncertainty 
associated with the future success of the potential product. Instead, the focus should be on whether or not the 
actions of the dominant firm have a negative effect on incentives of competitors to continue pushing in research 
and development.    
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We will begin by understanding the more conventional analysis of innovation that is applied 
to most competition cases (including those involving free high technology) in general. We 
will see that those are very much based on the presumption that competition is good for 
consumer welfare and does not involve any direct assessment of what the current state of 
innovation in that particular market or closely related market is like. We will then consider 
the direct consideration of innovation in the form of pipeline products and research and 
development projects. We will observe how this is different and involves a more direct 
consideration of actual ongoing innovation in the industry without using any presumptions as 
a basis for analysis. 
 
5.2.1 Analysis of innovation in general 
 
Thus far, we have mentioned that the introduction of innovation markets in free high 
technology analysis will contribute towards an appropriate test. However, this is not to say 
that innovation does not already currently play a role in competition analysis in all cases 
including free high technology ones. It does play a role, but is embedded, as we will see, in 
the analytical framework that assumes competition is good for consumers. We therefore need 
to look at how innovation is analysed and therefore understand how it may be inadequate. We 
will ultimately see that the analysis we look at here is very different from the innovation 
market concept and that is why current analysis of innovation in general is not appropriate.  
  
The case of Crown Cork & Seal/CarnaudMetalbox34 concerned a merger between two large 
manufacturers who were present in the packaging industry.35 Both were present in the 
                                                          
34 Crown Cork & Seal/CarnaudMetalbox (Case No IV/M.603) [2014] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7104_1396_2.pdf accessed on 23rd September 2017 
35 Ibid para 1- 5 
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specific market of tinplate aerosol cans in the EU.36 The product had its own market as 
tinplate aerosol cans had technical advantages that other forms of packaging did not; hence 
substitutability with other forms was difficult.37 But more importantly, the case stated that 
these were the only two companies together who were capable of pushing innovation in this 
area forward; they had the technical know-how, research and development and technology to 
do this.38 This sort of innovation led to competitors to attempt innovation as well.39 The 
concern was that with a reduction in competition there would be less of a drive for 
innovation.40 Hence, whilst the merger was allowed, the EU Commission approved it on 
condition that the companies divest some of their aerosol business and in addition provide the 
company with licenses over know how, for example.41 An important aspect of this decision is 
the fact that the effect on innovation is taken quite seriously and is considered an important 
part of the decision. However, it is still considered within the original paradigm of fewer 
competitors leading to less innovation. Although, it was argued that the two companies have 
better ability to innovate and could combine to improve efficiency in innovation, the 
reduction in competition is what was the more concerning issue.   
 
One of the problems with this sort of analysis is that it appears narrow in the sense that it only 
considers the innovation efforts of the parties involved and others in the same market; it is 
possible that there are others developing other forms of new packaging that can be 
substitutable or even be of such a substantially greater quality that it can completely render it 
                                                          
36 Ibid para 11 
37 Ibid paras 12-13 
38 Ibid para 61 
39 Ibid 66 
40 Ibid 
41 Ibid 115 
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obsolete.42 However, the EU Commission’s decision in Shell/Montecatini43 appears to some 
extent, consider alternative innovations that take place beyond the relevant market in terms of 
products that one day could replace the current generation. The two companies sought 
approval for a joint venture in the area of polypropylene technology and the licensing of that 
technology.44 Together the two companies would have between 50 % to 75% of the market.45 
The EU Commission concluded that they were the most technically advanced in comparison 
to their competitors, they had strong patent portfolios and that competitors would not be able 
to restrain them due to these factors; the joint venture would significantly impede 
competition.46 But what the EU Commission also considered is that there were a number of 
entities engaged in research and development of a new generation of polypropylene 
technologies that could outclass the current technology.47 However, the EU Commission did 
not allow this fact to affect its conclusions on the high market power of the two companies.48 
It stated that commercialization of the new technologies being developed could take a very 
long time and it would be hard to determine the true potential of it at this point in time.49   
 
The maintenance of a certain number of competitors in a market is therefore still a very 
important factor, even when innovation is considered. It appears to be a deeply-entrenched 
method of analysis. The question never focuses on any incentives that the dominant company 
may have to innovate apart from competitive pressure within the market. Innovation is only 
meant to thrive where there is a competitive market. The great extent of this theory is 
                                                          
42 Marcus Glader Innovation Markets and Competition Analysis (Edward Elgar 2006) 98 
43 Shell/Montecatini (Case No IV/M. 269) [1994] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m269_en.pdf accessed on 23rd September 2017 
44 Ibid 
45 Ibid 
46 Ibid 
47 Ibid 
48 Ibid 
49 Ibid 
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somewhat reflected in the EU Commission investigation of Optical Fibres.50 In this case an 
American company known as Corning was to engage in three joint ventures with three 
different cable manufacturers. Corning had advanced technology that the cable manufacturers 
required and the three different cable manufacturers were based in three different European 
countries. Corning was the one of the few companies that had this technology. The EU 
Commission found overall that competition in the market would be reduced. It however 
recognized also that there were immense advantages to the joint ventures; Europe would be 
able to quickly advance technologically in this area obviously bringing in benefits to 
consumers. Despite this, the EU Commission still resolved the reduction in competition via 
particular remedies.51 We therefore see how important this aspect of the competition analysis 
is. The bringing of new technology to the benefit of consumers is not enough; there must not 
be a simultaneous reduction in competition.  
 
The truth is that the assessment of the competition structure as opposed to a pure analysis of 
the benefits to consumers is deeply ingrained in competition law. The competition 
investigation of pharmaceutical industries is a good example to illustrate this. We can see the 
high emphasis on assessment of competition in the pharmaceutical industry where companies 
are more likely than any other industry to require market power to produce. Pharmaceutical 
companies invest massive sums of money52 into developing drugs for over ten year periods 
before they are allowed to market them and recoup their investments.53  
                                                          
50 Optical fibres (Case No IV/30.320) [1986] OJ L 236/30  
51 Ibid- paragraph 84 onwards- The different joint ventures were not allowed to exchange any competitive 
information whatsoever such as prices and marketing plans. They were also required to provide quotations 
annually to the EU Commission so that the EU Commission can monitor prices.  
52 D Masi ‘The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs’ (2003) 22(2) J Health Econ 
151-85; the author puts the cost up to 800 million euros to develop and research a drug. 
53 Ibid 18; Referring to footnote 13 on this page the author receives this information from a book in Italian; 
Lucioni Le conseguenze delle politiche di contenimento della spesa pubblica nel contest atuuale del mercato 
farmaceutico in Rassegna di Diritto Farmaceutico (1996) 358   
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On top of that a significant number of their research and development projects fail at various 
pre-market stages of the development of the drugs;54 hence there is a lot of money lost. It is 
therefore understandable why a pharmaceutical company may have to be allowed some level 
of market power over particular drugs and the development of those drugs in order to 
motivate it to push medicines and treatments forward to the benefit of the public. From a 
consumer welfare point of view, drug therapies without question have helped people with 
various diseases and have an extremely important role in improving the state of modern 
society.55 If pharmaceutical companies are constantly anxious about competition and are 
worried that they cannot recoup their profits, they will probably invest less and drug 
development will be pushed backwards.  
 
Given this context, the fact that competition authorities still put a great emphasis on the 
competition structure of the market when they investigate pharmaceutical mergers, means 
that competition structure assessment is here to stay and will be difficult to replace. In terms 
of formulating a new test for free high technology, the test must include competition structure 
assessment.    
 
It would therefore appear, in our quest to find a test that fits in with the unique features of 
free high technology, we cannot formulate a test that completely bypasses an analysis of the 
competitive structure of the market. We therefore need to find a test which will involve some 
                                                          
54 See Marcus Glader Innovation Markets and Competition Analysis (Edward Elgar 2006) 113; Development of 
drugs tend to involve three clinical phases (this entails human testing), each of which must be passed 
successfully before marketing of the drug is allowed. Phase 1 usually starts ten years before product launch and 
generally there is only a 10% chance of being successful. Phase 2 occurs some four to five years before launch 
and tends to involve a 30% 
 success rate. Finally Phase 3 starts three years before launch usually with a 50% success rate. 
55 Claudia Desogus Competition and Innovation in the EU Regulation of Pharmaceuticals; The Case of Parallel 
Trade (Intersentia 2011) 12 
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analysis of the number of competitors in the market. However, as we will see next, the 
concept of the ‘market for innovation’ looks at innovation from a different angle. We will see 
that this type of market can actually allow us to convincingly and with coherence present the 
free high technology innovation market as a competitive market without having to paint the 
picture of a competitive market in the current product market. It also simultaneously allows 
us to retain the aspect of competition in our test. The next section therefore now turns to 
innovation market. 
 
5.3 Innovation Markets 
5.3.1 Innovation markets; a concept introduced by Gilbert and Sunshine 
 
Gilbert and Sunshine brought the concept of innovation markets in focus.56 An innovation 
market contains all research and development projects by companies that are substitutable 
with each other. Gilbert and Sunshine have set particular criteria to be followed in order for 
innovation markets to be formulated. 
 
When it comes to mergers it must first be considered what the overlapping research and 
development projects are between the two merging parties.57 Then one needs to detect other 
companies that are not only engaged in, but could potentially be engaged in the near future, in 
substitutable R&D projects.58 Then, competition in the downstream market must also be 
taken into account. If there is a lack of competition in the downstream market or current 
product market, it may be an indication that there is more of an incentive to reduce R&D.59 
                                                          
56 R.Gilbert & S. Sunshine, 'Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of 
Innovation Markets’ (1995) 63 Antitrust L.J. 569 
57 Ibid 
58 Ibid 
59 Ibid 
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Then you have to measure their market shares in the innovation relevant market by 
calculating the amount of money spent on R&D. 60Then we finally need to consider whether 
the merger would create any efficiencies in R&D.  
 
Gilbert and Sunshine however appear to interpret that an innovation market can be quite wide 
in the sense that it tests how markets in which the merging parties at this very moment are not 
competing in yet. 61 The competitive pressure in a R&D market for example, can come from 
various sources including companies from outside the industry which have the ability to 
engage in similar R&D or those who have just purchased assets that would allow them the 
capabilities. 62  
 
Hence Gilbert and Sunshine are concerned with not only how, for example the main product 
market where the competitors are active in, but how they may potentially affect future 
markets. 63 They made this clear by distinguishing them from markets for future products and 
those for current products. 64 Considering innovation markets expands the narrative 
significantly. 65 They use the example of two sole producers of ingot in the market who are 
planning to merge. 66 Both companies also produce cable and lawn furniture using the raw 
material ingot. They both compete in cable in the entire world, but have separate 
geographical markets in lawn furniture. 67 A traditional merger analysis of the downstream 
products would simply reveal a reduction in competition in cable but no difference in lawn 
                                                          
60 Ibid 
61 Ibid 
62 Ibid 590 
63 Ibid 
64 Ibid 
65 Ibid  
66 Ibid 580-586 
67 Ibid 
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furniture due to segregated geographical markets. 68 However, if they considered innovation 
markets, they figured there would be a reduction in R&D for producing ingot efficiently at 
lower cost and therefore there was a prevention of lowering production costs (subsequently 
leading to lower prices) of not only cable, but also of lawn furniture. Without the innovation 
market, the adverse effect on the lawn furniture market would not have been seen. 69 
 
The Gilbert and Sunshine approach has, however, come under critical scrutiny. One of the 
stated problems with Gilbert and Sunshine is that it is premised on assumptions that may not 
be true; the assumption is that a concentration will reduce R&D incentives and reducing the 
number of R&D will reduce innovation.70 Sometimes the problem is that price competition 
drives profits to a level where R&D cannot be invested in. Also R&D is risky in the sense 
that it is very uncertain whether it will lead to innovation in the first place.71 So when we 
speak of R&D we are not necessarily speaking of innovation, because the R&D may not 
translate into that. Being too concerned with the market for innovation has been criticized 
also on the basis that innovation is likely to be achieved only when companies pool their 
resources via mergers and joint ventures in the first place.72 
 
Although the Gilbert and Sunshine approach to and use of innovation markets have been 
criticized as we have just seen,  the analysis of competition amongst substitute research and 
development projects has taken place in Commission investigations. We will see this in the 
                                                          
68 Ibid 
69 Ibid 
70 See for example J Baker ‘Fringe Firms and Incentives to Innovate’ (1995) 63 Antitrust L.J 621where the 
author states that R&D investment is only encouraged where there is market power on the part of the company, 
as it can then receive a great share of profits to perhaps offset the expensive risk taken by investing in R&D 
71 See R Rapp ‘The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to Merger Analysis: The use of 
Innovation Markets’ (1995) 64 Antitrust L.J 19, 27 
72 See for example T Jorde & D Teece ‘Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for Competition and 
Antitrust’(1990) 4 J Econ Persp 75 and J Ordover & R Willig ‘Antitrust for High-Technology Industries: 
Assessing Research Joint Ventures and Mergers’(1985) 28 J.L & Econ 312 
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next section. This therefore allows us to consider this as a current tool used by competition 
authorities that may potentially be applied to free high technology investigations. We will 
next look at how the EU Commission has approached innovation markets.  
 
 
 
5.3.2 Analysis of innovation markets 
 
First thing to note is that the consideration of innovation markets is not without legal basis 
and is not merely a proposal. For example, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines states that 
where there is a merger between a company and another which is a potential competitor and 
where there is evidence that there is a significant likelihood that it will grow into a competitor 
but for the merger, it can be concluded that there will be significant anti-competitive effects 
(this is of course provided that in addition there is or would be an insufficient number of 
other current/potential competitors in the post-merger scenario).73 Although this does not 
directly indicate the need to consider the market or competition over innovation, it asks the 
EU Commission to consider a set of factors which would logically include pipeline 
innovation projects. The existence of such projects for example would understandably count 
towards evidence as to whether or not one of the merging parties will enter a relevant market. 
In taking such factors into consideration one considers the same factors needed to in the 
analysis of an innovation market.  
 
                                                          
73 Council Regulation (EC) of 5 February 2004 on Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the 
Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03 ) [2004] OJ C 31/5 
paragraphs 58-60 
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One of the obvious issues however, is to what extent one can assess the ‘significant 
likelihood’ as required by the Horizontal Merger Guidelines from pipeline products in their 
very early phases of development; there will always be a great level of uncertainty as to the 
success of any innovation/development project.74 However, the EU Commission went on to 
show that assessments based on early stages could be carried out.  
 
The first pharmaceutical case to show this was Novartis/GSK Oncology where the EU 
Commission took into consideration two early phase products each developed by each of the 
merging parties to conclude that should the products eventually reach market, they would be 
substitutes.75 The EU Commission concluded that in the post-merger scenario there would 
only be one other company that would have a similar R&D project and therefore there would 
be a reduction in innovation competition leading to a reduction in competition in the new so 
to speak future product market.76  Hence, innovation markets definitely have a legal basis but 
also can involve the analysis of R&D projects whose chances of success are uncertain.  
 
Such cases on pharmaceutical mergers can provide us with a very good insight into how 
future innovation that is not yet in complete existence is assessed; in other words we are 
going to look at innovation markets. By looking at how innovation is analysed in such cases 
we can gain an idea on how far the analysis is capable of going in a case concerning free high 
technology. The basic approach to innovation markets is to ensure that there is a sufficient 
                                                          
74 F Have, J Martinez & E Demertezi ‘The European Commission’s Pharmaceutical Merger Control Practice: an 
overview of the state of play’ (2016) 39(1) World Compet. 85, 106 
75 Novartis / GlaxoSmithKline Oncology Business (Case COMP/M.7275)[2015] paragraph 89 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7275_20150128_20212_4158734_EN.pdf accessed 
on 30th September 2017 
76 Ibid 
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number of projects aimed at development and innovation. 77 Hence, it would generally appear 
that there is a negative presumption associated with any further concentration in the any area 
of innovation. Examples of cases where the authorities acknowledge a high level of 
concentration in an innovation market but still conclude that there will be anti-competitive 
effects appear rare.78  
 
5.3.3 Analysis of innovation markets and the conventional assumption of more competition 
being good for consumer welfare 
 
Innovation markets have been analysed very often in the form of R&D markets. In this 
section we therefore aim to assess how R&D is analysed as a market.79 In doing so we will 
more importantly discover how the analysis still basis itself on the idea of more competition 
being good for consumer welfare. This is a good thing for our purpose of finding a test suited 
to free high technology. We have noted how it would be too radical and controversial at this 
stage to propose any test that scraps the presumption that more competition is good for 
consumers. Any acceptable test will therefore have to incorporate and implement this idea. 
We therefore show in this section how innovation markets very much safely conform to this 
presumption.  
                                                          
77 Commission Notice — Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal 
cooperation agreements [2001] OJ C003 paragraph 51 
78 Quite a stark example does not even come from Europe but from the United States. See Genzyme/Novazyme 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc, File No. 021 0026, Closing letter,, January 13, 2004; both companies were engaged in 
very early stages of research into the treatment of Pompe disease. Novazyme’s treatment specifically showed 
some good promise. There were no other firms developing treatments like these two entities. Despite the 
obvious concentration in the innovation market for this treatment, the FTC did not find any anti-competitive 
effects  and closed the investigation. It was stated that the effects on innovation cannot be inferred simply by 
counting the number of other similar development programs in the market. More important questions were 
whether R&D would be more successful through the merger and whether there was any reduced incentive post-
merger to work on those R&D programs. There were two dissenting opinions on this case both reflecting 
surprise at the fact that a monopoly was allowed to be created.  
79 Although this is not necessarily the formal term given by the authorities to describe the analysis of research 
and development  
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The EU Commission, through its decisions, has expressed the aim to ensure that there is 
competition in the area of research and development; this can be considered as a market for 
innovation. For example, in Glaxo Wellcome/SmithKline Beecham80 the EU Commission was 
not very concerned with the research and development of anti-migraine medicine; whilst 
SmithKline (SK) already had a pipeline product in phase II81 and Glaxo Wellcome (GW) had 
two products in the market, SK committed to licencing out its compounds in anti-migraine to 
other entities who could continue the research/development.82 Hence, there is less of a chance 
of reduction of competition in R&D in that field as the licensee of those compounds will 
become the new competitor.83 In terms of the research and development of treatment of 
colorectal cancer there were no major concerns either; both companies had products in phases 
II and III but did not have a large market share and there were other key players engaged in 
research and development in the area.  
 
The EU Commission considered in GlaxoWellcome that in terms of R&D in second line 
therapies of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) there were at least three other 
competitors with competing products in the pipeline. Despite this, the EU Commission 
concluded that Glaxo’s market power would be further entrenched in the market taking into 
consideration the merger with SB and there was always the possibility of the competing 
products failing. It appears that the need for a larger number of competitors in the market 
outweighed the fact that there were already competitors with competing products in the same 
                                                          
80 Glaxo Wellcome/ Smithkline Beecham (Case No COMP/M.1846 )[2000]  available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1846_en.pdf accessed on 30th September 2017 
81 Ibid 
82 Ibid 
83 Ibid 
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phases of development; more competition appears to bring a better chance of a successful 
innovative product.   
 
Another EU investigation which takes into consideration products still under nascent stages 
of development is Upjohn/Pharmacia.84 The EU Commission considered research and 
development in areas such as solid tumours.85 Pharmacia’s product under development for 
tumours was expected to come out in six years time.86 It was expected that by that period it 
would face competition from other products that were also simultaneously under 
development at the time.87 The conclusion was therefore that there would be no creation or 
increase of a dominant position in the research and development of solid tumours.88 
 
We therefore see how in EU investigations competition between research and development 
projects is considered an important aspect in the final decisions of the authorities. So far we 
have seen this sort of analysis in pharmaceutical and medical industries. However as we will 
see next, this type of analysis can also take place in other industries and therefore is not 
prevented from having wider applications. 
 
In the US there have also been cases considered by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
where innovation markets have been considered within the context of technology as opposed 
to pharmaceuticals. For example, in Sensormatic89 two manufacturers (namely Sensormatic 
and Knogo) were present in the market for electronic article surveillance in retail stores. 
                                                          
84 Case No IV/M.631- Upjohn/Pharmacia. OJ C 294/9 (1995) 
85 Ibid 
86 Ibid 
87 Ibid 
88 Ibid 
89 Sensormatic Electronics Corporation (FTC File No. 941 0126)  
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Under an agreement Sensormatic would acquire all Knogo patents for a new type of 
technology known as ‘Superstrip’ outside of North America.90 Knogo would then have a non-
exclusive license to ‘Superstrip’ and would continue developing it. Furthermore, the two 
companies agreed to cross-license any improvements made on the technology by either 
company91. Superstrip was considered a new generation product whereby the manufacturers 
themselves could install the appropriate security devices themselves (also known as source 
labelling), instead of the retailers having to do so.92 The FTC considered the markets for 
research and development of disposable labels developed for source labelling and R&D in the 
processes to manufacture these disposable labels. It came to the conclusion that, given the 
patent protection, it would be difficult for others to enter this market and compete.93 An 
agreement such as this between the two companies would not provide an incentive for Knogo 
to invest in such R&D due to reduced competition in the market; overall R&D would be 
reduced for a product that was not in the market yet. Sensormatic was prohibited from 
acquiring the patents in US and Canada, but could only attain a non-exclusive license to it. 
We can see that in the field of technology, one can also analyse products in development 
which have a potential future market, but which is not currently in existence.94 The research 
and development of and the bringing to the market of new products can be a concern for the 
authorities (at least in the United States). However, the FTC could have also included R&D 
of alternative security solutions into the same market for R&D of source labelling; the 
alternative future products could have restrained any attempts at anti-competitive behaviour 
by the dominant players.95  
 
                                                          
90 Ibid 
91 Ibid 
92 Ibid 
93 Ibid 
94 Ibid 
95 Marcus Glader Innovation Markets and Competition Analysis (Edward Elgar 2006) 132 
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In this section we have established therefore, that the innovation market analysis is still also a 
form of competition analysis very much concerned with the amount of competition in a 
market. Hence, suggesting the use of it fits neatly into the general narrative that competition 
is good for consumers. We therefore have one good reason so far to be using this test and can 
therefore consider it viable. Before we apply the innovation market test to free high 
technology, there is one more criteria we need to consider to be able to assess innovation 
market analysis as a viable test. We will next look at the standard of proof associated with the 
analysed R&D projects.  
 
5.3.4 Analysis of innovation markets and standard of proof associated with R&D projects 
 
One of the problems that we have mentioned associated with innovation markets is the fact 
that R&D projects could be at different stages of development and there could be 
considerable uncertainty as to whether the development will turn into a successful 
product/service. With free high technology markets, analysing the different innovation efforts 
may also be associated with the same problem of uncertainty. So one obvious issue is 
ensuring that any test we propose for free high technology reaches an acceptable standard of 
proof. In this section we consider cases that have looked at innovation markets and what sort 
of standards are to be reached in terms of including a research and development project in the 
market.   
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Assessment of research and development can be detailed. For example, in Glaxo Wellcome96 
the EU Commission took into consideration the specific categories of research and 
development within the specified area of COPD. It was found that Glaxo Wellcome and 
Smithkline Beecham had pipeline products in this area, but also that each product was 
differentiated in terms of effectiveness and particular types of COPD treatment. Furthermore, 
the EU Commission considered that existing products were not of great quality and hence 
there was an attractive research and development market for it. It was concluded that it was 
unlikely that the research and development would be reduced by the parties because of this 
and the fact that the R&D in this case was slightly differentiated and because there was a 
sufficient number of competitors.97 We therefore see that in terms of standard of proof, the 
quality of existing products may be considered, but the chances of success from relevant and 
competing R&D projects do not have to be proved to a great extent. 
 
The notion that proof of success does not have to reach a high standard is reflected in other 
cases as well.  In Pfizer and Pharmacia98 Pfizer had a dominant erectile dysfunction 
medication known as Viagra using what was known as PDE-5 inhibitors.99 Although a 
number of companies were developing similar types of medication using these specific 
inhibitors, Pfizer was in the middle of patent litigation against these competitors; Pfizer had a 
broad patent over the PDE-5 inhibitor.100 Should Pfizer win the litigation it would become 
virtually a monopolist in the area of medication for erectile dysfunction and a merger with 
Pharmacia (which was developing competing medication) would only strengthen Pfizer’s 
                                                          
96 Glaxo Wellcome/ Smithkline Beecham (Case No COMP/M.1846 )[2000]  available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1846_en.pdf accessed on 30th September 2017 
97 Ibid 
98Pfizer/Pharmacia (Case No COMP/M.2922) [2003] 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2922_en.pdf available at 30th September 2017 
99 Ibid  
100 Ibid 
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monopoly power.101 There were competitors who had non-PDE-5 inhibitors in development, 
but they were at such a nascent stage that their success could not be predicted.102 Hence the 
EU Commission resolved the issue by making the merger conditional upon Pharmacia 
divesting its research and development in erectile dysfunction medication to ensure 
competition.103  
 
In terms of the depth the EU Commission goes to make conclusions, there could have been a 
good possibility that the drugs in development by Pharmacia could have eventually failed 
meaning that by divesting them to a competitor of the merged entity would not lead to any 
successful competitive pressure.104 It goes to show that the strength of the evidence of the 
quality of a product and/or likely success of a product does not have to reach a high 
threshold.  We also see this in other cases. In Tetra Pak Rausing SA v Commission105 for 
example, Tetra Pak acquired Liquipak which held an exclusive license over a new technology 
for milk packaging that was still under development. The technology for packaging was 
considered to potentially make a breakthrough in the market.106 With Tetra Pak’s dominance 
in liquid food packaging machines it was said that the acquisition was likely to prevent entry 
from competitors; this is despite the fact that there was some uncertainty as to what stage of 
development the technology was in.107 It was held that there was an abuse of a dominant 
position.108  
 
                                                          
101 Ibid 
102 Ibid 
103 Ibid 
104 Marcus Glader Innovation Markets and Competition Analysis (Edward Elgar 2006) 122-123 
105 T-51/89 Tetra Pak Rausing SA v Commission (Tetra Pak I) [1990] ECR II-309  
106 Ibid  
107 Ibid 
108 Ibid 
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One thing we understand now having looked at the different cases, is that innovation markets 
need only include the existence of  research and development projects. How successful the 
research and development project will become in terms of manifesting in a real tangible 
innovation does not appear to be an important factor in determining whether the R&D project 
should be included as a competitive force. Similarly, if we were to apply innovation markets 
to free high technology, we would not require strong evidence of the prospects of success of 
any innovation/R&D projects. As long as they are substitutable, they can be included into the 
innovation market. The relatively low threshold to be included as an effectively competing 
R&D project means that the innovation market is more likely to be competitive in free high 
technology markets. We will discuss this further in the next section. 
 
 
 
5.4 The application of innovation markets in free high technology 
5.4.1 How an innovation market can help with formulating an appropriate test for free high 
technology 
 
An innovation market would typically be a lot broader compared to a conventional product 
market.109 Given our discussions, this is quite understandable. It is difficult to predict how 
successful particular innovations at early stages of development will eventually be. There is a 
chance that only a small number of R&D projects will culminate in a product that will enter 
the product market. Hence the R&D/innovation market is likely to be much wider and 
contain more substitutes than the final product market.  
                                                          
109 R Gilbert & S Sunshine ‘The Use of Innovation Markets: A Reply to Hay, Rapp and Hoerner’ (1995) 64 
Antitrust L.J 75, 81 
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Another reason that they are likely to be wider is because of the fact that in really early stages 
of development it is difficult to predict which type of products the research may help with at 
the end. The research may end up assisting in a completely different type of product.110 
Hence the innovation market may, again be much wider than the ultimate product market.  
 
Similarly, in the high- technology industry there is more likely to be more companies trying 
to make innovations in a particular product than actually on the product market. We consider 
this in more detail in the next section. Hence, the market share of the dominant search engine 
or social network in the innovation market is genuinely lower and therefore as long as there 
are a number of competitors putting in innovation effort there is competition in innovation to 
the benefit of consumers. For example, in Glaxo Wellcome/SmithKline Beecham when the 
EU Commission discussed the innovation market related to COPD, a variety of R&D 
programmes were considered as competitors; the competitors were at different stages of 
development as well.111 However, when it came to assessing the current product market in 
existence and the effects on it emanating from the merger, only a limited number of products 
close to the final stages of development/testing (stage 3) were considered as possible 
constraints in the market. The point is that if we simply consider the innovation market in 
free high technology, the market is genuinely wider and will have more competitors. In that 
way the EU Commission can convincingly build the picture of a competitive market, making 
the parties in question appear less dominant.  
 
 
                                                          
110 Ibid 212 
111 Glaxo Wellcome/ Smithkline Beecham (Case No COMP/M.1846 )[2000]  available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1846_en.pdf accessed on 30th September 2017 
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5.4.2 Innovations in the free high technology industry  
Before we can suggest an analysis of any innovations in the free high technology market, we 
need to have a look at whether there is any impediment to access information on innovation. 
Unlike the pharmaceutical industry, research and development in the high tech industry is far 
more clandestine and less transparent; there may not be a great amount of transparency in the 
free high technology field in terms of research and development.112 Innovations are often 
announced and implemented/put out in the market suddenly.113 This is an understandable 
strategy to keep ahead of the competition. If this is the case it would be hard to predict with 
accuracy what a competition law analysis of innovation in the industry would look like at this 
point.  
 
However, from our general knowledge about free high technology markets, we can gain an 
idea of how the innovation market might look like. For example, the top search engines and 
social networks were born out of some informal collaboration between friends and creators’ 
dorm rooms.114 So who knows, there may be a multitude of individuals in the world trying to 
build a smarter search algorithm or a higher quality social network. Unlike the 
pharmaceutical industry, research and development does not require expensive licenses, 
                                                          
112 Following are examples that demonstrate the highly secretive nature of innovations in the free high 
technology market. See Daily Mail Reporter ‘Apple Engineers tell how company guards its secrets by asking 
them not to speak to their WIVES and monitoring each prototype with iTrack’ (MailOnline 28 May 2013) 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2331937/Apple-engineers-company-guards-secrets-demanding-
employees-talk-WIVES-monitors-prototype-iTrack.html accessed 3rd April 2017; Nick Statt, ‘Apple reportedly 
has hundreds of people working on a secret virtual reality team’ (The Verge, 29 January 2016) 
http://www.theverge.com/2016/1/29/10871228/apple-secret-virtual-reality-team-report accessed 3rd April 2017. 
Contrast this with pharmaceutical companies like Pfizer and GSK where they openly list their projects on their 
websites. See for example, http://www.pfizer.com/research/science_and_technology/product_pipeline   and 
http://uk.gsk.com/en-gb/research   
113 See for example Henry Blodget, ‘Ignore The Screams--Facebook's Aggressive Approach Is Why It Will 
Soon Become The Most Popular Site In The World’ (Business Insider/Tech Insider 17 May 2010) < 
http://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-privacy-innovation-2010-5?IR=T> accessed on 3rd April 2017. 
Whatsapp suddenly released Snapchat-like features with a few days’ notice, see Parmy Olson ‘Whatsapp 
changes everything with its new “status” feature’ (Forbes 20 February 2017) < 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2017/02/20/whatsapp-status-snapchat-snap-stories/#4751f7c94e1f> 
accessed 3rd April 2017 
114 It is common knowledge that the creators of Facebook started the social network in their dorm room.  
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patents and years of trials. Hence, it is still reasonable to include all those various smaller 
enterprises in the innovation market.  
 
Even without the specific detection of all these different projects that may be brewing outside 
the public or industry’s eye at the moment, it is probably safe to conclude that the free high 
technology industry would involve lots of competing research and development projects. This 
is because many established high technology companies that are potential competitors 
regularly and openly try to compete. There are various examples of how free high technology 
companies regularly attempt to enter other markets that also involve free high technology. 
For example, Instagram, a social website (also mobile site) involving photo-sharing recently 
introduced a feature allowing short videos recorded easily and quickly by users on their 
mobile phones to be shared with users. This has been said to be a feature which Snapchat had 
become known for.115 Facebook introduced ‘Facebook Live’ which allows users to make live 
broadcasting videos via their smartphones.116 This had originally been introduced by an 
application known as Periscope.117 Viber, originally a voice/messaging communication 
application and Facebook (fundamentally known for social networking) have both introduced 
online video chat, a market historically dominated by Skype and Facetime for Apple 
Smartphone users.118 Amazon introduced Echo, a smart home assistant that runs on Bing’s 
search engine. Google then recently introduced its own smart home assistant speaker.119 
                                                          
115 Baldwin Cunningham ‘Snapchat vs Instagram stories: What Business Owners need to know’ (Forbes 25 
April 2017) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/baldwincunningham/2017/04/25/snapchat-vs-instagram-stories-
what-business-owners-need-to-know/#123e33095fe2> accessed 29 June 2017 
116 Alex Hern ‘Facebook Live is changing the world- but not in the way it hoped’ (The Guardian 5 January 
2017) < https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/05/facebook-live-social-media-live-streaming> 
accessed on 29 June 2017 
117 Ibid 
118 Nadeem Unuth ‘Skype vs Viber: Which is better’ (Lifewire 14April 2017)  https://www.lifewire.com/skype-
vs-viber-3426404 accessed on 29 June 2017 
119 Andrew Gebhart ‘Google Home vs Amazon Echo, round 2: Google strikes back’ (Cnet 18 May 2017) < 
https://www.cnet.com/uk/news/google-home-vs-amazon-echo/> accessed 29 June 2017 
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Furthermore, there are definitely examples where companies like Google and Facebook 
regularly publish a lot of their scientific/technical research openly directly on their 
websites.120 Hence, an authority like the EU Commission would likely have access to 
information on the competing R&D projects of the various competing technology companies. 
In other words, there would be no hindrance in finding out necessary information to find out 
the nature of the innovation markets in free high technology markets. 
 
Given these examples, whilst there are companies that will possess power within a particular 
market, in the market for innovation they are faced by other large competitors who are also 
just as able to compete. We can therefore reasonably envisage (even without taking into 
consideration the smaller entities trying to enter the market) a good number of dominant 
platforms holding market power in their own specific markets but regularly competing to 
gain entry into each other’s markets.  
 
In the above examples, there was obviously research and development going on behind the 
scenes before a lot of the companies entered a new market. Hence, if we do an innovation 
market analysis, the company who has market power in the current product/service market 
may not appear to have it in the innovation market. In the innovation market we have no idea 
as to eventually what market shares the companies will receive in the future if their 
innovations come to market. Instead, all research and development projects would be 
considered to present competitive pressure on the incumbent.  
 
In an innovation analysis questions about, for example, network effects would be less 
relevant. The innovation market is simply concerned with the number of and nature of 
                                                          
120 See https://research.fb.com/publications/ and https://research.google.com/  
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players in the market competing against each other for research and development. For 
example, in the pharmaceutical industry in terms of the innovation market the EU 
Commission would be mainly concerned with who controlled and owned the assets required 
as inputs for research and development; if there were various players who could provide the 
inputs then competition concerns are alleviated.121 In the free high technology industry there 
is unlikely to be assets completely necessary for research and development.  
 
 
 
5.4.3 Resources needed to succeed in free high technology market 
 
In having a closer look at innovation markets, we have also seen how innovation can be 
extremely costly, slow and uncertain in the pharmaceutical industry. It is quite 
understandable that many innovation markets in the pharmaceutical industry would be highly 
concentrated. But how would innovation markets in the free high technology market look like 
instead? In order to answer this question the obvious thing to do is to consider what current 
innovations are being worked on by high technology companies. However, scrutinizing and 
assessing the various published information about R&D in these companies to understand 
what the innovation market would look like falls beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, one 
way to predict the likely nature of the innovation market is to look at what is required during 
the innovation/development stages of free high technology companies in order for them to 
eventually create a viable business. What we will see in doing so is that the resources 
required for innovations in the stages before a free high technology company to become large 
and sustainable are not as vast as you would need in more traditional industries. Hence, the 
                                                          
121 Marcus Glader Innovation Markets and Competition Analysis (Edward Elgar 2006) 216 
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innovation market is likely to be less concentrated, also given the ease with which potential 
entrants can start a competing R&D project.  
 
Successful high technology platforms (including free ones) that operate online and eventually 
become worth a lot of money through creating lots of value for its users are not those that 
actually produce the demanded products and services.122 Instead, successful platforms are the 
ones who can enable the producers of products/services to easily and efficiently connect with 
those consumers who want those products and services and vice versa.123 Search engines 
connect search users to information published by independent content producers and 
advertisements; search engines do not produce or own the content that users search for. 
Social networks connect users to content (such as pictures and videos) created by other users. 
An accommodation booking site connects people to those who provide accommodation; the 
booking site does not own any of the accommodation. The task of connecting two groups of 
individuals/entities is much less costly than producing and transporting the goods and 
services yourself; hence, the high technology platforms have much lower fixed costs.124 In 
addition, once the original version125 of a web/mobile application is made, copying it and 
redistributing it over the internet costs next to nothing to the point that such companies have 
been dubbed ‘the zero marginal cost company’.126  The general trend has been for start-ups to 
be able to provide better quality products at increasingly lower costs.127  
                                                          
122 A Moazed & N Johnson Modern Monopolies; What it Takes to Dominate the 21st-Century Economy (St 
Martin’s Press New York May 2016) 28.  
123 Ibid Furthermore the author uses the example of Pets.com which owned its own warehouses from which it 
delivered Pets related goods. The fixed costs were very high to begin with. In contrast, eBay built an online 
platform connecting separate producers to various consumers. It did not have to deal with transport or 
warehouse costs. Its sole job was to connect the two relevant parties. Pets.com did not survive whereas eBay 
went on to become a lot more successful.  
124 Ibid 79 Start-up costs are lower than ever.  
125 Ibid 85- The original version can cost up to $250,000. But this is not much compared to, for example, the 
millions of dollars and extensive time periods that go into developing a new drug 
126 Ibid 79 
127 Ibid 80 
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This is not to deny that there are costs involved in getting a platform on its feet. A high 
technology platform needs to be able to build a wide regular audience before the network 
effects can become active and then allow the platform to grow exponentially by itself. For 
example, Uber, the transportation mobile application, started off by paying drivers to be 
available to customers on demand to ensure that they had some guaranteed rides for 
customers.128 This had to be done before it could get enough willing drivers on the 
application. Hence, sometimes ‘money subsidies’ need to be provided to get a platform 
going.129 However, they are nominal in comparison to the million dollar figures heard of in 
the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
So what do the comparative low costs for start-ups in the high technology industry trying to 
introduce a new product in the market say about a high technology innovation market? It is 
most likely to be a competitive one given how relatively easy it is to have innovation activity 
going on without the need for specific unique assets owned by a few. Whether or not the 
innovation efforts will be a successful one is a separate one. As Gilbert and Sunshine state: 
 
‘If innovation directed to particular products or processes does not require specific 
assets, entry into R&D would be easy and the innovation market would be 
competitive’ 130 
 
                                                          
128 See Brad Stone The Upstarts: How Uber, Airbnb and the Killer Companies of the New Silicon Valley are 
changing the World (Little, Brown and Company 2017)  
129 Alex Moazed & N Johnson Modern Monopolies; What it Takes to Dominate the 21st-Century Economy (St 
Martin’s Press New York May 2016) 196 
130 R Gilbert & S Sunshine, 'Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of 
Innovation Markets’ (1995) 63 Antitrust L.J. 569, 596 
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Hence, given the trend we saw in the previous sub-section of dominant firms attempting to 
enter each other’s markets and the relatively low cost for research and development, it is 
likely that it is easier to start off R&D projects in the free high technology sector and it would 
therefore likely be more R&D projects at any given time.  
 
5.4.4 Application of innovation market analysis to free high technology investigations 
 
We have now established that free high technology involves constant multiple innovation 
efforts that can come from new low profile entrants to highly established companies. We also 
have seen that one of the reasons behind this is the low capital costs required in such markets. 
Hence, a free high technology innovation market is likely to be much more competitive than 
a pharmaceutical innovation market. As we have seen, the competition authorities feel that 
research and development can be limited when it comes to pharmaceutical mergers. The 
innovation market can be quite concentrated in this sense. With the pharmaceutical industry 
however, there are quite specific reasons for this. Carrying out innovations in the 
pharmaceutical sector, as discussed, involve years of research and development and therefore 
involve costs of magnanimous proportions; there is also arguably a low rate of success. 
Furthermore, companies protect their processes, which are necessary ingredients for 
innovations, through strong patent protection.131 Hence, everyone else is prevented from 
using the same processes without permission from the patent owner; duplication of 
innovations is therefore less likely as it might be in other industries with less patent 
protection.132 The innovation market is therefore likely to be concentrated.133 Furthermore, it 
                                                          
131 Michael Carrier Innovation for the 21st Century: harnessing the Power of Intellectual Property and Antitrust 
Law (Oxford University Press 2009) 298  
132 Ibid 
133 Ibid 
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has been suggested, because the pharmaceutical research and development of competitors are 
always transparent, companies are more likely to merge or do joint research to make the 
research more efficient.134 In turn, this leads to further concentration in the market.135    
 
There is, however, some guidance that may prevent the innovation market in free high 
technology being competitive despite a high number of alternative innovation efforts. There 
appears to have been suggestions that where a competitor in the innovation market has a high 
market share in the current product market, the competitor is likely to have more market 
power in the innovation market as well. This could pose a problem for our purpose of finding 
a test that convincingly portrays a free high technology market to be genuinely competitive.  
 
The EU Commission’s ‘Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements’ explains how the 
market share in current product markets can affect the interpretation of their potential power 
in the innovation market.136 Although the guidance specifically relates to agreements under 
Article 101, it provides us a good insight into the EU Commission’s attitude towards 
innovation markets in general and how it could therefore possibly view such markets in an 
investigation of a merger or unilateral action. It states that when it comes to innovation 
markets, where the research and development is aimed at improving or replacing the current 
products/services then the market share in the current products/services is to be considered as 
an indication of the competitive position of the parties in that innovation market.137 It is only 
                                                          
134 Bjorn Lundqvist Joint Research and Development under US Antitrust and EU Competition Law (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2015) 19 
135 Ibid 
136 Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to 
horizontal co-operation agreements (2011/C 11/01)[2011] OJ C11/1 
137 Ibid Para 124 
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when the R&D efforts targeted towards a completely new product occurs that the competitive 
position of the incumbent cannot be assessed through its market share in the current product 
market.138  
 
Hence, if the authority were to investigate a dominant search engine’s innovation market, it 
would state that it had too much market power in the innovation market based on its 
dominant share in the current search market; hence any merger or unilateral action that could 
increase that market power would probably not be allowed. However, one may interpret a 
product to be new if it replaces, but also renders the previous product obsolete. For example, 
one could say that search engines have replaced the Yellow Pages. Search engines are a 
completely new product in the sense that they operate with much more efficiency, but they 
have also carried out the task of replacing a previous product. Hence a product that replaces 
could also be very new in which case market share in the current product market does not 
have to be taken into consideration as an indicator of what the power in the innovation market 
is.  
 
Furthermore, it has been observed that generally, market share is not attributed in innovation 
markets.139 Hence, where an incumbent company has high current market share in the current 
product market, that high market share cannot be used as a good indication of market power 
in the innovation market. Instead, competition authorities in the market are more likely to 
consider other factors such as the quality of the different R&D, stage at which the products 
                                                          
138 Ibid Para 126 
139 Marcus Glader Innovation Markets and Competition Analysis (Edward Elgar 2006) 220 
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are and access to resources140 and critical assets.141 We can therefore safely predict that 
innovation markets related to free high technology are likely to be competitive.       
 
4.4.5 Effect of innovation markets on final decision of Competition authorities 
 
There has been suggestion that the consideration of innovation markets is only ancillary and 
supportive of current product market analysis; it is current product market analysis which 
determines the outcome of an investigation or case at the end of the day. 142 For example, in 
cases such as Crown Cork and Montecatini  market share in the current product markets of 
the merged entities would be quite high; they would be at least above 60%.143 
 
However, there are examples where the innovation market aspect of the case has had a wider 
influence on final decisions. For example, in Boeing/McDonnell Douglas the EU 
Commission considered McDonnell Douglas to be a company that was able to apply 
competitive pressure in the market because of its innovative efforts in the area of commercial 
aircraft despite its low and decreasing market shares in the current product market of large 
commercial aircraft.144 McDonnell Douglas possessed 150 patents relevant to large 
                                                          
140 Ibid 
141 Joseph Kattan ‘Antitrust Analysis of Technology Joint Ventures: Allocative Efficiency and the Rewards of 
Innovation’ (1993) 61 Antitrust L.J 937, 954 
142 See for example, R Gilbert & W Tom ‘Is Innovation King at the Antitrust Agencies? The Intellectual 
Property Guidelines Five Years Later’ (2001) 69 Antitrust LJ 43,44. It is important to note that this article deals 
with merger cases decided in the United States. However it is also referred to in Marcus Glader Innovation 
Markets and Competition Analysis (Edward Elgar 2006) 227, where the author mentions this along with 
mentioning European cases where product market analysis appeared more important. 
143 See Crown Cork & Seal/CarnaudMetalbox (Case No IV/M.603) [2014] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7104_1396_2.pdf accessed on 23rd September 2017, 
Shell/Montecatini (Case No IV/M. 269) [1994] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m269_en.pdf accessed on 23rd September 2017 
144 Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (Case No IV/M.877) [1997] available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m877_19970730_600_en.pdf  accessed on 7th October 
2017, Paras 33 & 34- for example, market share of McDonnell Douglas fell to as low as 2% in the market for 
large commercial jet aircraft in Europe 
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commercial aircraft and these, along with the patents owned by Boeing, were considered to 
be vital for future development of technology. 145 The company regardless of its tiny market 
share in commercial aircraft was considered to be able to provide potential competitive 
pressure on the Boeing’s dominant position. 146  
 
This is also supported by the 2004 EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines which states that 
companies with relatively small market share can be an important competitive constraint if 
they have ‘promising pipeline products’.147Could this lead to the conclusion that competition 
authorities would be willing, with supportive evidence, to find companies with very high 
market share in the current product market to have lower market power in the innovation 
market? Well we have seen the high viability of this approach reflected throughout Chapter 3 
in terms of the EU Commission’s approach to free-high technology markets. They consider 
the constant innovation in the industry to be a threat to anyone with current high market 
shares (although, as seen in Chapter 3, it is not argued in the most convincing way). 
 
Either way, this creates uncertainty over what type of results the application of innovation 
markets in the free high technology markets may have in two ways. Firstly, as mentioned, 
there is a good chance that the end result will very much be determined by the level of market 
power in the current market as opposed to the innovation market. In most of the cases we 
have seen, the lack of competition in the innovation market coincided with a high 
concentration in the current product market.  
 
                                                          
145 Ibid Para 102 
146 Ibid Para 120 
147 Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements 
(2001/C 3/02) O J C003- see paragraph 38 
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Secondly, competition analysis will tend to include the consideration of several markets. 
Hence, we cannot look at the innovation market in isolation and ignore analysing the current 
product market. This means that in free-high technology investigations, when a proper 
analysis takes place, we will have on the one hand a current product market where the 
conclusion is that there is very high market power which is more likely to lead to an abuse of 
dominance or significant reduction in competition post-merger; on the other hand we are 
likely to see a simultaneously competitive innovation market. But as long as there is a finding 
of high market power in one market, there is still a very good chance that an abuse of 
dominance can be found. In that case, our hope to use the innovation market as a tool to lead 
to the conclusion of a highly competitive market without having to show that they have low 
market power in the current product market is obliterated.  
 
We therefore need to consider whether there is any form of analysis in competition law that 
would allow us to consider the innovation market in relatively more isolation. Next, we 
therefore look at a particular consumer harm test which narrows the focus on and analysis of 
the creation of a new product. The test asks whether a potentially abusive practice prevents 
the emergence of a new product. We will explore this in detail and see how well it can fit in 
with free high technology. 
 
5.5 The Magill test 
 
Harm to consumers148 is a factor taken into consideration in competition analysis; however 
this is usually in the context of discussing how a reduction in competition would adversely 
                                                          
148 This refers to a lowering of benefits to consumers/consumer welfare in the form of prices, innovation 
and quality of the concerned product/service. 
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affect quality and innovation to the detriment of consumers as opposed to directly assessing 
other factors such as the actual ability of the companies to innovate. We saw this in Chapter 
3. Historically however, there has been one particular test in competition law that directly 
asks whether an action on the part of the dominant firm leads to the prevention of a specified 
new product from entering a new market; unless it can be shown that there will be a 
prevention of the appearance of a new product in the market to the benefit of consumers, the 
dominant entity can continue with its otherwise anti-competitive practices even if the 
consequence involves a possibility of a reduction of effective competition in the market.149 
One can already see how this should be appropriate for free high technology cases in the 
sense that it likely involves dominant firms creating innovative product even in the absence 
of competition. This test appears to address these unique features of free high technology. 
The test was set out in the Magill150 case. In this chapter we will consider the Magill test in 
greater detail to not only understand it better, but whether the case law as it stands could 
technically allow the application of this test in free high technology cases.  
 
One of the obvious roadblocks we will see with the use of this test in free high technology 
investigations is the fact that at first it appears to only be applicable to cases where an 
intellectual property right is refused access to by the defendant company, the existence of an 
intellectual property being paramount. We will initially see that it is the, so to speak, sacred 
intellectual property right that can only justify the special features of the Magill test.  
However, subsequent cases151 seem to suggest that the existence of the intellectual property 
                                                          
149 We will see in this chapter that the particular action (in these cases refusal to supply) on the part of the 
incumbent must risk elimination of competition in order for that action to be illegal. Hence, a potential reduction 
in competition is not enough; the potential complete elimination is.   
150Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television 
Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission of the European Communities [1995] ECR  I-00743 
151 For example,  Case T–201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3619 
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right is not important after all and that the Magill test is simply another alternative test that 
can be used to determine whether there is an abuse of a dominant position. This can be seen 
as the subsequent case law erodes that strict requirements of the elements of the test. For 
example, we eventually find that a product does not have to be completely new and an 
intellectual property does not have to be completely indispensable to the continued existence 
of a competitor in order to find an abuse. These elements of ‘newness’ and ‘indispensability’ 
get watered down in the subsequent case law, showing that the existence of an intellectual 
property right need not involve a special test. And because of this, we then have more liberty 
to apply the Magill test to other situations potentially involving an abuse of a dominant 
position. Hence we can apply it to free high technology investigations as well.   
 
Therefore, in this section we will be going through both Magill and other cases that involved 
similar facts to it to see how the requirements of the test were watered down. Only by doing 
this can we understand how the involvement of a refusal to access an IP right is not necessary 
and therefore justify using the Magill test in free high technology investigations.  
 
5.5.1 Elements of the Magill test 
In section 3.3.2.2 we discussed the facts and judgement of the Magill case from which we can 
extract the elements of the Magill test. The test can be formulated as follows: 
A refusal to license an intellectual property right to an entity is abusive when  
a) the IP right is indispensable to the production and marketing of a new product, for 
which there is potential consumer demand on an ancillary market and 
b) competition is completely excluded in the ancillary market due to the refusal.    
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5.5.2 Why the Magill test? Foundational values of the consumer harm test and free high 
technology 
 
We note that involvement of intellectual property rights is required in order for this test to be 
applicable. As we will see, it has also been argued that this special test was formed to ensure 
that there would be a good balancing exercise between the potential conflict of interest 
brought about by on the one hand intellectual property rights (which provide the rights holder 
with a monopoly over the IP) and on the other competition law (which attempts to prevent 
any reduction in competition or increase in market power, so to speak). Hence, in order to 
figure whether the consumer harm test is applicable to free high technology, we would have 
to consider whether there are any parallels with intellectual property rights that could also 
enable it to qualify for analysis under the Magill test.  
 
What we will find is that in essence there are important similarities between the 
circumstances of the Magill case and those of free high technology service investigations. 
And this is why the test is most likely applicable to free high technology than any other test. 
The other reason we will see why the test is comparatively appropriate is because it narrows 
down the issues to the possibility of future innovations as a qualification for allowing a 
unilateral action to continue. If there is no prevention of innovation due to the incumbent’s 
unilateral action, then the action can continue even though competition may be reduced in the 
market. In order to understand this, we need to have a better understanding of the nature of 
intellectual property rights.  
 
The Magill case involves an intellectual property right that the right holder refuses to license; 
this is what is being complained of as an abuse of dominance. Intellectual property rights 
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provide the right holder with the legal authority to prevent anyone else from using the 
intellectual property; it allows him/her to have a monopoly over the intellectual property.152 
In addition, the purpose of these intellectual property rights is to encourage innovation.153 
The argument is that the monopoly over the intellectual property encourages the right holder 
to invest further in research and development, making innovation more likely.154 This is 
because he or she contemplates recovering the investment in the future as the right holder is 
the only one allowed to collect earnings from the intellectual property.155 In the absence of 
such a right, individuals or entities would not feel investment in research and development is 
a risk worth taking as anyone else is allowed to use the intellectual property and reap the 
benefits from it.156  
 
The consumer harm test in Magill, as we shall see, was designed to strike a balance between 
incentives to innovate (arising from its intellectual property rights) on the part of the 
dominant company and any potential reduction in competition.157 Similarly we see in the free 
high technology sector dominant companies that are able to innovate and produce better for 
consumers due to their monopoly power. Hence, here we also need to find a test that balances 
the two.  
                                                          
152 Luc Peepercorrn ‘IP Licenses and Competition Rules: Striking the right balance’ (2003) 26(4) World Compet 
528 
153 See for example OECD ‘Policy Roundtables; Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights’(1997) 
DAFFE/CLP(98)18, pg 7 available at http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/1920398.pdf accessed on 22nd 
December 2016; ‘At the highest level of analysis IPR and competition policies are complementary because they 
share a concern to promote technical progress to the ultimate benefit of consumers. Firms are more likely to 
innovate if they are at least somewhat protected against free-riding.’ 
154 Bo Vesterdorf ‘Article 82 EC: Where do we stand after the Microsoft judgement?’ (2008) 1 ICC Global 
Antitrust Review 1 
155 Ibid ‘Without the protection offered by IPRs, as created by legislation, an important part of innovation might 
be endangered because of the often considerable economic investments required to innovate. And precisely 
because of the protection offered to the inventor, others will in turn also need to innovate in order to try and 
compete on the same market.’ 
156 Ibid 
157 Erik Osterud Identifying Exclusionary Abuses by Dominant Undertakings under EU Competition Law: The 
spectrum of tests (Kluwer Law International 2010). See also Gustavo Ghidini Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law- The Innovation Nexus (Cheltenham Edward Elgar 2006) 99 
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Similarly, in the case of free high technology we have a situation where an entity with 
monopolistic features such as high market share is also providing an innovative service and 
strives to innovate. In other words we are addressing monopoly power which encourages 
innovation, like a monopolising intellectual property is meant to encourage innovation. The 
unique situation where a monopolistic right also is likely to uniquely provide a positive effect 
such as innovation at zero price in the economy  can be seen as the main reason for the courts 
ensuring that there can only be exceptional circumstances where such a monopoly is to be 
prevented.158 It has been said that intellectual property law confers legal proprietary rights to 
an individual and therefore any interference with the way the right holder deals with such 
rights needs to be justified by strong unique circumstances.159 As we will see, it is the idea of 
‘exceptional circumstances’ which gave rise to the Magill test.  
 
The question now is, to what extent can Magill’s consumer harm test be applied in cases 
dealing with free high technology? We will look at different aspects of the test now to see 
any obstacles that may come our way.  
 
                                                          
158 See for example, Giorgio Monti  EC Competition Law (Cambridge University Press 2007) 228; ‘the reason 
why the courts impose an obligation to license only in exceptional circumstances is because there is a 
presumption that a refusal to license IP rights benefits the economy’ 
159 See Case 238/87 Volvo v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd [1989] 4 CMLR 122, 123- The judgement appears to maintain 
the, so to speak, sanctity of an intellectual property right to then conclude that only the exercise of the right can 
be challenged, and even then, only under particular circumstances. A refusal to license an exclusive awarded 
right, even when a reasonable royalty rate for the license is offered, cannot be considered an abuse of a 
dominant position. The ownership of the right cannot be challenged under any circumstance. However, the 
exercise of such a right by the proprietor can be challenged and may under certain circumstances be considered 
an abuse. Also see C Wardle ‘ANALYSIS- Ruling on the airwaves- Magill tested to what extent the EU’s 
powers are bound by treaty’ (1995) 17 LS Gaz 92-  the author indicates how the exceptional circumstances 
factor in the Magill judgement just about justifies preventing the free exercise of an otherwise legal intellectual 
property right. ‘The saving grace of this judgment is that, on the face of it, it is confined to “exceptional 
circumstances”. For this reason the more alarmist interpretations of Magill are, in my view, unlikely to be 
realised.’   
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5.5.3 The necessity of the presence of an Intellectual Property Right for this test to be 
applicable 
 
5.5.3.1 Indispensability and Elimination from the market 
This consumer harm test is conventionally associated with the particular situation where the 
refusal of intellectual property rights is involved.160 There is further supporting evidence of 
this in cases that came afterwards. For example, the judgment in Bronner161 laid down the 
following qualifications to override the exercise of a refusal, having scrutinised Magill: 
 
1) The refusal must eliminate all competition in the downstream market,  
2) The refusal must be incapable of objective justification  
3) It must be indispensable to the downstream market; that is, there can be no 
substitute facility available.  
 
Although Bronner’s consideration of Magill can be seen as an expansion of the Magill test 
into non-intellectual property rights cases162 (we recall from section 3.3.2.2 that Bronner 
concerned the refusal of a general property right i.e. the refusal to supply services from a 
delivery system owned by the incumbent),it can also be seen in an opposing light.  Bronner 
ensured to limit and, in a sense, clarify the scope of Magill to cases where there was an 
intellectual property right being used to carry out a refusal to supply.163 The Bronner 
                                                          
160 See Brenda Sufrin ‘Comment on the Magill Case’ (1992) 3(2) Ent. L.R. 67- all copyright holders should pay 
close attention to Magill as it specifically prevents copyright holders (and quite possibly holders of other forms 
of intellectual property) from refusing licensing where the refusal prevents the emergence of a new product in an 
ancillary market.  
161 Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. 
KG [1998] E.C.R. I-7791 
162 Hedvig Schmidt ‘Article 82’s “exceptional circumstances” that restrict intellectual property rights’ (2002) 
23(5) ECLR 210, 215. 
163 E O’Hanlon ‘Refusal to supply jurisprudence in European competition law since Oscar Bronner’ (2006) 9 
Trinity C.L. Rev. 156, 159 
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requirements seem to be very strict and capable of making intervention in non-Intellectual 
Property Rights cases less likely.164 Whilst Bronner appeared to question and limit the effects 
of Magill, IMS165 seemed to make it appear open and applicable again.166 In IMS copyrighted 
information (which was refused to the complainants) was considered indispensable; the court 
ordered access to the essential facility. IMS also confirmed, like in Magill, that the licensee 
could not simply intend to replicate goods, but make new products. IMS also confirmed that 
the ‘indispensability’ test had to fulfil the 3 conditions in Bronner which were also confirmed 
as being cumulative conditions.  They also confirmed that the secondary market could simply 
be a potential market or even hypothetical market from which all competition must be 
excluded. Hence, from IMS we saw a further intervention in the exercise of intellectual 
property rights. The structure of the IMS test also appeared to undermine the sanctity of 
intellectual property rights; the first step of the test was to ask whether there was the 
prevention of a new product as opposed to asking whether the IP right was indispensable in 
the first place.167 It is therefore questionable how strict of an assessment factor the existence 
of an IP right is.168  
 
Then, the Microsoft case appeared to lower the bar for intervention in intellectual property 
rights further. We saw that Bronner laid down a strict test in terms of indispensability and 
elimination of competition.169 Microsoft, having refused interoperability information to its 
competitors, argued that like in Bronner, its competitors had alternative operating systems to 
                                                          
164 G McCurdy ‘Intellectual Property and Competition: Does the essential facilities doctrine shed any new light’ 
(2003) 25 (10) EIPR 472 
165 Case C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co.OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG ECR 2004 I-05039 
166 Valentine Korah Cases and Materials on EC Competition Law (2nd ed. Hart Publishing 2001) 
167 Joost Houdijk ‘Case Comment- The IMS Health Ruling: some thoughts on its significance for legal practice 
and its consequences for future cases such as Microsoft’ (2005) 6(3) EBOR 467, 479 
168 Ibid 
169 See Case C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co.OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG ECR 2004 I-05039, I-
5085 and I-5088  
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work with and therefore would not be completely eliminated. The judgement on the other 
hand said that there was no need to show that there would be high likeliness of elimination 
but simply the risk of elimination, which is a lower standard test so to speak.170 The judgment 
also added that there is not just a question of viability, but economic viability in deciding 
whether there is a risk of elimination. The EU Microsoft judgment also found that the 
interoperability information was indispensable in the sense that the alternatives available to 
Microsoft’s competitors were not economically viable (Windows was the dominant operating 
system).171 Hence, in that sense the meaning of indispensability is not as strict as insinuated 
by Bronner and IMS Health.172 
 
In terms of the sanctity of intellectual property rights in the context of refusals to supply cases 
it is important to note that the Microsoft judgment clearly stated that it was not an objective 
justification that the interoperability information was covered by intellectual property 
rights.173 The other way of looking at this is that the use of the consumer harm test in Magill 
seems less likely to have to be related to an intellectual property right to be applied.174 
 
It can definitely be argued that the fact that there is an intellectual property right involved is 
not necessarily the main factor that distinguishes this test. In other words it will be seen that 
                                                          
170 Francois Leveque ‘Innovation, Leveraging and Essential Facilities: Interoperability Licensing in the EU 
Microsoft case’ (2005) 28 World Compet 71, 90 
171 Bo Vesterdorf ‘Article 82 EC: Where do we stand after the Microsoft judgement?’ (2008) GAR 1, 7: the 
concept of indispensability has been broadened to include economic indispensability.  
172 C Ahlborn & D Evans ‘The Microsoft Judgement and its implication for Competition Policy towards 
Dominant firms in Europe’ (2009) 75(3) Antitrust Law J. 901; The courts approach lowered the bar for both the 
indispensability requirement and elimination of competition standard. ‘Refusal to grant access to an input no 
longer has to be an absolute bar to participating in the market for the input to be indispensable’  
173 See Case T-201/04  Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3619 paragraphs 329 and 330- the judgment 
refers to IMS and Magill stating that refusal of access to an intellectual property right could be abusive.  
174 There is more of a willingness than ever to find a refusal to supply anti-competitive where access to another 
entity’s intellectual property is denied. See E O’Hanlon ‘” Refusal to supply” Jurisprudence since Oscar 
Bronner’ (2006) 9 Trinity C.L. Rev. 156, 165 
 
338 
 
in order to override the exercise of an IP right, there is no need for very special 
circumstances. The DC Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v Microsoft175 analogizes 
this idea in response to Microsoft’s argument that it should be able to exercise its IP rights as 
it wishes as they are rights bestowed by law; 
 
‘That is no more correct than the proposition that use of one’s personal property, such 
as a baseball bat, cannot give rise to a tort liability.’176 
 
 
 
 
5.5.3.2 The new product requirement 
 
This requirement is considered to have been designed to have the effect of setting a very high 
threshold for finding an abuse in order to justify blocking the free exercise of intellectual 
property rights by the rights holder.177 The refusal must prevent the emergence of a new 
product for which there is a potential demand. There is no clear definition of what a new 
product is in the Magill case, but it appears indicated to be a product that is not currently 
offered in the market. 178  
 
                                                          
175 United States v Microsoft 253 F.3d 34 (DC Circ.2001) 
176 United States v Microsoft 253 F.3d 34 (DC Circ.2001) at 63 
177 Erik Osterud Identifying Exclusionary Abuses by Dominant Undertakings under EU Competition Law: The 
spectrum of tests (Kluwer Law International 2010) 218. The threshold is relatively higher because generally all 
that is needed to show an abuse of a dominant position is a restrictive effect on competition. However, where the 
refusal to license an intellectual property right is involved, the additional burden of showing a prevention of a 
new product in the market must be carried out.    
178 Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television 
Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission of the European Communities [1995] ECR  I-00743 paragraph 54 
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However, the necessity of the ‘new product’ element in a test specifically applicable to a case 
involving intellectual property rights can be questioned. In Tierce Ladbroke SA v 
Commission179 the judgement stated that an abuse of dominance in such cases could be either 
proven where the intellectual property right is indispensable to the business activity the 
complainant wants to engage in or where the refusal prevents the emergence of a new 
product.180 Hence, it appears that the new product requirement is not a necessary qualification 
in these abuse of dominance tests; it may be one of the many considerations. The implications 
of this can however be wider in the sense that it is not a strict test reducing the need for the 
existence of an IP right to justify the use of a test.  
 
The Microsoft judgment stated that the new product criterion fell under a broader article 
102(b)TFEU category of limiting technical development to the prejudice of consumers.181 
Hence, the new product criterion can be one way of showing limiting technical development, 
but not the only way. The two tests (Magill and Microsoft) therefore do not conflict; they are 
alternative tests.182  
 
 
5.5.3.3 How new does the ‘new product’ have to be? 
 
One of the main issues that arises when discussing legal tests that focus on assessing 
innovation is the difficulty of making an objective assessment of the quality of the 
                                                          
179 Case T-504/93 Tierce Ladbroke SA v Commission of the European Communities ECR 1997- II-00923 
180 It may be worth noting however that it can be argued that Ladbroke was trying to introduce a new product in 
the market with potential demand as in Magill; it was going to integrate live broadcasting of races (although not 
necessary for betting) into the betting experience so to speak. See S Opi ‘The Application of the Essential 
Facilities Doctrine to Intellectual Property Licensing in the European Union and the United States: Are 
Intellectual Property Rights Still Sacrosanct?’ (2001) 11(2) Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 409, 461-2 
181Case T-201/04  Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3619 Paragraph 632 
182 Erik Osterud Identifying Exclusionary Abuses by Dominant Undertakings under EU Competition Law: The 
spectrum of tests (Kluwer Law International 2010) 233 
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goods/services in question and of the possibility of increased innovation. Questions about 
whether any of the dominant companies’ competitors have better products that consumers do 
not have access to because of, for example, switching costs, are undoubtedly difficult as it 
can be a subjective issue. What may be a positive innovation to one consumer may be a 
negative to another.  
 
Therefore, to what standard does the ‘newness’ or ‘quality’ of the new product have to be 
proven in order to satisfy this test? The criterion appears to be satisfied as long as the 
products/services are not mere duplicates of what is already offered on the market; it has to 
simply be of a different nature in the sense that it provides features to consumers that are not 
provided by any other competitor or the dominant company itself.183  There is therefore no 
substantive analysis of the quality of the product/service; neither does there seem to be a 
requirement for evidence showing that there would be an actual demand for this 
product/service.184 
 
In Microsoft it appears that a direct appraisal of the newness of a product is not even 
required; instead, the effect on the incentives to innovate can be taken into consideration. The 
incentives test implemented by the EU Commission was to see whether or not competitors’ 
incentives to innovate would be reduced and whether or not the incentives of Microsoft to 
                                                          
183 See Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, Case C-418/01, IMS Health v NDC Health [2004] ECR-I5039, 
para 62. The judgment does not disagree with this statement. The judgment does not set out any elaborate 
criteria to analyse the new product, determine whether it is of a good quality and therefore there would be a 
demand for it. As long as it is different and not offered on the market, there appears to be an assumption that 
there will be a demand for it.  
184 See Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television 
Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission of the European Communities [1995] ECR  I-00743 
.- The judgment in Magill does not discuss any evidence behind substantiating the claim that there is potential 
consumer demand for the new product. It appears to accept the existence of the potential demand as a fact.  
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innovate would be reduced should it be forced to release the interoperability information.185 
But it must be noted that the CJEU stated that the test of whether or not Microsoft’s own 
incentives would be reduced is a question to be answered when considering whether there is 
an objective justification to refuse provision of interoperability information. It was not 
relevant when the judgement was trying to consider a competitor was trying to bring in a new 
product.  
 
 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
5.6.1 Can we apply Magill’s consumer harm test to free high technology cases? 
But does this mean that we have any evidence to be able to apply the Magill test to any other 
abuse apart from that relating to refusal to supply? As we have already seen there is proof in 
the literature and cases that the test in Magill can arguably be applied to cases that do not 
involve intellectual property; the existence of intellectual property rights, in hindsight and in 
essence were not the direct reasons behind having a special consumer harm test.186 But it is 
not necessarily clear whether it can be applied outside the realm of refusal to supply cases.187 
But even when we look at classic refusal to supply cases, we see that they could also directly 
                                                          
185 Erik Osterud Identifying Exclusionary Abuses by Dominant Undertakings under EU Competition Law: The 
spectrum of tests (Kluwer Law International 2010) 80; the author states that the test was in this sense two tiered. 
But disagreed with the EU Commission’s conclusion on whether incentives for Microsoft were reduced. The EU 
Commission shifted the burden of proof on Microsoft to show that incentives to innovate would be there and 
had argued that Microsoft’s incentives to innovate would continue.  
186 Brenda Sufrin ‘Comment on the Magill Case’ (1992) 3(2) Ent. L.R. 67, 68; ‘It would be wrong to look 
at Magill just as an attack on the exercise of intellectual property rights. It can equally be seen as part of the 
application of Article 86 to refusals to supply.’  
187 Ibid Note that the author believes in the extension of Magill beyond IP rights but only to the extent that they 
can apply to Article 86 (Now 102) refusals to supply cases. She lists cases as examples of where abuse was 
found due the denial of resources to competitors showing that these were not limited to cases where there were 
IP rights over the resources. Examples given were Case 238/87 Volvo AB v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd [1988] ECR 
6211 and Case 53/87 CICRA v Régie Nationale des Usines Renault [1988] ECR 6039. Note thought that these 
are under the category of ‘refusal to supply’   
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be part of the broader category of exclusionary conduct, hence putting the focus on the fact 
that it is more about the exclusionary aspect of the refusal that is of concern; in other words 
there was no need to distinguish between refusal to supply and exclusionary cases.188 For 
example, the United Brands and Commercial Solvents cases involved literal refusals to 
supply; the judgements however did not refer to any particular refusal to supply/essential 
facilities doctrine and did not state or indicate the requirement of indispensability or 
essentiality.189 It was seen from these cases that refusal to access a facility or to supply as a 
way to prevent competitors from competing effectively (as opposed to prevent them from 
competing at all or eliminating them from the market) was enough to lead to an abuse even 
where the facility/supply was not essential.190  
 
The indispensability requirement was clearly stated in Oscar Bronner. This does not mean 
that previous cases such as Commercial Solvents and United Brands191 constitute bad law; the 
                                                          
188 John Temple Lang ‘Defining Legitimate Competition: Companies’ Duties to Supply Competitors and Access 
to Essential Facilities’ (1994) 18 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 437, 443 
189 See Joined Cases 6-7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA &  Commercial Solvents Corporation v 
Commission of the European Communities [1974] E.C.R 1974 -00223- company in dominant position refused to 
supply raw materials to a competitor downstream; this could lead to the elimination of that company from the 
market. For this reason the refusal was prohibited. On page 233-235 of the judgement, whilst it was 
acknowledged that there were alternative suppliers and processes that could literally enable the claimant to 
continue producing the end-product, they would be unable to provide it on the same scale and conditions that 
currently enabled it to produce to the efficient levels. Hence, it can definitely be argued that the supply from this 
particular dominant supplier was not essential in its strictest meaning. Hence, it can be argued that 
indispensability/essentiality did not play a strong role in the case. Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission 
[1978] ECR 20- In this case the two parties did not have a competitive relationship downstream. United Brands 
refused to supply to one of its distributors because it started distributing a competing brand of banana. The ECJ 
stated that there was a duty to supply. Again, the distributors had alternative suppliers and therefore the supply 
was not essential/indispensable in its strictest sense. But given United’s dominant position, it would discourage 
other distributors from distributing United’s competitors at the supply level.  
Furthermore, the US has also had similar cases that make us question the need for a specific essential facilities 
doctrine where refusals to supply are involved. For example see Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing 
Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). Aspen Skiing owned three slopes and had a previous agreement with Aspen 
Highlands, which owned one slope, to jointly give access to customers to all slopes on one ticket. Aspen Skiing 
then decided to stop providing this access through a joint ticket. The judgment ignored the essential facilities 
doctrine and simply found Aspen Skiing in breach due to an attempt at monopolization.  
190 John Temple Lang ‘Defining Legitimate Competition: Companies’ Duties to Supply Competitors and Access 
to Essential Facilities’ (1994) 18 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 437, 443 
191 Joined Cases 6-7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA &  Commercial Solvents Corporation v 
Commission of the European Communities [1974] E.C.R 1974 -00223 
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Bronner case can be distinguished in the sense that the judgement stated that it was 
economically feasible to exist without the need of the delivery system and that it would be 
possible for other media to form partnerships together and form their own delivery network. 
However, being able to exist albeit with less competitive force and a facility being 
indispensable are two different things. Bronner is therefore seen as an attempt to limit the 
scope of any existing refusal to supply doctrine.192        
 
4.6.2 New test; Combining the Magill test and innovation markets 
The new product requirement in the Magill test is probably the point at which we can 
consider the potential use of innovation markets. However, it is important to note that the 
new product in Magill and the innovation market are conceptually different. The new product 
is a specifically identifiable and viable product for which there would be consumer demand. 
Innovation markets involve a future product that may be identifiable, but it is uncertain how 
successful and useful it may be. This is because the innovation market considers the product 
at its research and development stage.  
 
However, our consideration of competition analysis in this section reveals that the concept of 
an innovation market reaches a standard (in terms of its ability to predict whether there will 
be new products in the future) acceptable by the standards seen in the case law. Whilst we 
saw Magill require the identification of a specific new product (with no strict standards of 
proof that there would be a demand for the new product), Microsoft merely considered the 
incentives to innovate. Microsoft did not require any particular potential improvements or 
new features that the refusal would prevent to be identified. It appears to state that the refusal 
                                                          
192 Sergio Baches Opi ‘The Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to Intellectual Property Licensing in 
the European Union and the United States: Are Intellectual Property Rights Still Sacrosanct?’ (2001) 11(2) 
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 409, 433 
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would lower incentives on the part of competitors to innovate and therefore this would 
prevent technological development. Analysing the different R&D projects in an innovation 
market is also a way to allow the prediction of new products and innovations in the future. If 
anything, it requires a higher standard of proof in the sense that the different operating R&D 
projects need to be considered.  
 
I therefore propose the following test for abuse of dominance cases:  
A practice of a high technology company operating online in the relevant market 
where the product/service is free, can only be considered an abuse of a dominant 
position when  
a) it prevents the emergence of a new product and 
b) competition eliminated in the relevant current product market.    
 
However, as discussed, the emergence of a new product is not a strict requirement. That can 
be replaced by the test below.  
 
A practice of a high technology company operating online in the relevant market 
where the product/service is free, can only be considered an abuse of a dominant 
position when  
a) it significantly reduces competition in any relevant innovation markets it 
operates and 
b) competition is eliminated in the relevant current product market.    
 
Ensuring that the innovation market remains competitive is another way of ensuring that new 
products or improvements are not prevented in the future.  
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Similarly, I propose the following test for merger cases: 
 
A concentration in the relevant market where one of the products/services is free, will 
significantly impede effective competition, in the common market or in a substantial 
part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant 
position, when  
a) it significantly reduces competition in any relevant innovation markets the 
merging parties operate and 
b) competition is eliminated in the relevant current product market.    
and shall be declared incompatible with the common market. 
 
 
5.6.3 How is this test similar to the Magill test? 
5.6.3.1 Exceptional Circumstances: 
The specific qualification that this test only applies to situations concerning a high 
technology company providing free services could be considered fulfilling the ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ qualification that justified the formulation of the special Magill test. Just like 
the test in Magill was formulated with the aim of striking a balance between the free exercise 
of rights giving a monopoly over particular intellectual property which potentially 
encouraged innovation to the benefit of consumers and a reduction in competition resulting 
from a refusal to access the intellectual property potentially decreasing benefits to consumers. 
Similarly, with free high technology markets there is the unique situation where a dominant 
company with market power is providing a highly innovative service for free to the benefit of 
consumers (the company’s increasing dominance being an important reason behind its ability 
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to provide an increasingly innovative service) and a reduction in competition. Just like the 
Magill test, this new test for free high technology would involve a balancing act where a 
potentially monopolising act has the advantage of benefiting consumers ultimately but could 
also decrease competition in the market.  The potential reduction in competition due to the 
unilateral act would have to be balanced against the potential increase in consumer welfare 
also likely to emanate from the dominance enhancing act.  
 
 
5.6.3.2 High standard for indispensability and new product: 
The Magill test first asks whether the refusal prevents the emergence of a new product. Lets 
say it does and therefore the authorities/judge wants to intervene in the use of the 
monopolising intellectual property right. As we have seen, this can be argued to be a 
significant intervention of a right that should reach a high standard of justification. The way 
this is done is by introducing a balancing element in the test. In Magill this comes in the form 
of the ‘indispensability’ aspect of the test where it is asked whether competition in the 
secondary market is completely eliminated; in other words, is the intellectual property right 
indispensable for the survival of competitors in that market. This reflects a high standard of 
justification for intervention. Similarly, we require the proposed test for free high technology 
to include some sort of balancing act. 
 
If the innovation market is found to be competitive in the first part of the test and at that point 
the unilateral act of the dominant company would not be in breach of competition rules. Of 
course, there is then the likelihood that competition is reduced considerably in the current 
product market. Although we have discussed that in the case of free high technology a 
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reduction in competition does not adversely affect consumer welfare (but may even in fact 
improve it), we also acknowledge the possibility of false positives in competition analysis.193  
 
We therefore must ensure that there is some safeguard in the test. This is why the second part 
of the test would attempt to assure that a dominant free high technology company is not 
allowed to continue with otherwise abusive practices with the excuse of a highly competitive 
innovation market at the expense of significant levels of competition in the current product 
market. But because we recognize the unique contribution to consumer welfare that dominant 
free high technologies can make, there needs to be a complete elimination of competition as 
opposed to a reduction to find the company foul of competition rules. Although this test is 
skewed towards favouring a dominant free high technology company, the requirement that an 
elimination of competition should not take place will protect against the risks of having no 
competition whatsoever and having a pure monopoly.  
 
5.6.3.3 No need for a radical approach to free high technology markets 
Our consideration of free high technology markets has revealed how, from a consumer 
welfare point of view, the analysis of innovation is more important than in any other market. 
This is especially because other markets involve a monetary price being charged to 
consumers and therefore in those circumstances a reduction in competition could pose a real 
danger to consumers because of significantly higher prices.  
 
But we also observed that generally both historical and current competition analysis avoids 
making direct analysis of innovation as a determinant of outcomes. Suggesting such a method 
would be, so to speak, radical at the place competition analysis is at. The test proposed here 
                                                          
193 See A Devlin & B Jacobs ‘Antitrust error’ (2010) 52(1) Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 75 
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for free-high technology markets avoids this approach (despite it being an appropriate one) 
and sticks to traditional analysis of competition in markets. It simply alters the market to be 
analysed. In doing so it eludes any radical approach and becomes more acceptable and suited 
to current competition regime’s analysis.  
 
5.6.4 The consequences of applying this test 
5.6.4.1 How this test will work in practice  
 
It is important to illustrate how the proposed test would have panned out in the EU 
Commission investigations we looked at in Chapters 3 and 4. The first part of the test asks us 
to consider whether there will be a significant reduction in competition in relevant innovation 
markets. The second part of the test asks us to consider whether competition will be 
completely eliminated in the current product market. We will see below how these tests 
would have operated in the Facebook/Whatsapp  and Microsoft/Skype mergers.  
 
5.6.4.1.1 Facebook/Whatsapp 
In the case of the Facebook/Whatsapp merger investigation what would happen is that 
instead of considering what current alternative social networks there are in the market, they 
would consider to what degree and number of alternative players are currently developing 
social network innovations in the market.  As we saw in section 5.4, the innovation market in 
digital high technology markets is likely to be very high. Research and development costs are 
low relative to other industries like pharmaceuticals and innovations can be made relatively 
easily. The EU Commission would be able to argue, for example, that there are players in the 
market such as Snapchat, Twitter and Periscope who have research units that are working on 
innovative ways to socially communicate. Furthermore, the EU Commission could argue that 
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barriers to entry are low given the relatively low capital costs of research and development 
involved. Hence, the innovation market will be presented as one with, not only a suitable 
number of alternative players, but also a suitable number of potential new players in the 
future, which could for example include less well-known start-ups whose research and 
development projects are at an embryonic stage. As we saw in our analyses in Chapter 4, the 
EU Commission has time and again argued that barriers to entry are low in the current 
product market for entry indicating that new players are able to enter the market. However, 
this argument makes less sense given that barriers are in reality low; the new player cannot 
just be able to enter the market, but also be able to effectively compete. It is harder to 
convincingly show this when the current incumbents possess very high market shares and 
benefit from significant network effects. However, saying that barriers to entry are low in the 
innovation market is more convincing as capital costs to start a project are low. There is no 
further requirement to show whether new players can actually effectively compete in the 
innovation market as the technology is not present for use by consumers yet. Hence, 
arguments regarding market share and network effects become redundant.  
 
Finally, the developing innovations that could be taken into consideration would be wide-
ranging. For example, let us say Snapchat are developing virtual reality glasses that allows 
users to feel that they are in the same room remotely when interacting with each other. Whilst 
this is not currently part of the public consciousness as a form of social networking, there is 
nothing to prevent the EU Commission from taking this into consideration in the innovation 
market when considering a merger involving Facebook. The EU Commission would not be 
required to prove extensively that the virtual reality glasses will be successful, that they will 
allow Snapchat to become a better competitor in the social networking market or that it will 
completely revolutionise social networking to the point that it will render the technology of 
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the likes of Facebook obsolete (and therefore belongs to a completely different market). As 
we have seen in the EU Commission’s pharmaceutical investigations, it  has taken into 
consideration the competitive constraints from research and development that is embryonic in 
that it is several years away from having the ability to show that it will be a successful 
product. It would therefore be enough for the EU Commission to be satisfied that there is 
simply a technology being developed that has some potential (even if seemingly limited now) 
use in social networking.  
 
Overall, the EU Commission would convincingly show that the innovation market is 
competitive, taking into consideration a wide-ranging group of current players, potential 
players and research and development programmes. A merger with Whatsapp would 
therefore not reduce competition significantly.  
 
The next part of the test would require the EU Commission to consider whether competition 
in the current product/service market is eliminated completely. The EU Commission here has 
a very high bar to reach to show this; there need only be one other competitor in the current 
product market for this part of the test to fail. We have seen in the case of 
Facebook/Whatsapp, even though both have very high market shares in social networking 
and communications applications, there are always other competitors such as Viber and 
Snapchat still present. Although we have argued in this thesis that barriers to entry through 
network effects are high enough to lead to a significant reduction in competition, they are low 
enough to allow some other competitors in the market, even though they may not be effective 
competitors. Hence the barriers are low enough so as to not lead to a complete elimination of 
competition. 
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Hence, the merger would be authorised under the test as competition would not be 
significantly reduced in the innovation market and eliminated in the current product market.  
 
Note that at no point does the EU Commission have to address arguments on network effects 
and market share in the first part of the test in its analysis of innovation markets. The research 
and development in the innovation market is not, in the conventional sense, being sold to 
anyone. Therefore there are no market share related issues here. The innovations are being 
developed internally. The arguments regarding network effects would be relevant to the 
second part of the test. However as explained, that part of the test would be difficult to satisfy 
as the EU Commission would have to show that network effects completely eliminate 
competition leading to a significant reduction in competition. By raising the bar in the second 
part of the test to a complete elimination of competition, the EU Commission can 
convincingly argue that network effects, whilst strong, are unlikely to lead to an elimination 
of competition. For example, Google already has over 90% market share in online search in 
Europe. Network effects have still not allowed a complete elimination of competition as 10% 
of the market belongs to smaller competitors. 
 
 
5.6.4.1.2 Microsoft/Skype 
In the case of Microsoft/Skype the EU Commission would consider the alternative innovative 
communications currently being developed in the innovation market instead of the 
competitors active in the current voice/video/instant messaging communications applications 
market. This would allow the EU Commission to consider other companies such as Apple 
(Facetime), Whatsapp, Facebook and Viber as companies who are regularly attempting to 
improve user experience by adding new features and improving quality of video 
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communications. The EU Commission is unable to convincingly take these competitors into 
consideration in the current product market especially if we consider that to be video 
communications on personal computers. Skype would end up having a massive market share 
through tipping given the Windows operating system’s large market share, leading to 
potential anti-competitive tying. In this scenario the EU Commission has to argue, as it did, 
that the market had competitors who are constantly innovating. As we know from previous 
chapters in this thesis, network effects are likely to prevent switching to other competitors 
even if they are more innovative. The EU Commission got around such arguments by saying 
that market shares were constantly changing and that switching was easy.  
 
When considering the innovation market however, arguments regarding tying and network 
effects do not come into play. In the innovation market the product is still being developed 
and improved; it is not in the market yet to be attached to a particular operating 
system/platform leading to network effects. Also, there is less likely to be controversy 
regarding market share in the innovation market. Yes, post-merger the two companies may 
combine their research projects to have a greater share of the innovation market, but this will 
be a lot less than their share in the current product market. For example, let’s say in the 
current product market Skype has 90% market share and there are 9 other competitors who 
have a split of the remaining 10%. Let’s say Microsoft was hypothetically one of those 9 
competitors developing its own video communications.194 In the innovation market however, 
Skype only has 10% of the market. Post-merger however, it together with Microsoft will have 
20%. 80% of the market will still be shared by 8 other competitors.  
 
                                                          
194 See Peter Bright ‘Microsoft buys Skype for $8.5 billion. Why, exactly?’ (Wired, 5 October 2011) available at 
https://www.wired.com/2011/05/microsoft-buys-skype-2/ accessed on 15 July 2018 
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In terms of the second part of the test the EU Commission is required to consider whether the 
merger would lead to the complete elimination of competition in the current product market 
to the point where there is no other video communications applications available on windows 
operating systems. This is difficult to prove as even on windows operating systems there are 
alternatives such as the desktop version of Viber and Google Hangouts which also allow 
video and voice communications.195 Hence, this part of the test would not be satisfied either 
due to the higher standard of showing complete elimination as opposed to significant 
reduction of competition in the current product market. Therefore the Microsoft/Skype merger 
would most likely be cleared under the test.  
 
 
5.6.4.1.3 Hypothetical scenario-taking the example of Google’s acquisition of Tenor 
 
In March 2018 Google acquired GIF image search company Tenor.196 GIFs are compressed 
series of images that consumers can use to express what they want to say via text or other 
communications applications such as Whatsapp. Tenor has a keyboard that can be attached to 
communications applications such as Facebook messenger to search for relevant GIFs to be 
sent to other users. Tenor has a large database of search users for GIFs. Although the 
acquisition was not scrutinised, because perhaps it did not reach certain turnover 
thresholds,197 we could analyse how it would work under our proposed test in hypothetical 
terms.  
                                                          
195 See Rob Nightingale ‘Fed up with Skype? Here are 6 of the best free alternatives.’ (MakeUseOf 22 February 
2017) available at < https://www.makeuseof.com/tag/fed-up-with-skype-here-are-6-of-the-best-free-
alternatives/> accessed on 15 July 2018 
196 Matthew Lynley ‘Google is acquiring GIF platform Tenor’ (Tech Crunch 27 Mar 2018) available at 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/03/27/google-acquires-gif-platform-tenor/ accessed on 5 August 2018 
197 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the United States has jurisdiction over investigating mergers where 
the company being acquired has to be valued at at least $50 million and the sales of one party has to be at least 
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Let’s say that we are in a situation where Tenor is the leading search engine for GIFs, GIFs 
have become the primary way of text communication and as a result, revenues have reached 
threshold levels that require scrutiny from the EU Commission. Under the current product 
market there would be a highly viable argument that Google can leverage its market share in 
search into GIF search through Tenor by integrating a Tenor search function into its general 
search function. This sort of tying could lead to the foreclosure of competing GIF search 
engines due to network effects and therefore lead to a significant reduction in competition. 
The EU Commission would, recognising that GIFs are free and Googles broader range of 
resources could potentially improve the GIF database, consider the merger to be good for 
consumers. In doing so, it would downplay the network effects that Tenor would benefit from 
and focus on the notion that the GIF market has multiple players and is characterised by 
unstable market shares. In this way it would justify the merger. Of course, we know that these 
arguments are inaccurate and the more likely outcome is that there will be a significant 
reduction in competition due to strong network effects.  
 
Under our proposed test however, the innovation market would still genuinely contain a 
number of competing players invested in innovating their GIF search technology.198  There 
are already a number of companies currently that have GIF databases.199 They would all have 
their own research and development teams perhaps attempting to produce better quality GIFs 
and improving the search technology so users can more easily find the specific GIFs they’re 
                                                          
$100 million whilst those of the other has to be at least $10 million (See FTC ‘Introductory Guide II: To file or 
not to file- when you must file a premerger notification form’ available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/premerger-introductory-guides/guide2.pdf accessed on 15 
July 2018). Tenor may not have sales worth at least $10 million; its estimated revenue was valued at $3 million 
(See https://www.owler.com/company/tenor2 ) 
198 See Craft ‘Tenor Competitors’ available at https://craft.co/tenor/competitors accessed on 15 July 2018 
199 Ibid 
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looking for. Furthermore, the capital investment may be considered low in this sort of 
innovation market meaning that it is quite easy to enter the market to start developing a new 
GIF database. GIPHY for example, partners with various media companies to ensure it has a 
license for GIFs that are, for instance, taken from clips of movies. It appears that GIPHY 
does not have to pay for these meaning that the capital cost is relatively low; the media 
companies in return gain promotion of their products through these GIFs.200 
 
Finally, as we have indicated, there are a number of competing GIF companies such as Giphy 
and Viotalk already present in the market.201 Hence, the merger is unlikely to lead to a 
complete elimination of competition in the market, although there may be a significant 
reduction. The second part of our test will therefore be successfully satisfied.  
 
5.6.4.2 Avoiding a traditional analysis of the current product market 
 
We saw in Chapter 3 clearly all the problems behind a traditional analysis of the current 
product market. The EU Commission is of the belief that the otherwise anti-competitive 
practices/merger of free high technology companies are good for consumer welfare. 
However, they are stuck applying a traditional analysis which forces them to show the free 
high technology companies to have low market power; as that is the only way you can let 
them off the hook. We saw how this leads to the EU Commission utilizing limited arguments 
that create a sense of uncertainty over the law. 
 
                                                          
200 Aashish Pahwa ‘How Giphy works and makes money? Everything you should know’ (Feedough 21 March 
2017) available at https://www.feedough.com/how-giphy-works-and-makes-money/ accessed on 5 August 2018 
201 Craft ‘Tenor Competitors’ available at https://craft.co/tenor/competitors accessed on 15 July 2018 
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This test allows the authorities to do away with this form of analysis and therefore do not 
have to answer any questions on factors such as market power and market share in the current 
product relevant market, and network effects. In other words, any questions asked to 
determine whether competition in the current product market will be reduced will become 
irrelevant. There will therefore be no need to come up with confusing justifications to satisfy 
the original competition law tests.  
 
Instead, the authorities will be required to look at competition from a very different angle. As 
we have seen, the innovation market is about looking at the alternate innovation projects 
(both current and potential) run by competing companies. From the technical definition of the 
innovation market it is much more plausible to show that there is relatively less market power 
than there would be in the current product market. In an innovation market one innovation 
project is just as potent as the other. At the research and development stage it is uncertain as 
to how successful any particular project will manifest into a successful product/service that 
will allow it to gain significant amounts of market power in future markets. In a current 
product market, one company’s product can be more potent in the sense that it is in the 
market already and can be much more highly demanded by consumers. We have seen, 
especially in the case of development of completely new products (not just improvements on 
current products) that will replace current products, market power in the current product 
market does not have any influence on the likely success of any innovation projects.  
 
With free high technology, we are more likely to get a highly competitive innovation market 
as it is relatively easy to have the technology in development. Questions about network 
effects at that stage are not likely to be relevant as the product or service in development is 
not in the market yet. Hence, questions about whether consumers are locked in and their 
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switching costs are not relevant. Those issues can be avoided and therefore there would be no 
need for the authorities to conjure up arguments based on limited reasoning. 
 
Finally, dominant free high technology companies are rewarded for their contribution to 
consumer welfare decreases in competition in the current product/service market as long as 
there are competing attempts at innovation in the market. This should also include a 
consideration of their own attempts at innovation. Although it appears that when applying the 
‘emergence of a new product’ test the effect on the incentives of the dominant company 
holding the essential facility to innovate is irrelevant,202 Magill is quiet on whether the 
dominant company itself planning to enter the market with the same new product would 
make the refusal to supply acceptable; however, this seems enough to avoid liability under 
the test. 203 
 
In summary the new proposed test solves the problem of limited and inconsistent reasoning 
of the EU Commission in free high technology cases by excluding the need for discussing 
network effects, which would only be relevant to the discussion of current product markets. It 
then enhances the quality of analysis by promoting the highly likely increase of consumer 
welfare as a result of increases in the market power of free high technology companies. At 
the same time it prevents the complete elimination of competition in the current product 
market to avoid the risk of false positives. Even if in this part of the test, the argument on 
network effects is used accurately, it is likely to only lead to the conclusion that competition 
would be significantly reduced. It would be difficult to prove that competition is eliminated. 
                                                          
202 Erik Osterud Identifying Exclusionary Abuses by Dominant Undertakings under EU Competition Law: The 
spectrum of tests (Kluwer Law International 2010) 227 
203 Sergio Baches Opi ‘The Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to Intellectual Property Licensing in 
the European Union and the United States: Are Intellectual Property Rights Still Sacrosanct?’ (2001) 11(2) 
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 409, 462 
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Regardless of our emphasis on the market power of companies like Google and Microsoft, 
the literally always have smaller competitors in the same current product market, even if they 
are not thriving.  Hence, it is likely that the incumbent’s action will fail this part of the test 
and the EU Commission will be able to allow the incumbent to continue with its consumer 
welfare enhancing actions, even if they lead to a reduction in competition. We know from our 
analyses in Chapter 3 that this appears to be the most likely intention of the EU Commission. 
 
5.6.4.3 Relevant market of advertising 
 
We note that a lot of the free high technologies we discussed in Chapter 3 are involved in 
online advertising. However, we chose to focus on the user’s point of view as the majority of 
the cases analysed did not involve an advertising market and for those that did, the market 
share in online advertising was low. For example, Facebook has a low market share in 
advertising and therefore from that particular point of view, the authorisation of the merger 
would appear non-controversial. The exception to all of this is Google/Doubleclick which 
appears to be the one anomaly that does not fit in very well with the thesis’ hypothesis. 
However, because it is the exception rather than the rule, the focus remained on users in this 
thesis.  
 
One could argue though in any future case involving a company like Google which has a 
major market share in a non-free sector such as advertising, the proposed test would allow the 
incumbent to reduce competition in a market where consumers have to pay a price; prices for 
advertisers could go up significantly. However, the simple solution to this is the use of 
commitments. For example, if in Facebook/Whatsapp Facebook did have a much larger 
market share in advertising already, the proposed test would only be applied to Facebook as a 
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social network and Whatsapp as a free communications application. Data could be exchanged 
between the two networks in order enhance, for example, the social network experience; 
Whatsapp already shares phone numbers with Facebook to improve friends suggestions.204 
However, the two parties would have to commit to not using the data to improve ad targeting. 
In that way the problem of a simultaneous reduction in competition in online advertising can 
be dealt with
                                                          
204 James Titcomb ‘WhatsApp is now sharing your phone number with Facebook - here's how to stop 
it’ (The Telegraph 26 August 2016) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/08/25/whatsapps-new-
privacy-policy-lets-it-share-your-phone-number-wit/ accessed on 2 September 2017 
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CHAPTER 6- CONCLUSION 
6.1 Conclusion 
 
As mentioned we first set the background against which the EU Commission investigations 
into free high technologies take place. The background included two main elements. First is 
the unique economics of free high technology. Second are the objectives and presumptions of 
competition law. In terms of economic theory there is a general consensus that large 
dominant firms or monopolies are not good for consumers. Monopolies are understood to be 
complacent and therefore are inefficient and suffer from a lack of motivation to innovate. 
However, we see a very different potential picture with free high technology companies that 
are large and dominant.  
 
Free high technology monopolies are good for consumers for a number of reasons. It was 
discovered in Chapter 2 that they are two-sided markets and therefore are able to uniquely 
help consumers like other two-sided markets in a way a single-sided one cannot. As a two-
sided market, these companies are involved in matching different groups of people who want 
something from each other on a common platform. If there is a platform in the market which 
is a monopoly and there are no competitors, then the platform will have all users in one place. 
This increases the chance of any one user being matched correctly. If there are many 
competitors, then all consumers will be split amongst different platforms and therefore there 
is a smaller chance that a user will be matched with the desired person/entity on the other 
side. For example, this is also similar to the concept of search engines being more effective 
when they have more users. They have a wider pool of information from which to detect 
search patterns and therefore be able to provide better search results. For these reasons it was 
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also found that multi-homing by consumers of several platforms simultaneously was 
inefficient.  
 
In terms of innovation, two-sided platforms are also beneficial to consumers. This is 
especially given that they tend to have a group of consumers that they charge far less and 
therefore the only way to attract them is to actually keep the level of innovation very high. 
This is especially seen and important in social networks and search engines as users are not 
charged anything. This high level of innovation then allows the platform to charge a higher 
and more lucrative price to the other side of the market.  
 
Chapter 2 also went beyond the two-sidedness of free high technology companies and 
explained how they are even a unique group amongst two-sided high technology markets in 
terms of providing consumers with benefits. We saw that the fact that they charge a £0 fee for 
their services to consumers means that any innovation, quality changes or additional features 
they implement will always result in an increase in consumer welfare. This may not be the 
case in other high technology sectors where there is regular innovation as there is a chance 
that the price may be proportionally higher than the quality improvement. We also saw that 
another reason innovation was very likely to be high in the free high technology industry was 
because there was always the threat of next-generation products/services which could 
completely replace the current market. This threat is always a strong motivation for 
companies to constantly attempt huge leaps in innovation.  
 
For all these reasons above it was established that the larger the free high technology 
company the better for consumers. Consumers further benefit from the fact that there are 
unique factors that motivate these large companies to constantly innovate despite the theory 
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that monopolies are in a complacent place and therefore are never motivated to make 
improvements out of fear of losing market share.  
 
We then moved on to establish whether this unique theory of free high technology markets 
actually suited the objectives and presumptions of competition law. It was found that 
competition authorities interpret fundamentally that competition is good for consumers. 
Although, for example, the guidance on the enforcement of Article 102 may indicate that the 
European Commission acknowledges in some instances more competition may not indicate 
better consumer welfare, in practice the authorities carry out their analyses in a way to 
strongly reflect that consumer welfare is directly proportional to competition. The issue is 
however, this presumption of competition law is incongruent with the unique features of free 
high technology. Therefore there is a tension between consumer welfare and competition in 
these markets.  
 
Where there is a tension between objectives, it needs to be established which one takes 
precedence over the other. In that way one can see what the result for free high technologies 
under investigation would be. If the main objective is consumer welfare, then free high 
technologies should be allowed to carry out activities that expand their market power. If it is 
competition, then these activities need to be limited. What we eventually find is that 
consumer welfare is the main objective of competition law over all other objectives and to 
say otherwise appears controversial.  
 
At the end we therefore bear witness to a, so to speak, confusing set of relationships. On the 
one hand consumer welfare is the prioritised objective of competition law, meaning that 
competition law and policy is to encourage or at least not hinder any increase in market 
363 
 
power on the part of free high technologies. On the other hand, competition law is based on 
the idea that competition is good for consumers. Therefore, it would be difficult to justify 
increases in market power due to the concomitant decreases in competition. But increases in 
market power are likely to be good for consumer welfare.  
 
Now that the theoretical/ideological tensions have been established in the context of free high 
technology and competition law, we moved on to Chapters 3 and 4 where we see how these 
tensions manifest themselves in the analyses and evaluations of competition authorities when 
they investigate free high technology markets. We then see how some real problems of 
uncertainty and inconsistency arise.  
 
In Chapter 3 we moved on to looking into competition law analytical frameworks related to 
relevant market analysis in free high technology markets. We began by establishing that a 
major part of the analytical framework in the form of market definition always requires 
competition authorities to analyse the number of and strengths of competitors in the market. 
Therefore competition analysis is to always ideologically begin with the notion that the 
amount and nature of competition in the market is important. Other forms of analyses that 
come after market definition such as ‘closeness of competition’, complements and leaving the 
market definition wide or open, although they may clash with the fundamental essence of 
defining a relevant market, all still entail the scrutiny of the level of competition in the 
market. We therefore already see an inconsistency with free high technology markets where 
competition levels are not important to determine the level of consumer welfare in the 
market.  
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In Chapter 4, we then looked at the substantive arguments that the EU Commission carried 
out with the purpose of finding out what the level of competition in the market is. These were 
arguments surrounding network effects, market share and innovation. We generally saw that 
the EU Commission shaped these arguments in a manner that showed that there was enough 
competition in the market and that also reflected that the level of competition in the market is 
to be the most important factor in free high technology markets just like any other market 
under investigation.   
 
We saw three different forms of network effects namely barriers to entry, lock-in effects and 
switching costs. The EU Commission generally follows a narrative in its free high technology 
investigations that barriers to entry are low because launching a service on the internet costs 
very little and web services can reach huge amounts of customers very easily. However, the 
literature reveals very important points that are overlooked by the EU Commission. For 
example, consumers very often stick to one service even if there is a competitor with a better 
quality service simply because they were used to a particular service. This presents high 
barriers to entry in the sense that it is hard for new competitors to take customers from the 
incumbent and survive. That is why ‘first movers’ in the industry very often are looked at as 
presenting high barriers even if their services are of a lower quality. Hence the EU 
Commission’s argument is limited in the sense it does not take into consideration these 
factors. Furthermore, it is also inconsistent as it describes barriers to entry to be very high in 
technological interoperability cases even where switching to different software such as media 
players and web browsers is free.  
 
With lock-in effects it was again seen that they were not strong enough to keep customers 
away from competitors. Users were always free to move between, for example, social 
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networks and communication applications. However, it was ignored that users again were 
likely to stick to the incumbent’s services. A lot of this has to do with the fact that the 
incumbent such as a large search engine has a lot of data that it can use to generate more 
effective search results simply due to the vast amount of information available. Also, a 
network such as a social network creates positive feedback loops in the sense that more and 
more people will join and stick to the network simply because more people they know are 
present on those networks/platforms.  These factors allow the incumbent to in a way coerce 
users into sticking to its services. Again, these are arguments that the EU Commission does 
not take into consideration. 
 
Finally, the EU Commission considered that switching costs for users were very low because 
none of these technology services actually cost anything in terms of money and the physical 
act of switching was easy. For example, with a search engine it means simply typing in a 
different URL for a different search engine. Again, however, the EU Commission failed to 
take into consideration the more subtle arguments with regards to switching. Behavioural 
economics strongly suggests that once users are used to using a particular service of the 
incumbent, they get used to it and stick to it. Looking for an alternative service indicates a 
high search cost for the user. This was further supported by evidence on search engine 
switching and trademark cases.  Even with the EU Commission believing the opposite, it was 
interesting to see how it appeared to consider switching costs to be lower in the unilateral 
cases where Microsoft tied its media player and web browser to its operating system. Free 
versions of both are available on the internet and can physically be downloaded at no extra 
cost and with a few clicks. Again the EU Commission appears inconsistent and there is no 
linearity in the arguments amongst the different categories of cases.  
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Market share was another main area of analysis and discussion for the EU Commission in 
terms of free high technology markets. Like the network effects arguments there was also an 
inconsistent approach. Market share in free high technology markets is considered temporary 
and therefore does not present a threat to competitors who can take over from the incumbent 
by simply innovating or differentiating their service. However, it would always appear that 
the EU Commission would consider that the high market share as a competitive threat when 
it considered the competitive pressure emanating from the concerned entity’s competitors. 
But when it came to the free high technology company under investigation itself, its market 
share was considered to be fleeting and therefore not a threat to competition. Furthermore, we 
also so how in a number of other technology cases market share was considered as an 
important factor that indicated an enhanced level of dominance. For these reasons the EU 
Commission’s approach is limited and inconsistent.  
 
Finally, there is the argument regarding innovation. The EU Commission does not directly 
assess the actual innovation generated by the incumbent and competitors. Instead, it makes 
assumptions about the motives to innovate depending on the level of competition present in 
the market. It is therefore another form of analysis of the EU Commission that makes its 
conclusion dependent on competition.  
 
In summary, we see the EU Commission paint a picture of low dominance in the free high 
technology markets. This is not consistent with the existence of network effects and durable 
high market shares. Furthermore, it is not consistent with the way the EU Commission has 
construed other technology cases.  
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Our next stage was to hypothesise about why the EU Commission implemented such a 
confusing approach given the facts that we had. The hypothesis was as follows: 
 
The substantive arguments/rationale used to justify the EU Commission’s decisions in 
free high technology investigations are limited and inconsistent because the EU 
Commission, whilst believing that a free high technology company having increased 
market share to the detriment of competitors could be good for consumer welfare, 
needs to prove that there would be a competitive market despite the merger or 
unilateral action of the dominant company(ies). 
 
In Chapter 2 we observed how dominant free high technology companies can be better for 
consumer welfare compared to a situation where there are high levels of competition. We 
also saw that consumer welfare is the main objective of competition law. So we start at this 
point and take it that the competition authorities in pursuit of a consumer welfare objective 
would want to allow free high technology companies to engage in practices and mergers that 
could lead to an increase in market power as this can be good for consumer welfare. What we 
saw in Chapter 4, is that the EU commission in fact does allow such actions and mergers to 
take place. However, the rationale it uses to justify these decisions is limited and inconsistent. 
This then can be attributed to the fact that the only way the EU Commission can justify these 
mergers and unilateral actions is by showing that there is a high level of competition in the 
market already. This is because of the way the analytical framework that is set. We saw for 
example how market definition and other forms of analysis in competition law investigations 
obligate the EU Commission to consider the level of competition in the market to determine 
dominance. Without dominance, there can be no abuse or a significant reduction in 
competition that is illegal under competition rules and regulations. Hence, if the EU 
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Commission wants to allow these mergers and unilateral actions, it has no choice but to paint 
the picture of high levels of competition in the market even when this is not the case.  
 
Given the hypothesis, we do not see any problem with the EU Commission’s decision itself; 
it is consistent with the objective of consumer welfare and allows dominant free high 
technology companies to flourish to the benefit of consumers. The problem of inconsistency 
and limited reasoning however, remains. Our next step is to therefore find a legal test that rids 
us of these problems and that the EU Commission can use to convincingly justify non-
intervention in mergers and unilateral actions of free high technology companies.  
 
In Chapter 5 we explored the possibility of coming up with a test that could assess innovation 
directly and do away with any test that prioritizes the consideration of competition in the 
market. What was found that all competition law tests require a consideration of competition 
in the authorities’ and courts’ analyses even if it is to the slightest level. It would be too 
controversial a step to put forward a test that ignored competition assessment completely. 
Instead, it is more appropriate and acceptable to propose a test that changes the angle from 
which competition is looked at in free high technology cases.  To help us with this, we 
determined that a combination between the Magill test and innovation market concept could 
allow us to come up with a test that could, whilst not avoiding an assessment of competition 
all together, avoid the need to involve arguments regarding network effects and market share.  
We recall that these were the aspects of free high technology that the EU Commission were 
making confusing arguments about.  
 
Innovation markets consider the number of research and development projects in the market 
that are substitutable with each other and therefore also competing against each other. This is 
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not the same as the amount of competition in the current product market. For example, with a 
search engine the current product market involves all the alternative search engines operating 
online. The innovation market would be the number of research projects funded by 
competitors and the incumbent search engine for the purpose of introducing a new product in 
the future. Whether there will be a successful new product in the near future is a different 
matter. For a search engine this could mean, for example, researching a new advanced form 
of search in the form of a home assistant.  But it could be other areas of research not related 
to search. The innovation market would contain all other projects attempting the same type of 
innovation. We then saw that given the nature of free high technology markets, at any one 
time there will be a significant number of competing research projects by both dominant 
established companies and smaller start-ups. Hence, an innovation market would genuinely 
be competitive. Arguments with regards to network effects and market share are not relevant 
as the uncertain culmination of the research project is not in the market yet. Innovation 
markets have been considered extensively in pharmaceutical cases and therefore there is no 
reason that it cannot be considered in free high technology cases in the sense that it is not a 
concept foreign to competition law. We saw that there was one problem. There is no way to 
simply justify the sole consideration of innovation markets without further qualifications. 
Hence, current product markets would still have to be considered and the EU Commission 
would have to apply the same inconsistent and limited rationale to justify the mergers and 
unilateral actions. Therefore it would not allow us to solve the main problem.  
However, a modification of the Magill test would allow us to shift focus on innovation 
markets. We saw that the Magill test was especially formulated for situations where the 
refusal to license a monopolising  Intellectual Property right would potentially lead to the 
restriction of competition. Whilst the grant of an Intellectual Property right may lead to a 
monopoly in a specific area, we saw that there were advantages associated with it such as the 
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encouragement of innovation on the part of companies. Similarly, with free high technology 
industries we have a situation where complainants want to restrict its potentially 
monopolising actions. But it also means punishing a large company that provides a free 
service that is highly innovative. The monopolising action itself is likely to also lead to 
further benefits for consumers as we saw from Chapter 2. Hence, these are special 
circumstances that call for a special analysis like that associated with the Magill test. 
Therefore the following test was proposed: 
 
A practice of a high technology company operating online in the relevant market 
where the product/service is free, can only be considered an abuse of a dominant 
position when  
a) it significantly reduces competition in any relevant innovation markets it 
operates and 
b) competition is eliminated in the relevant current product market.    
 
Similarly, the following test for merger cases the proposed test is as follows: 
 
A concentration in the relevant market where one of the products/services is free, will 
significantly impede effective competition, in the common market or in a substantial 
part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant 
position, when  
a) it significantly reduces competition in any relevant innovation markets the 
merging parties operate and 
b) competition is eliminated in the relevant current product market.    
and shall be declared incompatible with the common market. 
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In part ‘a’ the test avoids the need to discuss network effects and market share that would 
otherwise have to be discussed in the current product market. We saw that due to the 
intention of the EU Commission to be lenient towards free high technology companies whilst 
being stuck with an analytical framework based on competition being good for consumers, 
the EU Commission put forward limited and inconsistent reasoning in terms of its views of 
network effects and market share. This can be avoided in part ‘a’. In part ‘b’ the complainant 
has to prove that competition will be eliminated, which is a higher standard than the usual 
requirement of proving that competition will be simply reduced. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
even in that part of the analysis it would be difficult to convince that network effects could 
lead to a complete elimination of competition.  
 
From a consumer welfare perspective, however, this test also has many advantages. Given 
what we know about free high technologies, it maximizes consumer welfare. On the one 
hand, it allows the incumbent to increase its market dominance in the current product market 
to the benefit of consumers in that market. But it ensures at the same time that there is a 
competitive innovation market. This means that consumers get the best quality current 
generation product/service from the current incumbent and at the same time are guaranteed 
the chance of benefitting from any future high quality disruptive technologies that may 
threaten the incumbent. Finally, it ensures that there is no pure monopoly in the current 
product market. Whilst a dominant company with increasing market power may be good for 
consumer welfare in this industry, a pure monopoly would present too much of a risk1 in the 
                                                          
1 For one of the potential risks see L Khan ‘Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox’ (2017) 126(3) YLJ 564- The author 
explains that Amazon has engaged in predatory pricing to be able to gain a significant amount of customers to 
be able to take away market share. The company apparently often makes losses leading to the conclusion of 
predatory pricing. The aim is to therefore wait for all elimination of competition takes place and then raise 
prices for consumers, which will lead to consumers being worse off in the long run. Similarly, the complete 
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sense that there would be no competitive pressure whatsoever on the incumbent. It would tip 
the balance unfairly against, not only competition, but the traditionally established theory that 
competition is good for consumers.  
 
6.2 Impact and future research 
 
It may be of concern that the test proposed in this thesis leans excessively towards favouring 
dominant free high technologies at the expense of competition. However, as long as 
consumer welfare has been set as the main objective of competition policy, it is appears 
difficult to criticise favouring a dominant technology company that provides a continuously 
innovative service that is priced at zero for consumers.   
 
Whilst the privacy issue is of course generally a grave source of concern in terms of the 
protection of consumers, it has not been clearly shown how competition law can resolve the 
issue. This does not mean that this thesis dismisses the privacy issue completely for future 
purposes. It is just that there needs to be a significantly larger amount of evidence to clearly 
show how a dominant company which has increasingly more access to personal data used for 
providing services can be harmful to consumers. The harm needs to be clearly identified. An 
example may illustrate the type of research that is needed. In competition law investigations 
of newspapers and news channels there is this concept of media plurality (the simultaneous 
existence of different mediums of news) which is set as a standard that needs to be achieved.2 
Initially it may appear to be a standard based on a very strict Ordoliberal interpretation that 
                                                          
elimination of competition in the search market or social networking market may allow the dominant companies 
to have the confidence to charge prices for services that were previously free. As long as there is a little 
competition form alternative free service providers, this is unlikely to happen.   
2 J Pheasant, S Rab & A Sukhtankar ‘Case Comment: The Court of Appeal judgment in British Sky 
Broadcasting Group Plc v Competition Commission and the limits of media-plurality regulation’ (2010) 31(8) 
ECLR 318 
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reflects that the existence of competition is a right on its own that does not need to be 
qualified. However, media plurality has been qualified clearly on consumer welfare 
grounds.3It is important that consumers get different points of view of the news so that they 
are well-informed and are therefore not only affected by one potentially biased view. 4  
 
If the reduction of competition in free high technology markets is to be challenged, similar 
issues such as media plurality may have to be researched. For example, Facebook has both 
come under criticism for controlling politically sensitive content on their sites.5 Facebook 
was accused of not allowing freedom of speech by blocking hate speech. Another example, 
although not political, saw Google legally forced to delete particular links to news articles 
that gave descriptions of a particular person’s non-payment of debt around ten years ago. 6 
Otherwise others would have biased views of him on the basis of something that happened 
years ago. 7  
 
In other words, dominant social networks and search engines can clearly be involved in 
content control that involves bias. But there needs to be research to prove that they are biased 
and whether even bias is justified in particular circumstances. For example, one could argue 
that the blocking of hate speech is biased towards a particular group’s views; but it may still 
be justifiable to prevent the spread of those views for keeping society at peace. In the case of 
                                                          
3 Ibid- this can be substantiated by the fact that a head count of the number of media providers is not enough. 
Whether or not there is sufficient editorial control over the new media company being taken over for example is 
a factor to be taken into consideration. Hence there is a qualitative assessment of effect on consumers without 
any assumptions being placed on the number of competitors in the market.  
4 Ibid 
5 See Gabriel H Karger ‘What Does Facebook Think Free Speech is For?’ (The Harvard Crimson, 12 July 2017) 
available at http://www.thecrimson.com/column/rights-and-wrongs/article/2017/7/12/karger-facebook-free-
speech/ accessed on 10 September 2017 
6 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and 
Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 
7 Ibid 
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search engines and social networks this may be difficult as they are used for a wide range of 
purposes and searches. Political searches may simply be a small fraction of those searches.  
 
Nonetheless if these issues are proven, only then would the proposed test have to be revised. 
However, another point that might require consideration in the first place is whether other 
bodies of law such as data protection law are best designed to deal with the potential privacy 
costs. As indicated in Chapter 2, stricter data protection laws can directly control the use of 
personal information and therefore limit the influence digital companies gain from possessing 
big data. This seems a quicker way than placing a large burden on competition authorities and 
judges to make complex evaluations and conclusions on what level of privacy is optimum for 
consumers who also want an effective free high technology service.  
 
Finally, another issue that may be brought up is that this proposed test demotes the role of 
competition in the current relevant market as an important factor. This could be controversial 
as traditionally the reduction of competition in the current relevant market is a major issue in 
competition law that is embedded into its analytical framework. However, analysis of 
competition in the relevant market has not actually been replaced altogether; it has simply 
been replaced by the analysis of a very particular relevant current market i.e. the innovation 
market. It is a test that enables the EU Commission to take into account more directly the 
general competitive pressure coming from a potential looming disruptive technology, and 
subsequently allow a large free high technology company to expand its power in its current 
relevant market and continue providing a better service to consumers for free.  
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